Feminist historiography and the reconceptualisation of historical time by Browne, Victoria
 1 
 
 
Feminist Historiography and the Reconceptualisation of Historical 
Time 
 
 
Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University 
of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy 
 
by 
 
Victoria Browne 
 
January, 2013 
 
 2 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis conducts a reconceptualisation of historical time as a means of reorienting 
feminist historiography and changing the ways that we construct and approach histories of 
feminism. Various feminist theorists have argued that feminist theory requires a multilinear, 
multidirectional model of historical time, to enable productive encounters and exchanges 
between past and present feminisms, and account for the coexistence of parallel, intersecting 
feminist trajectories. This is particularly crucial in light of the continuing dominance of the 
phasic ‘wave’ model of feminist history, which is bound to notions of linear succession and 
teleological progress, and severely curtails the ways in which diverse feminist histories can be 
mapped, understood and related to one another. However, whilst alternative, multilinear, 
multidirectional notions of historical time have been mooted, there is rarely any clarity or 
elaboration on what exactly what this might mean or how it might work. This, I suggest, is 
because ‘historical time’ is itself an under-investigated and under-articulated concept. My 
contribution in this thesis, therefore, is to offer a detailed study of historical time, which 
makes sense of the idea that historical time is multilinear and multidirectional. In the course 
of this investigation, I develop a ‘polytemporal’ model of historical time, arguing that 
historical time is generated through a mix of different temporalities and fields of time, 
including the ‘time of the trace’, ‘narrative time’, ‘calendar time’ and ‘generational time’. 
Analysing each of these ‘times’ in turn, the thesis offers a thorough and internally complex 
account of historical time, demonstrating how thinking history ‘polytemporally’ can work, 
and how historical time can be understood as multilinear and multidirectional. Further, it 
offers concrete suggestions as to how this reconceptualised model can translate into a more 
nuanced and effective feminist historiographical practice, which opens up conversations 
between past and present feminisms in order to positively transform our presents and futures. 
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THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 
Making History, Making Time  
 
OVERVIEW 
 
If there is a distinct feminist attitude towards tradition, it would usually be characterised as 
one of suspicion, skepticism and iconoclasm. Feminists have sought to unsettle tradition and 
the aura of inevitability it bestows, often by appealing to shifting historical patterns and 
paradigms to demonstrate the instability and contingency of traditional sociocultural ideas 
about sex and gender. In this regard, feminists have used history as a subversive tool to 
undermine tradition. Yet, as feminism itself has become a historical ‘tradition’, with ‘icons’ of 
its own, interesting and important questions have emerged for feminists to address: How can 
feminism draw on its own history for inspiration and strategy without passively conforming 
to the expectations of past feminisms, or setting the past up as a nostalgic ideal against which 
to measure and compare the present? Conversely, how can feminists usher in new ideas and 
approaches in light of new conditions and problems, without enacting a violent or needless 
negation of past feminisms? Moreover, how can feminists construct and narrate ‘feminist 
history’ without instating or reproducing a hegemonic master narrative?  
Any response to these questions has to engage a conception of ‘historical time’, which 
governs the temporal logics we employ as we write and read histories of feminism, and the 
ways that we connect feminisms of the past to feminisms of the present and future. The 
dominant model of historical time within contemporary western historiography remains 
bound to notions of linear succession, teleological progress, and totality, and informs a 
hegemonic model of feminist history in the singular, presented as a progressive series of 
successive ‘phases’ or ‘waves’. This hegemonic model severely curtails the ways in which 
diverse feminist histories can be mapped and understood, as it functions by blocking out or 
 8 
distorting trajectories which do not fit into the dominant frame. It also fosters restrictive 
forms of historiographical and theoretical practice, as the model of successive phases or 
waves implies that only one approach is possible at a time, and moreover, that older forms of 
theory and practice necessarily become obsolete and must always be overtaken by newer 
ones. The hegemonic model of feminist history thus relies upon a progressivist understanding 
of historical change through time, whilst also constructing an antagonistic relation between 
feminisms old and new.  
Accordingly, various feminist theorists have begun to call for an alternative model of 
historical time: a model which is multilinear, and can therefore account for the coexistence of 
intersecting, parallel trajectories; and which is also multidirectional, and can therefore 
account for the ways in which the past affects and shapes the present, but also for the ways in 
which present perspectives can affect and shape our relation to the past. Such a multilinear, 
multidirectional model of historical time would enable a more heterogeneous understanding 
of feminist histories in the plural, and would also enable more fruitful interactions and 
conversations between feminisms of the past and the present. ‘Historical time’, however, is 
one of the most notoriously vague and under-investigated concepts within historiographical 
and philosophical discourse. Thus, whilst multilinear and multidirectional notions of 
historical time have been mooted, there is rarely any clarity or elaboration on what exactly 
what this might mean or how it might work. What does it mean, for example, to say that 
historical time moves in more than one direction, or to speak of ‘different times at the same 
time’?   
My contribution in this thesis, therefore, is to offer a detailed study of historical time, 
which makes sense of the idea that historical time is multilinear and multidirectional. I 
develop a ‘polytemporal’ model of historical time, arguing that historical time is generated 
through a mix of different temporalities and fields of time, including the ‘time of the trace’, 
‘narrative time’, ‘calendar time’ and ‘generational time’. Analysing each of these ‘times’ in 
turn, the thesis offers a thorough account of historical time as internally complex, showing 
that the temporalities involved in archival practice, narrative configuration, calendrical 
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mapping, and generational symbolics, are never reducible to one temporal determination, or 
one mode of temporal relations. In so doing, the thesis demonstrates how thinking history 
‘polytemporally’ can work, and offers a much-needed elaboration of the concept of a 
multilinear and multidirectional historical time. Further, it offers suggestions as to how this 
reconceptualised model of historical time can translate into a more nuanced and effective kind 
of historiographical practice within feminist theory. My proposal is that a polytemporal model 
of historical time would generate a feminist historiography which is sensitive to different 
ways of configuring historical time, and which opens up conversations between past and 
present feminisms as a means of positively transforming the present and future.  
The aim of this Introduction is to further explain and contextualise the rationale for the 
project, and to outline my methodology and polytemporal approach to historical time. The 
first section gives a definition of ‘feminist historiography’, whilst the second section positions 
the problems of contemporary feminist historiography within the context of the philosophy of 
history more generally, examining the legacy of Hegel and other speculative philosophies of 
‘world history’ which continue to shape our concepts of historical time and the ways that we 
construct and write histories today. The third section outlines my own approach to the project 
of reconceptualising historical time as a means of reorienting and transforming feminist 
historiography. It offers a basic definition of historical time as a ‘lived time’, outlines the 
method of ‘pragmatic pluralism’ that the thesis implements, and finally, provides a 
preliminary sketch of the polytemporal model of historical time that is elaborated in the main 
body of the thesis.  
 
1 
WHAT IS ‘FEMINIST HISTORIOGRAPHY’? 
 
The term ‘historiography’ has two key meanings. In the first instance, it refers to a self-
reflexive mode of historical practice: ‘a critical consciousness at work in the writing of 
history’ (Chandler 1998:77). In the second instance, it refers to a theoretical or philosophical 
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exercise that takes a step back from the writing of substantive history, in order to critically 
examine the ‘deeper’ underlying conceptual models and imaginaries that inform the kinds of 
histories we write, and the ways that we use and approach our histories. As this is a 
theoretical, rather than a historical study, I refer to ‘historiography’ primarily in the second 
sense, and use the term ‘feminist historiography’ to mean a theoretical meta-reflection on the 
way that feminists have constituted and conceptualised histories of feminism, and the effect 
that this has on feminist political and intellectual practice. In this sense, the study is 
politically, as well as philosophically, engaged. That is, whilst it does take a philosophical 
‘step back’ from substantive history, it does not take a disinterested view on the dynamics and 
processes of feminist history-writing and history-making, conducting itself as a merely 
academic exercise. Rather, this kind of philosophical feminist historiography is a strategic, 
immersed kind of historiography, intimately linked to ethicopolitical concerns and discourse 
(La Capra 1985).  
 ‘Feminism’, it must be emphasised, is a fluid, and moreover, a contentious term, 
particularly when associated with the universalising presumptions of certain strands of white 
western feminism
1
. Consequently, various terms such as ‘womanism’ (Walker 1983)2, ‘US 
third world feminism’ (Sandoval 2000)3, ‘black feminism’ (Mirza 1997), ‘third world 
feminism’ (Heng 1997), or ‘Mestiza feminism’ (Gillman 2011), have been formulated to 
emphasise geographical, cultural and historical specificity, and to mark a feminist 
                                                          
1
 ‘Western’ is also a complicated and contentious term, yet it is retained in this thesis as a shorthand for 
denoting cultural fields and configurations which position themselves, and are positioned, as inheritors 
of European intellectual histories—including Greco-Roman philosophy and myth, European 
Christianity, and influential intellectual movements such as the ‘Renaissance’ or the ‘Enlightenment’—
and moreover, have often been embroiled or implicated in European political and cultural colonialism 
from the sixteenth century to the present day. For a historical and geographical sketch of the ‘idea of 
the West’, see Bonnett (2004). For more on ‘western feminism’ and it’s ‘others’, see Mohanty (1991b).  
 
2
 ‘Womanism’ was coined by Alice Walker, who defines a ‘womanist’ as a ‘black feminist or feminist 
of color’, and writes that ‘womanist is to feminist as purple to lavender’ (Walker 1983: xi). 
 
3
 Sandoval uses this term to refer to work by US women of color that created a ‘a new feminist and 
internationalist consciousness’, a ‘deliberate politics organised to point out the so-called third world in 
the first world’, including, for example Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa’s collection This Bridge 
Called My Back (1981) or Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s essay ‘Cartographies of Struggle’ (1991a).  
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consciousness and practice that is attentive to differences between women as well as to shared 
circumstances and potential commonalities.
4
 Whilst registering its range of meanings and its 
potentially problematic connotations, however, this thesis retains the term ‘feminism’ as a 
‘placeholder’. I use it in its broadest sense to denote the plethora of organised groups and 
individuals engaged in challenging the subordination and oppression of women within male-
dominated societies and communities, and the marginalisation of women’s knowledges, 
experiences and creations within androcentric discourses. This means adopting a pluralistic 
and problem-centered understanding of ‘feminism’, as opposed to understanding it as a 
coherent political identity or unified theoretical framework. Thus, I use the feminist ‘we’, not 
in presumption of a shared perspective, approach or experience, but rather, in presumption of 
a shared interest in a certain set of problems (Marder 1992; Bennett 2006; Wiegman and 
Elam 1995)
5
. 
In the simple sense that ‘feminism’ means challenging patriarchal domination and 
control, and androcentric norms and imaginaries, the field of ‘feminist history’, (which I use 
throughout as a shorthand for ‘feminist histories of feminism’), necessarily overlaps with the 
field of ‘women’s history’, (i.e. ‘feminist histories of women’s lives’). The historical project 
of recovering female pasts and making women ‘visible’ in history, thereby displacing or 
complicating androcentric and patriarchal perspectives, is indeed a vital feminist practice 
(Lerner 1979; Bennett 2006). However, the idea of a distinct ‘feminist history’—separable 
from ‘women’s history’—has emerged in conjunction with the consolidation of the idea of 
‘feminism’ itself, as a self-consciously articulated, organised intellectual and political 
movement, or coalition of movements
6. As Susan Stanford Friedman explains, ‘the feminist 
                                                          
4
 To consider the problem of appropriation of political action by women in the name of ‘feminism’ see, 
for example, De Groot on the case of Iranian ‘feminism’ (2010). 
 
5
 For more on the ‘negotiating the status of the “we”’, see Lyotard (1989), or Carby (1997:52). 
 
6
 For more on the various definitions or classifications of a social, political or cultural ‘movement’, see 
Cathcart (1980) or McGee (1980), both of whom argue that a ‘movement’ can be defined through its 
discursive or rhetorical form, as opposed to a more traditional historical materialist approach which 
defines a ‘movement’ as a social phenomenon, i.e. an organised series of coordinated, collective 
actions in the public sphere.  
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desire to “make history” entangles the desire to effect change with the desire to be the 
historian of change’. This means that ‘writing the history of feminism functions as an act in 
the present that can (depending on its influence) contribute to the shape of feminism’s future’ 
(Friedman 1995:13). In other words, feminist narrations of the history of feminism have 
themselves become part of the history of feminism (Scott 1996:18). My interest is thus in how 
feminists have sought to position themselves within histories of feminism and feminist 
legacies, thereby self-consciously and strategically building an intellectual and political 
tradition, and a historiographical field or community.
7
 
In focusing on the ‘internal’ dynamics of feminist history,—i.e. on how feminists 
conceptualise, construct, and mobilise feminist histories—the thesis does risk a kind of 
feminist insularity. After all, one of the biggest problems facing feminists in contemporary 
‘post-backlash’ contexts is how feminism is represented by the ‘outside’, for example within 
discourses declaring the ‘end of feminism’, or referring to ‘post-feminism’ as a way of 
marking the decline or obsolescence of feminism (Henry 2004:19).
8
 Another serious problem 
is the appropriation and redeployment of feminist concepts, for example by advertising 
companies advising on what is ‘empowering’ for women (Faludi 1992; Power 2009). An 
inward-looking historiography could certainly be viewed as an evasion of the need to engage 
with these wider social issues and discourses, and  tackle hostile exterior forces. Theories and 
narratives which are too internal to feminism, as Nancy Fraser points out, often ‘fail to situate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
7
 See, for example, the statement of the 1970 black feminist ‘Combahee River Collective’, who named 
themselves after the campaign led by Harriet Tubman to free 750 slaves near the Combahee River in 
South Carolina in 1863. ‘It was a way of talking about ourselves being on a continuum of black 
struggle, of black women’s struggle’, explains founder Barbara Smith (1979:83-8). Or for another 
example, in 1969, the ‘New York Radical Feminists’ (founded by Shulamith Firestone and Anne 
Koedt) declared: ‘We are dedicated to a revival of knowledge about our forgotten feminist history, and 
to a furthering of the militant tradition of the old radical feminist movement’. They plotted a 
‘reclaimed’ history which included women’s movements of the nineteenth in the US and UK, and also 
‘feminist independents such as Simone de Beauvoir’ (quoted in Henry 2010:56). 
 
8
 In narratives of ‘post-feminism’, the prefix ‘post’ usually indicates a rupture, pointing to a time after 
feminism – a time when feminism is no longer needed because its goals have been achieved. 
Paradoxically, then, the term can in fact signal ‘both failure and success, both an anti-feminist critique 
of the misguidedness of feminism and a pro-feminist nod to feminism’s victories’ (Henry 2004:19).  
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interior changes in relation to broader historical developments and the larger political context’ 
(Fraser 2008:101). Indeed, separating feminism off as its own field is a classic move of 
narrow white feminism, and can signify a failure to appreciate the various different pathways 
into and out of feminism, and the ways in which feminisms have arisen in tandem and 
coexisted with antislavery, antiracist, and anti-imperialist struggles, and also national 
modernisation and reform movements, or religious-nationalist/cultural-nationalist revivalisms 
(Roth 2004; Heng 1997).  
However, by treating the ‘internal’ temporal dynamics of feminist history as an 
isolated or autonomous topic, I am not thereby arguing for the autonomy of feminism per se. 
Engaging with wider contexts, entangled legacies, and antifeminist discourses are all crucial 
feminist tasks. Yet, as Diane Elam insists, ‘while the backlash against feminism must be 
taken seriously… merely instituting protective measures against threatening patriarchal 
intruders would be too simple a solution to the problem. Rather… it is important to ask some 
serious questions about what is happening within feminism…’ (Elam 1997:55; see also Siegel 
1997). That is, whilst on the one hand there is a pressing urgency to reclaim and reconstruct 
histories of feminism in response to the persistent erasure and misrepresentation of feminist 
histories by antifeminist political and cultural discourses
9
, this project must not be a simple 
resuscitation of the same old stories and historical models. This is because, in the words of 
Friedman, ‘our actions as feminists – including the productions of our own history – run the 
risk of repeating the same patterns of thought and action that excluded, distorted, muted or 
erased women from the master narratives of history in the first place’ (Friedman 1995:12). It 
is therefore important that feminist theorists conduct a reflexive investigation into the 
construction of feminist history, which in turn, requires a deeper philosophical enquiry into 
the conceptions of ‘history’ and ‘historical time’ that have informed feminist historiography 
as it has intersected with broader historiographical contexts and frameworks.  
                                                          
9
 Indeed, there is plenty of empirical evidence of a surging interest in feminist histories, for example, 
the recent proliferation of ‘witnessing’ and archival projects, and conferences and workshops dedicated 
to feminist histories (see, for example, Calvini-Lefebvre et al 2010)
9
. 
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2 
THE LEGACY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF  
‘WORLD HISTORY’ 
 
It has become customary to divide the philosophy of history within western scholarship 
according to two approaches. The first is the ‘speculative’ approach, which seeks to identify a 
pattern in historical events, extract a general principle or mechanism to account for this 
pattern, and posit an explanatory concept that imbues the historical process ‘as a whole’ with 
a telos: a purpose and meaning (Dray 1964:62-3). This speculative approach is predominantly 
associated with the ‘brief flowering’ of speculative philosophies of history in Enlightenment 
Europe during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (ibid).  The second approach is 
the ‘critical’ or ‘presentist’ approach, which redirects attention away from the course of 
historical happening, and from all talk of mechanisms or meaning, towards the writing of 
history in the present. This critical approach can be sub-divided into two different schools: the 
Anglo-American ‘analytic’ school, which conducts epistemological enquiry into the status of 
historical knowledge, and the ‘continental’ or ‘structuralist’ school, which undertakes literary 
analysis of historical texts
10
. In this thesis, however, I pursue a third approach to the 
philosophy of history: an approach which focuses on the elusive concept of ‘historical time’ 
itself (Ricoeur 1988:104).  
                                                          
10
 The speculative / critical distinction was in fact constructed by philosophers in the analytic school as 
a means of distancing themselves from the speculative tradition, defining their own approach against 
what they regarded as unwarranted and unsubstantiable speculative claims about the historical process 
(Dray 1964; O’Brien 1971). The analytic school has focused largely upon epistemological debates 
concerning certain historiographical terms, such as ‘explanation’, or ‘causation’, but without 
considering the relevance of these debates to wider theoretical discourse or historical existence. As 
such, whilst it offers useful clarifications, its utility to feminist historiography is limited. There is 
considerable merit in the continental, or structuralist approach, in that it draws critical attention to the 
role of not only literary conventions but also political practices in the construction of historical 
knowledges and imaginaries. However, as I argue in chapters 2 and, 3, taking an exclusively 
structuralist approach results in an impoverished conception of historical reality, and moreover, of 
historical time. For more on the analytic approach, see Danto (1965; 1995), and for more on the 
structuralist, literary approach, see Kellner (2000), Budd (2009), Vann (1995), or Rayment-Pickard 
(2000). 
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Several feminist theorists have argued that the concept of ‘historical time’ is 
irredeemably bound to notions of teleological progress and totality. Julia Kristeva, for 
example, in her renowned essay ‘Women’s Time’, describes ‘the time of history’ as the time 
of ‘project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding’ (Kristeva 1986b:192). This 
conception of historical time has arisen due to the pervasive and continuing influence of those 
speculative philosophies of history mentioned above that emerged in Enlightenment Europe, 
including Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ (1991), 
Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1955), or 
Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975). There is, of course, no singular 
or uniform ‘Enlightenment’ philosophy of history11. There are philosophers of the era such as 
Hamaan or Herder who repudiate not only Enlightenment narratives of progress, but further, 
the idea that one can understand human histories in unified terms at all (Herder 1969; 
Hamaan 1996a; 1996b)
12
. Moreover, those Enlightenment philosophers who do present a 
progressivist philosophy of ‘world history’, or ‘universal history’, differ in terms of the 
principles or ‘ends’ that they postulate, and moreover, their general philosophical systems of 
which their philosophies of history form a part (Hutchings 2008:39-46). Nevertheless, whilst 
it has been formulated in a variety of ways, the basic speculative thesis that history has 
                                                          
11
 The term ‘Enlightenment’ or Aufklärung became widespread in eighteenth-century Germany 
particularly; the term was transferred from German into English in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and has become common only in the latter half of the twentieth-century (Burns 2000). For 
elaborations on the meaning of ‘Enlightenment’, see the collection What is Enlightenment? (ed. 
Schmitt 1996), which presents a variety of perspectives from both the late eighteenth and the twentieth 
centuries, including Kant’s famous essay ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ In this 
essay, Kant defines Aufklärung as a continuous process leading to emancipation from prejudice and 
superstition, and a capacity for independent thought and ‘mature’ judgment, rather than an already 
enlightened ‘age’ (Kant 1996). 
 
12
 Herder, in his 1774 text Yet Another Philosophy of History, critiques the idea that one can ‘group 
into one mass the people and periods which succeed each other eternally like the waves of the sea’ 
(Herder 1969:181). Hamaan, in his 1784 letter to Christian Jacob Kraus, offers a political critique of 
Enlightenment philosophy which contends that the so–called ‘enlightened’ state simple replaces one 
politically dominant group with another, i.e. the ‘Enlighteners’ (1996b). Moreover, in his 1784 
‘Metacritique on the Purism of Reason’, he takes issue with Kant’s universalistic approach to 
philosophy, claiming that Kant imagines he can simply ‘invent’ a ‘universal philosophical language’, 
whereas in fact, words have meaning only in relation to the time and place where they are appropriate 
(1996b). Because of these challenges to the ideas of progress and universality, Herder and Hamaan are 
often described as ‘counter-Enlightenment’ thinkers, a term popularised by Isaiah Berlin (1997).  
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reason, purpose, and direction, and can be treated in the collective singular as ‘world history’ 
or ‘universal history’, has been a recurring and vital element of European Enlightenment 
philosophy, and has greatly influenced understandings of historical time over the past two 
centuries (Brown 2001:6; Koselleck 2004:9-25; Gray 2007:97; Nisbet 1980:171)
13
. Of all the 
speculative philosophies of history, it is Hegel’s that has arguably been the most 
philosophically influential, and indeed, is the most clearly and fully articulated philosophy of 
history of its kind
14
. It is expounded most explicitly in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History, and is worth briefly outlining here, for its exposition of the ideas of ‘graduated 
progression’ and historical unity or ‘totality’, which, as we will see, continue to inform the 
temporal logics of contemporary historiography.  
In the Lectures, Hegel claims that ‘world history’ represents ‘the development of the 
spirit’s consciousness of its own freedom and of the consequent realisation of this freedom’ 
(Hegel 175:138).
15
 Freedom, or self-determination, is the telos within Hegel’s philosophy of 
                                                          
13
 For more on the idea of progress in Enlightenment philosophy, see Nisbet’s History of the Idea of 
Progress (1980). The first half of the book surveys the idea of progress within the classical world, the 
early Christians, the Medieval era and the Renaissance, but his key argument is that the idea of 
progress ‘triumphs’ within western philosophy between 1750 and 1900. Nisbet discusses various 
formulations of ‘progress’ during this period, including the influential writings of Turgot, Edward 
Gibbon, Adam Smith, the Founding Fathers, Condorcet, William Godwin, Thomas Malthus, John 
Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Saint-Simon, August Comte, Karl Marx, and of course, Kant and Hegel.  
14
 It is important to distinguish here between Hegel’s philosophy per se, which covers a huge range of 
philosophical topics and concerns, and Hegel’s philosophy of history. Indeed, Hegel’s accounts of 
morality and politics, the relationship between freedom and the state, and the relationship between 
particularity and universality have informed feminist philosophy in various important ways. For 
investigations into feminist philosophy’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy more widely conceived, 
see Hutchings (2003), Mills (1996), Sandford and Stone (1999). For more on the impact of Hegelian 
thought upon contemporary philosophy more generally see Butler (1999), Rockmore (2003). For recent 
attempts to conceive of a ‘weak’ Hegelianism, or to rework a dialectical philosophy which abandons 
Hegel’s teleological account of world history, see Houlgate (2005), Malabou (2005), or Nancy (2002).  
 
15
 Hegel writes that the realm of the ‘spirit’, as opposed to the realm of ‘nature’, is that realm ‘created 
by man himself’ and ‘encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the present day’ 
(Hegel 1975: 44; see also Hegel 1977). ‘Spirit’ is a complex term, but it is best understood as the world 
of intersubjectivity which is self-determining and self-changing. ‘Subjective spirit’ refers to individual 
self-conscious existence and experience, whilst ‘objective spirit’ refers to all that self-conscious 
existence has produced in terms of culture (including art, religion and philosophy), law, institutions, 
habits, and the ‘second nature’ of an environment produced though human labour (Hutchings 2003:39-
40). In fact, as Hutchings explains, objective and subjective spirit may be analytically distinguishable 
but they are in fact inseparable and mutually constitutive in an ongoing process. Thus for Hegel, self-
determination is ‘the truth of a complex, mediated and self-reflective whole rather than that of an 
individual agency’ (ibid).  
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history, as he posits that the immanent purpose or goal of history is for human beings to 
become conscious of themselves as freely and historically self-determining beings. It is also 
the principle or ‘mechanism’, as the emergence of such self-consciousness is what drives 
history forwards (Houlgate 2005:21-2). ‘Freedom’, in Hegelian terms, is not an a-historical 
phenomenon grounded in the will of individuals but rather, is only meaningful within 
institutionalised relations of mutual recognition (Hutchings 2008:44). The realisation of 
freedom, in Hegel’s account, is thus not simply about individual enlightenment; rather, he 
posits that the ultimate end of ‘world history’ is that spirit should ‘actualise’ or ‘objectivise 
this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and give itself an objective existence’ 
(Hegel 1975:64). As such, the rise of the (modern) state is vital to Hegel’s account of ‘world 
history’, whereby the state emerges as the self-conscious imposition of constraints by a 
community of autonomous individuals: an explicit realisation of history’s implicit principle 
and telos:  
 
‘The state is the more specific object of world history in general, in which freedom 
attains its objectivity and enjoys the fruits of this objectivity. For the law is the 
objectivity of the spirit, and the will in its true expression; and only that will which 
obeys the law is free: for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free. When 
the state or fatherland constitutes a community of existence, and when the subjective 
will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity 
disappears’ (ibid:97).  
 
According to Hegel, all societies and cultural forms are working out this underlying 
logic, as ‘world history’ unfolds in a variety of determinate forms—different ‘nations’, 
‘civilisations’ or ‘worlds’—which can be interpreted as different levels of self-conscious 
recognition of the meaning of social life as self-determination (ibid:51-54). Hegel speaks of 
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four ‘worlds’ in his Lectures: ‘Oriental’, ‘Greek’, ‘Roman’ and ‘Germanic’16. Though 
tenuously linked to specific geographical areas and specific eras, these are better described as 
‘world-outlooks’ which stand in a formal relation to one another (Rauch 1988:ix). Thus, 
Hegel writes that whilst there might be a coexistence of different principles or determinate 
forms, each represents a ‘particular stage of development, so that they correspond to epochs 
in the history of the world’ (Hegel 1975:64). This makes it possible for Hegel to delineate a 
temporal hierarchy in which particular places become identified with particular stages of 
historical development, and to posit that at any given time, there will be a culture or 
civilisation that is most ‘advanced’, for example, European modernity in his own time:   
 
‘The aim of the world spirit in world history is to realise its essence and to obtain the 
prerogative of freedom… but it accomplishes this in gradual stages rather than at a 
single step… Each new individual national spirit represents a new stage in the 
conquering march of the world spirit as it wins its way to consciousness and 
freedom… the world spirit progresses from lower determinations to higher 
determinations and concepts of its own nature, to more fully developed expressions 
of its Idea’ (ibid:63). 
 
For Hegel, then, ‘world history’ must be treated as a unity, even though different 
societies and cultures do not work out and ‘actualise’ the underlying logic of self-conscious 
self-determination at the same time or the same rate. Whilst a merely empirical study might 
suggest there is simply a plurality of human societies, cultures and histories, for Hegel, the 
philosophical perspective enables us to subsume this plurality under a higher principle of 
                                                          
16
 Hegel writes that in the ‘Oriental world’—an extremely broad category stretching from Ancient 
Egypt to China—the ‘Orientals’ knew only that one person (the monarch) was free; the Greco-Roman 
world knew that some people are free; and in contrast, ‘our own’ knowledge, i.e. the modern 
‘Germanic’ world, the world of Christian Europe, is that all people are free, in terms of the spiritual 
identity accorded to all individuals, which means all have the capacity for self-determination (Hegel 
1975:54-5).  
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unity
17. ‘The principles of the national spirits in their necessary progression’, he writes, ‘are 
themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which ascends through them in the 
course of history to its consummation in an all-embracing totality’ (ibid: 65). Moreover, 
Hegel argues, whilst empirical studies may indicate that historical events arise and relate to 
one another in an arbitrary and haphazard way, the philosophical perspective reveals a 
rationally determinable pattern, principle and purpose within history. This perspective permits 
us to see beyond not only the apparent arbitrariness and disparateness of historical 
happenings, but also beyond historical injustices and atrocities, via the process of ‘intellectual 
reconciliation’. The ‘only thought which philosophy brings with it’, he claims, ‘is the simple 
idea of reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a 
rational process’ (ibid: 27). Accordingly, philosophy ‘transfigures reality with all its apparent 
injustices and reconciles it with the rational’ (ibid: 67).  
As stated, Hegel’s is one among several ‘speculative’ philosophies of history 
formulated within eighteenth and nineteenth-century western thought. Within contemporary 
historiography, in contrast, it is very rare to find an advocate of the speculative approach. In 
the first instance, any philosophical claim postulating an overall ‘direction’ that history is 
taking is easily discredited when faced with the actualities of historical shifts and happenings. 
Hegel’s claim that reason and freedom are gradually becoming ‘realised’ within social and 
ethical life, for example, is difficult to defend in light of empirical evidence to the contrary. 
Moreover, Hegel’s insistence that ‘reason governs the world’ has been denounced as 
extremely problematic in light of the injustices and atrocities that have continued to occur 
throughout the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. As Adorno famously declares, 
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 This constitutes a significant difference from Kant who theorises the relation between empirical and 
philosophical history in much more ambiguous terms. Indeed, Kant writes in his ‘ninth proposition’ 
that ‘it is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to how 
world events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends’ (Kant 1991:51). In light of 
this tension between empirical and philosophical history, he casts the idea of progress as a regulative 
idea, rather than a guaranteed outcome. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the essay, he does tentatively make 
the claim that civil freedom is in fact ‘gradually increasing’, that enlightenment is ‘gradually arising’, 
and a universalistic, cosmopolitan ‘feeling is beginning to stir…’ (ibid:50-51). I discuss the Kantian 
approach of postulating historical progress and unity as a regulative idea further in chapter 7. 
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after Auschwitz it is impossible to claim that ‘the real is rational and the rational is real’ 
(Adorno 1973:306; see also Arendt 2006:86-88; and Ricoeur 1988:205). Speculative 
philosophies of history such as Hegel’s have therefore been largely abandoned: firstly on 
epistemological grounds, as we admit the impossibility of grasping human history ‘as a 
whole’ and determining an overall ‘pattern’; and secondly on ethical grounds, as we oppose 
reconciliatory attempts to ‘rationalise’ historical atrocities and injustices, or to consider 
human societies on the basis of which is the most or least ‘advanced’ (Young 1990).  
However, whilst contemporary historiography has, in the main, explicitly refuted 
teleological and universalising speculative philosophies of history, the influence of these 
philosophies survives implicitly in the form of historiographical and temporal ‘logics’, in the 
sense that ‘logic’ refers to a means of working out, organising, relating and ordering thought 
and phenomena (Mink 1978; Megill 1995). Feminist historiography is a good example. 
Feminists rarely adhere to anything like Hegel’s speculative philosophy of ‘world history’18; 
indeed, feminists have often been at the forefront of the challenge to the presentation of 
history in terms of teleological progress and universality, insisting that there are diverse 
histories which do not all move in the same ‘direction’, and cannot be subsumed under 
universalising categories and temporal schema (Newton 1989; Lerner 1979; Kelly 1984; Scott 
1986)
19
. Nonetheless, when it comes to narrating histories of feminism itself, feminists have 
frequently imported those very historical models and temporal logics that they have so 
vehemently criticised. As I demonstrate in chapter 1, feminist narratives of feminist history 
are frequently organised around a series of successive ‘phases’ or ‘waves’, and presented in 
                                                          
18
 Exceptions notably include Shulamith Firestone’s ‘grand’ historical narrative, as presented in The 
Dialectic of Sex, which postulates that ‘the biological division of the sexes for the purpose of 
reproduction, which lies at the origins of class’ is the ‘mechanism’ driving the course of historical 
development (Firestone 1971:13). Firestone’s rewrites Engels’ formulation of historical materialism to 
claim that ‘the sexual-reproductive organization of society always furnishes the real basis, starting from 
which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of economic, 
juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given 
historical period’ (ibid:13-4).  
 
19
 ‘Gendering’ history is premised upon the principle that differently positioned people experience and 
make sense of historical happenings and processes in different ways. Joan Kelly’s essay ‘Did Women 
Have a Renaissance?’(1984) is a classic example of this kind of ‘gendered’ approach.   
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terms of a progression, which culminates in the author’s position in the present, from where 
she has a purview of ‘feminist history’ as a whole. This hegemonic model of feminist history 
thereby imports two of the key characteristics of Hegel’s philosophy of history outlined 
above: firstly, the idea of a ‘graduated’ progression which follows a ‘series of successive 
determinations’ or stages that progressively overcome one another (Hegel 1975:64; 138); and 
secondly, the idea that diverse and particular histories can be treated as instances of a more 
general pattern or unified historical trajectory (ibid: 65). Even Kristeva, who emphatically 
disavows the teleological, progressive, linear ‘time of history’, presents the history of 
feminism in these terms (Kristeva 1986b)
20
. 
The legacy of speculative philosophies of history is thus more entrenched than might 
appear at first glance within contemporary feminist historiography, as narratives of feminist 
history continue to rely upon and reproduce a progressivist, stagist, totalising historical 
model. As I explain in chapter 1, the deployment of this model results in highly reductive and 
misrepresentative accounts, as feminist history is divided into rigid categories such as 
‘liberalism’, ‘Marxism’, ‘radical feminism’ and ‘poststructuralism’, which are mapped onto a 
progressive chronology, and presented as different ‘phases’ or stages that oppose and come 
one after the another. It is true that different feminist approaches emerge in different eras, but 
this does not mean that they are entirely ‘contradictory’, or that they necessarily surpass one 
another, as the logic of sequential negation implies. For example, ‘poststructuralist’ feminist 
theory may have emerged at a later date than ‘liberal’ feminist theory and has challenged 
some of its core tenets; but in the process, liberal feminism has not simply disappeared. 
Rather, it persists and poses its own challenges to poststructuralist feminism in return. To 
present different feminist approaches as sequential historical stages can thus preclude a 
productive exploration of encounters between such coexisting and intersecting theoretical 
trajectories. Moreover, the totalising and teleological gesture of discerning an overall 
‘direction’ to feminist theory results in universalising presumptions that all feminisms 
everywhere have gone through, or will go through, the same trajectory as hegemonic western 
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 Kristeva’s progressive, ‘phasic’ account of feminist history will be outlined in detail in chapter 1.  
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feminism and, as such, that certain kinds of feminism are more ‘advanced’ or ‘sophisticated’ 
than others.  
 The continuing influence of these sequentialist, teleological and totalising temporal 
logics suggests that a more radical ‘root and branch’ reconceptualisation of historical time is 
required, to inform a different kind of historiographical practice. As stated, for some feminist 
philosophers, the concept of ‘historical time’ is in fact irredeemably bound to notions of 
teleological progress and totality. This kind of claim is particularly common within feminist 
literature on ‘women’s time’, whereby ‘women’s time’ is positioned in contradistinction to 
‘historical time’, which is characterised as a patriarchal, ‘phallocentrically structured, forward 
moving time’ (Forman and Sowton 1989; Kristeva 1986b; Ermath 1992; Showalter 1985a). 
The discursive field of ‘women’s time’ studies, it must be affirmed, has proven to be a fruitful 
site for enquiry into women’s temporal perspectives and experiences, and has importantly 
challenged androcentric and patriarchal accounts of time-consciousness and temporal 
existence. Yet, to dismiss historical time as a ‘patriarchal’ time, and position ‘women’s time’ 
as a qualitatively different kind of time, is to ignore the important ways in which the idea of 
historical time has shaped, and continues to shape, women’s lives and feminist politics. It can 
also have the effect of de-historicising feminist struggles and women’s lives and practices, 
through structurally locating women outside history, that ‘linear’ time shaped by the actions 
of men (Watts 1988:14).
21
  
 It is certainly true that conceptions of historical time have been dominated by 
teleological, totalising models; however, my proposal is that the concept of historical time is 
not simply reducible to grand notions of teleological progress and totality. It has a much 
wider reach and range of meanings, as well as having value as a ‘large-scale’ time that 
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 Problems have also arisen from the way in which ‘women’s time’ has consistently been depicted as 
‘cyclical’ in opposition to the ‘phallocentrically structured, forward moving time’ of men. This 
dualistic approach has come under critical fire, not only for its essentialist overtones (in equating 
‘women’s time’ with the time of ‘nature’ or ‘biology’), but further, for its failure to acknowledge the 
ways that ‘linear time’ is lived by women as well as men. Felski draws parallels between the way that 
the temporality of non-western societies and cultures is portrayed as ‘cyclical’–closer to nature–in 
juxtaposition to the ‘linear’ time of the post-industrial West (Felski 2000). See also Gupta on this issue 
(1992). 
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enables the sharing of multiple pasts, presents and futures. Rather than abandoning the 
concept of historical time, then, this study argues for a reworked, enriched model of historical 
time as a basis for thinking and constructing feminist histories differently. This alternative 
model of historical time must be able to account for the coexistence of different feminist 
trajectories and approaches, and moreover, for multiple determinations of the time of 
feminism itself, given that feminism ‘does not fold a temporal vision into its very core’ 
(Felski 2002:22; see also Fernandes 2010; Roof 1997). In the sense that feminism is an 
emancipatory movement, there are indeed some basic features common to most formulations 
of ‘feminist time’, namely, the hope that the future will be ‘better’ than the past and present, 
and the conviction that oppressive gender regimes are not necessarily fixed for all time. Yet, 
there is no innate feminist vision of the temporality of emancipatory politics and processes, or 
core understanding of how the past, present and future are related or bound to one another. As 
the thesis will demonstrate, there are various ways of understanding the temporality of 
historical change and transformation. 
First of all, however, it is important to clarify in a preliminary sense what we actually 
mean when we talk about ‘historical time’. For example: to what extent are determinations of 
historical time bound by metaphysical or physical models and concepts? What kind of 
‘reality’ does historical time have? In light of such questions, the rest of this Introduction will 
outline my basic understanding of what ‘historical time’ is, and my method of investigation. 
 
 
3 
WHAT IS ‘HISTORICAL TIME’?  
 
My conception of historical time depends upon two core theses: firstly, I contend that 
historical time must be understood and theorised as a lived time: a time that is lived by 
embodied, situated subjects, and which is dependent upon sociocultural systems of 
 24 
representation and schemas of shared experience. Secondly, I argue for a polytemporal
22
 or 
‘composite’ conception of historical time, as a time that is generated through the intersection 
or mixing of various ‘times’ and temporalities. This conception of historical time—as lived 
and polytemporal—will be outlined below using the frameworks of ‘post-positivist’ realism 
and ‘pragmatic pluralism’.  
 
3.1 
Lived Time and Post-positivist Realism 
 
As stated, my first core thesis is that historical time is a lived time. The notion of ‘lived time’ 
foregrounds the experiential, discursive and symbolic aspects of temporal existence, as 
opposed to scientific and metaphysical approaches which are interested in time as an 
objective condition or phenomenon of the world or universe. Scientific approaches of course 
differ from metaphysical approaches, in the sense that scientific approaches use empirical 
data or mathematics to develop physical, biological or astronomical theories of time, whilst 
metaphysical approaches use speculative reason to develop theories of time, often postulating 
that there is a gap between our empirical and cognitive grasp of the world, and the world as it 
is ‘in itself’. However, there is a certain amount of mutual ‘borrowing’, given that both 
scientific and metaphysical approaches share an interest in the objective realities of ‘time’, 
regardless of how time might be perceived or conceived in a sociological or personal sense
23
. 
The notion of ‘lived time’, in contrast, pertains to the way that different individuals and 
societies think, feel, behave and relate to one another according to their experiences of, and 
ideas about, time.  
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 My conception of ‘polytemporality’ is primarily inspired by Dipesh Chakrabarty’s conception of 
‘heterotemporality’ in Provincializing Europe (2000), and its adoption by Kimberly Hutchings in Time 
and World Politics (2008). However, due to the potentially heteronormative connotations of this term, 
particularly within the field of feminist studies where it could imply ‘heterosexual’ or ‘heterocentric’ 
temporality’, I have elected to use ‘polytemporality’ instead. 
 
23
 For more on metaphysical and physical theories of time see Dainton (2001).  
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The turn towards lived time in philosophy has been greatly influenced by Kant’s 
‘Copernican turn’, which shifts away from a treatment of time as a mind-independent 
condition of the world, towards a treatment of time (and space) as a function of our minds and 
a framework through which we read experience (Kant 2007:67; Battersby 1998:61; Couzens 
Hoy 2009:6-7).  This turn, as David Couzens Hoy explains, is the first step away from a 
physics and a metaphysics of time towards a philosophy of ‘lived time’ or temporality (ibid: 
7). Yet in fact, Kant’s transcendental idealist account itself does not offer a philosophy of 
lived time, because for Kant, time is not something that is itself known or experienced. 
Instead, he posits time as a transcendental condition of knowledge and experience. ‘Time is 
not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience’, he writes, nor is it a 
‘discursive concept’ (Kant 2007:74-5, A30/B46). Rather, time is an a priori ‘intuition’ or 
form that is imposed onto the ‘manifold of sense experience’ via three distinct modes: 
persistence or duration, simultaneity, and succession (ibid: 74-8, A31/B47)
24. ‘Different 
times’, he claims, ‘are but part of one and the same time’, and thus cannot coexist but are 
necessarily sequential (ibid). Moreover, he describes time as the ‘form of inner sense’, which 
conditions the ‘intuition of ourselves and of our inner state’, and ultimately depends upon the 
‘transcendental unity of apperception’ (ibid: 77). As such, in Kant’s account, time itself is not 
something that is ‘lived’; it is a transcendental condition of sensible and intellectual life. The 
Kantian account of time is thus of little utility in developing a theory of historical time as a 
lived time. 
This study therefore approaches historical time neither in terms of time as an 
objective condition ‘out there’, nor in terms of time as a transcendental condition of 
subjective experience. As an investigation into lived time, it can be considered essentially 
‘phenomenological’ in the very broadest sense that ‘phenomenology’ is the ‘philosophy of 
experience’ (Stoller 2009; Weiss 2011). Yet, as I argue in chapter 3, a subject-centered 
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 Thereby presupposing a backdrop of stable substances or permanent bodies in space. For further 
exegesis of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, see, for example, Bird (2006), Ward (2006), Strawson 
(1995). 
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phenomenological framework cannot suffice, given that historical time is an intersubjective, 
‘large-scale’ time that is determined and mediated through sociocultural systems of 
representation and experiential schemas (Chakrabarty 2000:74).  Accordingly, I propose that 
historical time should be understood as a socially and culturally constructed form of time, 
which is generated through intersubjective ‘temporalisations’ of history. ‘Temporalisation’ 
connotes ‘an activity, a complex praxis of encoding Time’ which has various dimensions 
including the linguistic, the interpretative and the performative (Fabian 1983:74). By 
‘temporalisations’ of history, therefore, I mean the practice of impressing a temporal structure 
on to conceptions of history, and relating past, present and future in politically significant 
ways (Koselleck 2004; Ricoeur 1988:104).  
My first core thesis, then, is that historical time is a lived time that is generated 
through the intersubjective, sociocultural practice of temporalising historical trajectories and 
conceptions of history. To claim that historical time is a socially and culturally constructed 
time is not to say that historical time is not ‘real’. Rather, my account of historical time as a 
‘lived time’ engages a notion of reality as ‘lived reality’, an approach which can be helpfully 
formulated through the epistemological framework of ‘post-positivist realism’. Post-positivist 
realists contend that what is ‘real’ stretches beyond the empirical world of objects, or the 
physical world of forces, to include the reality of ideas, relations and other things of an 
abstract character. From this perspective, the reality of an abstract idea exists in its effects, its 
manifestation in social practices, relations and structures, its role within conceptual schemas 
that give both content and form to social and individual experience. Accordingly, knowledge 
‘is not simply out there in the world waiting to be apprehended’ but is always derived through 
embodied, socially and culturally mediated experience (Gillman 2010:6-7)
25
.  
This post-positivist epistemology is informed by a pragmatic approach to reality and 
truth which stresses the interactivity of human subjects with the natural and social world of 
which they form a part (Gillman 2010:6; see also Haddock Siegfried 1996).  In his 
                                                          
25
 It thereby differs from the empiricist treatment of experience as a ‘basic unit’, and also from 
simplistic treatments of experience as ‘transparent’ or self-evident. I discuss this further in chapter 3.  
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Pragmatism lectures, William James explains that according to the pragmatic conception of 
knowledge and truth, truth is ‘made, just as health, wealth and strength are made in the course 
of experience’ (James 2000:96)26. The constructivist, contingent conception of truth, in turn, 
depends upon a mutable, processual conception of ‘reality’ itself, given that ‘truth’ means 
essentially the ‘agreement of an idea with reality’. For pragmatism, James writes, reality is 
not ‘ready-made’, but rather, is always ‘in the making,’ because our constructed conceptual 
schemas affect the way we live or experience reality, and moreover, because experience is 
always ‘boiling over’ such schemas of truth and knowledge, which means that our 
understandings of ‘reality’ must be continuously re-made (ibid: 87;123). Indeed, James 
speaks of ‘realities’ and ‘truths’ in the plural, because experience is never uniform and 
singular, nor are the truths or knowledges with which lived experience coincides. The 
pragmatic conception of truth and reality formulated by James in these lectures thus serves as 
an alternative to the metaphysical conception of ‘truth with a big T’ and ‘reality with big R’, 
whereby reality is singular, ‘ready-made and complete’, and truth is ‘found’ or ‘given’ as true 
(ibid: 27-30). It also offers an alternative to speculative metaphysical accounts such as 
Hegel’s, which postulate that there is an overarching principle or telos determining the 
‘reality’ of life, even if reality and truth are unfolding and not statically given.  
To claim that we ‘make’ our contingent truths and lived realities is not to say there 
are no restraining elements or, as James puts it, ‘resisting factors in every experience of truth-
making’ (ibid: 117). This includes the body of our own prior beliefs, wider belief systems 
which pre-exist us, and also nonhuman and ‘natural’ elements as resisting and determining 
factors. For example, physical, biological and astronomical processes and temporalities 
unavoidably affect historical experience and knowledge, such as ‘time’s arrow’ or the ageing 
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 I follow James’ formulation of pragmatism here, rather than its more rationalistic ‘systematic’ 
versions, as developed by Charles Peirce, for example. For an overview of different ‘pragmatisms’, 
their histories and current manifestations, see Bernstein (2010), or Malachowski (2004); for more on 
feminism and pragmatism, see Haddock Siegfried (1996), or Hamington and Bardwell-Jones (2012).  
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process (Koselleck 2004:1)
27. Any notion of ‘historical time’, then, is not constructed in a 
vacuum free from the influence of ‘natural’ factors or sociocultural traditions. The crucial 
point, however, from a pragmatic, post-positivist perspective, is that the ways in which 
historical time is understood and experienced are dependent upon shifting constellations of 
truth and determinations of reality that are not fixed nor the same for everyone
28
. This 
epistemological approach to historical reality and historical time enables us to retain a critical 
view, and investigate why we conceive of historical time as we do, and moreover, our own 
role in configuring historical time in a particular way. It thereby resists an uncritical 
naturalistic positivism, which relies on scientific or naturalistic models to make claims about 
how historical time ‘really’ is, whilst also resisting an entirely voluntarist epistemology, 
where we are imagined to be free to make any kinds of truths and meanings we wish.  
 
3.2 
Pragmatic Pluralism and the Polytemporal Model of Historical Time  
 
Theorising historical time as a ‘lived time’ requires us to move away from fixed conceptions 
of ‘Truth’ and ‘Reality’, and thus from ‘Time with a capital T’, and consider how historical 
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 Indeed, this is the important lesson encapsulated by Adorno’s concept of ‘natural history’, i.e. the 
mutual imbrication and interdependence between the ‘historical’ and the ‘natural’, or rather, the 
material ‘excess of the object’ which exceeds the conceptual schemas that would try to contain it (Cook 
2011). 
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 In focusing on discursively mediated constructions of time, my approach diverges from the ‘new 
materialist’ feminist philosophers who have taken a renewed interest in scientific theories of time to 
provoke a rethink of feminist politics and histories. Elizabeth Grosz’s recent work has been particularly 
influential, as she argues that feminism has left behind notions of nature and matter by focusing strictly 
on the ‘historical effects of sexual difference’, and suggests that the Darwinian model of evolution can 
provide a different and more promising model of history (Grosz 2004; 2005). As stated above, 
historical, cultural experience is of course connected to biological and physical temporal orders. It may 
also be true that ‘social constructivist’ feminist theory has tended to neglect the determinative 
importance of the biological  (see also Battersby 1998:20-3; Moi 1999). However, the ‘new materialist’ 
thinkers often have a rather imprecise and undeveloped concept of historical time, and indeed of 
‘history’ itself. Grosz, for example, tends to conflate ‘history’, ‘time’, ‘evolution’ and ‘change’, using 
them as interchangeable terms instead of distinct concepts with their own meanings, fields, and 
functions. The scientism and naturalism of the ‘new materialism’ also rather evades important critical 
questions about how ‘nature’ can be theorised or known in any immediate/unmediated sense, thereby 
risking importing an uncritical ‘germ of positivism’ in the turn to scientific paradigms to underwrite 
feminist knowledges, politics and methodologies (Howie 2002:193).  
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time is constructed, experienced and interpreted within specific social, cultural and political 
fields of discourse and practice. As such, a pragmatic post-positivist epistemology constitutes 
a valuable framework for describing in a basic sense what historical time ‘is’, i.e. a ‘lived’ 
time which is constructed through intersubjective temporalisations of historical experience 
and reality
29
.  
The pragmatic conception of truth and reality, further, translates into a 
historiographical method, which can be termed ‘pragmatic pluralism’. As we have seen, 
pragmatism has a thoroughly ‘embedded’ conception of enquiry, which opposes the 
‘spectator theory of knowledge’, and is based instead upon ‘an understanding of how human 
agents are formed by, and actively participate in shaping, normative social practices’ 
(Bernstein 2010:19). The pragmatic method in philosophy therefore views ideas and theories 
as revisable ‘tools’, rather than seeking out one ultimate theory or final solution (James 
2000:27-8). As James explains it, the guiding question for a pragmatic philosopher is to ask 
‘what difference would it practically make’ if we adopted this or that alternative ‘world-
formula’? (ibid: 26-7). The pragmatic method ‘appears less as a solution, then, than as a 
program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing 
realities may be changed’ (ibid: 28). Taking a pragmatic approach to historical time, 
accordingly, means exploring how historical time is constructed and put into practice within 
specific sociocultural contexts, and further, addressing the normative question of ‘how best to 
relate to time and the optimal strategy for dealing with time on the level of the social and 
historical’ (Couzens Hoy 2009).  
The pragmatic approach also requires a pluralistic method of investigation, because if 
historical time is an intersubjectively produced, shifting configuration, it cannot be 
approached from only one angle or perspective. Rather, we need to draw on a variety of 
methods and approaches, (within the broad contours of a pragmatic epistemological 
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 I am informed by this broad framework as I formulate a historiographical epistemology of ‘indirect 
realism’ in chapters 2, 3, and 4, which challenges the anti-realist position that ‘brackets’ the ‘ real past’ 
from historiographical enquiry, and also challenges the naturalistic understanding of historical time in 
terms of a ‘natural chronology’.  
 30 
framework), to explore and make sense of the various ways of configuring historical time. 
‘The time of our lives’, as Keith Ansell-Pearson asserts, ‘is not only an existential issue but 
also, amongst other things, a political one, a task for phenomenology to work through, a task 
for genealogy to complicate, and a problem for hermeneutics to decipher and interpret’ 
(Ansell-Pearson 2011:1). Given the complexity of the intersubjective praxis of temporalising 
history, then, a theory of historical time needs to draw on a plethora of resources, including: 
phenomenological accounts of the structures of temporal experience; hermeneutical accounts 
which consider its interpretative dimension; literary or structuralist accounts which examine 
the linguistic and discursive systems and schema that influence and shape the experiential and 
the interpretative; genealogical accounts which demonstrate the contingency of hegemonic 
models and thought patterns and trace alternatives; cultural accounts which explore the 
construction of temporal imaginaries through mythology, ritual and art; and sociopolitical 
accounts which consider how certain representations of time and institutionalised time-frames 
are used to determine and coordinate social and political relations.  
Using this method of pragmatic pluralism, the thesis will develop a ‘polytemporal’ 
model of historical time. The polytemporal model that I articulate in chapters 2 – 7 rests upon 
the basic premise that there is no ‘one’ historical time or one temporal direction within which 
diverse histories are somehow all embroiled. On the contrary, I demonstrate that there will 
always be multiple, shifting configurations and conjunctions of historical time, as different 
histories have their own mixes of time and their own temporalities. In this sense, the 
polytemporal approach conceives of historical time as ‘composite’, generated through 
different temporal layers and strands, which combine and intersect in distinct ways to produce 
particular experiences and discursive formations of historical time. Once we understand 
historical time as an outcome of various temporalisations of history, it becomes difficult to 
separate the term ‘time’ from ‘temporality’ and ‘temporalisation’. However, I use the term 
‘time’ in this thesis primarily to denote a particular field or ‘genre’ of time, and ‘temporality’ 
to denote the specificities of that time’s ‘temporal logics’: i.e. the way that it organises, orders 
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and relates past, present and future, and its rhythms, directions, and pace. The thesis focuses 
on four ‘times’ that consistently enter into constructions of historical time:  
 
 The ‘time of the trace’, characterised by a ‘two-way’ temporality, as past events spill 
over into the present as ‘traces’, and conversely, through tracing the past we are 
oriented ‘back in time’.  
 ‘Narrative time’, which generates temporal orders through marking beginnings, 
middles, ends, continuities, breaks, flashbacks, flash-forwards, returns and echoes. 
 ‘Calendar time’, which dates and organises histories into timelines through temporal 
markers such as years, decades and centuries, as a means of orienting and anchoring 
historical understanding and imagination. 
 ‘Generational time’, which is created through the connections and relations between 
different lives as they overlap through different times and ages.   
 
By exploring each of these fields of time, using a variety of theoretical approaches and 
concepts, the thesis develops a composite, layered, and internally complex model of historical 
time as a traced time, a narrated time, a dated time, and a relational time. Moreover, it 
demonstrates the temporal complexity within each field of time: showing that the 
temporalities involved in archival practice, narrative configuration, calendrical mapping, and 
generational symbolics and relations, are diverse and never reducible to one temporal 
determination.  
In focusing on these four different ‘times’, I am not suggesting that they are exhaustive of 
‘historical time’ or that they must all be in evidence if we are to speak of historical time30. 
Indeed, if we accept that there are multiple configurations and ways of living historical time, 
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 This is a particularly important point with regards to how nonwestern cultures are so often described 
as not having a ‘sense of history’ because certain ways of conceiving of  dealing with time presumed to 
be ‘essential’ to historical consciousness are observed to be missing (see, for example, Young 1990; 
Chakrabarty 2000).  For these kinds of reasons, anthropologist Carol Greenhouse argues for an 
approach to time which does not presume in advance what ‘time’ is (Greenhouse 1996).  
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and that each history has its own mix of times and its own temporalities, we must admit the 
impossibility of giving an exhaustive or complete account of historical time. There will 
always be temporal logics and fields of time that escape our own fields of knowledge and 
experience or elude our understanding.
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 The model I articulate and develop in this study is 
therefore not intended as a complete or all-encompassing model or theory. Rather, it is 
intended as a partial account that demonstrates how a polytemporal approach can work, 
marking a ‘provisional orientation’ for a different inhabitation of the feminist 
historiographical field, to enable a different kind of historical practice (Brown 2001:4-5). 
Articulating a basic or partial ‘model’ of historical time in this way is, in the first instance, of 
critical, analytical value, as it helps us to be clear what we might mean when we speak of 
multidirectional, multilinear concepts of historical time. The idea of ‘nonlinear history’, or of 
‘multiple times’, can certainly appear rather vague, and is often dismissed as a ‘postmodern 
flight of fancy’. It is helpful, therefore, to try and articulate exactly how such conceptions of 
historical time can work, which in turn, makes the idea of nonlinear histories and plural 
historical temporalities much more defensible and plausible. As well as having critical, 
analytic value, theoretical models such as this also have transformative value, in that they can 
alter a domain of reality through changing the language of investigation, helping us to think 
and act otherwise
 
(Ricoeur 1984). Thus, I give content and detail to my ‘polytemporal’ model 
of historical time—rather than simply mooting it as an abstract idea or future possibility—
through reference to the four ‘times’ identified above32. 
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 I discuss this further in the thesis’ Conclusion, as I identify fields of time which this thesis does not 
address, for example, sacred time or digital time.  
 
32
 Using spatial metaphors and speaking in terms of ‘models’ of historical time, is perhaps to invite the 
Bergsonian criticism that in figuring or ‘spatialising’ time we aren’t ‘thinking in time’ at all (Bergson 
2004, 2005; see also Guerlac 2006). However, the idea that ‘pure flux’ is a ‘truer’ conception of time 
than those informed by spatial metaphors is problematic from the perspective of lived time, in that time 
as it is known, and as it is felt, is often ‘configured’ in some respect. Indeed, as Adorno argues, the 
Bergsonian ‘flux’ operates as a kind of regulative ideal that implicitly retains a split between the 
conceptual, (operating in terms of space-time grids), and the ‘real’ of pure flux or becoming (Adorno 
1973). I would also question whether it is possible to separate the spatial from the temporal in the 
manner that Bergson and neo-Bergsonians imply. Doreen Massey, for example, among other ‘radical 
geographers’, has insisted on the ‘inseparability of time and space, on their joint constitution through 
the interrelations between phenomena’. As such, she argues, ‘neither can be conceptualised as the 
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4 
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
 
Chapter 1 gives a critical account of the ‘hegemonic model’ of feminist history, providing 
examples in the first section, including the ‘phasic’ account of feminism constructed in 
Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ essay. Whilst there are of course variations in the specific 
content of the narratives examined, it is possible to identify a commonality of content, and 
moreover of form, as these accounts of feminist history are organised around a series of 
distinctly demarcated ‘phases’, and presented as a progressive trajectory.  The chapter then 
moves on to clarify why this hegemonic model is problematic.  Firstly, it considers the 
consistent and systematic misrepresentation that ensues from its deployment, focusing 
particularly on the model’s progressive structure. It then assesses the temporal logics of 
‘sequential negation’ and ‘teleological totalisation’ underpinning the hegemonic model in 
greater depth, identifying their detrimental effects upon feminist historiographical practices. 
The chapter concludes by identifying instances within the critical literature where feminists 
have called for an alternative, multilinear, and multidirectional model of historical time 
through which to reconstruct feminist histories and reorient feminist historiography. The 
challenge is then set for the rest of the thesis, i.e. to articulate such an alternative model of 
historical time.  
Chapter 2—‘The Time of the Trace’—begins this project of articulation by 
addressing what we mean when we speak of ‘history’. On the one hand, ‘history’ refers to 
‘the course of events that really happened in the past’, and on the other hand, ‘history’ refers 
to ‘the stories we tell about what we think happened in the past’. The key aim of the chapter is 
to develop an adequate account of the complex relationship between these two senses of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
absence of the other’ (Massey 1992). Rather than seeing space and time as oppositional, then, and 
regarding the presence of spatial metaphors as the mark of a failure to ‘think in time’, my view is that 
we can quite legitimately turn to spatial metaphors and models as useful tools for conceptualising and 
articulating historical time. 
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‘history’: an account which can recognise the role that present perspectives and motivations 
play in determining our understandings of the past, whilst also affirming the determining 
influence of past events upon present perspectives and knowledges. The first two sections 
make a case against the structuralist or ‘narrativist’ school of historiography, associated 
primarily with Hayden White and Roland Barthes, which focuses exclusively on the writing 
of history, and adopts an ‘anti-realist’ epistemology that brackets all questions of the 
historical narrative’s referential link to the past event it purports to describe. I argue instead 
for an ‘indirect realism’, which posits that whilst a direct or objective knowledge of past 
realities is of course impossible, an indirect, dynamic link between the historical narrative and 
the past event can be defended. I outline this indirect realist position through reference to Paul 
Ricoeur’s work on the relation between language and event, and the reality of the historical 
past, drawing particularly upon his ontology of the ‘trace’. The final section then 
demonstrates how this model of indirect realism can inspire a form of historical practice that I 
term ‘restless revisionism’: a processual, reflexive model of revisionism, which forges a 
provocative relation between the empirical and the rhetorical aspects of historical practice, 
and seeks to continually disrupt established narratives and presumptions in the present 
through re-tracing feminist pasts.  
Chapter 3—‘Narrative Time’—further investigates the relationship between 
interpretation and event, through undertaking a more detailed exploration of the relation 
between historical time and narrative time. The key argument here is that narrative 
temporalities can be understood as ‘internal’ to historical events, and thus to historical time. 
The chapter begins by challenging once again the structuralist or ‘narrativist’ approach, which 
treats narrative time as ‘external’ to historical time, and defines historical time in reductive 
terms as a ‘merely’ chronological sequence of events. To collapse this dualistic model, the 
second section considers the phenomenological approach to time and narrative taken by 
David Carr, which moves us towards a much richer understanding of the ‘lived’ temporality 
of historical events, and the ‘affinity’ between lived time and narrative time. Yet, the subject-
centered phenomenological method he adopts is ultimately insufficient, given that historical 
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time is an intersubjective time, and narrativity is an intersubjective practice. Accordingly, the 
third section draws instead upon hermeneutical accounts of historical time and theories of 
‘narrativity’, which foreground the role that narratives and narrative configurations play in 
temporalising intersubjective fields of experience and ‘horizons of expectation’. I turn 
initially to Reinhard Koselleck’s hermeneutical theory of historical time, to provide the basic 
theoretical framework, which I supplement with a ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’, and a feminist 
politics of narrativity, which compel us to appreciate and investigate the internal temporal 
complexity within any culture of time or narrative context.  The chapter concludes by 
suggesting that these approaches also orient a flexible and experimental kind of narrative 
practice, seeking out narrative forms and techniques that can express more adequately the 
multiple voices and temporalities that feed into and out of feminist histories.   
Chapter 4—‘Calendar Time’—considers the question of historical chronology in 
more depth, and adds another layer to the complex model of historical time that the thesis is 
developing. It argues for a qualitative approach to calendar time, which problematises 
assumptions that calendar time is a neutral, straightforwardly chronological or ‘linear’ time, 
and that ‘real’ historical time is essentially calendrical. The analysis begins by drawing on 
sociological and genealogical approaches to challenge naturalistic and reified understandings 
of calendar time, and to demonstrate that it is a socially specific constructed tool for 
coordinating, managing and orchestrating social, economic, political and cultural life. To 
elaborate the qualitative approach, the second section offers a selective reading of 
Heidegger’s analysis of ‘time-measuring’ and ‘time-reckoning’ in Division II of Being and 
Time, which illustrates that quantitative time-measuring frameworks emerge as such an 
outcome of qualitative, materially-situated processes of collective time-reckoning. The third 
section then addresses the ‘publicness’ of calendar time, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s 
pluralistic conception of publicness to develop a ‘deepened’ account of public time, as a 
framework which enables temporal coordination, but importantly, is not uniform in its 
meaning and effects. The final section shows that a qualitative understanding of calendar time 
can give rise to a more reflexive and sensitive way of approaching feminist timelines, which 
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recognises the value-laden nature of dated time. Further, it can initiate more creative ways of 
configuring and coordinating feminist histories though calendar time that generate a 
multiplicity of intersecting feminist timelines, rather than just one.   
Chapter 5—‘Generational Time’—weaves in yet another temporal layer to my model 
of historical time, as it explores the temporal configurations and significations of feminist 
‘generations’ and genealogies. It firstly gives a critical account of the dominant patriarchal or 
‘Oedipal’ generational paradigms, which portray generational legacy in terms of hierarchical 
succession and competitive rivalry, and have detrimental effects upon feminist relations and 
politics. I argue, however, that whilst linear and patriarchal/Oedipal determinations may well 
be dominant, this does not mean that they are the only determinations that exist or are 
possible. To think feminist generations outside of the mainstream patriarchal/Oedipal models, 
the chapter goes on to consider Luce Irigaray’s work on reconstructing and reimagining 
female genealogies. Aspects of Irigaray’s work offer a promising route out of linear 
generationalism; yet her rather monolithic treatment of the ‘western symbolic order’ and 
‘cultural imaginary’ limits the transformative potential of an Irigarayan approach. As such, 
the final section draws upon ‘postkinship studies’ in anthropology, which shifts us towards 
thinking in terms of not ‘one’, but ‘many’ symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries. To make 
the case for this kind of approach, I refer to Hortense Spillers’ and Madhu Dubey’s studies of 
matrilineal metaphors in the African American context, which demonstrate the importance of 
tracing different histories and symbolic orders, which open up different generational 
imaginaries and relational practices. The chapter concludes by endorsing the hermeneutic of 
‘repetition with variation’, which offers a promising way of interpreting and understanding 
generational time, as it can attend to the complex interplay between continuity and 
discontinuity within the process of history-making and tradition-building. 
Chapter 6—‘Repetition’—elaborates further on repetition as a historiographical 
concept that not only provokes a rethinking of the temporality of tradition and generationality, 
but further, provokes a reconceptualisation of historical processes and practices more 
generally. I draw particularly on Christine Battersby’s use of the Kierkegaardian concept of 
 37 
‘recollecting forwards’ and the Nietzschean concept of ‘untimeliness’, which depict repetitive 
temporality in terms of a relational dynamism between past, present and future. The chapter 
then goes on to consider how this conception of repetition can translate into historiographical 
practice. In the first instance, I suggest that the idea of repetition can inspire a transformative 
historiographical practice, premised upon ‘repeating’ or re-activating forgotten ideas and 
methods that can be brought to bear on feminism’s present and its possible futures. In the 
second instance, the concept of repetition can foster a reflexive and critical form of 
historiographical practice precisely because it factors in the repetition of the undesirable 
aspects of past feminisms, as well as the more desirable aspects, which continue to repeat 
themselves in our own presumptions and discourses, even as we may think we left them 
behind. To expand on this idea, I turn to Dominick La Capra’s psychoanalytically-inspired 
concept of ‘historiographical transference’, as a way of understanding the process of 
repetition and displacement that occurs as a structural determinant of historical practice. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the notion of a ‘dialogue’ between past and present, as a way 
of positively and responsibly engaging with repetitions of the past in the present, of both the 
desirable and the undesirable kind.    
The final chapter—‘Polytemporality’—considers the crucial question of how we can 
conceive of shared time and historical collectivity within a polytemporal model of historical 
time. My first aim is to challenge arguments that the concept of ‘totality’ is a necessary 
regulative idea or ‘methodological imperative’ for drawing together diverse histories and 
temporalities. Challenging both the Kantian argument put forward by Ricoeur, and the 
Marxian argument put forward by Fredric Jameson, I argue that there is nothing necessary 
about ‘projecting a totality’. Indeed, I contend that the concept of totality is detrimental to the 
project of generating a historiographical practice that is sensitive to plural determinations of 
historical time. This is because the thought of ‘totality’ invites a notion of historical time as a 
‘container’: as a single time frame that we are all ‘in’ by default, whether we know it or like it 
or not. Against the higher ideal of ‘totality’, plural determinations are regarded as lesser 
approximations, rather than as constitutive of historical time. I suggest, therefore, that it may 
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be more productive to try and think ‘histories in the plural’ without the idea or specter of 
totality. To this end, the second section of the chapter draws on the work of Johann Fabian, 
Gloria Anzaldúa, and particularly Dipesh Chakrabarty, to consider how it can be meaningful 
to speak of shared historical time from a ‘polytemporal’ perspective, without ‘totality’ as a 
regulative guarantor. I develop a notion of ‘complex coevalness’, supported by a practice of 
‘temporal translation’, which does not rely on an overarching temporal backdrop or a 
universal ‘third term’, but rather, operates through ‘barter-like’ exchanges and ‘porous’ 
encounters. On this model, it is possible to share time and forge collective histories without 
assimilating different temporal frameworks and perceptions into one, or homogenising the 
diverse ways of experiencing, imagining, constructing and reckoning with historical time. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Hegemonic Model of Feminist History 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Feminist movements and trajectories have always been manifold and diverse, with crossovers 
and points of connection, as well as divergences and points of contention. ‘Feminism is not’, 
as Misha Kavka insists, ‘the object of a singular history, but rather, a term under which 
people have in different times and places invested in a more general struggle for social justice 
and in doing so have participated in and produced multiple histories’ (Kavka 2001: xii). 
Despite this diversity, however, it has become common to narrate ‘feminist history’ as a 
singular trajectory, which is divided into different sequential ‘phases’ and presented in 
progressive terms, with one phase overcoming another. Consequently, the ‘potentially 
enlightening and liberating spaces’ produced by feminism have gradually morphed into a 
‘great hegemonic model’, which systematically misrepresents and curtails the ways in which 
feminist consciousnesses, methods and activisms can be conceptualised (Sandoval 2000:47). 
This chapter concentrates on outlining the ‘hegemonic’ model of feminist history, giving a 
critical account of its operation across a range of western feminism’s various institutional 
contexts and theoretical strands, and clarifying its problematic effects
33
.  
Section 1 provides illustrations of feminism’s hegemonic model, referring firstly to 
Julia Kristeva’s influential essay ‘Women’s Time’ (1986b) as its key example, and also to 
recent analyses of storytelling trends within western feminist theory (Sandoval 2000; 
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 ‘Hegemony’, in the sense proposed by Antonio Gramsci (1971), refers to the phenomenon whereby 
dominant groups maintain their dominance through ‘the negotiated construction of a political and 
ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups’ (Strinati, 1995:165). 
The intention behind Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is to try and explain why the majority continue to 
uphold the values of the dominant group and the status quo, even when these values reflect the interests 
and lives of just a small minority. ‘Hegemony’ is therefore an apt term to describe the dominant model 
of feminist history, because, as I will explain, feminists consistently subscribe to this model, even 
though we frequently recognise that it corresponds to only a very specific trajectory of feminism.  
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Hemmings 2005; 2011). The principal aim of this section is to establish that there is a 
dominant model of feminist history, even though this might not be immediately apparent. 
Whilst the examined narratives of feminist history may differ in terms of specific content, and 
in terms of the author’s own theoretical position, there are similarities in terms of general 
content, and in terms of historiographical form. Whether an author presents three key ‘phases’ 
or four, or whether she uses the trope of ‘phases’, ‘generations’ or ‘waves’, a common 
storyline emerges, which is that feminist history has moved away from a theoretical concern 
with equality (the sameness between women and men), towards a concern for women’s 
uniqueness (women’s difference from men), and finally, towards an increasing concern for 
the differences between women (difference in general). Moreover, in each case, the structure 
or form is similar, as the examined accounts are each organised into a series of distinctly 
demarcated phases or stages, and presented as a steady progression from past to present.  
Section 2 goes on to discuss the serious and systematic misrepresentation of feminist 
histories that ensues through the deployment of this hegemonic model, focusing particularly 
on its progressive structure. It shows that ‘progress narratives’ which portray feminist history 
as a singular trajectory that moves ‘from sameness to difference’ often rely upon a 
representational technique of ‘temporal othering’, whereby the positive representation of 
one’s own kind of feminism in the present is secured through the negative portrayal of 
feminisms of the past. For example, ‘third wave’ feminist writings frequently secure an 
impression of the third wave as diverse, flexible, and heterogeneous, through projecting the 
opposite characteristics, such as narrowness, rigidity, and homogeneity, back in time on to 
‘second wave’ feminism. Whilst the intention of such narratives is to embrace and emphasise 
feminist diversity, the effect is contrary to the aim, because by presenting a temporal 
juxtaposition between the ‘heterogeneous’ feminism of ‘now’ and the ‘homogenous’ 
feminism of ‘back then’, the progressive storyline is incapable of representing difference and 
diversity throughout feminist presents and pasts. A further effect of this progressive structure 
is the ‘temporal containment’ of different ‘types’ of feminist theory, as they are fixed to 
certain eras and designated as ‘stages’ on the pathway to the present.  
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Section 3 focuses in more detail on the ‘deeper’ conception of historical time that 
underpins and informs the hegemonic model of feminist history. It will be suggested that this 
hegemonic model relies upon two interrelated temporal logics: ‘sequential negation’ and 
‘teleological totalisation’, which can be linked to the residual influence of the speculative 
philosophies of ‘world history’ discussed in the Introduction. The analysis in this section 
clarifies how these temporal logics work in reference to the examples already discussed, and 
outlines their detrimental effects. The logic of ‘teleological totalisation’, I argue, results in a 
closed-minded attitude towards the past and future, and moreover, in universalising and 
evolutionist presumptions that feminisms everywhere are working out the same trajectory, 
though at different ‘stages’ of development. Moreover, the related logic of ‘sequential 
negation’, I claim, precludes a productive exploration of the interconnections between 
different coexisting strands of feminism, and of the potential relevance that older strands of 
feminism might have within present contexts. In light of these problems, the chapter 
concludes by stressing the need for an alternative model of historical time within feminist 
historiography.  
 
1 
OUTLINING THE HEGEMONIC MODEL:   
‘PHASES’ OF FEMINISM 
 
Since the early 1980s, the ‘phase’ trope has become a conventional means of demarcating 
shifts in methodology and consciousness within intellectual histories of feminist thought. The 
idea of different ‘phases’ of feminism is perhaps most famously articulated by Julia Kristeva 
in her 1979 essay ‘Le temps des femmes’, first published in English as ‘Women’s Time’ in 
1981.
34
 The first half of this section gives an outline of the three ‘phases’ of feminism that 
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 ‘Les temps des femmes’ appears in 1979 in 33/44: cahiers de recherché de sciences des textes et 
documents, volume 5, 5-19. It was translated as ‘Women’s Time’ in Signs, volume 7(1), in 1981, and is 
reprinted in The Kristeva Reader, edited by Toril Moi, in 1986 (Moi 1986). I refer here to this latter 
reprinted version of the essay.  
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Kristeva demarcates in this essay
35
. My intention is to show that Kristeva’s reliance upon a 
singular, phasic,  progressive narrative of feminist history has the effect of undermining her 
stated aim of moving towards a more complex conception of ‘women’s time’ and the time of 
feminism. The second part of the section will then discuss the entrenchment of the phasic 
account since the publication of Kristeva’s essay.  
 
1.1  
The Phases of Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ 
 
In ‘Women’s Time’, Kristeva outlines three key historical ‘phases’ through which feminism 
has passed, each characterised by a distinct attitude towards time and history, and a distinct 
way of positioning itself within space
36
. The first phase is characterised in this account by an 
‘egalitarian’ ethos, and a commitment to a progressive concept of historical time. ‘In its 
beginnings’, Kristeva writes, ‘the women’s movement, as the struggle of suffragists and 
existential feminists, aspired to gain a place in linear time as the time of project and of 
history’ (1986b:193). In fact, Kristeva regards this phase as inclusive of ‘socialist’ feminism 
as well as ‘liberal’ feminism, as she discerns an essential commonality between the two in 
terms of their shared ethos of egalitarianism and investment in a linear ideal of historical 
progress. Thus, as Kristeva tells it, even as feminists turned from liberalism to socialism in 
the quest for a more radical overturning of the social contract, feminists retained their focus 
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 In fact, Kristeva’s historical narrative of feminism functions in the essay as a way of framing her 
main argument, which concerns the possibility of transforming the ‘symbolic order’ from a productive 
to a reproductive economy. Theorists interested in this problematic will therefore focus more closely 
on this core argument, rather than upon the historical narrative that accompanies it. Indeed, from this 
perspective, Kristeva’s gesture of tracing a history of feminism might well be viewed as a ‘false 
counter’ or a ‘decoy’ (Roof 1997:81). However, the ‘phasic’ history of feminism that she traces has 
been hugely influential, and as such, warrants being outlined here in isolation from the rest of the 
essay. 
 
36
 I will pay more attention to the temporal/historical aspect of Kristeva’s analysis than the spatial. For 
more on the relationship between history and geography, time and space, see Osborne (1995 17-20), 
Massey (1994), or Young (1990). 
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on equality with men and historical progress. However, she continues, the turn from 
liberalism towards socialism ultimately proved unsatisfactory, given the limited capacity of 
socialist/Marxist theory to account for sexual difference, or for relations of reproduction 
within the social and symbolic order. As such, socialist feminism exhausted its potential, 
making way for a ‘second phase’ of feminism guided by ‘Freudianism’: a phase which 
relinquished the egalitarian aspirations of the ‘first phase’ and began to investigate the deeper 
apparatuses of power, language and meaning (ibid: 195-7).  
Kristeva identifies this ‘second phase’ or ‘generation’ with ‘women who came to 
feminism after May 1968’, and with those ‘who had an aesthetic or psychoanalytic 
experience’ (ibid: 194). This generation, Kristeva claims, sees itself as qualitatively distinct 
from the former, and is essentially interested in ‘the specificity of female psychology and its 
symbolic realisations’, exploring the ‘dynamic of signs’, and thereby adding more subtle and 
complex problems to the demands made by the earlier generation of feminists (ibid: 194). By 
breaking off from the earlier generation’s aspiration to progressive incorporation into the 
social contract, this more radical generation, Kristeva contends, operates according to an 
entirely different temporal mode. This new temporal attitude, she writes, can be characterised 
by an ‘almost total refusal’ of linear temporality, and as a consequence, an ‘exacerbated 
distrust of the entire political dimension’ (ibid). Accordingly, in Kristeva’s depiction, the 
feminist struggle became no longer a quest for equality within the terms of the social contract, 
but rather, in its ‘second phase’, it became a separatist struggle with difference and 
specificity: 
 
‘By demanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite 
sex… this feminism situates itself outside the linear time of identities which 
communicate through projection and revindication. Such a feminism rejoins, on the 
one hand, the archaic (mythical) memory and, on the other, the cyclical or 
monumental temporality of marginal movements’ (ibid).  
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This ‘second phase’ of feminism is depicted by Kristeva as an improvement on the 
‘first phase’, due to its more thoroughgoing investigation into the relationship of the subject 
to power, language and meaning, indeed, the very apparatuses of subjectivation itself (ibid: 
196-8). However, whilst feminism has ‘at least had the merit of showing what is … deadly in 
the social contract’, she claims, it has in fact reverted to another means of regulating 
difference, fabricating a ‘scapegoat victim’ (ibid: 209-10). This is the inevitable result of 
invoking a universal subject ‘Woman’ and ‘mak[ing] of the second sex a counter-society’ 
(ibid: 202). As a way out of this ‘inverted sexism’, Kristeva describes a new ‘third phase’ or 
‘generation’ emerging in Europe, characterised by an ‘avant-garde’ attitude, enabling 
‘aesthetic practices’ that bring out the singularity of every person and the multiplicity of every 
person’s possible identifications (ibid: 210). Her anticipatory hope is that having started with 
the idea of difference, feminism will be able to: 
 
‘…break free of its belief in Woman, Her power, Her writing, so as to channel this 
demand for difference into each and every element of the female whole, and finally, 
to bring out the singularities of each woman, and beyond this, her multiplicities, her 
plural languages…’ (ibid: 208).  
 
Kristeva contends that this ‘third’ attitude of avant-garde (post)feminism37 does not 
exclude the previous two attitudes. Rather, she states, it makes possible ‘the parallel existence 
of all three ‘phases’ of feminism within the same historical time’ (ibid: 209). In other words, 
the previous two attitudes—‘insertion into history and the radical refusal of the subjective 
limitations imposed by this history’s time’—can be mixed or held together in the third 
attitude (ibid). This idea promises a much more complex understanding of historical time and 
existence, characterised by a multiplicity of temporalities (Jardine 1981). Kristeva also 
                                                          
37
 I describe Kristeva’s ‘avant-garde’ feminism here as a (post)feminism, because whilst on the one 
hand she presents it in ‘Women’s Time’ as a continuation of feminist thought, the essay also implies 
that the avant-garde attitude is a departure from the ‘feminist project’, which she equates with either a 
naïve egalitarianism or a self-indulgent separatism which both fabricate a universal female subject.  
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suggests an interesting way of understanding the term ‘generation’, when she writes that it 
can imply ‘less a chronology and more a mental or ‘signifying space’ (Kristeva 1986b: 209)38. 
Yet, she does not develop these ideas in any depth or detail, and moreover, their promise is 
undermined by the historiographical effects of her own narrative of feminist history. By 
presenting the three ‘phases’ or ‘generations’ in terms of a singular, progressive trajectory—
from egalitarianism to separatism to avant-gardism—Kristeva in fact simply repeats and 
reinforces the ‘linear’ model of history that she wishes to refuse. Claiming temporal 
complexity and multiplicity for the third phase alone, the essay effectively blocks the thought 
of a more complex kind of historical time where temporal complexity goes ‘all the way 
down’, instead of being seen in horizontal, epochal terms and restricted to a specific historical 
era. Her promising conception of ‘generation’ as a ‘signifying space’ is similarly undermined 
by her own presentation of the three ‘generations’ of feminism in successive terms, whereby 
each follows and overcomes the former. This only serves to reinforce the idea of a unilinear 
generational succession, even as she purports to deny the link between ‘generations’ and 
chronology.  
Consequently, whilst Kristeva opens up the problematic of time as a crucial site for 
feminist exploration, and also the possibility of a different understanding of historical time, 
her own essay remains locked in a highly schematic framework in which distinctly bounded 
historical ‘phases’ negate and succeed one another in a singular progressive trajectory. She 
therefore ends up reproducing precisely the kind of historical model she wishes to overturn. 
 
 
                                                          
38
 The problematic of feminist generations will receive a thorough treatment in chapter 5; therefore it 
will not receive much critical attention in this chapter, which focuses on the tropes of ‘phases’ and 
‘waves’.  
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1.2 
The Entrenchment of the Phasic Model 
 
The phasic, progressive model of feminist history has gradually gained hegemonic status 
within western feminist theory since the publication of Kristeva’s essay. This is due not only 
to the influence of Kristeva, but also to the influence of several phasic classificatory 
typologies constructed by prominent U.S. theorists in the 1980s, as Chela Sandoval 
demonstrates in her recent survey of hegemonic western feminism (Sandoval 2000:47). 
Alongside Kristeva’s essay, Sandoval cites  texts by Alison Jaggar (1983), Gayle Greene and 
Coppélia Kahn (1985), Hester Eisenstein (1985), Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (1980), Elaine 
Showalter (1985b), Cora Kaplan (1985), and Lydia Sargent (1981), as being key in 
entrenching the phasic account, which she describes as feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’ 
(ibid). The different ‘phases’ outlined by these different authors, it must be emphasised, may 
differ in number and may not be exactly equivalent. As such, it is not immediately evident 
that a ‘hegemonic model’ exists at all. The point, however, is that ‘manifestly different types 
of hegemonic feminist theory and practice are, in fact, unified at a deeper level into a great 
structure’ (Sandoval 2000:47). 
A comparison between Kristeva’s account in ‘Women’s Time’ and the influential 
typology formulated by Alison Jaggar in Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) can 
demonstrate this point effectively. Kristeva, as we have seen, identifies three ‘phases’ of 
feminism, which can be summarised as: (1) ‘egalitarian’ (including both liberal and 
Marxist/socialist), (2) ‘separatist’ (radical/cultural), and (3) ‘avant-garde’. In contrast, 
Jaggar’s account identifies four phases of feminist theory: (1) liberal (2) Marxist (3) radical 
and (4) socialist.
39
 Kristeva’s three phases and Jaggar’s four phases thus do not exactly map 
on to one another. Unlike Kristeva, Jaggar does not subsume liberal, Marxist and socialist 
                                                          
39
 I want to stress here that I am referring specifically to Jaggar’s account in Feminist Politics and 
Human Nature (1984). In her other works, for example, Living with Contradictions (1994), Jaggar 
places more emphasis on the ambiguities and crossovers within feminist theory.  
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feminisms together within one phase of ‘egalitarian’ feminism. Rather, she separates out 
liberalism and Marxism into two distinct types, and also distinguishes between Marxist and 
socialist feminism, presenting socialist feminism as the last ‘phase’ in her account: a recent 
development which she hopes will ‘synthesise the best insights of radical feminism and of the 
Marxist tradition and that simultaneously will escape the problems associated with each’ 
(Jaggar 1983:123)
40
. Whilst Kristeva characterises the feminist present in terms of an ‘avant-
garde’ attitude that can ‘bring out the singularities of each woman’, Jaggar identifies the 
feminist present with a ‘socialist’ feminism that can register the significant differences 
between women, (such as class and race), whilst maintaining a focus on challenging the 
inequitable social and economic structures of capitalist patriarchy.  
Despite the significant differences between Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s respective 
accounts, however, we can identify a general commonality of content, in that both authors 
portray feminist history as a singular trajectory which begins with a universalistic 
egalitarianism, moves on to explore the uniqueness of women’s perspectives and experiences, 
and finally, arrives at a realisation of the need to take the differences between women into 
account. Moreover, there is a similarity in form, as both authors present their narratives as a 
phasic, progressive trajectory which culminates in the author’s own theoretical position in the 
present. Kristeva presents her preferred ‘avant-garde’ (post)feminism as an ‘emerging’ phase 
of feminism; similarly, Jaggar presents her preferred ‘socialist feminism’ as a ‘developing’ 
theory which has emerged out of Marxist and radical feminisms and is moving beyond them. 
In both cases, the author’s theoretical position is accorded superiority through being 
designated as present or ‘emergent’, surpassing all the other ‘phases’ that feminist theory has 
‘passed through’ in order to arrive at this present moment of theoretical sophistication and 
promise for the future. The comparison between Kristeva and Jaggar is therefore instructive, 
as whilst there are differences in content, both narratives are organised around a ‘common 
code’ that classifies feminist thought according to a phasic developmental taxonomy, 
                                                          
40
 This is how ‘socialist feminism’ is usually presented, i.e. as a synthesis of Marxism and Radical 
feminism (see, for example, Howie 2010).  
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representing higher and higher levels of historical, moral, political and aesthetic development 
(Sandoval 2000:47). As such, both of these leading theorists have played a role in securing 
the entrenchment of feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’, despite their very different 
theoretical allegiances and spheres of influence.  
Clare Hemmings’ recent research study into historiographical trends within western 
feminist theory in the 1990s and 2000s further attests to the growing dominance of the 
‘phasic’ model, extrapolating from a broader geographical range, and from more current 
samples of feminist writing  (Hemmings 2005; 2011)
41
. Since the late 1990s, Hemmings 
demonstrates, the hegemonic phasic model has become crystallised around decade-specific 
periodisations—the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s—and more concentrated around questions of 
racial and cultural difference. In the accounts that she surveys, ‘1970s feminism’ is 
consistently associated with universalising and essentialist perspectives, and represented as 
largely white and middle class. Feminism in the 1980s is associated with ‘challenges’ to those 
perspectives by black and US third world feminists, and characterised as the era of ‘identity 
politics’. Finally, the 1990s is associated with the rise of a more ‘sophisticated’ form of 
feminist theory, most notably poststructuralism, and an embrace of difference and diversity. 
Once again, a phasic account emerges, which is slightly different in terms of content, but 
nevertheless, follows a general storyline that moves ‘from sameness to difference’, and is 
organised around a series of phases that progressively overcome one another in a steady 
succession.  
Hemmings contends that this common storyline is generally told from three different 
vantage points in the present. The first views the rise of poststructuralism as a positive 
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 Hemmings’ research is based upon a range of extracts taken from feminist journal editions from the 
1990s and 2000s, including: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society; Feminist Review; 
Feminist Theory; Nora: Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies; European Journal of Women’s Studies; 
and Australian Feminist Studies. All of these extracts are in English (including articles that have been 
translated into English), though there is a range in the geographical location of the journals, including 
the UK, the US, Australia and Western Europe. Hemmings’ method for this research was to analyse a 
series of extracts from these journals which give ‘common sense glosses’ of the development of 
western feminist theory. She deliberately highlights extracts that are tangential to the author’s main 
argument such as introductions or segue paragraphs. She also cites the source of the extracts she 
analyses—the journal and the year—rather than the individual author, a tactic that is intended to 
emphasise the role of ‘journal communities’ in establishing dominant feminist knowledge practices 
(2011: 22). 
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phenomenon, and thus tells the story as a ‘progress narrative’: a developmental trajectory that 
moves away from problematic assumptions of unity and essentialist understandings of 
‘woman’ (1970s), through a transitional phase consisting of ‘critiques’ of such essentialist 
categories (1980s), and finally towards a greater theoretical sophistication and openness to 
‘difference’ in the poststructuralist present (1990s and 2000s). The second vantage point casts 
the rise of poststructuralism in negative terms, whereby the purported increase in theoretical 
sophistication is portrayed as a movement away from the political efficacy and vibrancy of 
1970s feminism, into a de-politicised, institutionalised feminist present governed by an arcane 
theoretical hegemony. From this perspective, the story is told as a ‘loss narrative’, whereby 
the 1970s is cast as ‘good’ unified, politicised feminism, the transitional 1980s as the last 
bastion of political feminism, and the poststructuralist 1990s as ‘bad’ apolitical 
academic/institutionalised feminism. Hence, Hemmings observes, progress and loss 
narratives tell a similar story, using similar markers and rehearsing similar shifts, but the loss 
narratives perform a reversal of values. ‘Progress and loss narratives are… locked into a 
mutually reinforcing battle for meaning with a common storyline’ (Hemmings 2011:61). The 
third vantage point that Hemmings identifies tells the story as a ‘return narrative’, which 
again follows a similar storyline that begins with a naïve universalising materialism and 
moves through a ‘cultural’ or ‘linguistic turn’, but the return narrative adds on a new 
‘emerging’ phase of ‘new materialism’. This is presented as a synthesis of the ‘earlier’ focus 
on the material, and the ‘later’ focus on the cultural and the linguistic, within a ‘new 
materialism’ that can take us forward into the future (ibid: 97)42.  
It is not always easy to categorise these academic narratives according to the three 
types Hemmings proposes. As such, she suggests, they ought to be considered as overlapping 
rather than entirely distinct. The key point, however, is their reliance upon a common 
historiographical structure, which moves successively from phase to phase, and compels 
                                                          
42 For examples of feminist ‘new materialism’, see the collection New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, 
and Politics, which includes essays by prominent ‘new materialist’ theorists Jane Bennett, Rosi 
Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz (ed. Coole and Frost 2010).  
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feminist subjects to occupy a singular perspective on the past and a theoretical cutting edge in 
the present (ibid: 3). For example, even though the ‘new materialist’ narratives of ‘return’ 
propose ‘a nonlinear methodology that transforms the past rather than relinquishing or 
returning to it’, Hemmings argues that this proclaimed epistemological openness often masks 
their schematic historiographical structure, which follows a familiar phasic trajectory 
appropriated from hegemonic or ‘common sense’ narratives of feminist history (ibid: 108; see 
also Ahmed 2008)
43
. A comparison can be drawn here with Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time’ 
essay, which promises a more complex understanding of historical time and the time of 
feminism, yet falls back on exactly the kind of progressive, singular model of history that she 
disavows.  
As a final illustration, feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’ is also pervasive within 
narratives of feminist ‘waves’.44 Once again, there are differences to register. Firstly, whilst 
academic accounts of feminist theory tend to refer to ‘phases’, the ‘wave’ trope is in fact the 
preferred term within wider cultural discourses about feminism generated outside the 
academy, including media accounts of feminist history.
45
 A second distinction is that 
                                                          
43
 In her article ‘Imaginary Prohibitions’ (2008), Sara Ahmed makes a similar argument to Hemmings. 
Whilst affirming that there is much useful and insightful work being undertaken under the name of 
feminist ‘new materialism’, Ahmed, like Hemmings, calls into question its ‘founding gesture’, which is 
to point to feminism as being routinely anti-biological, or habitually ‘social constructionist’: a gesture 
which has been taken for granted and in turn offers a false and reductive history of feminist 
engagement with biology, science and materialism. ‘You can only argue for a return to biology by 
forgetting the feminist work on the biological, including the work of feminists trained in the biological 
sciences. In other words, you can only claim that feminism has forgotten the biological if you forget 
this feminist work’ (2008:24-27). 
 
44
 For an example of a forceful proclamation of a second ‘wave’ of feminism, see Greer’s The Female 
Eunuch (1970), which proclaims that ‘this book is part of the second feminist wave… The new 
emphasis is different. Then genteel middleclass ladies clamored for reform, now ungenteel middle-
class women are calling for revolution’. For examples of ‘third wave’ writings see Walker (1995), 
Heywood and Drake (1997), Dicker and Piepmeier (2003) and Baumgardner and Richards (2000).  
 
45
 It is significant, for example, that the coining of the term ‘second wave’ is generally traced not to an 
academic text but to a 1968 article written by journalist Martha Weinman Lears for the New York 
Times magazine on the rise of ‘The Second Feminist Wave’ (Hewitt 2010:1). Similarly, the term ‘third 
wave’ feminism first gained attention when it was used in an article written for Ms magazine by 
Rebecca Walker, entitled ‘Becoming the Third Wave’ in 1992 (Henry 2004:23). Henry points out that 
the term ‘third wave’ was in fact used in the academic journal Feminist Studies five years earlier, by 
Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith Stacey in an article entitled ‘Second Thoughts on the Second Wave’. 
However, the fact that it is Walker that is generally credited with coining the term perhaps 
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academic narratives of ‘phases’ tend to construct feminist history as an intellectual history, 
whilst narratives of feminist ‘waves’ tend to construct feminist history more as a 
sociopolitical history, taking a broader view of feminism and including feminist activism 
outside, as well as inside, the academy. ‘Wave’ narratives therefore tend to focus more upon 
‘on-the-ground’ activism and specific political goals and historical events than the academic 
accounts of feminist theory do
46. Thirdly, the temporal implications of ‘phases’ and ‘waves’ 
are slightly different. The ‘waves’ trope connotes a surge or swell of activity followed by a 
decline: a dynamic of ‘ebb’ and ‘flow’, whilst the ‘phases’ trope implies a more continuous 
transition from one phase to another without ‘gaps’.  
However, whilst there are features which render the ‘wave’ trope distinct, ‘wave’ 
narratives do tend to present shifts in feminist consciousness and method very similar in 
content to those shifts presented in the phasic accounts of academic feminist theory cited 
above. The ‘first wave’ is generally associated with an egalitarian consciousness and a 
reformist approach, the ‘second wave’ with a consciousness of sexual difference and a 
revolutionary approach, and the ‘third wave’ with a consciousness of diversity and a 
pluralistic approach. Further, the ‘wave’ narratives, like the ‘phase narratives’, tend to present 
their demarcated waves in progressive terms, as each self-designated ‘wave’ has tended to 
view themselves as ‘both building on and improving’ the wave(s) that preceded them (Hewitt 
2010:2, emphasis added). Despite the ebbs and flows, then, ‘wave’ narratives, like the 
‘phasic’ narratives of academic feminist theory, tend to unify ‘feminist history’ into the 
collective singular, and then divide it into sequential stages within a developmental, 
progressive account. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
demonstrates that the term ‘third wave’ feminism is associated with feminist activism more generally 
speaking, rather than with a primarily academic approach.  
 
46
 For example, the beginning of the first ‘wave’ in the US is conventionally marked by the women's 
rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York, 1848, with its ‘ebb’ being marked by the ratification of 
the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Hewitt 2010:3). The beginning of the ‘second wave’ is similarly 
marked within wave narratives by socio-cultural currents and significant political events, such as the 
rise of the Civil Rights movement and counter-cultural protests in the U.S. and Europe, or the passing 
of the Equal Rights Amendment (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003:9-10). 
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In summary, whilst there are differences in the specific content of the examined 
accounts, and between the positions of individual authors, it is possible to identify a common 
phasic, progressive trajectory that has become entrenched across a wide range of feminist 
theory over the past thirty years. The ‘phasic’ model has become ubiquitous, as feminist 
theorists consistently chart a historical course from one phase to another, culminating in an 
author’s own position in the present, whether it be ‘avant-garde’ (post)feminism, ‘socialist 
feminism’, ‘poststructuralist feminism’, ‘new materialism’, or ‘third wave feminism’.  
 
2 
THE PROBLEM OF MISREPRESENTATION: 
TEMPORAL OTHERING AND TEMPORAL CONTAINMENT  
 
The ‘phasic’ model of feminist history has become ubiquitous across a wide range of feminist 
discourse. This is not to say, however, that this hegemonic model has become absorbed 
without contention. Several edited collections, monographs, and special journal editions have 
appeared since the late 1990s which challenge the hegemonic phasic model on the grounds 
that it is highly reductive and misrepresentative
47
. This section draws on this critical literature 
to give an account of why the hegemonic model results in such serious and systematic 
misrepresentation, attending particularly to the progressive structure of those narratives that 
chart feminism’s supposed trajectory ‘from sameness to difference’.  
As illustrated by the selected examples above, feminists have become increasingly 
concerned to represent their own kind of feminism in terms of ‘difference’ and diversity. 
Kristeva’s ‘third generation’, she hopes, can ‘bring out the singularities of each woman, and 
beyond this, her multiplicities, her plural languages…’ (1986b:208). The language of 
‘multiplicity’ or ‘diversity’ is equally crucial for the success of the ‘progress’, ‘loss’, and 
                                                          
47
 See, for example, Gillis, Howie, and Munford (2004); Hewitt (2010); Kaplan and Looser (1997); 
Hemmings (2011); Henry (2004);  and special journal issues of Women: a Cultural Review (ed. 
Calvini-Lefebvre et al, 2010); Feminist Studies (ed. Hewitt and Liu, 2002; ed. Raitt and Phillips, 2008); 
Australian Feminist Studies (ed. Spongeberg, 2009); and Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature (ed. 
Laird 2002).  
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‘return’ narratives that Hemmings describes. Whilst progress narratives lay claim to diversity 
and vibrancy—in juxtaposition to the ‘singular’ notion of womanhood that supposedly 
permeated earlier feminisms—so do loss narratives, depicting older feminisms as diverse and 
vibrant, and the feminism of today as dominated by a singular and dry theoreticism  
(Hemmings 2011:65). Return narratives similarly claim diversity, multiplicity and vibrancy 
for the ‘new materialism’, purporting to surpass the singularity and stasis of both ‘old’ 
materialism and poststructuralism. Spokeswomen for the ‘third wave’ also consistently 
present themselves as ‘broader in their vision, more global in their concerns, and more 
progressive in their sensitivities to transnational, multiracial, and sexual politics than earlier 
feminists’ (Hewitt 2010:2).  
In what follows, I am not criticising the embrace of diversity or the advocacy of 
pluralism. Indeed, the ‘polytemporal’ model of historical time I go on to develop in the 
following chapters is driven precisely by my insistence on registering and affirming 
differences in experience, interpretation and method.  My argument, rather, concerns the 
misrepresentation that occurs when ‘difference’, ‘diversity’ and ‘plurality’ can represent only 
the present in the case of ‘progress narratives’ (or only the past in the case of ‘loss 
narratives’)48. In other words, the concern for theoretical diversity and difference expressed 
within progressive phasic and ‘wave’ narratives is frequently undermined by the temporal 
organisation of their storylines, because when difference or diversity ‘belongs’ to one phase 
or era, it is denied in another. To explain this argument, I focus below on two representational 
techniques that are crucial to securing the progressive representation of feminist theory’s 
history. The first I describe as ‘temporal othering’, whereby an author represents their own 
kind of feminism as ‘heterogeneous’ through assigning the opposite characteristic— 
‘homogeneity’—to a different era, an ‘other’ time. This goes hand in hand with what I term 
‘temporal containment’: a form of periodisation which fixes different kinds of feminism as 
transitional ‘phases’ that have been superseded along feminism’s developmental way. Both 
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 My focus in this section, however, will be on progress narratives.  
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representational techniques achieve the impression that it is the feminist present alone which 
is truly diverse and can deal adequately with ‘difference’.  
The representational technique of ‘othering’ whereby one’s own identity is secured 
through hierarchical binary oppositions will be highly familiar to feminist and postcolonial 
theorists
49
. Within progressive phasic and third wave feminist narratives, as stated, it is past 
feminisms that are ‘otherised’, such that all those characteristics an author wishes to define 
her own position in the present against are projected backwards in time, for example, on to 
‘second wave’ or ‘1970s feminism’50. This can be aptly described as a technique of ‘temporal 
othering’, or, to borrow from Johann Fabian, ‘temporal distancing’ (Fabian 1983:30). The 
first problem with this kind of ‘otherising’ gesture is that it frequently leads to the work of 
feminists of earlier eras being dismissed in an uncritical manner as ‘essentialist’ or 
‘universalising’ without even having been read (Henry 2004). For instance, the progress 
narratives that define themselves against 1970s ‘essentialism’ rarely contain any direct 
citations from texts written in the 1970s, relying instead upon generalising secondary sources 
(Hemmings 2011). An example of this kind of juxtapositional presentation of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
feminism can be found in Alison Piepmeier and Rory Dicker’s introduction to their anthology 
of ‘third wave’ feminist essays, where they write that ‘[whilst] many of the goals of the third 
wave are similar to those of the second wave, some, such as its insistence on women’s 
diversity, are new’ (Piepmeier and Dicker 2003:10). The claim here that ‘insistence on 
women’s diversity’ is something ‘new’, something that belongs to ‘third wave’ feminism, 
implies that (old) second wave feminist theory did not address the issue of women’s diversity, 
or consider it important, without offering any arguments or citational evidence for thinking 
that this was the case.  
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 For compelling depictions of this technique of ‘othering’, see Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) or 
Genevieve Lloyd’s Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (1993b). 
 
50
 As noted, in the case of ‘loss narratives’, it is the other way round, and feminism of the present is 
made to bear all those characteristics that supposedly were not present in the idealised feminist past.  
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The extent to which ‘third wave’ authors stress continuities or discontinuities 
between the ‘third wave’ and the ‘second wave’ is admittedly variable. Indeed, many ‘third 
wave’ writers, including Piepmeier and Dicker, are keen to emphasise the continuities 
between the second and third waves in terms of both strategy and theory (see also Heywood 
and Drake 1997). However, whilst links between ‘second’ and ‘third’ might well be 
acknowledged, the idea that there is such a thing as a ‘third wave’ rests ultimately upon its 
differentiation from a ‘second wave’. This requires a reduction in the complexity of the so-
called ‘second wave’, as it is posited as ‘a definable phenomenon, as embodying a more or 
less coherent set of values and ideas which can be recognised and then transcended’ (Bailey 
1997:23). Moreover, as stated, it is a framing device through which claims about the 
heterogeneity of the present are secured through juxtaposition with the supposed homogeneity 
of the past. ‘Since no monolithic version of “woman” exists’, write Piepmeier and Dicker, 
‘we can no longer speak with confidence of “women's issues”; instead, we need to consider 
that such issues are as diverse as the many women who inhabit our planet’ (2003:9, emphasis 
added). Through ‘time-loaded’51 statements like these, second wave feminism is consistently 
made to bear all those characteristics that the third wave defines itself against and ‘no longer’ 
perpetuates, including universalism, essentialism, racism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, 
sexual prudishness, humourlessness and authoritarianism.  
To challenge this kind of gesture is not to deny that the frequent characterisation of 
the so-called ‘second wave’ as racist or ethnocentric, for example, contains many grains of 
truth. Many feminist texts written by white feminists in the 1970s (and before and since) have 
indeed been implicitly and/or explicitly racist, or seemingly oblivious to the differences that 
‘race’ makes. In an essay ‘Double Jeopardy’ published in 1970, Francis Beale was already 
describing the ‘second wave’ of US feminism as a ‘white women’s movement’, because of its 
insistence on organising around the division of male/female alone, and widespread refusal to 
grasp the significance of racial and class divisions for the theorisation of sexual politics 
                                                          
51
 The term is borrowed from Shumei Shih (2002).  
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(Beale 1970). White women’s writings and activism, moreover, have received much more 
attention from outside and inside feminist circles, rendering it a white-dominated or ‘white-
washed’ discourse and movement (Roth 2004:6). Accordingly, the depiction of the ‘second 
wave’ as ‘white’ and ‘homogenous’ within third wave narratives is intended as ‘an 
acknowledgement of the dominance of white feminists, and the secondary status given to 
black feminists or ‘feminists of color’ during the last forty years of feminist theory and 
movement’ (Henry 2004:33). This gloss by Kristina Sheryl Wong in Piepmeier and Dicker’s 
anthology serves as a good example:   
 
‘First and second wave feminisms sought to empower women as a united front. 
Although they offered a political voice for women as a whole, they didn’t 
acknowledge the varying agendas and experiences of individual women. Third wave 
feminism was a response by women of color and others who felt homogenised by a 
movement defined by the goals of middle-class, white women’ (Wong 2003:295). 
 
The gesture of repudiating ‘second wave’ feminism in this manner, however, often 
engenders the opposite of its intended effect. This is because when ‘second wave’ feminism is 
consistently represented as white and middle-class, the presence of nonwhite, non-middle 
class women in 1960s and 1970s feminism remains erased. As Lisa Marie Hogeland writes, 
‘it’s become a truism that the second wave was racist, for instance, no matter that such a 
blanket argument writes out of our history the enormous contributions of women of color in 
the 1970s’ (Hogeland 2001:110). So, although the intention of ‘third wave’ progress 
narratives is to embrace and celebrate difference and diversity, the progressive ‘sameness to 
difference’ storyline makes it impossible to represent differences and diversity throughout 
feminist pasts, presents and futures. Because it is a progressive chronology, ‘the differences 
represented by… women of color’, Sandoval observes, ‘only become visible in the last phase’ 
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(Sandoval 2000:50).
52
  As such, the centrality of the feminisms of women of colour in the 
‘second wave’ goes missing from these progress narratives, as does the history of white 
antiracist feminism, which has been intertwined with, and fuelled by the feminist theory and 
activism among women of colour (Thompson 2010:39).  
To be fair, several of the third wave narratives do in fact position ‘third wave’ 
feminism as an ‘inheritor’ of multiracial and multicultural feminisms from earlier times. 
Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for example, introduce their anthology on ‘third wave 
feminism’ by asserting that ‘the definitional moment of third wave feminism has been 
theorised as proceeding from critiques of the white women's movement that were initiated by 
women of color, as well as from the many instances of coalition work undertaken by U.S. 
third world feminists’ (Heywood and Drake 1997:2). The intention underlying this gesture is 
to affirm the significance and influence of women of colour and U.S. third world feminists, to 
give this work a key role in the narrative. But yet again, through telling this story as a 
progressive, phasic account, the effect is contrary to the aim. In the first instance, to describe 
this work as ‘critique’ of white ‘second wave’ feminism, (i.e. as coming after), is once more 
to erase black feminisms from the ‘second wave’. Moreover, in positioning this work as a 
precursor to ‘third wave’ feminism, such narratives end up representing black feminism as a 
‘gateway’ sandwiched between the two ‘waves’: a transitional, contained phenomenon which 
has now been surpassed. This can be described as ‘temporal containment’: a form of 
periodisation whereby certain  kinds of feminism are fixed as transitional ‘phases’ leading up 
to the present, and by implication, as phases which are now over. Accordingly, even when 
certain feminist theories or practices are affirmed as a positive legacy—rather than as ‘bad’ 
feminism of the past versus ‘good’ feminism of the present—they are nevertheless 
represented as a ‘moment’ that has been surpassed by the (ultimately superior) present.  
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 As I will argue in chapter 6, the deflection of racism and ethnocentrism onto the past can also lead to 
a rather uncritical attitude in the present, where it is presumed that racial bias is no longer an issue 
because it was a thing of the past.  
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To illustrate, feminists such as Gloria Anzaldúa or Audre Lordes are the 
contemporaries of many white feminists who are associated with the ‘second wave’; yet their 
work is consistently positioned as responsive or corrective of the ‘second wave’ and thus as 
inaugurating a ‘new era’ of inclusive ‘third wave’ feminism (Fernandes 2010). The decadal 
representation of feminist theory, as Hemmings’ study shows, plays a particularly important 
role here in positioning black feminism within the ‘transitional 1980s’, the era of ‘identity 
politics’. This positioning—between the ‘essentialist 1970s’ (second wave) and the 
‘poststructuralist 1990s’ (third wave)—not only removes feminists such as Anzaldúa and 
Lourdes from the ‘second wave’; it also implies that their time is now over, as the torch has 
been passed on to the ‘third wave’. Further, it leads to a frequent typecasting of the work of 
black feminists as ‘identity politics’, an approach that is usually characterised within feminist 
theory as an improvement on the universalising tendencies of ‘1970s feminism’, but which 
nevertheless remains grounded in rigid and static identity categories (Fernandes 2010:110)
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. 
Whilst it is often acknowledged that ‘black feminism’ and ‘poststructuralist feminism’ share a 
common concern with ‘difference’, the two camps are frequently imagined to be composed of 
‘different writing subjects’, and it is ultimately ‘poststructuralism’ that is credited with the 
move away from essentialist notions of ‘universal womanhood’ and treated as contemporary 
(Hemmings 2011:46).  
This process of temporal containment applies equally to lesbian feminism, as the 
‘transitional’ 1980s is cast not only as the era of black feminism, but also as the era of the 
‘sex wars’, in which debates about sexuality and ‘pro-sex’ arguments supposedly inaugurate a 
departure from the ‘repressive’ attitudes and sexual essentialism of the 1970s, whilst also 
serving as a precursor to the queer theory of the 1990s (Hemmings 2005; 2011). Once again 
reducing 1970s feminism to a singular perspective, (sex-negative and heterosexist), this 
repeated periodisation erases the presence of lesbian feminism in the 1970s, such that it 
becomes embroiled within a generalised ‘pro-sexuality’ movement of the 1980s, and is finally 
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 Fernandes argues that, in fact, much of the work produced by black feminists and feminists of colour 
in the 1980s, such as Anzaldúa,  represents a theoretical challenge to the ‘logic of identification’ that 
supposedly characterises black feminist ‘identity politics’ (Fernandes 2010).  
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superseded by the queer theory of the 1990s. In consequence, the radicality of the lesbian 
challenge to heteronormativity is frequently overlooked or underestimated, through being 
temporally contained within a distinct era that has been supposedly surpassed (Hemmings 
2005; Jackson 2010).  
Alongside ‘temporal othering’, then, the ‘sandwiching’ effect of ‘temporally 
containing’ black feminisms and lesbian feminisms in the ‘transitional’ 1980s helps to 
entrench the idea that ‘1970s feminism’ was ‘homogenous’ and ‘essentialist’ and needed to 
be counterbalanced and ‘critiqued’. It also secures the idea that only very recent forms of 
feminist theory and practice have the tools, awareness, and nuance to deal adequately with 
‘difference’. ‘Difference’, therefore, ‘loses much of its power by being seen in epochal 
terms… subsumed within a familiar story of evolution from sameness to difference, from the 
one to the many’ (Felski 2000:3).  
 
3 
THE TEMPORAL LOGICS OF FEMINISM’S HEGEMONIC MODEL 
 
Feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’, I have argued, leads to serious and systematic 
misrepresentations of diverse strands of feminist theory and practice. The progressive 
storyline which moves ‘from sameness to difference’ often relies on a technique of ‘temporal 
othering’, as feminisms of previous eras are made to bear all those characteristics that 
feminisms of now define themselves against. This not only leads to the earlier work of a wide 
range of feminists being uniformly dismissed as ‘essentialist’ without being read; it also 
erases the presence of many diverse strands of feminism from earlier eras of thought and 
activism. It also subjects certain kinds of feminisms to ‘temporal containment’, whereby they 
are positioned within a neatly bound and packaged era that is presented as a completed ‘stage’ 
or ‘gateway’ leading up to the (more sophisticated) present. Truly ‘diverse’ feminism is 
presented as a new phenomenon, and it is implied that only feminist theories formulated in 
the very recent present can register the significance of ‘difference’.  The progressive storyline 
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therefore blocks the same kind of nuanced vision that the authors in question want to apply to 
their own kind of feminism in the present (Davis 1995:282).  
The problem, however, is not simply one of historical representation, i.e. with the 
storyline or schema itself.
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 A historiographical analysis of feminism’s great hegemonic 
model must attend, further, to the ‘deeper’ conceptions of history and historical time which 
inform and underpin these kinds of feminist narratives and periodisations. Or as Fredric 
Jameson puts it,  ‘above and beyond the problem of periodization and its categories… the 
larger issue is that of the representation of History itself… of the historical sequence in which 
such periods take place and from which they derive their significance’ (Jameson 1981:28, 
emphasis added). As stated in the thesis’ Introduction, the model of ‘graduated’ historical 
progression through stages or phases can be traced to speculative philosophies of history such 
as Hegel’s, which have exerted a significant influence over our understandings of historical 
time for the past two centuries. My aim in this final section is to clarify the key problems 
which arise from the continuing employment of this model of graduated progression, through 
attending to its two core, interrelated, temporal logics: ‘teleological totalisation’ and 
‘sequential negation’. 
3.1 
Teleological Totalisation 
 
 ‘Teleological’, as explained in the thesis’ Introduction, is a term usually associated with 
speculative philosophies of history that postulate an inevitable progression in ‘world history’ 
towards ever-greater freedom and enlightenment. Such teleological philosophies of history 
are rooted in metaphysical meta-narratives which imbue the course of ‘history as a whole’ 
with an overarching or immanent meaning or purpose, for example, theological conceptions 
of ‘providence’, or in the case of Hegel, an immanent conception of ‘spirit’ or human nature 
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 Challenging the model on the grounds of misrepresentation is more the preserve of feminist 
historians, (rather than historiographers), who are offering substantive historical studies which 
contradict and subvert the dominant model. Hewitt’s collection includes several good examples of this 
substantive historical response (Hewitt 2010).  
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as self-conscious self-determination (Dray 1964:62-3). Yet, ‘teleology’ can also have a more 
restricted application, denoting the retrospective designation of a particular course of events 
as a developmental, unified trajectory, which has culminated in the present of the narrator, 
and will continue on in this direction in at least the immediate future. That is, teleological 
reasoning focuses on the end as a means of explaining and justifying the course of historical 
development (Hutchings 2008:51). The term ‘totalisation’, similarly, need not only be used in 
the ‘grand’ Hegelian sense of speculatively making ‘history as a whole’ into a ‘complete 
picture’ (Dienstag 1994). Rather, I use the term to refer to the practice of totalising a 
designated ‘segment’ of history—in this case ‘feminist history’—from the perspective of a 
feminist standpoint in the present. Allan Megill describes this as the difference between a 
‘grand narrative’ of history as a whole (informed by a ‘meta-narrative’ of human meaning or 
purpose), and a ‘master narrative’ of a specific segment or field of history (Megill 1995)55.  
To claim that the hegemonic feminist narratives examined above are ‘teleological’ or 
‘totalising’ thus does not mean that they adhere to anything like Hegel’s grand teleological, 
totalising narrative of ‘world history’ as the inevitable realisation of reason/freedom in 
history. However, these narratives do import teleological and totalising logic into their 
accounts.  
The logic of ‘teleological totalisation’ is evident in all of the hegemonic narratives 
examined above, which each tell a master narrative about the past from the vantage point of a 
(superior) present, thereby discerning an overall ‘direction’ in feminist history that has 
culminated in the present, or is set to do so in the (predictable) future. In the examples 
provided in section 1, the authors in question accord their own present with a diagnostic 
privilege, as they identify a singular trajectory leading from the past to the present moment, 
totalising the past from the perspective of a knowing present and portraying their own 
approach as ‘last and best’ (Spencer 2004:9) Both Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s accounts, for 
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 According to Megill’s, taxonomy, a ‘master narrative’ claims to offer the authoritative account of a 
particular segment of history and a ‘grand narrative’ claims to offer the authoritative account of history 
generally, whilst a ‘metanarrative’ (most commonly belief in God or an immanent rationality) is what 
serves to justify the grand narrative (Megill 1995:152-3) 
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example, oscillate between the retrospective and the predictive or anticipatory, with the 
present being endowed with the epistemological capacity and clarity of vision to identify the 
meaning and ‘direction’ of the past, and further, to predict or stimulate a future direction. 
Thus, both authors offer an evolutionary amalgamation of feminist thought and practice up to 
this point, whilst designating their own position in the present (‘avant-garde’ (post)feminism 
for Kristeva or ‘socialist feminism’ for Jaggar) as the beginning of a new direction for a better 
future. This triumphant tone is also detectable within ‘third wave’ narratives where the author 
tends to be positioned as a ‘heroine of the past, present, and future of Western feminist 
theory’ (Hemmings 2011:5).56  
The first problem with this teleological logic resides in its alignment with the 
representational technique of ‘temporal othering’, as discussed in section 2, whereby the past 
is cast in a negative light as a narrator’s present is portrayed as an improvement, as more 
‘enlightened’. It also gives rise to a sense of implacable certainty that we know what the past 
was all about, what it has meant, and what it has to teach us. The relentless movement 
forwards means that even when authors see this teleological trajectory in negative terms, the 
present position of hindsight is always granted with superior authority. Whether we reject the 
recent feminist past for being ‘essentialist’, or whether we mourn the loss of past political 
practices, in either case we think we already know what we have overcome or what we have 
lost. This sense of epistemological security in the present leads to a certain closedness to the 
past: a resistance to letting the past interrupt our secure subject positions and perspectives in 
the present, and our sense of the possible. The teleological treatment of the past as a complete 
story that has led up to the present also leads to a certain closedness to the future, as it 
encourages us to think that the identified direction will continue. This logic is detectable even 
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 It is missing in the case of the ‘loss’ narratives, given that they are laments. Nevertheless, the logic of 
teleological totalisation is still apparent in the loss narratives. That is, the author performs a 
retrospective totalisation of feminist history from a position of wisdom and superior knowledge in the 
present, charting feminism’s supposed decline and descent into theoretical impasse. Indeed, as 
Hemmings observes, many loss narratives not only perform totalising diagnoses of the past and 
present, but further, orient themselves towards future prediction when they suggest that the only hope 
for the future is a return to feminism’s glorious past. 
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in the ‘return’ narratives that Hemmings analyzes, which proclaim not only a ‘new 
materialism’ but also a new relation to time. Whilst many of these narratives affirm the 
‘radical unknowability’ of the future, there is nevertheless a sense of assurance that the future 
of feminism does in fact lie with a single epistemological and ontological formulation, i.e. 
that offered by the ‘new materialism’ (Hemmings 2011:113)57. The future is ‘open’ and 
‘unpredictable’, but it seems this openness and unpredictability can only be welcomed by 
embracing ‘new materialism’.  
Alongside bolstering an inflated sense of epistemological certainty, the second key 
problem with the logic of ‘teleological totalisation’ is its embroilment in universalising and 
evolutionist presumptions. That is, teleological models lend themselves to universalising 
evolutionism because it is presumed there is an inevitable logic being worked out in local 
instances. As we have seen, Hegel’s hierarchical treatment of diverse cultures and societies as 
representative of different ‘stages’ of historical development depends upon his thesis that 
different cultures and societies are all working out the ‘underlying’ logic of self-conscious 
self-determination (Hegel 1975:51-4). In the case of feminism, the legacy of this kind of 
teleological, universalising thought is evident in the common presumption that the supposed 
trajectory of western feminist theory is the trajectory of feminist theory, and thus, that 
feminisms everywhere have gone or will undergo the same patterns, vacillations and ‘phases’, 
and move from a concern with legal equality and reform, towards a more ‘sophisticated’ 
exploration of the processes of subjectivation and the significance of difference.   
The attempt to universalise historical trajectories specific to Anglo-American and 
Western European feminist movements has resulted in western scholars often treating the 
‘first’ and ‘second waves’ of feminism in the west as precursors to feminist movements in 
other parts of the world (Tripp 2006:54). Accordingly, the universalisation of ‘time-charged 
terminologies’ such as Kristeva's three-stage theory of feminist consciousness has led to 
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 This is why, Hemmings argues, the ‘emergent’ concern for materiality is portrayed, on the one hand, 
as already happening and urgently required, yet at the same time, the time of new materialism is 
portrayed as deferred. For an example of this, see van der Tuin (2009). 
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assumptions and judgments that non-western feminisms are ‘stuck’, for example, in the 
liberal stage or the ‘nationalist stage’ (Shih 2002:98). The teleological aspect of feminism’s 
‘great hegemonic model’ thus converts easily into universalising evolutionism and the logic 
of ‘First in the West, and then elsewhere’ that has functioned as a cornerstone of colonial 
philosophy and policy (Chakrabarty 2000:8; see also Young 1990). This evolutionary logic is 
further fuelled by the ‘inclusion paradigm’, which positions nonwestern women as outside 
feminism, in need of the ‘recognition’ or ‘inclusion’ of the ‘third wave’s’ embrace (Fernandes 
2010). The presupposition, as Fernandes argues, is that feminism is a phenomenon and 
product of white western society that is ‘imported’ to the nonwestern world (ibid). 
A clear example of this kind of universalising outlook is evident in Kristeva’s text 
Des Chinoises, or ‘About Chinese Women’ (Kristeva 1986a), in which Kristeva struggles to 
determine the status of Chinese women according to ‘the usual temporal hierarchy of the 
West over China’ (Shih 2002:98). Chinese women were legally more equal to Chinese men, 
than women in European countries were to European men, in the 1950s and after, which 
subverts the usual temporal hierarchy whereby the west is more ‘advanced’. Yet Kristeva’s 
attitude towards this state of affairs is highly ambivalent due to the presumptions underlying 
her own temporal topography. In Kristeva’s text, as Shumei Shih points out, the advanced 
legal status of Chinese women is ‘both the site of envy and anxiety… For Kristeva, Chinese 
women were both liberated under Mao and embodiments of the silent, primordial Orient’ 
(ibid). Whilst Kristeva is forced to register Chinese women’s formal status, her analysis 
remains rooted in presumptions that nevertheless, European theory and modes of subjectivity 
and sociality are still ‘ahead’. Gayatri Spivak similarly observes that Kristeva’s text leans 
heavily on the assumption that the theoretical paradigms of ‘French High Feminism’ are 
appropriate within such an extremely different situation of political specificity (1981:160-1). 
The extension of a certain kind of French feminism into an ‘international frame’ thus 
constructs a position for Kristeva as high judge and bringer of avant-garde radicalism, whilst 
positioning Chinese feminism as less theoretically sophisticated.  
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3.2  
Sequential Negation 
 
The logic of teleological totalisation frequently goes hand in hand with the logic of sequential 
negation, as teleological, progressive accounts are often presented as a ‘graduated 
progression’, whereby a ‘series of successive determinations’ are organised into an ascending 
order as each negates and overtakes the former (Hegel 1975:138). As we have seen, this is 
one of the key features of the hegemonic model of feminist history, as hegemonic narratives 
divide feminist history into a series of phases or waves, with each overcoming the former. 
The major problem with this logic of sequential negation is that it cannot grasp the 
coexistence of supposedly ‘oppositional’ or ‘contradictory’ approaches and perspectives. 
Different feminisms of course emerge at different times, and there are certainly disagreements 
between different kinds of feminism. Poststructuralist feminist theory, for example, informed 
by theorists such as Kristeva, Lacan, Derrida or Spivak, has indeed emerged at a later time 
than liberal western feminist theory, informed by earlier theorists such as Mary 
Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill as well as more recent liberal thinkers. Moreover, there 
are fundamental points of dispute between poststructuralist and liberal feminists. Yet, 
liberalism has not simply melted away following the advent of poststructuralist theory, and 
those points of disagreement and debate have not been ‘won’ by one side of the other. Indeed, 
feminist theorists often insist upon the productivity of such disagreements, debates and 
arguments (Howie and Tauchert 2004; MacCormack 2009). The logic of sequential negation, 
however, seeks to contain and manage these debates through the imposition of a neat 
sequential order from one ‘phase’ to the next, as one comes after and displaces another.  
This implies that the debate is closed, and moreover, presumes that there are neatly 
bounded ‘positions’ or ‘types’ of feminist theory in the first place, and that feminist theorists 
and practitioners can only have one theoretical allegiance at a time (Bastian 2011). Whilst 
some feminists do indeed describe their feminism in distinctly ‘titled’ terms, (e.g. ‘Marxist’, 
‘liberal’ or ‘poststructuralist’), feminists of different times and places have in fact consistently 
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moved ‘between and among’ different approaches and strategies, especially given feminism’s 
interdisciplinary nature. Sandoval describes the operational mode of US third world 
feminism, for example,  in such terms, functioning ‘like the clutch of an automobile, the 
mechanism that permits the driver to select, engage and disengage gears in a system for the 
transmission of power’ (Sandoval 2000:57). This kind of methodological fluidity and 
coexistence cannot be grasped by the logic of sequential negation, with the consequence that 
productive explorations of the interrelations between different approaches and histories are 
often precluded. Indeed, such logic results in the imposition of divisive breaks within an 
already beleaguered feminist movement (Gillis and Munford 2004). 
A related problem with the logic of sequential negation is that it carries an 
implication that perspectives and approaches derived at an earlier time are deficient or 
obsolete. We therefore effectively confine them to the ‘dustbin of history’ or treat them as a 
‘historical artefact’ rather than as a project or part of a living body of work (Weeks 
2011:117). This way of treating the past is a consistent feature of modern ‘historicism’, 
whereby a given text or theoretical paradigm is treated as ‘not only of its time – developed 
within a particular political conjuncture and conceptual horizon – but as only of its time’ 
(ibid). In other words, the gesture of ‘locating’ a text, idea or practice within a historical 
context often comes with a presumption that this is where it should stay, that it has no 
purchase or relevance outside of this context. As in the examples of ‘temporal containment’ 
given above, ‘each contribution is fixed to a linear time by a logic… that marks, seals, and 
divides each moment’ (ibid).  
To be clear, there is of course a necessity for feminists to ‘keep up to date’, and 
attuned to changes in social, economic and cultural conditions in which feminisms operate. 
Indeed, the most promising aspect of many of the ‘third wave’ narratives, I would argue, is 
their commitment to facing up to changing conditions. Heywood and Drake, for instance, are 
particularly keen to outline the economic determinants of third wave feminism in the US, 
emphasising that ‘transnational capital, downsizing, privatisation, and a shift to a service 
economy have had a drastic impact on the world these generations have inherited’ (Heywood 
 67 
and Drake 2004:13). The claim is that the ‘new world order’ necessitates an ‘overhaul’ of 
feminism, as we come to recognise that ‘global capitalism is overtaking many of the social 
structures under which second wave feminists operated’ (Sidler 1997:37-8). ‘Third wave 
feminism’, as Piepmeier and Dicker contend, thus represents:  
 
‘…a reinvigorated feminist movement emerging from a late twentieth-century 
world… third wave feminism's political activism on behalf of women's rights is 
shaped by—and responds to—a world of global capitalism and information 
technology, postmodernism and postcolonialism, and environmental degradation. We 
no longer live in the world that feminists of the second wave faced’ (2003:10).  
 
This is undoubtedly true, and it is important to highlight the pragmatic materialist 
strain of the third wave narratives, because it shows that proclaiming a third wave is ‘not a 
case of daughterly rebellion for its own sake’ (Spencer 2004:11). Rather, in most cases, the 
formation of a ‘third wave’ ought to be viewed as a genuine attempt to grapple with the 
‘specificity of our historical situation’ (Heywood and Drake 1997:4), to rethink what 
feminism means and what it can do within specific social and cultural conditions. Having said 
this, however, there is a marked tendency within third wave literature to present the 
theoretical outlook of the third wave as an inevitable bi-product of its historical moment 
(Henry 2004:35). For instance, Dicker and Piepmeier write that ‘just as it is interested in a 
multiplicity of issues, the third wave operates from the [theoretical] assumption that identity 
is multifaceted and layered’ (2003:10). The suggestion here is that as feminists have 
‘expanded’ their focus to include a ‘multiplicity of issues’, feminist theory has shifted 
accordingly – towards a pluralistic theoretical understanding of personal identity informed by 
post-Lacanian psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theory. Yet, this is a problematic claim, as 
it is perfectly possible to juggle a diverse range of interests, or to engage with complex social, 
economic or technological phenomena, whilst holding an integral and holistic concept of 
personal identity.  
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The point here is that there is no easy correlation between the context, the problem, 
and the type of theory that is required, as third wave narratives often seem to suggest. Gillian 
Howie describes this kind of slippage as a tendency to confuse the ‘logic of intellectual 
debate with the condition of the world’, for example, when poststructuralism or 
postmodernism is mapped onto post-fordism as the next historical stage (Howie 2010b:5). 
This leads to assumptions that only ‘postmodern’ theory and logic is able to contend with the 
‘messiness’ of globalised late-capitalist conditions, when in fact, it is equally possible to 
argue that ‘postmodern logic’ is part of the problem rather than the solution. Such ‘slippages’ 
or presumptions are fuelled by the logic of sequential negation, whereby approaches of the 
past must be ‘superseded’ by those more recent. The result of this sequentialist logic is that 
feminist ideas and approaches of the past are frequently dismissed without even being 
considered or explored, as they are presumed to be out-of-date, and thus of no possible use or 
pertinence to the present or future. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide illustrations of feminism’s ‘great hegemonic 
model’, and further, to highlight the problems which result from its deployment, in terms of 
the way that feminist theory conceives of, and relates to, its own diverse history. The 
hegemonic model leads to the imposition of reductive schematic and progressive frameworks, 
which systematically and seriously misrepresent the diversity of feminist movements and 
trajectories, by implying that diversity within feminism is something new, and can only be 
grasped by a single theoretical approach. Moreover, the hegemonic model’s ‘temporal logics’ 
result in unproductive attitudes towards history, which fail to grasp history’s subversive and 
transformative potential. In the first instance, the logic of teleological totalisation results in a 
closedness to the past and to the future, as we believe that we already know what the past has 
to teach us and what the future will hold. We thereby restrict the possibilities for the past to 
interrupt the present and provoke a reorientation of our thinking and acting. Secondly, the 
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logic of teleological totalisation results in universalising and evolutionist presumptions, 
where it is presumed that feminisms everywhere are working out the same trajectory, though 
at different ‘stages’ of development. Thirdly, the logic of sequential negation leads to the 
imposition of reductive typologies, and to the idea that only one approach is possible at a 
time, which precludes productive explorations of interconnections between different 
coexisting strands of feminism. Accordingly, fourthly, fixing certain types of theory to certain 
times leads to the treatment of theory and strategy from previous times as obsolete, of no 
relevance to feminist predicaments and problematics in the present. 
If the hegemonic model of feminism is supported and sustained by a progressivist, 
phasic or ‘stagist’ model of historical time, there is a crucial need for a critical feminist 
historiography that can identify and challenge its teleological and sequentialist temporal 
logics whenever they are in evidence. This chapter, for example, has undertaken such a 
critical exercise. However, to anticipate my argument in the following chapter, whilst critical 
analyses make a vital contribution by helping to identify and diagnose the problem, feminist 
historiography ultimately requires a more thoroughgoing philosophical intervention. Indeed, a 
familiar criticism of feminist theory is that it has become increasingly adept at refining 
critiques of those models already in existence, but less so at thinking creatively and 
developing alternatives. As Wendy Brown observes, ‘whilst many have lost confidence in a 
historiography bound to a notion of progress… we have coined no political substitute for 
progressive understandings of where we have come from and where we are going (2001:3). 
Thus, alongside critical approaches and methodologies, feminist historiography must also 
undertake the constructive project of building alternative models of history and historical 
time.  
The appetite for this kind of positive, thoroughgoing historiographical reorientation is 
certainly discernible within recent feminist writings:  
 
‘Feminist thought… requires a conception of history that can contain both the 
insights of the past and the potential breakthroughs of the future within the messy, 
 70 
unresolved contestations of political and intellectual practice in the present 
(Fernandes 2010:114).  
 
‘Can we conceive of time as multidirectional as well as linear? Can we conceive of 
cause and effect going both ways?’ (Roof 1997:86) 
 
Yet, whilst there have been repeated calls for alternative conceptions of history and historical 
time, the conversations around exactly what such conceptions might look like, or how they 
might work, are often rather tentative and vague. This can be attributed, I suggest, to an 
underdeveloped conception of what we mean by ‘historical time’, or indeed, by ‘history’. 
When we speak of ‘history’, are we referring to a course of past events, or to the stories we 
tell about past events? And when we speak of ‘historical time’, are we referring to a 
sequential time ‘in which’ historical events occur, or to discursive conceptions of historical 
time? In order to develop greater clarity, and to give content to the idea of a multilinear, 
multidirectional model of historical time that is being mooted in the passages quoted above, 
the rest of the thesis will address these kinds of questions, beginning with the question of 
what we mean by the term ‘history’ in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Time of the Trace 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a burgeoning discontent amongst feminists with the hegemonic model of feminist 
history. This model systematically misrepresents diverse feminist movements and trajectories, 
and the temporal logics that it employs result in unproductive historiographical orientations 
and practices. What is therefore required is an alternative model of historical time to inform a 
more productive and nuanced feminist historiography. The project to develop such an 
alternative, however, currently remains under-explored and under-articulated. I suggested in 
the previous chapter that this can be attributed to a vague and ambiguous notion of what we 
actually mean when we speak of ‘historical time’, and moreover, ‘history’ itself: a term which 
has two distinct, though intersecting, meanings. On the one hand, ‘history’ refers to clusters 
and series of past events or happenings: to ‘what really happened in the past’, which we can 
term ‘history A’. On the other hand, ‘history’ refers to the narratives we construct and 
accounts we give of ‘what we think happened in the past’, which we can term ‘history B’58. 
This chapter will address the epistemological and ontological questions and tensions which 
are produced at the overlap of these two senses of ‘history’. In so doing, it will offer a more 
robust understanding of ‘history’, and further, will develop an account of the temporality of 
historical practice and the ‘time of the trace’. 
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 As a clarificatory note: my use of ‘history A’ and ‘history B’ here is different to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s deployment of the terms ‘History 1’ and ‘History 2’ in Provincializing Europe (2000), 
where he uses ‘History 1’ to refer to grand historical narratives, and ‘History 2’ to refer to subaltern 
and ‘minor’ historical narratives which intersect with but continually interrupt History 1. I will be 
discussing Chakrabarty’s work further in chapter 7.  
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Since the 1960s, there has been a decisive and thoroughgoing shift away from 
‘objectivism’ within academic historiography, i.e. from the notion that historians can offer 
neutral and disinterested accounts of what objectively, ‘really’ happened in the past59. It has 
become widely accepted that linguistic conventions, institutional contexts, and the specific 
situations and interests of the narrator in the present, always orient and shape the kinds of 
histories we search for and the kinds of histories we write.
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 Few historiographers today, 
therefore, would subscribe to an ‘objectivist’ or ‘direct realist’ epistemology, and take 
seriously Leopold von Ranke’s incitement to reconstruct the past wie es eigentlich gewesen, 
or ‘as it really was’.61 The challenge to objectivism or direct realism in historiography is thus 
not a particularly controversial issue. The point of debate, rather, concerns the 
epistemological and ontological implications of this challenge.  
For the structuralist school of historiography, often described as ‘narrativism’, the 
challenge to objectivism/direct realism in historiography results in an ‘anti-realist’ 
epistemology, whereby ‘history’ in the sense of ‘what really happened in the past’ (or ‘history 
A’) is regarded as the ‘impossible object’ of historical discourse. From this anti-realist 
perspective, ‘ the  real past plays no role in the practice of history; what we know of the 
human past we know only by means of the discipline of history… There is no way to jump 
outside the framework of that discipline to a real past of any sort’ (Goldstein 1980:429). 
Narrativist historiographers therefore focus exclusively upon the linguistic and literary 
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 Howie, borrowing from Thomas Nagel, uses the term ‘objectivism’ to refer to the ‘ideology of 
objectivity’, as distinct from ‘objectivity’: a term to describe the ‘thing-ness’ of the mind-independent 
material world (Howie 2010a:5-7). 
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 In fact, as Judith Lowder Newton points out, the role of feminist theory as a progenitor of this kind 
of thinking is often overlooked within the historiographical field. For example, accounts of the ‘New 
Historicism’ usually give the impression that it is ‘post-modernism’ or ‘post-structuralism’ that has 
come up with these kinds of ideas, and feminism has ‘responded’ (see Newton 1988:153). 
 
61
 Von Ranke’s aim was to avoid injecting histories of past events with the ‘spirit of the present’, and 
his empiricist method consisted in relying as far as possible on the most ‘immediate documents’ such 
as eye-witness accounts. He was entirely opposed to the Hegelian philosophy of history with its a 
priori projections of rationality or ‘spiritual’ determinations. This is not to say that Ranke was opposed 
to the idea of constructing a ‘world history’; but for Ranke, empirical study always takes precedent. We 
‘must always inquire into what really happened’ and only then can we discern if there is a development 
of unity and progress (Ranke 2000:90-1; Burns 2000).  
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frameworks and protocols which condition the writing of history in the present (or ‘history 
B’), and bracket the referential function of historical narratives and their claim to represent a 
past event that ‘really’ happened. This anti-realist epistemology gives rise to an ‘anti-
revisionist’ stance within narrativist historiography, such that critical linguistic analysis of the 
‘historical text’ is presented as a more defensible and indeed, more radical alternative to 
revisionist projects, which seek to construct counter-narratives about what ‘really’ happened 
based on new archival research.  
This chapter, however, will argue that these two steps—‘anti-realism’ and ‘anti-
revisionism’—are not a necessary consequence of ‘anti-objectivism’. As an alternative to the 
anti-realist approach, the chapter outlines an ‘indirect realism’: a historiographical 
epistemology premised upon the claim that whilst a direct or objective knowledge of past 
realities is indeed impossible, an indirect link between the past event as it is ‘constituted’ by 
historians in the present (‘history B’), and what has ‘really’ happened in the past (‘history A’) 
can be defended (McCullagh 1980). This, in turn, supports a historical practice that I term 
‘restless revisionism’, which entails both textually reflexive and proactively revisionist 
elements. Bearing in mind Fernand Braudel’s criticism of ‘event-based’ historiography—i.e. 
that it conceives of historical change in terms of point-like, exceptional, individual acts 
(Braudel 1995)—the chapter adopts a very broad sense of ‘event’62. An ‘event’, as I use the 
term here, refers to ‘happenings’ of the past, which can include bursts of activity, such as an 
organised or spontaneous act or performance, but also more sustained periods of activity and 
intellectual endeavour. The advantage of retaining the term ‘event’ is that it conveys a strong 
sense of the actual happening of the past (‘history A’), even as we recognise that our 
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Braudel is an influential figure in the ‘Annales’ school of historiography, which studies long-term 
historical structures or la longue durée, combining geographical and sociological approaches with 
historical studies, and downplaying the importance of specific events and individuals. Braudel’s study 
of The Mediterranean, for example, is organised according to three different levels of time. The first 
level is slow, almost imperceptible geographical time; the second level is the long-term time of social, 
economic and cultural history; the third level of time is the history of individuals and specific events, 
which for Braudel is the most superficial (1995).  
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knowledges and reconstructions of past events and conditions will always be mediated by the 
linguistic and interpretative schemas permeating our present contexts.
63
 
The structure of the chapter effectively works ‘backwards’, outlining in section 1 the 
problematic effects of ‘anti-revisionism’, and then, in sections 2 and 3, showing why anti-
revisionism and anti-realism do not necessarily follow on from anti-objectivism.  Section 2 
revisits the anti-realist arguments that underpin the anti-revisionist stance, as articulated most 
eminently by Roland Barthes (1970; 1982) and Hayden White (1973; 1978; 2009). The aim 
here is to demonstrate that we require a much richer understanding of historical ‘reality’ than 
is offered by both objectivist and by narrativist historiographies, to enable us to grasp the vital 
link between interpretation and happening. To develop such an understanding, section 3 goes 
on to build a case for an ‘indirect’ historical realism. Here, I turn predominantly to Paul 
Ricoeur’s work on the relation between language and event, and the ‘reality of the historical 
past’, drawing particularly upon his account of ‘metaphor’ and ‘split reference’, and his 
ontology of the ‘trace’ (1978; 1984; 1988; 2009). The processual account of historical reality 
offered by Ricoeur gives rise to an indirect realist historiography, which postulates an 
‘indirect’ referential relationship between historical narratives and the past events that they 
attempt to describe and account for. Section 4 then shows how this indirect historical realism 
opens up a process-oriented, reflexive conception of historical practice, which I describe as a 
‘restless revisionism’. Finally, the conclusion draws out the implications of the discussions in 
this chapter for our understanding of historical time, explaining how ‘indirect realism’ and 
‘restless revisionism’ implicitly entail a multilinear, multidirectional understanding of the 
‘time of the trace’ and historical practice. 
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 To further clarify: in speaking of ‘actual’ past events, I differ from Deleuzean theorists who treat 
‘the event’ in transcendental terms as the virtual ‘event’: an opening on to a ‘nonhistorical past’ 
(Colebrook 2009a), the condition or ‘immanent feature of all actualisation’ (Boundas, 2006:82). For 
more on the ‘virtual’ approach to history and ‘becoming’, see edited collections by Grosz (1999), or 
Colebrook and Bell (2009b). I undertake a critical analysis of the ‘virtual’ approach elsewhere (Browne 
2011).  
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1 
THE PROBLEM WITH ‘ANTI-REVISIONISM’ 
 
The textually reflexive turn brought by structuralist or ‘narrativist’ approaches has in many 
ways been extremely valuable within feminist historiography. By becoming more aware of 
how narrative techniques and linguistic conventions shape the kinds of stories we tell about 
the past, we can become more critically aware of how these narratives work, and their effect 
on the reader in the present (Hemmings 2005; 2011). The reflexivist approach becomes more 
problematic, however, when it is presented as a self-sufficient alternative to revisionist 
projects and the quest for counter-narratives. This section will outline this argument with 
reference primarily to Clare Hemmings’ recent ‘anti-revisionist’ interventions into feminist 
storytelling (2005; 2007; 2011)
64
. 
Hemmings’ textual analyses of hegemonic narratives of feminist history, (as referred 
to in the previous chapter), serve as an illuminating demonstration of the kinds of insights that 
the textually reflexive approach can bring to feminist historiography. She identifies several 
textual techniques that are consistently used within these hegemonic historical narratives, 
such as the ‘mobilisation of affect’ through the rhetorical tone of the narrative, which operates 
to create a certain affective state in the reader (Hemmings 2011:24). The celebratory tone of 
progress narratives, for example, achieved through the deployment of adjectives such as 
‘interesting’, ‘exciting’, ‘far-reaching’, ‘generative’, and ‘creative’, provides ‘little room for 
dissent’ (2001:20-1). Another textual technique is the use of the present or past tense to 
secure the temporal structure of the narrative, for instance, when black feminist ‘critiques’ are 
referred to in the past tense, in contrast to ‘poststructuralist’ approaches which tend to be 
described in the present tense. The effect, as discussed, is that black feminism is depicted as a 
‘phase’ which has passed, and poststructuralism, in contrast, is portrayed as ‘linguistically 
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 Using Hemmings’ texts in this way, as ‘representative’ of a certain philosophical position, 
admittedly risks doing violence to the subtleties and singularities of Hemmings’ work, and of turning 
her into a ‘straw woman’. It is helpful in this instance, however, to unpack the philosophical logic that 
leads to the anti-revisionist attitude, to examine the steps that can lead from textual reflexivism to anti-
revisionism, and to be clear about what is at stake in such a move. 
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alive and present’ (2011:46). Hemmings’ semantic analysis thus offers some highly useful 
insights into how and why the hegemonic narratives work so effectively, which can help us 
recognise when we are deploying such textual techniques to tell our own stories, and to 
identify such techniques at work in the writings of others. Her argument, however, is not 
simply that a focus on language and ‘the technology of Western feminist story telling’ should 
lead the feminist theorist and historian to an increased self-reflexivity. She argues, further, for 
an anti-revisionism, which she presents as an unavoidable outcome of an anti-objectivist, 
textually reflexive approach.   
Hemmings’ case against revisionism is premised upon an anti-objectivist 
epistemology, which recognises that there is no, and can be no, ultimate, complete, objective 
historical truth. ‘Since it is impossible to tell a full story about the past… accounts are always 
selective ones that do precise work in the present’ (2007:69). For Hemmings, this axiomatic 
anti-objectivist claim is implicitly disavowed by revisionist projects, which, she contends, are 
inherently aligned to a fantasy of historical objectivity and neutrality. When the revisionist 
asks ‘what really happened?’, Hemmings argues, she presents herself as innocent of what she 
might find out, thereby ‘prevent(ing) attention to the political investments that motivate the 
desire to know, and that generate a writer’s epistemological and methodological practices’ 
(Hemmings 2005:118). Accordingly, the newly revised story ‘erase s  its own construction’ 
(2007:73). Her second argument is that the revisionist project is inherently wedded to a linear 
model of historical knowledge-building, where the story is corrected ‘in a linear fashion – that 
is from past to present’. Revisionism, she claims, thus ‘implicitly tends towards the 
construction of new master narratives—a consensus and synthesis of perspectives—which 
effects a closing down and fixing of the past’ (2007:72).  
Given this revisionist ‘fantasy of objectivity’ and implicit tendency towards master 
narratives, Hemmings argues, we should resist a revisionist response, which would ‘go back 
to the archives’ to get at ‘what really happened’ in the recent feminist past, thereby 
‘interven[ing] at the level of truth-telling’. Instead, she presents the ‘textually reflexive’ 
approach—based upon critical textual analysis, ‘methodology over content’, and ‘textual 
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strategies’—as an alternative to the revisionist approach (2007:72-4). In the first instance, 
Hemmings sees critical textual analysis as a transformative practice in itself, because it 
instigates a ‘temporary break in the monotony of the repeated’ (2011:189). And secondly, she 
suggests that by instigating such breaks and pauses, we can open ourselves up to different 
ways of telling and ‘re-narrating’ feminist stories: Textual strategies of ‘re-narration’, she 
writes: 
… ‘start from textual and political absences in the stories we already participate in, 
explicitly folding these back into the narrative in order to refigure the political 
grammars of Western feminism. They offer ways of approaching feminist stories and 
politics over the temptation to produce a more correct account’ (2011:27).  
 
Textual analysis and textual strategies such as ‘re-narration’ are therefore presented 
by Hemmings as an alternative to revising or telling a new story. The only way of remaining 
faithful to the acknowledgement that ‘all histories are motivated and selective histories’, she 
suggests, is to experiment with ‘how we might tell stories differently rather than telling 
different stories’ (ibid: 16). It is questionable, however, whether this reflexivist, textual 
approach alone could ever be enough to interrupt and overturn the hegemonic narratives of 
feminist history, narratives which—as Hemmings herself points out in such careful detail—
have become so deeply entrenched. Indeed, a reflexivist strategy that ‘re-narrates’ narratives 
already in circulation risks securing the dominant stories even further (Torr 2007:65-6). This 
kind of problem can be viewed as part of a wider problem within feminist theory, which 
arises when textual analysis is treated as sufficient in itself as an oppositional methodology. 
Shumei Shih suggests that the textual or ‘deconstructive turn’ in feminist theory can be read 
as effectively a ‘displacement’ of the need to attend to the substantive complexities of 
nonhegemonic histories and lived experiences. ‘The deconstruction of Western universalist 
discourse’, she writes, ‘ends up exercising the muscles of Western universalist discourse… 
after all, if we want to study power and hegemony, we should study the West, right?’ (Shih 
2002:96). Shih’s broader point here is applicable to our more specific problematic of 
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countering feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’. That is, keeping the dominant narratives of 
feminism in the central analytic frame—to be formally analysed and ‘renarrated’—can be 
viewed as a ‘displacement’ of the more pressing need to generate counter-narratives. 
Attending to ‘the multiple erasures… of the present’ and ‘clearing conceptual space’ is 
certainly a fruitful starting point for reconsidering what kind of history might be necessary 
and useful (Hemmings 2007:73). Yet, open spaces in themselves are not generative, and 
intervening at the level of narrative form and technique alone arguably cannot provide 
enough impetus to the project to interrupt the hegemonic model of feminist history.   
This strategic problem is, further, related to a problem of accountability. Hemmings’ 
reflexivist approach quite rightly forces us to revisit and interrogate ‘what we think has 
happened’ in western feminist theory in the recent past, through analysis of how these stories 
are produced and maintained (2011:133, emphasis added). This is certainly crucial. But if we 
follow Hemmings, we still do not need to ask—indeed we should resist asking—‘what has 
happened’ and tell new stories according to what we find. This is problematic because 
feminists need to be accountable for the content of the stories we tell, as well as for their 
form, and consider ways in which truth claims in the present about what ‘really’ happened in 
the past can be evaluated in addition to a textual analysis of their claims to authority. Without 
such a framework for evaluating truth-content, it is difficult to respond to charges of historical 
relativism, and give an adequate defence of why the hegemonic narratives of feminism are 
misrepresentative and wrong, and why different ones are required. ‘Keeping meaning open’, 
as Hemmings argues, is indeed a ‘primary responsibility of a feminist theorist’ (2007:74). But 
the responsibilities of the feminist historian—a role we all take on, even momentarily, when 
we tell stories about feminism—include being accountable for the content of those stories as 
well as their form. This imperative demands a commitment to questioning and tracing ‘what 
happened’, rather than stopping short at interrogating our ‘technologies of the presumed’, and 
‘re-narrating’ a story we have already been told second, third, even fourth-hand. 
In short, then, textual strategies alone are not enough. In the first instance, we need to 
generate alternative narrative content as well as alternative narrative techniques in order to 
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disrupt the hegemonic narratives of feminist history. Further, we need to be accountable for 
the content of the stories we tell, as well as for the way in which we tell them. Reflexivism 
without revisionism thus constitutes a rather timid or partial response to the call for a radical 
challenge to feminism’s great hegemonic model. On the other hand, however, revisionism 
without reflexivism a ‘naïve’ revisionism does indeed, as Hemmings claims, risk 
presenting the feminist historian or historiographer as an ‘innocent’ observer or investigator, 
and further, risks creating a new master narrative that simply ‘corrects’ the previous in a 
linear fashion and ‘closes down the past’. As such, I propose, feminist historiography needs 
both revisionism and reflexivism. To challenge the idea that they are mutually exclusive, 
then, I need to demonstrate that reflexive attention to linguistic conventions and techniques 
does not (as Hemmings suggests) preclude a revisionist approach which seeks out alternative 
knowledges and narratives through undertaking new archival research. Moreover, I need to 
show that revisionist projects need not be aligned to a ‘fantasy of objectivity’, nor need they 
result in master narratives and thereby ‘close down’ the past.  
The rest of the chapter, therefore, is devoted to demonstrating the compatibility of 
reflexivism and revisionism, at both a theoretical and a practical level. The first task is to 
challenge the move that narrativist historiographers make from anti-objectivism to ‘anti-
realism’, which underpins the refusal of revisionism. Accordingly, the next section will revisit 
and problematise the case against historical realism as found in the influential 
historiographical writings of Roland Barthes and Hayden White (whom Hemmings cites as a 
key influence). The problem, as we shall see, lies with the impoverished understanding of 
historical ‘reality’ that accompanies the ‘anti-realist’ position.  
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2 
THE PROBLEM WITH ‘ANTI-REALISM’ 
 
The key move of anti-realist, structuralist historiography, as stated, is to bracket the question 
of ‘what really happened in the past’, thereby re-describing ‘history’ as, essentially, a literary 
exercise. A consideration of this anti-realist stance is impossible without acknowledging the 
influence of Fernand de Saussure’s linguistic theory. Indeed, the anti-realist position within 
historiography can essentially be understood as a historiographical application of Saussurean 
linguistic theory. For Saussure, the linguistic ‘sign’ is a ‘two-sided entity’ comprised of the 
‘signifier’ (the sound-image) and the ‘signified’ (the thought or concept), which may have an 
external ‘referent’, but this is beyond the linguist’s purview. Saussure’s insistence on the 
‘arbitrariness’ of the sign leads him to claim that language can be analysed as a formal, self-
contained, enclosed system (‘langue’), considered separately from the series of 
communicative speech acts which make use of this grammatical and semiotic system 
(‘parole’), and moreover, from its material ‘referents’ (Saussure 1970)65. In the 
historiographical context, this idea translates into a re-description of history as a ‘system of 
signs’, rather than a system or series of ‘events’ (Rayment Pickard 2000:275).  
The Saussurean influence is clearly evident, for example, in Roland Barthes’ essay on 
‘Historical Discourse’ (1970), in which he famously claims that ‘historical discourse does not 
follow reality, it only signifies it; it asserts at every moment: this happened, but the meaning 
conveyed is only that someone is making that assertion’ (Barthes 1970:154). For Barthes, 
history is simply one ‘species of narrative’, and what distinguishes historical narrative as a 
‘genre’ is not its referential links with an external ‘real’, but rather the literary and discursive 
features which produce the ‘effet du réel’, or ‘reality effect’, signifying or coding the text as 
‘history’ rather than fiction (1970:154). In support of this claim, Barthes draws on 
Nietzsche’s argument that ‘for a fact to exist, we must first introduce meaning’, by which he 
means that we can only designate something as a ‘fact’ if we already possess the 
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 For more on Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, see Culler (1976) or Harris (1987).  
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interpretative framework by which to categorise it as something ‘factual’ as opposed to fictive 
(ibid: 153). The ‘fact’, he argues, can only exist within language, as a term in a discourse. Yet 
historical discourse behaves ‘as if it were a simple reproduction of something on another 
plane of existence altogether, some extra-structural “reality’” (ibid: 153). Indeed, Barthes 
questions any kind of ‘realism’ in literature or narrative, historical or otherwise. ‘The function 
of narrative’, he writes, ‘is not to “represent”, it is to constitute a spectacle… not of the 
mimetic order… “What takes place” in a narrative is from the referential (reality) point of 
view literally nothing; “what happens” is language alone, the adventure of language’ (Barthes 
1982:294-5)
 66
.  
Hayden White’s work similarly formulates an anti-realist epistemology, yet White 
concentrates more closely on the implications that the anti-realist epistemology has for 
understanding historical practice and method. ‘It is sometimes said’, he writes, ‘that the aim 
of the historian is to explain the past by ‘finding’, ‘identifying’ or ‘uncovering’ the ‘stories’ 
that lie buried in chronicles, and that the difference between ‘history’ and ‘fiction’ is that the 
historian ‘finds’ his stories, whilst the fiction writer ‘invents’ his. This conception of the 
historian’s task, however, obscures the extent to which “invention” also plays a part in the 
historian’s operations’ (White 1973: 6-7). Linguistic tropes and interpretative modes, White 
argues, underlie not only the ‘emplotment’ of the story, but also underlie what are usually 
considered to be the ‘primitive elements’ of the process of history-writing, i.e. the processes 
of selecting and arranging ‘unprocessed’ historical data67. Although this level of 
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 The extent to which Barthes’ ‘structuralist analysis of narrative’ ought to be understood as fixed or 
exhaustive is a contested issue. Some commentators argue that by the end of the 1960s, there is a 
significant shift in Barthes’ work, from the desire for all-encompassing structural models towards an 
affirmation of multiple structural possibilities in a text. Sanford Freedman and Carole Anne Taylor, 
fore example, emphasise Barthes’ S/Z, in which Barthes’ concept of ‘différance’ attempts to reconcile 
evaluative criticism with plural readings of a text, drawing us ‘aesthetically towards the extension of 
meaning’, and ‘narrative flux’. As such, they argue, ‘Barthes’ interest is no longer in fixing the 
meaning of texts but instead mapping their movement’, and différance, an idea that Derrida also takes 
up, ‘underlies all discussion’ (1983:xx-xxiii). Susan Sontag also emphasises this shift from textual 
system to textual play (1983). What is unequivocal, however, is the radical epistemological challenge 
Barthes’ work poses for historiographers in his disconnection of the historical narrative from the 
‘referent’ or past event.  
 
67
 White defines ‘trope’ as ‘manner’, ‘mood’ or ‘style’, and ‘tropics’ as the process by which language 
constitutes fields of experience within a specific mode of identification and description. The key 
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understanding and description is ordinarily seen as essentially pre-interpretative, he claims, 
‘descriptions of events already constitute interpretations of their nature’ (White 2009:361). 
Echoing Barthes’ Nietzschean point, White argues that even when we think we are simply 
identifying or describing sets of events that we ‘find’ within historical records and archives, 
there are figurative tropes at work which dictate the way in which those events are described, 
as ‘facts’ or otherwise. For White, this implies that linguistic conventions must therefore be 
given historiographical priority in the analysis of historical discourse: firstly, because 
language protocols are required for the understanding of anything, and secondly, because the 
choices we make regarding the linguistic models we use to mark out a terrain of analysis 
should ideally be self-conscious rather than unconscious ones (White 1978:22).  
Barthes’ and White’s challenges to ‘outmoded’ objectivism and ‘naïve’ realism in 
history have provoked a much-needed scrutiny of the assumptions about fact and 
interpretation that we bring to the idea and practice of history. ‘We should no longer naively 
expect that statements about a given epoch or complex of events in the past “correspond” to 
some preexistent body of “raw facts” (White 1978: 47).  However, whilst these challenges to 
the objectivist conception of historical reality are to be welcomed, my contention is that 
neither theorist offers an adequate alternative means of conceiving of historical reality. 
‘Historical reality’, I agree, ought not to be construed as a complete sum of ‘raw facts’; but it 
does not follow that ‘historical reality’ is therefore simply an effect of language. When 
narrativist historiographers consider a ‘referential illusion’ as a simple ‘meaning effect’, the 
problem concerning the ‘reality of the historical past’ is not thereby resolved or abolished. It 
is simply bracketed or ‘set aside’ (Ricoeur 1984:79).  
White, in fact, takes a less extreme or cavalier approach to the question of historical 
reality than Barthes. Barthes’ reduction of the status of ‘historical reality’ to an ‘effet du réel’ 
entirely dismantles the distinction between historical and fictional literature, in that he treats 
them simply as different genres (Rayment Pickard 2000: 275). In contrast, White is careful to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘tropes’ he identifies, as I will discuss further in section 3, are ‘metaphor’, ‘metonymy’, ‘synecdoche’ 
and ‘irony’.  
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stress that he is not denying that there is a ‘real’ referent which makes historical narratives 
historical rather than fictional (White 2009: 354). On the other hand, however, White’s core 
argument is that what should interest the historiographer is the ‘literature of fact’: the 
techniques or strategies that language uses to constitute an event as factual or fictive. Indeed, 
because ‘there are no apodictically certain theoretical grounds on which one can legitimately 
claim that any one representative mode is more ‘realistic’ than another’, he claims, ‘the best 
grounds for choosing one perspective on history rather than another are ultimately aesthetic or 
moral rather than epistemological’ (1973:xii). According to his ‘tropological’ approach, then, 
the only way historical narratives can be critically assessed is in terms of their linguistic or 
tropological characteristics. Thus, whilst White wants to preserve the distinction between 
historical and fictional events, he does not offer any means to distinguish between them, other 
than by construing the way they are described as different figures of speech.  
The referent on the ‘other side’ of the narration, I contend, thereby hovers in White’s 
work as a shadowy figure. It functions as the term that prevents history from sliding 
wholesale into fiction, but which cannot be brought into the critical frame. This performs an 
essentially Kantian move, by according the past event a ‘noumenal’ status as that which must 
be thought but cannot be known, thereby severing the link between ‘history A’ (‘what 
happened’ in the past), and ‘history B’ (the account we give of ‘what we think happened’), 
and pushing ‘history A’ outside the boundaries of legitimate enquiry and critique. Hemmings 
does something similar, as she claims that feminist narratives are ‘haunted’ by past events 
that they exclude, whilst at the same time confining the critical field to an analysis of textual 
techniques and knowledge politics of the present. As with White, the gesture is towards 
something that really happened, something that makes a historical narrative historical, and 
that makes existing historical narratives inaccurate and inadequate. But from this narrativist 
perspective, the ‘past event’ cannot be taken up into historiographical enquiry, which remains 
fixed on the form rather than the content.  
My core argument, then, is that narrativist formulations of ‘anti-realist’ epistemology 
rely upon a highly impoverished notion of ‘historical reality’. In Barthes’ work, ‘historical 
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reality’ is reduced to a linguistic ‘reality effect’; in White’s work, ‘historical reality’ is 
reduced to a kind of regulative idea, i.e. an idea which must be thought (in order to maintain 
the history/fiction divide) but its reality cannot be known. To be clear, the anti-objectivist 
claim that there are no ‘raw historical facts’, and that there can only ever be ‘events under 
description’, is not the problem (Mink 1978:146).  Historical events will always be 
symbolically mediated and subject to various interpretations, both in retrospect and at the 
time of their occurrence. The problem, rather, lies with the implication that because a past 
event is symbolically or ‘tropologically’ mediated, its ‘reality’ cannot be ‘known’, and thus 
must be bracketed from historiographical analysis. In doing so, anti-realist historiographers 
construct a pre- or extra-discursive notion of the historical ‘real’ that is akin to the Kantian 
noumenal, or indeed the Lacanian Real
68
. This is a highly impoverished or abstract notion, as 
it implies that historical reality is a realm which is somehow made inaccessible, or blocked 
out, by the conceptual frameworks and lenses through which individuals and groups interpret 
and shape the worlds that we inherit and the lives that we live. Yet what would ‘historical 
reality’ be, if stripped of its symbolic, interpretative determinations?  
Accordingly, we need a more complex and much richer notion of historical ‘reality’, 
to serve as an alternative to the objectivist idea that past reality is a reservoir of ‘raw facts’ 
waiting to be discovered, and to the narrativist idea that past reality is an effect of language, 
or an ‘external’ realm somehow ‘beyond’ the symbolic frameworks through which historical 
discourses and knowledges are shaped. This shift can be accomplished by turning to the 
broadly ‘pragmatic’ conception of ‘lived reality’, outlined in the Introduction, which affirms 
that lived reality is always mediated through symbolic structures. More specifically, a richer 
understanding of the ‘reality of the historical past’ can be reached through the 
historiographical approach of ‘indirect realism’.  
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 In Lacan’s account, the order of the ‘Real’ (into which we are born) has no differentiation, no 
boundaries or borders, no ‘lack’. It is outside language and the order of the Symbolic, which in 
contrast, is constituted in terms of oppositions, e.g. presence/absence, and a differentiated set of 
signifiying elements. The Real is impossible to integrate into the Symbolic order, utterly resisting 
signification (Evans 1996). I discuss the Lacanian approach further in chapter 5.  
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3 
INDIRECT REALISM 
 
If ‘history’ is to be understood as something more than a literary genre, we need a more 
adequate account of the relation between the past event or ‘what really happened’ (‘history 
A’), and the historical account that conveys ‘what we think happened’ (‘history B’). An 
ontological account of this relation is required, (rather than stopping short at an epistemology 
of history-writing in the present), because, as Ricoeur points out, the epistemological question 
about the status of historical knowledge often masks or deflects the ontological question: 
what is it knowledge of? (Ricoeur 2009:366). As argued above, in deflecting this question, 
anti-realist historiographies promulgate a highly impoverished conception of historical reality. 
Essentially, then, we need a theory of the ‘reality of the historical past’ which accounts for the 
happening of the past, and also, for determinations of the past through historical narratives. 
This will underpin an epistemology of ‘indirect realism’, which preserves the referential 
function of historical narratives and takes seriously the commitment to seeking historical 
‘truths’, even whilst recognising that truth-telling or truth-making is dependent upon 
linguistic conventions and political motivations in the present, and moreover, is a process that 
can never be fixed. 
To articulate such a theory, this section turns predominantly to Paul Ricoeur’s work 
on the relation between language and event, and the reality of the historical past. The analysis 
focuses firstly upon Ricoeur’s dynamic theory of ‘metaphor’, ‘split reference’, and ‘mimesis’, 
which offer promising ways of articulating the referential relationship between past events 
and historical narratives
69. The section then elaborates further by drawing on Ricoeur’s 
concept of the ‘trace’, which establishes a dynamic model of the reality of the historical past, 
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 It must be stressed here that this discussion bears no pretension to offering a thorough philosophical 
or linguistic treatment of the nature of metaphor. The intention, rather, is to demonstrate that reflexive 
attentiveness to language does not require an ‘anti-realism’, and to offer a richer historiographical 
understanding of historical reality as a symbolically mediated reality.  
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premised upon an ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ between past and present, between ‘history 
A’ and ‘history B’.  
3.1 
Metaphor, Split Reference, and Mimesis 
 
To illustrate Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor and its pertinence to historiography, it is 
instructive to stage an initial comparison between Ricoeur’s approach (1978; 2009), and the 
‘tropological’ approach taken by Hayden White (1973; 1978). The difference between 
White’s and Ricoeur’s theories of metaphor can be explained in broader terms of the 
difference between the literary approach to metaphor and the philosophical approach. ‘The 
via philosophica’, Jonathan Culler explains, ‘locates metaphor in the gap between sense and 
reference’, whereas ‘the via rhetorica… situates metaphor in the space between one meaning 
and another’ (Culler 1974:219). Or as Judith Roof puts it: ‘While philosophy rightly worries 
about the productive propensities of metaphorical thinking, structural linguistics is concerned 
with metaphor’s status and operation as a basic linguistic operation’ (Roof 1996:20). 
Ricoeur’s philosophical approach, I will argue below, is more adequate to the question of 
historical reference and reality than White’s ‘tropological’ approach, because it accords a 
much stronger role to the happening of the ‘event’, which provokes metaphorical expression 
and the ‘need for narration’ in the first place. 
As we have seen, White stresses that every history is determined or shaped by its 
‘metahistory’: the interpretative framework upon within it is grounded. His ‘tropological’ 
approach classifies different kinds of discourse, including historical discourse, according to 
the linguistic modes that predominate in them, rather than by reference to their contents or 
referential function (White 1973:3-4). In Metahistory, White claims there are four linguistic 
‘master tropes’ governing the construction of historical discourse: metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche and irony (ibid:31-8). The ‘master tropes’ are immanent in the language the 
historian must use to describe the events, White states, even prior to constructing them into a 
story. In its metaphorical mode, for example, historical discourse is essentially 
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‘representational’, asserting a relation of resemblance between the event and the narrative, 
whilst metonymy is ‘reductionist’, synecdoche ‘integrative’, and irony ‘negational’ (ibid: 34). 
Strictly speaking, however, White claims that metonymy, synecdoche, and irony are all kinds 
of metaphor, in that each trope seeks to ‘liken’ the described event to ‘some form with which 
we have already become familiar in our literary culture’ (White 2009:358). In this sense, the 
master tropes governing historical discourse are variations on a metaphorical continuum, 
despite the different kinds of illuminations they aim at on the figurative level (1973:34). 
Although irony can, in fact, be viewed as ultimately ‘metatropological’, representing a stage 
of consciousness in which the problematic nature of language itself has been recognised, in 
contrast to the ‘naivety’ of the other tropes, which presuppose the capacity of figurative 
language to grasp the nature of reality  (ibid: 36-37).  
In some respects, Ricoeur is a fellow traveller with White, in that both are concerned 
to bring the problem of representing the past event ‘to language’ (Ricoeur 2009:371). In 
Ricoeur’s view, White helps us to clarify the paradoxical nature of the historical operation: 
‘The intention is certainly oriented toward what really happened in the past, but the paradox is 
that one can designate what it is that precedes all narrative only by prefiguring it’ (ibid: 370). 
Further, argues Ricoeur, White is correct to understand the ‘reality’ of the historical past as 
metaphorical in nature (Ricoeur 1984:81). Where Ricoeur departs from White, however, is in 
his understanding of the nature and function of metaphor. For White, the metaphorical 
significance of historical discourse is entirely linguistic. His description of the metaphorical 
operation, as we have seen, is restricted to giving an account of the way in which the events 
under description are ‘likened’ to ‘some form with which we have already become familiar in 
our literary culture’ (White 2009:358). In White’s exposition, therefore, historical 
representation is a phenomenon inside language, and as such, all we can legitimately learn 
from the statement ‘this really happened’ is that the described event has been linguistically or 
metaphorically coded as a historical event as opposed to a fictive event, through a 
tropological analysis. In contrast, Ricoeur insists that language ‘does not constitute a world 
for itself. It is not even a world’ (1984:78). His ‘ontological presupposition of reference’, 
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rather, is that ‘because we are in the world and affected by situations, we try to orient 
ourselves in them by means of understanding; we also have something to say, an experience 
to bring to language and to share’. Language is thus oriented beyond itself; it says something 
about something, and crucially is not a self-sustaining system (ibid)
70
.  
This basic premise guides Ricoeur’s core argument in The Rule of Metaphor, which 
postulates that the metaphorical statement or utterance functions in ‘two referential fields at 
once’: not only the referential field of language but also the referential field of affective 
experience and activity (Ricoeur 1978:299).
71
 Whilst White’s tropology treats metaphor as 
simply ‘a function of transference common to a diverse range of (figurative) tropes’, Ricoeur 
argues that a ‘living metaphor’ brings an ‘unknown referential field towards language’, telling 
us something new about reality, and thereby providing an extension of meaning (ibid: 299-
300). This gain in meaning is not to be thought of as a conceptual gain, (as it is yet to be 
brought under the requirements of the concept), but rather as a ‘semantic shock’: a shock that 
produces the need for interpretation in the first place (ibid: 296). A ‘living metaphor’ is an 
ignition, a flaring, a bringing of something new. The notions of ‘split reference’ and ‘living 
metaphor’ thus give a different sense to the etymological meaning of ‘metaphor’ as ‘transfer’ 
(ibid: 298). Indeed, Ricoeur argues, the tensional situation of metaphor’s ‘split reference’ has 
ontological implications, as expressed within the metaphorical copula, in which ‘is’ is a kind 
of ‘being-as’: 
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 One of Ricoeur’s key influences here is the linguistic theorist Èmile Beneviste, which differentiates 
him from theorists such as Barthes who follow Saussure. Beneviste preserves the referential function of 
language, whereas Saussure. As we have seen, insists on the arbitrariness of the sign and focuses on the 
signifer and signified, treating language as effectively a self-contained, enclosed system (Ricoeur 
1984:77-8). 
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 The notion of ‘split reference’ is taken from Roman Jakobson who claims that ‘the supremacy of 
poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous’, 
(quoted in La Capra 1983:126). La Capra in fact questions Ricoeur’s reading of Jakobson, but my 
argument pertains to Ricoeur’s historiographical use of the notion, which I find to be a useful means of 
preserving the referential function of historical narratives.  
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‘Being as… means being and not being. In this way, the dynamism of meaning 
allows access to the dynamic vision of reality which is the implicit ontology of the 
metaphorical utterance’ (ibid: 297).  
 
Ricoeur’s philosophical theory of metaphor and ‘split reference’, I suggest, can be 
usefully deployed to articulate an indirect realism, which upholds the challenge to 
objectivism, (the belief that there can be a neutral and disinterested account of ‘reality’), 
whilst also upholding the thesis that there is a referential link (albeit indirect) between the 
historical metaphor and a fluid historical reality that defies direct description. Ricoeur concurs 
with White that there is no unmediated truth to be told about historical reality, that ‘being-in-
the-world’ is to be in a world that is always already marked by linguistic practice. Yet his 
model of ‘discourse’ is different from White’s, as Ricoeur moves away from the focus on 
discursive forms, and restores the etymological meaning of ‘discourse’ as a movement ‘to and 
fro’: a referential movement, backwards and forwards between textual mediations, and a 
material, affective, dynamic world (Ricoeur 1984:78). He describes this as a dynamic 
‘dialectic of event and meaning’ governing the semantic autonomy or ‘distanciation’ of the 
text (ibid).
 Whilst it could be argued that Ricoeur’s presentation of ‘split reference’ can tend 
towards a dualistic depiction of event and language, on my reading, the concepts of ‘split 
reference’ and ‘living metaphor’ effectively express the interdependence between event and 
language.  On this model, we can acknowledge the mediated nature of historical events, 
whilst also affirming the existence of historical happenings which exceed their conceptual 
framing and cross ‘through the tropics of discourse’ (Ricoeur 2009: 371). Ricoeur’s dynamic 
theory of metaphor thus enables us to affirm the ‘eventness’ of history, whilst also affirming 
its discursive dependences and determinations. As Reinhard Koselleck explains: 
 
‘Historical events are not possible without linguistic activity; the experience gained 
from these events cannot be communicated except through language. However, 
neither events nor experiences are exhausted by their linguistic articulation. There are 
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numerous extralinguistic factors that enter into every event, and there are levels of 
experience that escape linguistic determination. … Stated more generally, language 
and history depend on each other but never coincide’ (Koselleck 2004:22).  
 
The concepts of ‘split reference’ and ‘living metaphor’ aptly capture the 
noncoincidental interdependence that Koselleck describes, and offer two ways of 
conceptualising the ‘indirect’ referential function of historical narratives, i.e. in terms of a 
noncoincidental interdependence between past event and historical language. Ricoeur’s 
conception of ‘mimesis’ plays a similar role within his Time and Narrative volumes, where 
he argues that ‘the mimetic function of narrative poses a problem exactly parallel to the 
problem of metaphorical reference’ (Ricoeur 1984:xi). Here, Ricoeur uses ‘mimesis’ in the 
Aristotelian sense of ‘imitation of action… and of life’ (Aristotle 1996:11), or as Ricoeur 
explains it, the ‘refiguring of the order of action’ (ibid: 54). ‘To narrate is to remake action’, 
Ricoeur contends, because narrative is always foregrounded in the world of action, with its 
practical structures and its symbolic resources. A narrative emerges from within ‘the whole 
set of conventions, beliefs and institutions that make up the symbolic framework of a culture’, 
which confers an initial ‘readability’ on action by providing the rules of meaning the 
cultural codes, manners, norms and customs that make it possible to interpret particular 
actions and behaviours. A narrator can communicate a particular meaning to a reader because 
they share this ‘pre-understanding’ of both the practical field, and the symbolic field through 
which the practical field is endowed with meaning and communicability (ibid: 57). Like 
metaphor, then, narrative ‘mimesis’ can be thought of as a ‘relay station’ between two 
reciprocal, interwoven referential fields: the field of language, and the field of practice and 
event (Ricoeur 1988:27).  
The concept of ‘mimesis’ thus demonstrates another way of affirming that linguistic 
and conceptual frameworks always mediate action and experience, whilst also preserving 
something of the materiality and the happening of the referent (Clark 1990:154). Taken 
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together with ‘living metaphor’ and ‘split reference’, these aspects of Ricoeur’s work can take 
us further towards an indirect historical realism, which preserves the referential function of 
historical narratives, but without reverting to historical objectivism. To claim that our theories 
and narratives are tied to ‘real’ events or states of affairs is not the same thing as claiming that 
they are ‘objective’ (Howie 2010:4). We can affirm the partial and mediated nature of our 
historical knowledge and understanding, without abandoning the referential function of 
historical narratives to link realities of the past with realities of the present.  To elaborate 
further, the discussion below turns to Ricoeur’s concept of the ‘trace’, as another way of 
articulating the dynamic, referential relationship between past events and historical narratives. 
The concept of the ‘trace’ is particularly important, as it gives a stronger account of the 
temporality of the ‘history A’—‘history B’ relation, capturing the relationship between past 
and present as one of process and reciprocity. 
 
3.2 
The Trace 
 
The notion of the ‘trace’ is vital to Ricoeur’s indirect realism, because the constraint imposed 
upon the historian by the ‘trace’ of the past is what makes historical narratives distinct from 
poetic or fictive interpretations of reality. In its most basic sense, he explains, the ‘trace’ refers 
to the empirical documents and artefacts of the historical archive, which incur a kind of debt 
to the past upon historical discourse and ‘demand an endless rectification on its part’ 
(2009:371).
72
 White would object here that Ricoeur’s notion of a ‘debt’ to the past inclines 
history towards a backward-looking conservatism, via a commitment to the ‘dead truths of the 
past’ (Kellner 2009).  Moreover, as feminist historiographers have consistently pointed out, 
the archive is ideologically formed: it conserves what meets the criteria of visibility and 
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 ‘Archive’ he defines as an ‘authorised deposit’, an organised body of documents; whilst ‘document’ 
takes on the role of a warrant, ‘nourishing history’s claim to be based on facts’, informing us about the 
past and enlarging the scope of our collective memory (Ricoeur 1988:116-7). 
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worth, as determined by those with the power to authorise and preserve. However, Ricoeur’s 
concept of the trace does not depend solely on the empirical trace as embodied in the existing 
archive or document. The source of the authority of the archive and the historical document, 
he contends, stems from the ontological presupposition that ‘the past has left a trace, which 
has become the archives and documents that bear witness to the past’ (1988:184). The trace, 
Ricoeur explains, is thus a more ‘radical phenomenon’ than the document or archive (ibid.) In 
coming to stand for the past, claims Ricoeur, the trace is a ‘representation’ of the indirect 
referential link between past and present. The ‘reality of the historical past’ consists in this 
analogical substitution of the past by the trace which it leaves behind:   
 
‘Inasmuch as (the trace) is left by the past, it stands for the past, it “represents” the 
past, not in the sense that the past itself would appear in the mind (Vorstellung) but in 
the sense that the trace takes place of (Vertretung) the past, absent from historical 
discourse… (Taking-the-place-of) characterises the indirect reference specific to 
knowledge through traces and distinguishes from any other the referential mode of 
the history of the past. This referential mode is inseparable from the work of 
configuration itself: for it is only by means of the unending rectification of our 
configurations that we form an idea of the inexhaustible resources of the past’ 
(Ricoeur 2009:365). 
 
The ontological status of the trace is thus essentially paradoxical. On the one hand, 
the trace is visible to present perception as a vestige or empirical mark. ‘The passage is no 
longer is but the trace remains’ (Ricoeur 1988b:119).73 On the other hand, however, it is a 
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 Ricoeur acknowledges his debt to Levinas’ essay on ‘La Trace’ here (1972). For both philosophers, 
the trace is distinguished from all the signs that get organised into systems because it ‘signifies 
something without making it appear’, and therefore disarranges some ‘order’. It is always a passage 
that it indicates, rather than a possible presence. As such, both ‘underline the strangeness of the trace’. 
Despite the influence of Levinas here, however, Ricoeur’s concept of the trace in fact differs from that 
of Levinas, as the Levinasian discussion of the trace is an enquiry into the possibility of an ethics, 
whereas Ricoeur is enquiring into the conditions of historical knowledge and the reality of the 
historical past. Moreover, Levinas’ ‘past of the Other’ is an ‘absolute past’, whereas Ricoeur does not 
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marker of absence, as it ‘indicates the pastness of the past without showing or bringing to 
appearance what passed’. Moreover, whilst the trace is a representation of the survival of the 
past into the present, it is nevertheless dependent upon the work of configuration to become 
absorbed into the meaningful reality of the present. The trace, Ricoeur writes, is therefore 
‘one of the more enigmatic instruments by which history refigures time… it does so by 
constructing the junction brought about by the overlapping of the existential and the empirical 
in the significance of the trace’ (ibid:125-6). 
Insofar as the significance of the trace consists in an ‘overlapping of the existential 
and the empirical’, a key advantage of Ricoeur’s concept of the ‘trace’ is that it is not simply 
an abstract notion, but rather, has a practical grounding. It is empirical traces or ‘marks’, and 
the practical construction of a historical narrative on the basis of these, which keep the reality 
of the historical past in play. ‘If the trace is a more radical phenomenon than the document or 
the archive’, Ricoeur writes, ‘it is nevertheless the use of documents and archives that makes 
the trace an actual operator of historical time’ (ibid:184, emphasis added)74. On the other 
hand, by extending the notion of the trace beyond the merely empirical, Ricoeur affirms the 
more ‘radical’ significance of the trace as a historical ontology. ‘The past event’, he writes, 
‘however absent it may be from present perception, nonetheless governs the historical 
intentionality’ (Ricoeur 1984:82). The sense that ‘someone passed by here’, that something 
happened, provokes and affirms the intentionality to somehow grasp past realities, even when 
no empirical traces or marks have survived into the present as ‘marks’ or ‘sign-effects’. 
Writers of feminist and ‘women’s history’, for example, have consistently had to contend 
                                                                                                                                                                      
place the absent in an immemorial past, outside of any memory (Ricoeur 1988:125). In this respect, 
Ricoeur’s conception of the trace also differs from that of Derrida, who like Levinas, speaks of the 
trace as a condition of the empirical, whilst Ricoeur speaks of the trace in historiographical terms as 
both an existential condition and an empirical mark. For Derrida, the trace does not appear as such, but 
can be understood rather as an ‘opaque energy’ that propels the chains of traces: the trace is the aporia 
or slippage between absence and presence that is the condition of all appearing (Derrida 1988:65). 
 
74
 Accordingly, I would suggest that Ricoeur’s concept of the trace is of more utility to feminist 
historiography than Levinas’, which remains on the level of the ‘transcendental’.  
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with the absence of documentation of women’s lives75. Nevertheless, feminist historians have 
developed a sophisticated and creative engagement with ‘traces’ embedded in purportedly 
banal or trivial events and acts, and indeed, in archival absences or silences themselves, 
which after all, tell us something about past realities. Such versatility in pursuit of the ‘traces’ 
of women’s pasts testifies to the significance of the more ‘radical’ sense of the trace as a 
historical ontology. 
Ricoeur’s ontology of the trace—with its overlapping existential and empirical 
aspects—thus aptly captures the movement of history between presence and absence, 
providing an alternative account of the reality of the historical past, and demonstrating the 
indirect referential mode of historical narratives. On Ricoeur’s account, the reality of the 
historical past is not conceived as a complete sum of unmediated ‘raw facts’, but neither is it 
reduced to a linguistic ‘reality effect’. Rather, it consists in the interplay between the 
fragmentary and indeterminate traces of past happenings that spill over into the present in the 
form of empirical marks or ‘sign-effects’, and the ‘work of configuration’ which keeps those 
traces, and thus the reality of the historical past, in play. This process, I suggest, can be 
theorised as an ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ between historical happenings, and historical 
interpretation. On the one hand, the way in which a happening or event is interpreted is itself 
part of the event, constituting part of the event’s truth and meaning. This requires a reflexive 
awareness around what we bring in the present to historical enquiry and the writing of history. 
But on the other hand, the past event will always exceed any specific interpretation or 
conceptualisation. What it means, what it meant and therefore what it ‘was’ or ‘is’ is 
always ambiguous and in process. Shoshana Felman writes eloquently of this process, arguing 
that history (in the sense of the happening of the event) ‘outruns narrative, as though the 
narrative did not quite have time to catch its breath and catch up with history, to catch up with 
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 Ricoeur himself, I acknowledge, does not make enough of the political issues of absence and 
authority when it comes to discussing the role of the archive and the construction of dominant 
historical narratives.  
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the full significance as well as the abruptness, the overwhelming aspect of the crisis and of 
the change that history has meant’ (Felman 2000:264).  
The temporality of this dynamic model of historical reality—whereby the present 
narrative configures the past event but is nevertheless ‘outrun’ by it—is much richer and more 
complex than the ‘presentism’ of the ‘narrativist’ approach. White, for example, claims that 
the historical past is ‘constituted backwards’, because ‘history is only ever written as part of a 
contest in the present ‘between contending poetic figurations of what the past might consist 
of’ (White 2009:363). However, this claim implicitly disavows the historicity of one’s 
linguistic and interpretative framework, which has not simply materialised out of thin air in 
the present. Moreover, White places a great emphasis on the capacity of the historian to 
choose the linguistic model they adopt to represent historical reality, thereby overstating the 
extent to which the present can distance itself from, and thus ‘choose’ a perspective on, the 
past. In contrast, an indirect realist perspective, guided by an ontology of the trace, accords a 
determinative role to the past as well as to the present. This means that neither can be treated 
independently of the other, as there is a mutual determination of the present by the past and 
the past by the present. We can conceptualise this as a ‘two-way temporality’, whereby the 
historical past is constituted through a ‘backwards-forwards’ movement between past and 
present.  
 Ricoeur’s account of the ‘trace’ thus greatly enhances the project of building an 
indirect realism. It offers another means of conceiving of the noncoincidental and 
asymmetrical interdependence between historical happenings and historical narratives, and 
further, brings out more clearly the dynamic two-way temporality of historical reality, aptly 
capturing the fluid and reciprocal relation between past and present. Ricoeur’s account of the 
trace also gives a useful account of the relation between the empirical traces of the past and 
the more radical sense of the trace as a historical ontology. In this regard, it gives us a means 
of rethinking historical practice, which the final section will demonstrate, showing how the 
indirect realism sketched here can translate into a process-oriented conception of archival and 
historical practice that I term ‘restless revisionism’.  
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4 
 RESTLESS REVISIONISM 
 
Ricoeur’s notions of ‘metaphor’, ‘mimesis’, ‘split reference’, and the ‘trace’, I have argued, 
are useful in developing an indirect historical realism, which can take on the insights of 
textual reflexivism whilst preserving the referential function of historical narratives. 
Conceiving of historical reality in dynamic and processual terms—based upon a 
noncoincidental, asymmetrical interdependence between event and language, happening and 
interpretation—means that we can uphold the challenge to objectivism or direct realism, 
whilst nevertheless allowing for a continuity or link between historical narratives constructed 
in the present and events as they happened in the past. The indirect realist approach thereby 
preserves the crucial interconnection between historical research, based on a commitment to 
the archive and to somehow grasp the reality of the historical past, and historiographical 
theory, which enquires into the interpretative and conceptual frameworks that inform 
historical practice.  It enables criteria for accountability that are not restricted to methods or 
techniques of storytelling, and moreover, leaves room for revisionist projects that can coexist 
with, and mutually inform, critical historiographical methodologies focused on representative 
models and techniques.  
This kind of revisionism is different to the ‘naïve’ revisionism that Hemmings warns 
us against. Hemmings, we can recall, makes two key arguments against revisionism. In the 
first instance, she claims, revisionist projects implicitly disavow the selective nature of 
history-writing, positioning the revisionist as an ‘innocent’ enquirer and obscuring the politics 
motivating the desire to know. The newly revised story, she writes, ‘erase s  its own 
construction’ (Hemmings 2007:73). Her second argument is that revisionism leads to the 
reinstatement of master narratives and a fixed perspective on the past, as revisionist accounts 
seek to ‘correct’ the previous. ‘Revisionism, she claims, ‘implicitly tends towards the 
construction of new master narratives—a consensus and synthesis of perspectives—which 
effects a closing down and fixing of the past’ (ibid:72). The implication is that an anti-
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objectivist perspective implicitly entails an anti-realist and an anti-revisionist historiography. 
However, the indirect realist account developed above gives rise to a different kind of 
revisionism, which is not aligned to a fantasy of innocence or objectivity, and nor does it tend 
towards master narratives which ‘close down’ the past. I describe this as a ‘restless 
revisionism’, which operates according to three historiographical modes:  active, reflexive, 
and receptive.  
The active mode of ‘restless revisionism’ consists in taking the initiative and asking 
‘what really happened’? in order to generate alternative historical narratives. As argued in 
section 1, this is crucial for disturbing the hegemonic narratives that have had such a strong 
and problematic influence over feminist theory and discourse. According to the dynamic 
theory of metaphor proposed by Ricoeur, ‘dead’ or ‘worn-out metaphors’, enshrined in 
catalogued meaning, can be disrupted and broken apart through ‘living metaphors’, which 
‘tell us something new about reality’ and provoke fresh perspectives (Ricoeur 1978:291). So 
if the ‘wave’ metaphor, for example, is a worn-out metaphor which constricts the way that 
feminist narratives are constructed, it can be broken apart through staging archival 
encounters, which unleash traces and glimmers of the past, as meaning is generated anew 
through the ‘transfer’ between past and present. To try and create ‘living metaphors’, we need 
to seek out forgotten traces and fragments of feminist pasts, rather than simply ‘re-narrating’ 
stale and sedimented stories from a new perspective.  
Informed by the indirect realist model sketched above, however, this kind of active 
revisionism does not construct a new narrative as a ‘finished product’. As Ricoeur puts it, the 
documents and artefacts of the historical archive ‘incur a kind of debt to the past upon 
historical discourse and demand an endless rectification on its part’ (2009:371). Though the 
term ‘rectification’ used here by Ricoeur does perhaps suggest replacement, or an increase in 
‘correctness’, I want to emphasise the term ‘endless’ instead, which recasts the project of 
revisionism in processual terms. This processual understanding of historical practice emerges 
from the processual conception of historical reality given above, as on this account, the 
meaning of historical reality or a historical event is dependent upon the ongoing work of 
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interpretation: what it ‘is’ or ‘was’ cannot be settled once and for all. Moreover, whilst traces 
of the past spill over into the present, the past is not given directly as ‘raw fact’; nor is it given 
in the same way for everyone. Taking the ‘indirect realist’ view of the historical past—
whereby traces of the past are given differently to different subjects in the present—therefore 
leads to a pluralistic model of historical knowledge, rather than an aggregative model. On an 
aggregative model, the sum of different perspectives and narratives add up to give a fuller, 
more complete account (Joyce et al 1995:257). The aggregate model of historical knowledge 
and practice thus correlates with a conception of the historical past as a complete set of 
objective facts. A pluralistic model, in contrast, correlates with a different account of 
‘historical reality’, conceived in terms of the interplay between the fragmentary, 
indeterminate traces of past happenings that spill over into the present, and the complex and 
contestatory ‘work of configuration’ which keeps those traces in play. From this perspective, 
different perspectives and narratives do not need to aggregate into a comprehensive master 
narrative in order to be valuable or meaningful, or to tell us something ‘real’ about feminisms 
of the past.  
To recognise that past traces are not given ‘immediately’, nor given in the same way 
for everyone, moreover, demands a reflexive mode of historiography, grounded in an 
awareness of the role that the historian plays in shaping the historical past she investigates 
and narrates, and thus of the selectivity of historical narratives, which always do ‘precise 
work in the present’ (Hemmings 2007:69). Indeed, premised upon an ontological and 
epistemological framework which implicitly recognises the interdependence of interpretation 
and happening, this kind of revisionism is forced into reflexivity. Accordingly, ‘restless 
revisionism’ does not present the revisionist as ‘innocent’, nor does it erase the 
constructedness of the revised account. Rather, this kind of historical practice fosters a 
‘mutually provocative relation between the empirical and the rhetorical as equally necessary 
aspects of history-writing’ (La Capra 1985:21). It is not only an active revisionism that seeks 
to continually refresh the content of the stories it tells; it is also, and just as importantly, a 
reflexive revisionism in that it continually seeks to interrogate the way it tells them.  
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Revisionist projects, therefore, need not aim to set the story straight ‘once and for 
all’, or treat archives as fixed containers of truth, but instead, can aim to practice what 
Deborah Withers has described as ‘engaged interpretation’, (as opposed to ‘removed 
interpretation’), which is fully immersed in the knowledge politics that permeate historical 
work, and attentive to the selective and partisan nature of historical practice. This kind of 
engaged interpretation is well exemplified by Withers in her recent project ‘Sistershow 
Revisited’: an exhibition about an agit-prop feminist theatre troupe based in Bristol in 1973-
1975 (Withers 2011)
76
. One of the key effects of revisiting Sistershow is its troubling of 
hegemonic narratives which present ‘second wave’ and ‘1970s’ feminism in a puritanical 
light or a heterosexist frame. By identifying ‘queer tendencies’ and ‘camp aesthetics’ within 
Sistershow performances and practices—which are usually associated with ‘third wave’ or 
‘1980s’ feminism—Withers’ archival revisitings ‘jam dominant trajectories’ and subvert the 
‘straighter’ hegemonic narratives of the women’s movement (Withers and Chidgey 
2010:312). As such, she enables ‘Sistershow happenings’ to expand the ‘conditions of 
existence of contemporary feminism’, through unleashing the traces of these past feminist 
events within the present. Withers’ project serves as a demonstration that ‘revisionism’—
following traces and  ‘going back to the archives’—need not proceed according to a linear 
correctivist model, as she is not claiming that the Sistershow story she (re)constructs—of a 
small collective of mostly white women in Bristol—is in any way ‘definitive’ or that it should 
‘replace’ existing stories. The point, rather, is to disrupt the dominant master narratives, and 
moreover, to stimulate a restless desire to keep on revisiting feminist histories, to make us 
think again about what feminism has been and can be. 
In this sense, then, as well as harnessing the reflexive and active aspects of historical 
practice, a restless revisionism also operates according to a receptive mode. This 
‘receptiveness’ is not an ‘innocence’, but rather, a willingness to being transformed by 
encounters with past feminisms and allow ‘what we think we know’ to be radically altered by 
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 Sistershow was a ‘situationist-feminist cabaret’, which included a wide breadth of creative 
expressions such as song, film, dance, events, sketches and parodies. 
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events or ideas we had never heard of or even imagined. As we have seen, the model of 
historical reality that emerges from Ricoeur’s ontology of the trace accords an effectivity or 
determinative role not only to the present but also to the past. The reality of the historical past 
is indeed constituted through a backwards movement i.e. through the way we frame and 
narrate the past in the present, and our active pursuit of the past, but also through a forwards 
movement, i.e. through the overflow of the past into the present, as traces of past events and 
ideas interrupt the present and provoke new ways of thinking or acting. When historical 
practice models itself on this two-way temporality, which oscillates back and forth between 
past and present, it therefore cultivates not only an active and reflexive attitude, but further, a 
receptivity to the past. We are, it is true, never innocent of what we might find; but we can be 
surprised by it, hence the subversive power of history. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has examined the relation between the two senses of the term ‘history’, and 
argued that the historiographical upheaval which feminism requires can only be achieved 
through forging a provocative interrelation between the two. On the one hand, the narrative 
representation (‘history B’) can be understood as part of the ‘happening’ of history (‘history 
A’). The ways in which events are recorded and reported are caught up in the ‘happening’ of 
the event at the time, and further, significantly determine the ways in which past events are 
then received and reactivated in the present.  Indeed, the ‘events’ of history always belong to 
an interpretative chain of telling and retelling; as I discuss in the following chapter, every 
lived, narrated event is part of a wider narrative web.  This is not, however, to claim that 
linguistic mediation exhausts history to the extent that ‘history B’ is all that need concern us. 
The idea that history is merely a system of signs and symbols encloses language and literature 
‘in a world of its own’ and leaves us unable to account for the way that history moves. 
Accordingly, I have argued for an indirect historical realism staked on a dynamic historical 
ontology that I have theorised in terms of a noncoincidental, asymmetrical interdependence 
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between happening and interpretation. The thought that past events always ‘outrun’ or exceed 
our capacities to narrate and represent them, I have argued, enables a  ‘restless revisionism’: a 
historical practice that is alert to textual techniques and knowledge politics in the present, yet 
is equally committed to pursuing the traces of the past, according to the promises and 
constraints of the archive, and moreover, to being transformed by the encounter.  
I want to end now by drawing out more clearly the implications of the discussions 
above for a theory of historical time. In one sense, as Hayden White argues, history is indeed 
constituted ‘backwards’, according to the kinds of questions we ask and the interpretative 
frameworks that predominate in the present. Yet, by bringing the ‘past event’ back into the 
frame, I have reconceptualised the process of historical enquiry as not only a movement 
‘backwards’ from present to past, but more of a two-way ‘backwards-forwards’ movement 
between past and present, as the past event spills over into the present in the form of a trace: a 
‘sign-effect’ that, in turn, orients us ‘back in time’. This not only challenges the ‘presentist’ 
model which confines historiographical enquiry to the workings of the present, but further, 
challenges the linear model of revisionism whereby historical knowledge moves ever 
‘forwards’ as it grows inevitably more expansive and sophisticated. Rethinking revisionism as 
a restless process, via the time of the trace and archival time, thus disrupts both the ‘linear’ 
model of historical knowledge-building, and the ‘presentist model’, as it encourages a 
receptivity and openness to the past, as well as an awareness of how we shape and direct our 
understanding of the past from the position of hindsight in the present. This chapter has 
therefore explained one way in which history can be temporalised in a multilinear and 
multidirectional way, i.e. through a model whereby historical knowledges and understandings 
are generated through the dynamic oscillations between the interpretative workings of the 
present and the provocative traces of the past. 
The chapter has also given us our first indications of historical time as an enacted, 
lived, practical time. This is implicit in Ricoeur’s claim that whilst the trace is ‘a more radical 
phenomenon than the document or the archive… it is nevertheless the use of documents and 
archives that makes the trace an actual operator of historical time’ (1988b:184, emphasis 
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added). Ricoeur does not elaborate much further on this claim, but the idea that historical time 
is something that is ‘operated’ indicates a model of historical time as a kind of time that is 
activated and put into practice. I build on this idea in the following chapter, where I further 
consider the role that narrative plays in configuring historical time.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Narrative Time 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter focused on the referential function of historical narratives, as I outlined 
an epistemology of ‘indirect realism’, and a practice of ‘restless revisionism’, premised upon 
the dynamic, noncoincidental, asymmetrical interdependence between interpretation and 
happening. On the one hand, I argued, the trace of the past event will always exceed and 
‘outrun’ the narrative. Yet, on the other hand, interpretations and narrations are caught up in 
the ‘happening’ of the event at the time, and moreover, significantly determine the ways in 
which past events are received and reactivated in the present. This chapter delves deeper into 
narrative functions and forms, as I consider further the connection between historical time and 
‘narrative time’: the time of beginnings, middles, ends, flashbacks, flash-forwards, turning 
points, ruptures and returns. The principal aim is to demonstrate that narrative time can be 
understood as ‘internal’ to historical time, through examining the role played by narrative in 
shaping the temporality of historical events and the shifting configurations of historical time.  
There are two prevalent ways of theorising the relationship between historical time 
and narrative time within the field of historiography. The first is a structuralist approach 
adopted by ‘narrativist’ historiographers such as Barthes and White, who regard the 
narrativisation of historical events as a secondary, ‘external’ literary device, which cannot be 
attributed to historical reality as it ‘really’ occurs. From this perspective, ‘we do not live 
stories, we tell stories’, and thus, historical time and narrative time are treated as separate 
temporal orders. The aim of section 1 is to challenge this dualistic approach.  In the first 
instance, it fails to grasp the integral role that narrative plays in temporalising lived historical 
realities, by treating narrative as a secondary ‘artifice’. Further, it leads to a highly 
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impoverished notion of historical time itself, which is conceived in these structuralist analyses 
in terms of mundane chronology or ‘mere sequence’. The argument here therefore builds on 
and extends the critique of structuralist historiography advanced in chapter 2.  
The rest of the chapter seeks to articulate an alternative approach to the relation 
between historical time and narrative time, which treats historical reality as a ‘lived reality’, 
and therefore, historical time as a ‘lived time’. From this perspective, we do ‘live stories’, not 
only because narratives play a hugely significant role in determining our perspective on the 
world and place in it, but further, because we frequently live through courses of events 
according to a sense of ‘narrative’ temporal configuration, i.e. in terms of beginnings, ends, 
turning points, and so on. In this regard, narrative time can be understood as ‘internal’ to the 
temporality of historical events, and thus to historical time. Within this broad theoretical 
understanding of historical time as a ‘lived time’ however, there are two possible approaches: 
firstly, the phenomenological approach which uses a subjective first-person methodology 
grounded in the structures of ‘internal time-consciousness’; and secondly, the hermeneutical 
approach, which examines historical time as an intersubjective time at the level of the 
sociocultural.  
Section 2 examines the phenomenological route, focusing upon the Husserlian 
account of the temporal structures of consciousness and experience offered by David Carr 
(1986). Carr’s phenomenological account goes a long way to collapsing the dualistic model 
set up by structuralist historiography, positing an ‘affinity’ between lived time and narrative 
configuration at the most basic level of time-consciousness and lived events. Yet, whilst 
phenomenological analyses can give a partial account of how narrative time can be 
understood as ‘internal’ to historical time, the subject-centered method of Husserlian 
phenomenology alone is insufficient, given that historical time is an intersubjective time, and 
narrating is an intersubjective practice. Accordingly, the following section develops an 
account that starts from intersubjectivity, rather than the subjective standpoint, considering 
how the shifting patterns and configurations of historical time are generated through 
intersubjective interpretative activity and ‘narrativity’.  
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Section 3 draws firstly on Reinhard Koselleck’s hermeneutical account of historical 
time (2004), which offers a useful preliminary framework for theorising the role played by 
narratives and narrative configurations in temporalising the relation between intersubjective 
‘spaces of experience’ and ‘horizons of expectation’. Then, in order to grasp the significance 
of multiple and competing narrative determinations of historical time, I modify Koselleck’s 
approach through turning to ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’ (as articulated within postcolonial and 
feminist philosophy), and the paradigm of ‘narrativity’ (as articulated within narrative 
studies). Finally, having developed a theoretical account of the relationship between narrative 
time and historical time, I consider the methodological implications for feminist 
historiography in section 4. ‘Pluritopic hermeneutics’ and the ‘narrativity’ paradigm, I 
suggest, can orient a flexible and experimental practice of history-writing and reading, using 
multi-stranded and ‘fractured forms’, and engaging in ‘contrapuntal reading’, as a means of 
uncovering and expressing the diverse narratives and temporalities at work within the field of 
feminist history.   
 
1 
THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH:  
NARRATIVE TIME VERSUS HISTORICAL TIME 
 
In chapter 2, I challenged the ‘anti-realist’ epistemology adopted within structuralist or 
‘narrativist’ historiography, which focuses exclusively upon historical language and re-
describes history as essentially a literary discourse. The anti-realist approach, I argued, results 
in a highly reductive and impoverished conception of ‘historical reality’, as either a ‘language 
effect’ or a regulative idea akin to the Kantian noumenal or the Lacanian Real. This section 
will identify a further problem with the anti-realism of the structuralist approach, which is its 
reliance upon a reductive conception of ‘historical time’. As we will see, the structuralist 
effort to bracket out all talk of ‘historical reality’ and ‘real time’ is not always successful, 
which means that structuralist historiographers often fall back upon naturalistic, ‘common 
 106 
sense’ presumptions about ‘real’ historical time. This reductive notion props up the dualistic 
structuralist model, which positions ‘narrative time’ on one side, and ‘historical time’ on the 
other.  
The dualistic model of ‘narrative time versus historical time’ can be found in the 
work of both of the structuralist historiographers examined in the previous chapter.  Barthes, 
for example, in his essay ‘Historical Discourse’ proposes a friction between two time-scales: 
‘history’s and the history book’s’ (1970:147). He describes the ‘time of history’ as a simple, 
even ‘chronological sequence’, which the ‘time of the history book’ disrupts, through 
‘organisational shifters’ which reconfigure the ‘chronologically ordered subject matter’ 
within a complex, nonlinear matrix of semiotic temporal ‘structure’ (ibid). Examples of such 
‘organisational shifters’ include ‘performative openings’ where the historian’s voice 
interrupts the sequence being related, or the preface, which operates as either a prospective or 
retrospective meta-statement. ‘Transposition into the mode of sui-referential meta-statement’, 
Barthes argues, ‘serves not so much to enable the historian to express his subjectivity, as is 
commonly supposed, but rather to de-simplify the chronological Time of history by 
contrasting it with the different time-scale of the discourse itself’ (ibid:148). This claim about 
the chronological ‘time of history’, however, is in fact at odds with Barthes’ own ‘anti-realist’ 
epistemology, which purports to confine itself to the text and remain agnostic about matters 
of historical reality and real time. In ‘The Structural Analysis of Narrative’, for instance, 
Barthes insists that ‘both narrative and language know only a semiotic time, “true” time being 
a “realist”, referential illusion… It is as such that structural analysis must deal with it’ 
(Barthes 1983:271). Yet, despite claiming to bracket out ‘real time’ from his historiographical 
and narratological analysis, the distinction Barthes draws between ‘the time of history’ and 
the ‘time of the history book’ does smuggle in a presumption that historical time is ‘really’ 
and simply chronological, prior to being reconfigured within a semiotic temporal ‘structure’.   
A sharp distinction between historical time and narrative time is also discernible in 
Hayden White’s work, as he consistently suggests that narrative imposes a temporal order 
upon sets of events that in themselves they do not have. Like Barthes, White paints a picture 
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of two temporal orders: the chronological, meaningless order of historical time as ‘mere 
sequence’, and the nonlinear, meaningful order of narrative time. We can recall from chapter 
2 that White dramatically reduces the epistemological and referential function of historical 
narratives, arguing that no mode of historical representation can claim to be more ‘realistic’ 
than another. Yet at the same time, he disobeys his own dictum, when he suggests in an essay 
on ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’ that non-narrative histories, 
which ‘refuse to tell a story’, in fact come closer to representing the ‘real’ nature of events 
unfolding in time (White 1980). As such, he argues, it is annals and chronicles rather than 
historical narratives that come the closest to representing reality as it ‘presents itself’: either 
‘as mere sequence without beginning or end or as sequences of beginnings that only terminate 
and never conclude’ (ibid: 27). Narrative representations of reality in the form of a story, he 
claims, are ‘marked by a desire for a kind of order and fullness in an account of reality that 
remains theoretically unjustified… wear(ing) the mask of a meaning, the completeness and 
fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience’ (ibid: 20-24). In other words, 
meaningful temporal sequences, with chains of significance, turning points, or the sense of an 
ending or beginning, are pure fiction.  
There are two fundamental problems with the arguments put forward here by Barthes 
and White. The first lies with the idea that historical events unfold or are ‘given’ in ‘mere 
sequence’; and the second lies with the idea that we ‘never experience’ reality in the form of 
narrative configuration.  As stated, the idea that historical reality unfolds or ‘presents itself’ as 
mere sequence, and that meaningful temporal configurations of reality are a literary invention, 
reveals a naturalistic prejudice whereupon ‘real’ historical time is equated with the idea of a 
‘natural chronology’(Carr 1986:19). This can be attributed to the structuralist attempt to 
simply evade the question of historical reality, with the result that these theorists end up 
reproducing naturalistic ‘common sense’ presumptions, which ultimately enable positivistic 
and objectivist models to retain a monopoly on how to construe and deal with ‘reality’ 
(Ricoeur 1984). Historical events and conditions will of course be related to natural temporal 
orders, which can provide an idea of a ‘natural chronology’ based upon biological, 
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astronomical, or physical models (Koselleck 2004:105). Yet, ‘natural chronology’ is not the 
same thing as ‘historical chronology’, which is a specific mode of organising historical events 
and experience. This means that ‘to elicit historical chronology, even for events, 
“structuration” is needed’ (ibid: 106; Greenhouse 1996:34). The idea that historical events are 
‘given’ in chronological ‘mere sequence’, and are then given ‘structure’ at a later stage of 
narrativisation, is thus rather disingenuous, as historical chronologies are always ‘structured’, 
albeit in a different and more seemingly simple way than historical narratives. Distinguishing 
between a naturalistic model of chronological sequence or ‘natural chronology’, and a distinct 
concept of historical chronology, therefore brings into question the ‘common sense’ 
presumption that annals and chronicles are somehow ‘closer’ to ‘real’ historical time than 
narrative representations. Instead, if chronological and narrative configurations are both 
understood as distinct, interrelated, modes of organising historical events, then each will 
depend upon a specific kind of historical experience and understanding, and as such, neither 
can claim to be a more ‘authentic’ or faithful configuration of ‘real’ historical time77.  
This line of argument also begins to shift us away from the idea that historical events 
simply happen or unfold ‘in time’, towards a conception that historical events are temporal, 
with their own ‘internal’ temporal structures which can include, but also exceed, the serial 
‘before and after’ temporality of historical chronology. ‘Every history’, Koselleck writes, 
‘bears out that acting subjects perceive a certain duration: of inauguration, high points, 
peripateia, crises, and termination’, and accordingly, these internal conditions ‘determine the 
sequence of events’ (ibid: 106). That is, we often go through historical events with a sense of 
beginnings, endings and middles, (or are troubled by the lack thereof), even if a ‘complete’ 
narrative account can only be provided in retrospect. Moreover, the way we experience 
historical reality is deeply influenced by the specific narratives which govern our social and 
personal lives. Not only do we tell stories, but ‘stories tell us’ (Bennett and Royle 1995:41). 
White’s claim that we ‘never experience’ historical reality in terms of meaningful temporal 
                                                          
77
 I investigate the configuration of historical chronologies in further detail in the following chapter on 
‘calendar time’. 
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configurations, and that narrative only comes after the event, is thus, once again, rather 
disingenuous.  On the contrary, narrative configurations play a crucial role in determining 
how historical events are lived and experienced, at the time of their occurrence, and also as 
they become absorbed and retold as part of a broader cultural and historical memory. This 
sense of narrative configuration determines how historical events unfold, and as such, both 
chronological and narrative temporalities are ‘demonstrable within historical events’ 
(Koselleck 2004:94).  
The idea that ‘lived events’ have their own internal conditions and temporalities gives 
rise to a preliminary understanding of narrative time as ‘internal’ to historical time, rather 
than being ‘external’ or extraneous. From this perspective, historical chronologies and annals 
do not provide a ‘truer’ representation of historical time than historical narratives. Rather, the 
way historical time ‘really is’ depends upon how it is lived, and thus upon the ‘internal’ 
temporalities of historical events, which can include chronological and narrative 
configurations. The turn to ‘lived experience’, ‘lived events’, and ‘lived time’ will therefore 
be crucial to the rest of this chapter, as I further explicate this claim that narrative time is 
‘internal’ to historical time. But as we will see, these concepts of ‘lived experience’, ‘lived 
events’, and ‘lived time’ can in fact be theorised in two different ways: firstly, in 
phenomenological terms of first-person subjective experience; and secondly in broader terms 
of intersubjective, ‘experiential fields’, shaped by social relations and practices and cultural 
configurations. I will ultimately argue that the latter approach yields the most fruitful 
approach to historical time as a lived time, as it recognises the constitutive importance of 
intersubjective relations and cultural models in determining experienced relations to historical 
time. But before doing so, the next section will explore the phenomenological account of the 
‘affinity’ between narrative time and lived time at the most basic level of ‘internal time-
consciousness’.  
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2 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH:  
THE AFFINITY BETWEEN LIVED TIME AND NARRATIVE TIME 
 
The claim that narrative is ‘internal’ to historical time moves us away from the structuralist 
approach, which reductively equates ‘real’ historical time with simple sequence or 
chronology. This section will consider this claim in further detail, by drawing on the 
subjective phenomenology of time-consciousness, focusing particularly on the account given 
by David Carr in Time, History and Narrative (1986). The principal aim of Carr’s study is to 
overcome the dualisms of the structuralist model by demonstrating the ‘affinity’ between 
narrative time and ‘lived time’ at its most basic subjective level. To do so, he draws upon the 
Husserlian account of internal time-consciousness, in particular Husserl’s concepts of 
‘retention’ and ‘protention’, as he seeks to demonstrate that there is a kind of rudimentary 
‘narrative structure’ within certain ‘prefigured’ features of time-consciousness and action, out 
of which fully-fledged literary and verbalised narratives arise (Carr 1986:16). He then 
attempts to extend this thesis to explain the connection between narrative time and historical 
time.  
In his lectures on The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1964), 
Husserl contends that the structures of time-consciousness are essentially ‘retentional’ and 
‘protentional’, as conscious temporal experience is constituted through ‘retentions’ of the 
‘just passed’—the ‘comet’s tail’ of what has been perceived—and ‘protentions’, or 
‘immediate’ anticipations of what will be perceived (Husserl 1964:44-57). ‘Retention’ and 
‘protention’, unlike secondary ‘recollections’ and ‘expectations’, which come and go, belong 
to all experience (ibid: 68-71). Husserl describes this retentional-protentional process as a 
‘sinking’, ‘shading’ or ‘running-off phenomenon… a continuity of constant 
transformations… not severable into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into 
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phases, points of the continuity’ (ibid: 48)78. The famous example Husserl gives is of hearing 
a melody, an experience which consists in the retention of the tonal phase that has ‘just’ 
passed, and the protention or immediate anticipation of the imminent phase (ibid: 43). ‘The 
temporal phases of my hearing’, as Carr explains it, ‘stand in the same part-whole relation to 
each other as do the notes of the melody I hear. Just as each note is experienced as part of the 
melody as a whole, so the experience of it is lived through as part of the complex experience 
of the melody’ (Carr 1986:27-8).  
The first important point to draw from the Husserlian account is that 
phenomenological temporality, at this most basic level, is qualitatively different from serial, 
chronological temporality. By introducing a ‘longitudinal intentionality’ into the 
phenomenological present, Husserl renders the phenomenological present entirely distinct 
from the point-like instant of serial or chronological time (Husserl 1964:107). According to 
the Husserlian account, our experience is ‘directed towards, and itself assumes, temporally 
extended forms in which future, present and past mutually determine one another’ (Carr 
1986:31). Unlike the point-like instant, then, the phenomenological present contains the 
‘totality of the temporal spectrum within itself’ (Osborne 1995:49-50). As such, the 
phenomenological schema of past, present and future, as ‘modes of temporal orientation’, is 
not reducible to, or even mappable on to, a serial succession of instants in relation to a 
‘before’ and ‘after’ (Husserl 1964:48).  
Indeed, not only does the phenomenological account fundamentally differentiate 
experiential temporality from the serial temporality of simple chronology; it also raises the 
question of a whether a ‘mere sequence’ of events, whilst thinkable or conceivable in an 
abstract sense, is in fact experiencable at all (Carr 1986:24).
. 
According to Husserl, the idea of 
a simple succession of instants is a secondary, conceptual construction that arises when the 
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 It is a common criticism that Husserl pays much more attention to ‘retention’ than to ‘protention’. 
Indeed, this is one of the fundamental points of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl, along with his claim 
that retention and protention are not symmetrical counterparts, but rather, are fundamentally 
asymmetrical (Heidegger 2009). For further critical accounts of Husserl’s analysis of time-
consciousness, see The New Husserl: a Critical Reader (ed. Welton 2003), particularly the essays by 
Lanei Rodemeyer and Dan Zahavi.  
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present, which serves as the ‘perpetual source’ of the retentional-protentional series, is 
abstracted from the durational continuity it establishes (Husserl 1964:50; see also Osborne 
1995:50). On this account, the idea of a chronological historical time can be theorised as a 
‘secondary’ or ‘derived’ temporality, in contrast to the phenomenological primacy of 
retentional-protentional lived temporality. From the phenomenological perspective, then, the 
reality of our temporal experience is that it is complex and ‘configured’. Thus, Carr contends, 
‘it is the “mere sequence” that has turned out to be fictional, in the sense that we speak of a 
“theoretical fiction”’ (Carr 1986:25). 
Whilst there are problems with trying to derive an account of chronological time 
entirely through the ‘phenomenological reduction’79, the Husserlian analysis of ‘internal time-
consciousness’ does serve as a useful counterpoint to the structuralist proposition that 
complex temporal configurations are a secondary literary phenomenon. For Carr, moreover, 
the Husserlian account is not only valuable in challenging reductive sequentialist models at 
the most basic level of temporal experience; it can also explain the link between historical 
time and narrative. This is because the phenomenological account can demonstrate that 
temporal ‘configuration’ inheres in experience itself, and thus in lived events, just as temporal 
configuration is essential to narrative structure. The idea of an ‘event’, Carr claims, is already 
of something that has ‘temporal thickness’, and ‘events are experienced as the phases and 
elements of other, larger-scale events and processes. These make up the temporal 
configurations, like melodies and other daily occurrences and happenings, that are the stuff of 
our daily experience. Even though as temporal they unfold bit by bit, we experience them as 
configurations thanks to our retentional and protentional “gaze” which spans future and past’ 
(ibid: 24). Accordingly, he argues, there is an ‘affinity’ between narrative configuration and 
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 Husserl’s attempt to bracket the ‘naturalistic’ standpoint’ altogether is doomed to failure, as natural 
temporalities always determine time-consciousnesses to a certain extent. Indeed, Ricoeur contends that 
Husserl himself ‘borrows’ from objective determinations in his ‘primary’ phenomenological 
descriptions of lived time, for example, when uses the phrase ‘at the same time’, which is based upon a 
notion of objective simultaneity, or objective equality between intervals of time. Moreover, ‘the 
perception of duration never ceases to presuppose the duration of perception, and hence a time to 
which the subject is subjected, as much as a time which it constitutes’ (Ricoeur 1988:24).  
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the temporal configuration of simple lived events, which are the basic stuff or ‘building 
blocks’ of history. 
Carr’s argument depends upon an extension of the concepts of ‘retention’ and 
protention’ beyond the Husserlian account, which considers pre-reflective or ‘passive’ 
experience only, to include the temporality of our active, practical, lives as well. Like 
‘passive’ experience, Carr argues, action can be considered as an event that the actor ‘lives 
through’, and whichever stage of the action she is ‘located’ in, she has ‘a kind of 
‘prospective’ and ‘retrospective’ “grasp”’ of the past and future elements of the action (ibid: 
34). This ‘grasp’ effects a kind of ‘closure which articulates time by separating the given 
temporal configuration (action or event) from what goes before or after’ (ibid: 41). The 
example Carr uses here is of a person serving a tennis ball: an action where the different 
‘phases’ are integrated into one another and cannot be reduced to a chronological sequence. 
‘The intimate and complementary interrelation of present, future, and past… is an important 
part of action, or at least of a relatively short-term action such as that of hitting a tennis ball’ 
(ibid: 34). In this sense, Carr contends, the temporality of action is comparable to the 
temporality of pre-reflective or ‘passive’ experience; hence, the concepts of ‘retention’ and 
protention’ have a wider applicability than the phenomenology of internal, ‘passive’ or ‘pre-
reflective’ time-consciousness, and pertain to our active, practical lives.  
Beginning his account at the level of small-scale actions and subjective experience, 
then, Carr’s analysis demonstrates that ‘the bedrock of human events is not ‘mere sequence’ 
but ‘configured sequence’ … [which] inheres in the most basic of lived events and actions’. If 
configured temporal structures inhere in phenomena at this most basic level, he argues, then 
‘it cannot be maintained that they are imported from outside’ and achieved ‘only at the hand 
of literary invention’ (ibid: 49). Instead, Carr posits an affinity or ‘kinship’ between the 
‘configurational character’ of basic everyday lived events and the primary features of 
narrative structure. However, whilst there may be a demonstrable ‘affinity’ between narrative 
time and lived time at this basic ‘small-scale’ level, ‘narrative’ is not associated with only 
such basic actions and experiences as Carr describes, such as hearing a melody or serving a 
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tennis ball. The function of a narrative is not only to describe or report simple, everyday 
phenomena, but rather, to convey complex sequences and complex configurations that 
involve more than just one experiencing and acting individual. Historical time, moreover, is a 
large-scale time that involves multiple people and stretches far beyond individual experience 
and basic action. 
The utility of subjectivist phenomenology in explaining the relationship between 
historical time and narrative is therefore limited. We can certainly affirm that narrative and 
historical time do depend upon the subjective structures of individual time-consciousness, 
inasmuch as they depend upon the interrelation between past, present and future as ‘modes of 
temporal orientation’, and the capacity of individuals to think the past through the present and 
future, the future through the present and past, and the present through the past and future. 
Yet, whilst Carr manages to effectively overturn the structuralist idea that at some basic or 
fundamental level, human events are ‘merely sequential’ in their temporality, his method of 
beginning with a phenomenology of ‘internal time-consciousness’ and only then moving 
‘outwards’ towards a theory of intersubjective historical time runs into difficulties. The move 
from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, or ‘from I to We’, requires an extension of the notion of 
experience, such that an individual can speak of ‘our’ experience, even if she has had no such 
experience directly (ibid: 133). In the case of historical time, this is particularly crucial, as the 
‘we’ both predates and survives the individuals that constitute the ‘we’ at any given time. Yet, 
when we try to reach a universal collective singular—‘we’—through a first-person 
methodology, we tend to think in singular, reductive and generic terms about intersubjective 
historical experience and historical time-consciousness
80
. Or as Johanna Oksala puts it, the 
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 For example, Carr attempts to extend his account ‘outwards’ by adopting the viewpoint of a 
‘common subject’ or ‘we-subject’: a viewpoint ‘which is still first person but is plural’ (Carr 1986: 
133-4). Carr insists that the ‘we–subject’ is not simply ‘a larger–scale I’, yet he claims that ‘the ‘we-
subject’ displays the same temporal structure of ‘experience, action and life’ that is associated with the 
individual subject (ibid:149). The communal ‘we’, he writes, operates on a plane of ‘higher synthesis’ 
where the group can think and act as one, projecting a unified vision of ‘a future before us and a past 
behind us’ (ibid:168).  
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subject-centered methodology often results in the ‘patronising assumption that we are the 
entire structure’ (Oksala 2006:239).  
Feminist theorists have become particularly aware of the problems that arise when we 
try and move ‘outwards’ from the subjective level of individual consciousness and experience 
to the intersubjective and the general. This kind of method has resulted in generalising 
presumptions about ‘women’s experience’, based upon the experiences of just one individual 
or distinct group of women (Mohanty 1995; Mulinari and Sandell 1999). Feminists have also 
been sharply critical of the ‘epistemological foundationalism’ that ensues when we treat 
experience as a source for knowledge that needs no further interrogation or interpretation 
 
(Scott 1991; Stoller 2009)
81
. Cultural theorists and historians alike have argued that 
‘experiential facts’ always come with an ‘interpretative overlay’, thereby stressing the need to 
theorise and interpret the sociocultural norms, institutions and practices that shape 
‘experience’ (Battersby 2006:209). Just as importantly, feminist psychoanalytic theorists have 
stressed the role of unconscious structures and attachments (Brennan 2000; Minsky 1996). As 
such, ‘experience’ must not be taken as an unproblematic foundation for knowledge, but 
rather, as a complex and intersubjective field to be critically considered and interpreted 
(Stoller 2009).  
Consequently, a theory of historical time as a ‘lived time’ needs to give due weight to 
the constitutive importance of intersubjective relations and encounters, and to sociocultural 
norms, institutions and practices, as well as to the structures of ‘internal time-
consciousness’82. The following section, therefore, will attempt to explicate the link between 
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 Indeed, the concept of ‘experience’ has come in for such heavy criticism that it has become rather 
‘discredited’ within feminist theory (Martìn Alcoff 2000:44). Joan Scott, for example, concludes that 
historians and historiographers should change our object of study from historical ‘reality’ as it is 
experienced through lived events to the discursive systems that shape, codify and configure 
experience (1991). My own view, however, is that to disengage from ‘events’, ‘reality’, and historical 
‘experience’ (thereby re-describing historiography as essentially an exercise in literary or textual 
analysis), makes it difficult to make claims about historical happenings as the basis for political claims.  
Moreover, the concept of experience is fundamental to any theory of ‘lived time’, which requires that 
we modify and broaden our approach to ‘experience’, rather than simply abandoning it altogether. 
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 Many feminist phenomenologists have turned to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a means of 
exploring the intersubjective determinations of individual experience and consciousness, as Merleau-
 116 
historical time and narrative time through intersubjective ‘experiential fields’, rather than 
adopting a phenomenological methodology which places the subject at the centre.  
 
3  
THE HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH:  
INTERSUBJECTIVE NARRATIONS OF HISTORICAL TIME  
 
Treating historical time as a ‘lived time’ takes us away from the dualistic and reductive model 
of narrative time versus historical time, and enables us to argue that narrative is ‘internal’ to 
historical time. The theoretical shift towards lived time can initially be made through turning 
from a structuralist approach to a phenomenological approach. I have argued, however, that a 
subject-centered theory of lived time can only give a partial account, because historical time 
is an intersubjective kind of time, which requires a different kind of analysis and a different 
set of theoretical tools. In communicating with others, we engage in an interpretative activity, 
and through this intersubjective engagement, ‘a new dimension of time is established’ (Shutz: 
1982:219; see also Weiss 2011:182). The relationship between historical time and narrative 
thus cannot be theorised through the individual consciousness or experience alone. 
‘Experience’, as Silvia Stoller insists, ‘is always embedded in a field of experience’ (Stoller 
2009: 716). Accordingly, this section abandons the first-person phenomenological method, 
and examines the intersubjective, interpretative activity of configuring and narrating historical 
time.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ponty stresses that subjectivity is grounded within a fundamentally intersubjective experience (Weiss 
2011:177). This is not, however, to suggest that feminist phenomenologists have uniformly abandoned 
Husserl. For examples of feminist re-workings of the Husserlian framework, see, for example, essays 
by Heinämaa and Schües in the edited collection Time and Feminist Phenomenology (2011), or work 
by Alia Al-Saji, who argues that Husserl’s phenomenology of touch can be stretched beyond its initial 
‘methodologically solipsistic frame’, to be of use to feminist phenomenologies of embodiment (2010). 
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To pursue this intersubjective, interpretative approach, I initially turn to the 
hermeneutical account of historical time given by Koselleck in Futures Past (2004)
83
. Like 
Carr, one of Koselleck’s key concerns is to demonstrate that historical time is not reducible to 
chronology. ‘All experience’ he writes, ‘leaps over time; experience does not create 
continuity in the sense of an additive preparation of the past’ (Koselleck 2004: 260). Yet, 
Koselleck’s hermeneutics of historical time take us further than Carr’s phenomenological 
approach, helping us to ground a notion of historical time as a lived time that is neither 
reductively chronological, nor singular and subjective. In the first instance, Koselleck’s 
hermeneutical account offers a notion of ‘lived experience’ as a shared, discursively 
determined, interpretative field, rather than the ‘private experience’ model of subjectivist 
phenomenology. In the second instance, it offers a means of explaining the crucial role that 
narrative plays in configuring the shifting patterns and intersubjective determinations of 
historical time. The broad theoretical framework provided by Koselleck requires 
modification, however, if we are to grasp the significance of multiple and competing 
temporalisations of history. This can be achieved, I suggest in the second half of the section, 
through fusing a ‘pluritopic’ approach to hermeneutics with pluralistic theories of 
‘narrativity’. Taken together, these two approaches compel us to appreciate and investigate 
the internal temporal complexity within any culture of time or narrative context.   
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 Feminism and hermeneutics, it must be noted, do have a vexed relation, particularly the 
hermeneutical philosophy articulated by Hans Georg Gadamer. The three key problems with 
Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy, from a feminist perspective, are: firstly, that Gadamer's account 
entails a highly conservative attitude towards 'tradition', which fairly unquestioningly accepts the 
legitimacy of tradition, and treats the tradition of a culture or society as unified and homogenous; 
secondly, that the goal of Gadamer's hermeneutics is inherently conservative, in seeking 
'understanding', rather than transformation; and thirdly, that Gadamer's notion of 'understanding' as a 
'fusion of horizons' appears as a form of assimilation, a subsumption of different viewpoints to the 
detriment of the less powerful. However, whilst there are aspects to be avoided and reasons to be 
suspicious, there are many aspects of hermeneutical philosophy which are useful to feminist 
historiography, given that the basic issue at the heart of hermeneutical philosophy is one's 
consciousness of historicity and historical locatedness, and the question of how to interpret the past in 
relation to the present, and vice versa. Ricoeur uses the term 'traditionality', rather than 'tradition' (i.e. 
the transmitted content), to refer to the dynamic interplay between reception and innovation within the 
transmission and construction of knowledge and culture (Ricoeur 1988). And as we will see below, 
feminist and postcolonial theorists have developed critical, pluralistic hermeneutical approaches, which 
cannot be accused of conservatism. For more on the question of feminism and hermeneutics, see the 
edited collection of Feminist Interpretations of Hans Georg Gadamer (ed. Code 2003). 
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3.1 
Shifting Patterns of Historical Time  
 
Koselleck’s hermeneutical account of historical time pivots around two ‘meta-historical’ 
concepts: the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’. They are ‘meta-
historical’ concepts, he explains, in the sense that they can be taken as ‘anthropological 
givens’ and thus constitute the ‘condition of possible histories’ (2004:259). His key thesis is 
that the interrelation between these two concepts offers a ‘hermeneutical key’ to registering 
the shifting and complex configurations of historical time. Before explaining this thesis, I 
should stress that Koselleck’s ‘meta-historical’ concepts of the ‘space of experience’ and 
‘horizon of expectation’ are not ‘phenomenological’ in the sense of referring to ‘internal 
time-consciousness’. They are intended, rather, as intersubjective categories, which do 
incorporate the subjective consciousness, but importantly, are not subject-centered. The space 
of experience and horizon of expectation operate at a different level to personal experience, 
indicating intersubjective fields that both exceed and precede those of the individual. 
Koselleck takes into account the ‘element of alien experience contained and preserved in 
experience conveyed by generations and institutions’, and also the role of unconscious 
determinations of temporal experience. ‘Within experience’, he writes, ‘a rational reworking 
is included, together with unconscious modes of conduct which do not have to be present in 
awareness’ (ibid: 259) Accordingly, we have moved from a subjective model of ‘internal 
time-consciousness’ and experience to a model of intersubjective, shared ‘fields of 
experience’, shaped by discursive systems, social norms, and traditions.  
The ‘space of experience’ concept, Koselleck explains, refers to the dimensions of 
both past and present existence, because experience is ‘specified by the fact that it has 
processed past occurrence… experience based on the past is assembled through many layers 
of earlier times’ (ibid: 260). In contrast, the ‘horizon of expectation’ concept refers to the 
futural dimension of historical existence, and is described as ‘that line behind which a new 
space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen’ (ibid: 260-1). In many ways, he 
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concedes, ‘experience’ and ‘expectation’ presuppose and are entangled within one other. For 
example, ‘new experiences might open up other experiences’, or new hopes or 
disappointments can enter into old experiences with retroactive effect (ibid: 262). Moreover, 
expectation of the future always takes place in the present and past, such that expectation can 
be described as ‘the future made present’ (ibid: 259). In this sense, then, the ‘meta-historical’ 
concepts of the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’ enable us to 
demonstrate the complex interdependence between present, past and future (ibid: 258).  
On the other hand, however, whilst the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of 
expectation’ do presuppose and mutually constitute one another to an extent, they are not 
‘symmetrical complementary concepts which might mutually relate past and future’. On the 
contrary, experience and expectation are of different orders. Expectation itself, or the 
prospect of the future, is certainly experienced in the past and present, in the form of raised 
hopes and anxieties for example. Yet, ‘the intended conditions, situations, or consequences of 
expectation are not themselves experiential entities’ (ibid). The ‘legibility of the future’, 
Koselleck writes, ‘despite possible prognoses confronts an absolute limit, for it cannot be 
experienced… an expectation can never be entirely deduced from experience because it 
directs itself to ‘the not-yet, to the nonexperienced, to that which is to be revealed’ (ibid: 260-
1). Accordingly, whilst experience and expectation do partially ‘presuppose’ one another, 
they are in fact asymmetrical, ‘dissimilar modes of existence’, which do not coexist in a 
symmetrical or static relation (ibid: 261).  
Koselleck’s key thesis, therefore, is that the tension and interrelation between these 
two ‘meta-historical’ concepts offers a ‘hermeneutical key’ to registering the shifting patterns 
of historical time, as they redouble past and future on one another in an unequal manner. The 
‘space of experience’ expands or contracts in relation to an expanding or contracting ‘horizon 
of expectation’, thereby producing specific temporal configurations of history (ibid: 263). 
This hermeneutical formula opens up a methodology for Koselleck: a ‘semantics of historical 
time’, which studies the graduation of social and political concepts such as ‘tradition’, 
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‘revolution’, ‘progress’, ‘development’, ‘crisis’, ‘liberation’, or ‘stagnation’ according to 
the relationship between the ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ which these 
concepts convey. For example, we can interpret the historical temporality of societies or 
cultures premised upon ‘tradition’ according to an ‘almost seamless transference of earlier 
experiences into coming expectations’, as those living in the present subsist almost entirely by 
the experiences of their predecessors (ibid. 264). In contrast, the ‘progressive’ understanding 
of history can be interpreted as a contraction of the ‘space of experience’, and a concomitant 
expansion of the futural ‘horizon of expectation’, as ‘expectations that reach out for the 
future’ become detached from ‘all that previous experience has to offer’ (ibid: 267-7). In this 
case, the horizon of expectation is ‘no longer limited by the space of experience’, as it is 
believed that the future will be both different from, and an improvement upon, the past.
84
  
The hermeneutical account thereby offers a means of theorising and interpreting the 
shifting patterns of historical time, as a ‘large-scale time’ that transcends the limits of our 
personal existence, and enables us to conceive and communicate shared pasts and collective 
futures. Whilst the structuralist account separates historical time from discursively produced 
configurations of time, Koselleck’s hermeneutical account proposes that historical time is 
discursively produced, through intersubjective, interpretative activity which is determined by, 
and determines, specific ways of living history. This is why ‘historical time’ is not simply an 
empty definition, but is rather, ‘an entity that alters along with history and from whose 
changing structure it is possible to deduce the shifting classifications of experience and 
expectation’ (ibid: 259). Moreover, the hermeneutical account offers a means of explaining 
how narrative time can be understood as ‘internal’ to historical time, given that narrative 
plays such a vital role in configuring and reconfiguring the past-present-future relation, and 
therefore in generating the ever-shifting patterns of historical time. Narrative configurations 
                                                          
84
 Drawing on Koselleck’s theory, Ricoeur argues that if Enlightenment conceptions of history 
dominate discussions of historical time, this is because the Enlightenment brings these metahistorical 
categories governing historical consciousness to consciousness. In other words: ‘the variation in the 
relationship between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience was so apparent that it 
could serve as revelatory of the categories in terms of which we think about this variation’ (Ricoeur 
1988).  
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can broaden and open out the ‘space of experience’ or the ‘horizon of expectation’, or 
alternatively, narrow and close them down, thereby determining how historical time is 
discursively produced, imagined and experienced. Through narrative, we configure past and 
present experience, and negotiate expectations, carrying the past into the future, or 
conversely, retroactively transforming our accumulated memories of the past.  
However, whilst Koselleck’s theory allows that there are shifting determinations and 
patterns of historical time, he arguably does not pay sufficient attention in his own work to 
the struggles for meaning and articulation that produce particular hegemonic narratives and 
temporalisations of history. He tends towards ‘broad brush-stroke’ analyses of ‘time cultures’ 
such as the ‘Renaissance’ or ‘modernity’, which overlook the differences internal to these 
particular cultures of time. This kind of analysis has been consistently challenged by feminist 
and postcolonial theorists, who have questioned the characterisation of entire societies, 
cultures and eras according to a single cultural ‘experience’ or consciousness of historical 
time.  Joan Kelly’s renowned essay ‘Did Women Have a Renaissance?’, for instance, argues 
that women as a group, especially among the classes that dominated the Italian urban elite, 
experienced a contraction of social and personal options during this era, which the men of 
their classes did not experience as markedly. The quality of women’s historical and temporal 
experience during the ‘Renaissance’ thus differed considerably from that of men as a group 
(Kelly 1984: 20). Similarly, feminist and postcolonial theorists have insisted on differences 
within ‘the time of the modern’, and considered nonhegemonic forms of ‘modern’ temporal 
experience such as black ‘counter-cultures of modernity’ (Lyon 1999; Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 
1993; Felski 2000). In The Black Atlantic, for example, Paul Gilroy undertakes a formal 
analysis of black popular music as a means of interpreting the nature of modern temporality 
as a complex blend of innovation, tradition, cross-cultural, and cross-historical continuities, 
which complicates accounts that treat the ‘time of the modern’ as synonymous with the ‘time 
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of the new’, or set the temporality of the modern wholly against the temporality of tradition 
(Gilroy 1993:74)
 85
.  
Studies such as these demonstrate that different groups and individuals experience 
changes in their modes of temporality in distinctive and uneven ways, and moreover, draw 
attention to the politics of time that attend the rise to prominence of certain narrative 
configurations and forms of historical time-consciousness (Felski 2000:25). Accordingly, we 
cannot presume that there is a single unified ‘space of experience’ or ‘horizon of expectation’. 
Whilst Koselleck’s theory offers a rudimentary ‘hermeneutical key’ to registering the shifting 
patterns of historical time and the role played by narrative, it needs to be supplemented by 
approaches which can register the significance of multiple, competing narratives within 
experiential fields and temporal horizons.  
 
3.2  
Pluritopic Hermeneutics and Narrativity  
 
Historical time, Koselleck contends, is constituted through the interrelation between the 
‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’, as the tension between these two 
contracting/expanding domains generates ever-changing patterns of historical time. This idea, 
I have suggested, offers a useful basic framework for making sense of the claim that narrative 
time is ‘internal’ to historical time, given the crucial role that narrative plays in configuring 
and reconfiguring lived patterns of historical time. Yet, although Koselleck provides the basic 
theoretical tools, his hermeneutical analysis needs pushing a little further, because if historical 
time is generated through intersubjective, interpretative activity and a variety of overlapping, 
competing narratives, there can be no single historical-consciousness or unified culture of 
time.  
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For another interesting study which challenges accepted definitions and understandings of 
‘modernity’ and modern time-consciousness, see Nye (1993), who argues that the apparently 
anachronistic idea of ‘honour’ is what enables us to make sense of modern forms of western 
masculinity.  
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  One promising direction for a hermeneutics of historical time is opened up by the 
idea of a ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’, as it has been articulated within postcolonial and feminist 
philosophy (Mignolo 2003; Martín Alcoff 2006). To outline this approach, Walter Mignolo 
draws a comparison in The Darker Side of the Renaissance (2003) between ‘pluritopic 
hermeneutics’, and the ‘monotopic’ hermeneutics expounded and practiced by conservative 
hermeneutical philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer. A ‘monotopic’ hermeneutics, 
Mignolo explains, presumes a universal interpretative framework or horizon understood by a 
universal subject who ‘speaks for the rest of humanity’ (Mignolo 2003:11; Gadamer 1975). 
Or in respect to the discussion above, a ‘monotopic’ hermeneutical perspective would 
presume that a given ‘space of experience’ or ‘horizon of expectation’ is unified, i.e. that it is 
interpreted and understood in the same way by all those living within the same cultural field. 
In contrast, a ‘pluritopic’ hermeneutics presupposes more than one interpretative tradition or 
horizon within any experiential and cultural field, emphasising the ‘locus of enunciation’ and 
challenging the presumed universality of the understanding subject (ibid: 16-17). The need 
for a pluritopic hermeneutics, Mignolo argues, is crystallised and made most apparent within 
colonial situations, which involve a plurality of traditions and interpretative horizons (ibid: 
19). Historical processes of migration and colonialism have indeed led to increasing levels of 
interconnection between events in apparently disparate times and places. Yet, on the other 
hand, ‘we are a very long way from having a shared framework and experience of time and 
history, in terms of which it might be possible to arrive at a single evaluation of those events’ 
(Hodge 2011:209-21)
 86
.  
Linda Martín Alcoff’s account of ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’ in Visible Identities 
(2003) emphasises even further the challenge that the pluritopic approach presents to a 
presumed uniformity of social and cultural experience, and indeed, to a presumed uniformity 
of individual experience. One’s own hermeneutic horizon, she writes, is always ‘pluritopic’, 
because ‘multiple others are constitutive aspects of our interpretative horizon’, offering 
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 Despite the fact that the ‘globalisation’ paradigm appears to provide such a unifying interpretative 
horizon. For more on globalisation, plurality and ‘world-making’, see, for example,  Karagiannis and 
Wagner (2007). 
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alternative and in some cases competing background assumptions and interpretative practices. 
Accordingly, ‘we cannot assume that any hermeneutic horizon… is in fact coherent or closed 
to other horizons’ (2006:125). The approach of ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’ postulated here by 
Mignolo and Martín Alcoff prompts us to rethink and modify Koselleck’s hermeneutical 
theory of historical time, such that it can register significant interpretative differences that 
exist within particular societies and cultures of time. Rather than a ‘monotopic’ hermeneutics 
that presupposes an internally consistent ‘space of experience’ and unified ‘horizon of 
expectation’, pluritopic hermeneutics presupposes overlapping spaces of experience and 
multiple horizons of intelligibility and meaning.
87
  
Another promising way of theorising the multiple interpretations, narrations, and 
lived experiences of historical time is opened up by the paradigm of ‘narrativity’, which has 
become prevalent within the field of narrative studies. ‘Narrativity’ theorists treat narrative as 
above all a discursive practice, referring to ‘the work that narrative does, and its effects’, 
rather than to the formal structures and purely figurative dimension of narrative (Smith 2000). 
‘To produce a narrative’, Martin Macquillan states, ‘is to make a moment of inter-subjective 
experience knowable, or discernible as such, through communication’ (MacQuillan 2000:8). 
As such, theorists of ‘narrativity’ seek to embed any specific narrative within ‘the specificity 
of a textual practice where it is materially inscribed’ (de Lauretis, 2000:211).88  
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 Whilst the imagery of ‘pluritopics’ is indeed spatial, rather than temporal, I affirm that spatial 
metaphors and imagery such as ‘horizons’, ‘spaces’, and ‘topics’ are indispensably useful tools for 
thinking and articulating historical time. In this sense, as explained in a footnote in the Introduction, I 
reject the Bergsonian critique of ‘spatialising’ time.  
 
88
 From a linguistic perspective, we can understand the distinction between the formal, structuralist 
analysis of ‘narrative’, and the performative paradigm of ‘narrativity’, in terms of the Saussurean 
distinction between ‘langue’ and ‘parole’, wherein ‘langue’ refers to the linguistic system of signs and 
grammatical rules, and ‘parole’ refers to the series of speech acts which make use of this grammatical 
and semiotic system in order to communicate (Smith 2000). Privileging the performative paradigm of 
‘narrativity’ over a formalist analysis of the ‘text’ does admittedly invite the Derridean criticism of 
perpetuating the ‘metaphysics of presence’, by apparently entrenching a model of communication 
founded on the immediacy of the spoken word and the face-to-face presence of a speaker and listener 
to one another
88
. In response to such possible objections, however, I would argue that the paradigm of 
‘narrativity’ can stretch the historiographical imagination far beyond a simple communicative model 
based on a face-to-face encounter in the here-and-now, because it points us towards webs of 
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There are two key advantages to connecting a pluritopic hermeneutics of historical 
time with the paradigm of narrativity. In the first instance, the narrativity paradigm casts 
narrativity as a fundamentally plural affair: an ‘interconnected series of performances’ 
grounded in intersubjective encounters and relationships (Ricoeur 1988:260). Indeed, the 
paradigm of narrativity is entirely oriented by the recognition that ‘every life is bound up with 
other lives from the very beginning, and thus every story is always bound up with the stories 
of others’ (Butler 2005:27)89. In this sense, ‘narrativity’ theorists conjure images of dynamic 
and intersecting narrative matrices, theorising narrativity in terms of interlocking, overlapping 
narratives, within which we are embroiled, and upon which we depend for conducting and 
constituting ourselves as social, historical subjects. This means that the work of interpretation 
and narrativisation must be understood as a complex and ongoing process, rendering 
unthinkable a definitive interpretation that could unify the many different narratives together 
into one over-arching master narrative or aggregate account.  
The ‘narrativity’ paradigm, I contend, therefore guards against presumptions that 
certain societies or communities have one single narrative determination of historical time; 
rather, it invites us to think in terms of multiple intersecting narrations of historical time. 
Because it is rooted in the complexity of lived context, the narrativity paradigm can also take 
account of the limitations and contingencies of narrative. Not everything can become part of a 
communicable story or be taken up in a hermeneutical circle. Traumatic events, for example, 
may escape the dynamics of ‘readable’ remembrance and recuperation, persisting rather as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interconnected lives and stories which always exceed and precede the purview of any individual 
subject, or groups of subjects, at a given moment
.
.  
 
89
 Adriana Cavarero’s model of ‘reciprocal narration’ articulated in Relating Narratives (1997), for 
example, draws on Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘natality’ to underscore the relational underpinning of 
narrativity, and expose the insufficiency and contingency of the autobiographical standpoint. I am 
dependent on others for my ‘life story’, Caverero insists, most importantly because I am not a witness 
to the beginnings of my life, of which I have no reflexive cognition at the time, and cannot 
subsequently remember. Moreover, throughout my life I am not necessarily in the best position to 
judge what the meaning of my life and actions has been or will be. Thus, within scenes of ‘reciprocal 
narration’, my story might be given back to me in a new form or new light, as the ‘other’ witnesses and 
registers, discerning narrative threads and meanings where to me, they are invisible or opaque 
(Cavarero 1997:80). 
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unarticulated or unarticulable events that continue to influence and disturb in opaque and 
unconscious ways (Halsema 2011:116). Moreover, as argued in chapter 2, the enigmatic and 
elusive nature of past ‘traces’ always exceed and resist being fixed by a narrative ‘grasp’, but 
rather, re-emerge at unexpected moments to interrupt any attempt at a completed narrative 
account. 
The second key advantage of the narrativity paradigm is the emphasis it places on the 
politics of narrativisation. Narrative, as Judith Butler argues, is not only caught up in the 
emotionally laden scene of address; it is also fundamentally ‘caught up in the sphere of 
normativity and the problematic of power’ (Butler 2005:27)90. Like the pluritopic 
hermeneutical approach described above, theories of ‘narrativity’ reflect on the very process 
of constructing and ordering, and emphasise ‘the social and human interests in the act of 
telling a story as a political intervention’ (Mignolo 2003:15). Above all, this means 
acknowledging the significance of competing narratives, and the political uses and effects of 
particular narrative configurations. For example, narratives can be used to link and draw 
people and experiences together within a temporal-historical continuity, enabling us to share 
time through bridging different experiences and horizons. Yet, on the other hand, this 
‘bridging’ is not always successful, given that temporal concepts and horizons may not be 
meaningful or even intelligible to those living in the same social or cultural space (Leland 
2001120; Weiss 2011:173). Moreover, narratives can separate and exclude, inducing a sense 
of temporal disorientation or estrangement, as certain narratives can become hegemonic and 
dominant, whilst others are eclipsed or subsumed. Taken together, then, theories of 
‘narrativity’ and ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’ direct us to conceive of ‘spaces of experience’ and 
‘horizons of expectation’ in the plural, and further, to recognise that these spaces and horizons 
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 Whilst Butler brings out this political dimension very clearly in Giving an Account of Oneself 
(2005), it is not considered in any great depth by Cavarero in Relating Narratives (1997). Caverero sets 
up an idealised narrative scene or speech situation which cannot take account of instances of refusal to 
hear or ‘receive’, as certain voices drown out others, or certain narratives gains ascendancy.  Thus, 
whilst she gives a useful account of narrative plurality, her approach to the politics of narrative is rather 
unsatisfactory.   
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are mediated by multiple narrations of historical time, which are fraught with contest over 
meaning and authority.  
 
4 
FRACTURED FORMS AND CONTRAPUNTAL READING 
 
The preceding three sections have developed a theoretical account of the link between 
historical time and narrative time. I have argued that narrative time is ‘internal’ to historical 
time, in the sense that historical time is a lived time, and that narrative forms and practices 
shape lived temporal experience. I have also argued that historical time is an intersubjective 
time, generated through the tension between shifting ‘spaces of experience’ and ‘horizons of 
expectation’, and configured through interpreting and narrating shared pasts, presents and 
futures. Finally, I have claimed that because there are always multiple narratives and 
interpretative ‘horizons’, historical time is narrated and configured in multiple and internally 
complex ways, which have a political dimension and significance. Yet, whilst it has been 
important to give a theoretical account of the relationship between narrative time and 
historical time, it is also important to consider how these theoretical discussions can inform 
feminist historiography in more practical terms, and influence the way we write and read 
histories of feminism. The problem of historical communication and experience, as Peter 
Osborne argues, is not just philosophical; it is also a problem of cultural form (Osborne 
1996:133)
91
. In this regard, the challenge lies in considering how formal narrative 
configurations might express more adequately the multiple voices and temporalities that feed 
into and out of historical narratives and configure the shifting patterns of historical time.  
In some respects, narrative as a cultural form presents problems for the feminist 
theorist or historian seeking to express multiple narrative trajectories and temporalities within 
the field of feminist history, because narrative structure so often works to mask the 
intersubjective interdependence I have described, and the ambiguities of historical 
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 Osborne attributes this insight to Walter Benjamin.  
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interpretation. Once we have arranged past events into a recognisable narrative form, the past 
seems comprehensible and settled, making a depicted course of historical events appear 
finished and inevitable, and thus closing down alternative accounts. The linear and synthetic 
properties of narrative, and the authority of the narrative voice, for example, can have the 
effect of sealing up or masking the restlessness of the past, transforming indeterminacy and 
contingency into determinateness and finality. However, whilst the classic Aristotelian ideal 
of narrative form, which requires a holistic beginning-middle-end structure, is certainly 
pervasive (Aristotle 1996:13), this kind of narrative configuration is not exhaustive or 
inevitable. Indeed, as Genevieve Lloyd points out, there are many resources in narrative that 
go ‘beyond the tightly structured telling of a unified story with a beginning, middle and end’ 
and the limitations of the continuous narratorial voice or perspective (Lloyd 1993a:10-11). 
What is required, then, is not only a philosophical account of historical time and narrativity to 
inform our historiographical understanding, but also, an appreciation of the flexibilities and 
possibilities of narrative form and technique. Literary theorist Helen Carr poses the question 
as such:  
 
‘If we are coming to see that cultures can be understood as collections of narratives, 
not only stories into which we are born… but also stories we learn to tell, how do 
these fractured forms explore the competing and conflicting narratives we meet in our 
culturally diverse society? (Carr 2011:321).  
 
This kind of question gives rise to an immanent approach of working with and within 
narrative, trying to turn narrative’s figures and operations against oppressive or detrimental 
narrative determinations (Roof 1996a). Carr suggests that whilst nonlinear narratives emerge 
from the destabilising effects of traditional hierarchies of power, these ‘fractured forms’ can, 
in turn, work to interrupt and fissure those very master narratives which support these 
hierarchies (Carr 2011:322). In this regard, feminist literary theory offers many interesting 
insights and approaches to feminist historiography, as affirmed in chapter 2, as feminist 
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novelists and critics have uncovered and developed various techniques for creating 
‘decentered’, ‘restive’ and ‘interactional’ narratives within women’s fictional writing, which 
challenge the authority of the single narrator and the autobiographical voice, and also linear 
organisations which perform a narrative ‘closure’ and finality92. Such alternative narrative 
techniques can be used to portray discontinuities, repetitions, silences, and irresolvabilities, as 
a way of expressing ambiguities and variant interpretations
93
. The novelist Jeanette Winterson 
articulates this kind of approach nicely, suggesting that:  
 
‘When we tell a story we exercise control, but in such a way as to leave a gap, an 
opening. It is a version, but never the final one. And perhaps we hope that the 
silences will be heard by someone else, and the story can continue, and be retold’ 
(Winterson 2011:8). 
 
Feminist historiographical writing itself also includes some examples of 
experimentation with dialogic narrative structures and nonlinear formats. One example is 
Diane Elam and Robyn Wiegman’s introduction to their edited anthology Feminism Beside 
Itself (1995), written as two narratives in two side-by-side columns. The stories that each 
author tells intersect and echo each other, but by splitting the introduction into two, the 
authors force a recognition of the contested and polyvocal nature of feminist storytelling, and 
refuse a neat synthesis of perspectives. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa’s feminist 
anthology This Bridge Called My Back (1981) presents an even more thoroughgoing 
challenge to linear, narrative closure, as it intersperses more traditional ‘stories’ with essays 
and poetry, snapshot reflections, ‘stream of consciousness journal entries’, speeches, 
statements, dialogues, and letters. ‘One voice is not enough, nor two, although this is where 
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 Though of course, feminism as a genre has in many ways bolstered the authority of the narrative 
voice, and in particular the autobiographical voice, given that personal testimony and the ‘confessional’ 
style have been so prominent in feminist writing.  
 
93
 The special issue of Women: a Cultural Review on ‘Disrupting the Narrative: Gender, Sexuality and 
Fractured Form’, offers several illuminating examples (ed. Carr 2011).  
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the dialogue begins’ (Moraga 1981:34). The created effect is one of multiple voices, styles 
and ‘cultural tongues’, emerging from a web of intersecting lives and stories that cannot be 
captured or subsumed within one overarching narrative or temporal schema.  
As well as prompting experimentation with different ways of constructing and 
writing feminist histories, the idea of multiple ‘narrative webs’ and temporal horizons can 
also orient an alternative practice of reading feminist histories. This practice of reading is 
informed by an understanding that the historical and narrative context is always excessive of 
the singular narrative that would seek to give a definitive account of it. It may well be that a 
‘narrative’ is ‘totalising’ in strictly formal terms, because, as Mink argues, it generates it own 
distinctive and bounded ‘imaginative space’ (Mink 1978). This, after all, is why we describe a 
narrative in the singular as a narrative. Yet, to think in terms of ‘narrativity’ is to recognise 
that singular narrative ‘wholes’ are only temporary closures, which are always incomplete 
and entangled with many other narratives. In other words, the production of a singular 
narrative depends upon the experience of a ‘communal narrative-matrix’ out of which it 
arises, and which it cannot fully express, even if its tries to disguise this through the figure of 
closure (MacQuillan 2000:23-4).  This theoretical account gives rise to a practice of reading 
that Edward Said describes as ‘contapuntal reading’, whereby the ‘readerly subject’ extends 
their reading of texts to ‘include what was once forcibly excluded’, seeking out counter-
narratives and recognising that the singular narrative only exists as an activity of production 
within a larger discursive and material context (Said 1993:79). MacQuillan extends this idea 
of ‘contrapuntal reading’, arguing that it is necessary to not only seek out excluded material 
and counter-narratives, but also, to discern the excluded material or ‘resisting strands’ within 
the material that the narrative presents. In this sense, he claims, counter-narratives can be 
thought of as structurally integral to any singular account (MacQuillan 2000:24).  
From the perspective of ‘narrativity’, then, if historical narratives are constituted 
through intersubjective encounters and relations between subjects with different temporal 
orientations and horizons, it is inevitable that historical narratives will express that 
multiplicity of perspectives and experiences of historical time, ‘even when they appear to be 
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unified and coherent’ (Weiss 2011:174).  Even within more ‘traditional’ narrative formats, 
there are always breaks and slippages that reveal a multiplicity and an indeterminacy behind 
narrative coherence and apparently seamless structure. To illustrate: Lynn Segal’s feminist 
memoir Making Trouble (2007) is constructed in the traditional autobiographical format, as 
the authorial voice guides us through her own political journey and simultaneously diagnoses 
the changes of the times. There is, however, an arresting passage when the author jumps out 
of her own narrative account into another’s narrative, which includes an account of Segal 
herself (depicted using a pseudonym ‘Marie’). Segal quotes this passage (with displeasure) in 
her own book:  
 
‘She drew an … [un]flattering sketch of me at the time… as she saw us all within the 
collective household… We are easily recognisable, my name changed, 
incongruously, to Marie:  
 
There was Marie who darted around the borough on political errands… Marie, up to 
her neck in local politics…’ (Segal 2007:77)94.  
 
Segal is quick to resume her autobiographical narration, yet this opening out on to a different 
narrative has enacted a rupture that disturbs and unsettles the authoritative narrative voice. 
The sudden switch to biography, and then back to autobiography again, evokes a sense of 
‘temporal strangeness’ through what we might term a ‘doubled retrospection’. Through 
seizing on such moments of temporal strangeness, and reading ‘contrapuntally’, we can tease 
out the relational, political and temporal dynamics that underpin any singular narrative, as we 
are offered a fleeting glimpse into alternative narrations and rememberings of a shared 
history. 
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 Segal is quoting from Alison Fell’s Every Move You Make (1984: 22).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The key aim of this chapter has been to develop an understanding of ‘narrative time’ as 
‘internal’ to historical time, which enables us to explore the variety of ways that narrative 
practices and forms configure historical time. This argument depends upon a shift away from 
naturalistic ‘common-sense’ understandings of historical time as a ‘simple sequence’ of 
events. If historical time is understood, instead, as a ‘lived time’, we see that historical events 
have their own ‘internal’ temporalities, which are not limited to chronological sequence, but 
are also significantly shaped through narrative framings and configurations. One way of 
explaining the ‘internal’ relation between narrative time and historical time is via a 
phenomenological account, which demonstrates that lived time, or experiential temporality, 
cannot be reduced to the sequential temporality of ‘before-and-after’. Yet, whilst a 
phenomenological account can demonstrate an ‘affinity’ between the temporal structures of 
basic experience and narrative configuration, the phenomenological approach is in fact rather 
limited when it comes to accounting for historical time as a large-scale, intersubjective time. 
Accordingly, I have argued for a hermeneutics of historical time, which understands historical 
time as a narrated, interpreted time that mediates across experiential fields and temporal 
horizons. Hermeneutical theories bring narrative time to life, rather than confining it to the 
text, and reveal the poverty of the presumption that narrative time is an external ‘artifice’, 
imposed upon historical time from without. Moreover, the hermeneutical approach can be 
deepened and pluralised through drawing on ‘pluritopic’ hermeneutics, and the paradigm of 
‘narrativity’, which posit multiple interpretative horizons within any experiential, 
interpretative context, and a complex of narrative matrices and palimpsests which make 
possible, and always exceed, any single narrative. This pluralistic theoretical framework can 
orient a flexible and experimental practice of writing historical narratives, exploring the 
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possibilities of multi-stranded and fractured forms. It can also inform a practice of 
‘contrapuntal reading’, which detects and draws out multiple histories and lived times 
between and behind narrative closures.  
The account of ‘narrative time’ given here, therefore, not only contributes to an 
internally complex conceptual model of historical time, it also affirms the possibility of 
expressing such complexity through cultural form and within historical practice. In addition, 
it has importantly challenged ‘common-sense’ presumptions that historical time is ‘really’ 
linear and chronological.  However, as the first section of the chapter has acknowledged, 
historical chronologies do play a crucial role in configuring historical time, just as historical 
narratives do. The following chapter will therefore examine the temporal dynamics of 
historical chronologies and timelines in more detail, as I turn to the question of ‘calendar 
time’.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Calendar Time 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I challenged the ‘common-sense’ equation of ‘real’ historical time 
with an idea of ‘natural chronology’ or ‘mere sequence’. Through investigating 
phenomenological and hermeneutical accounts, the chapter moved us towards a richer 
understanding of the temporality of lived events and trajectories, and demonstrated how 
narrative time can be understood as ‘internal’ to historical time. The question of chronology, 
however, has not been exhausted, as I am yet to address in any detail an important dimension 
of historical time: ‘calendar time’. This is the time that organises histories into chronological 
order through temporal markers such as days, months, years, decades and centuries. Calendar 
time interweaves and intersects with the time of the trace, and with narrative time; indeed, 
what the trace or narrative signifies often depends to an important extent upon the markers 
inscribed in calendar time (Ricoeur 1988:108). Accordingly, calendars can aptly be described 
as ‘time maps’, which orient and anchor historical understanding and imagination.  
Despite its practical utility, however, calendar time is often viewed as an obstacle to 
developing creative and nuanced approaches to history. This is because the quantitatively 
configured calendrical grid or timeline ‘flattens’ historical time out into a framework of 
measurable intervals and periods, and thus appears incapable of capturing the complex, 
qualitative dynamics of historical events and trajectories. Consequently, feminist writings on 
time and temporality often imply that whilst dates and decades are perhaps necessary to 
historians, philosophy should be getting beyond them in order to reflect on ‘deeper’ or more 
meaningful temporalities (Ermath 1992; Colebrook 2009). The problem, however, with 
dismissing calendar time as a ‘vulgar’ or mundane kind of time, is that in doing so, we 
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overlook its philosophical significance as both a practical and a public time. The task for 
feminist historiography, therefore, is to engage more deeply and critically with calendar time 
on a philosophical level, and to consider how it might be deployed to map out feminist 
histories without resulting in bland chronologies and reductionisms, or swallowing up 
different temporalities which are irreducible to its numerical points and ordinal positions. As 
such, the key aim of this chapter is to make the case for a qualitative approach to calendar 
time: an approach which subverts the idea that calendar time is a neutral and 
straightforwardly chronological or ‘linear’ time, and which generates more critically 
reflexive, and creative calendrical practices.  
Section 1 begins the chapter by challenging reified understandings of calendar time. 
Calendar time is often reified as a natural kind of time, such that we presume that ‘real’ 
historical time is essentially calendrical: i.e. a homogenous ‘mere series’ of successive 
instants or quantifiable, measurable points. However, this section draws on sociological, 
anthropological and historical studies of calendar time to support an alternative understanding 
of calendar time as a socially constructed tool for coordinating, managing and orchestrating 
social, economic, political and cultural life. The reification of calendar time, I contend, is 
problematic, because it ‘covers over’ the constructed character of calendar time, and thus the 
way in which particular calendrical conceptions and configurations support certain kinds of 
social or historical orders. The rest of the chapter thus seeks to develop a qualitative approach 
to calendar time, as an alternative, which foregrounds the complex temporal dynamics and 
sociopolitical processes ‘underpinning’ calendar time, and the ways in which it used to 
organise, map and coordinate diverse histories.  
To work towards such a qualitative approach, section 2 makes use of the distinction 
that Heidegger draws between ‘time-measuring’ and ‘time-reckoning’ in Division II of Being 
and Time. I argue that a selective reading of Heidegger offers a qualitative account of 
calendar time as a socially constructed measuring system, demonstrating that quantitative 
time-measuring frameworks such as calendars are not simply ‘there’, but rather, are an 
outcome of qualitative, materially-situated processes of collective time-reckoning. A 
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Heideggerian approach to calendar time, however, can only take us so far, due to Heidegger’s 
‘thin’ conception of public time, which presumes that public time is a meaningless, 
homogenous time, experienced in the same way by all those in its orbit. Accordingly, section 
3 moves away from Heidegger as it enquires further into the nature of calendar time as a 
public time. I draw here upon Hannah Arendt’s pluralistic concept of publicness as a basis for 
developing a ‘deepened’ account of public time: an account that is not premised upon 
assumptions about neutrality, universality and uniformity, but rather, upon the need and 
desire for temporal coordination and time-sharing within and across diversity.  
The fourth and final section then brings these theoretical discussions to bear more 
directly on the problem of coordinating diverse feminist histories through calendrical points 
and frames of reference. I argue for a critical understanding of dating and periodisation as an 
interpretative, normative practice, and an approach that is reflexively attuned to the ways in 
which dates operate as ‘sticky signs’, and as ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ chronologies. Finally, I gesture 
towards a more constructive approach to configuring feminist timelines, showing that 
calendar time can play a valuable role in the project of overturning the hegemonic model of 
feminist history, through seizing on anachronisms, and using the specificity of the date to 
guard against reductive generalisations.  
 
1 
THE REIFICATION OF CALENDAR TIME 
 
The arguments in this chapter rest upon a base claim, which is that calendar time is a socially 
and culturally specific creation: a mechanism for organising and coordinating time, which is 
mediated through the temporality of lived experience and the regulatory practices of a 
common social and cultural life (Osborne 1996:66). This claim that calendar time is a ‘social 
construct’ may initially seem a little far-fetched, given that calendar time does appear to be 
the most natural and universal of temporal frameworks, governed as it is by solar, or lunar, 
rotation. Even though technological changes and mechanisation have led to increasingly 
 137 
abstract and ‘artificial’ ways of telling the time, (such that marking a ‘day’ has become 
possible without any reference to the position of the sun in the sky), the ‘day’, nevertheless, 
can seem to be the most ‘natural’ of measures.  Yet, as sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel insists, a 
‘day’ is always at root an ‘artificial’ segmentation of time, whether measured by a sun-dial, a 
mechanical time-piece such as a watch, or marked by a number in a calendrical grid.  
In the first instance, the calendar ‘day’, ‘month’ and ‘year’, can only ever be 
approximate representations of the ‘physiotemporal’ relations between the earth and the sun, 
or in the case of lunar calendars, between earth and moon (Zerubavel 1997:110). The key 
point, however, is not about physiotemporal or astronomical accuracy
95
. The point, rather, is 
that temporal measures are not natural measures that simply exist; rather, they are constructed 
measures that are decided upon and utilised within specific sociocultural situations and 
arrangements. It has to be established within an intersubjective context, for example, ‘what 
minimum planetary cycle has to be supposed and recognised before it is possible to transform 
the temporalities of the stars into an astronomically rationalised, long-term, natural 
chronology’ (Koselleck 2004:95-6). In this sense, whilst calendar time may be based on 
‘cosmological time’, calendar time does not belong to nature, in the sense of being ‘out there’, 
‘waiting to be discovered’. Rather, calendar time can be construed as a ‘calendrisation of 
cosmological time’ (Osborne 1995:67). This does not mean that calendar time is somehow 
‘unreal’, but more precisely, that calendar time is a temporal order that belongs to social, 
lived reality. It is a temporal system devised to regulate the way we reckon with, coordinate, 
live and share time. 
There is a wide range of sociological and anthropological work demonstrating this 
theoretical point that calendars are socially and culturally specific ‘versions’ of cosmological 
time, rather than being straightforwardly natural or universal measures. Such studies, for 
example, show that certain societies and cultural communities may use several calendars at 
once, for different social, economic, agricultural, cultural and religious purposes (Adams 
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 For interesting historical accounts of calendar customs and the quest to determine an ‘accurate’ 
calendrical year and month, see, for example, Blackburn and Holford-Stevens (1999), or Ewing (1998).  
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1995; Greenhouse 1996; Mughal 2008). They demonstrate, further, that the 
institutionalisation of a particular calendar depends upon a certain level of political authority 
to regulate social, cultural and economic life according to specific calendrical arrangements. 
Calendars can be used to facilitate and promote social coordination, or conversely, to 
establish social or cultural boundaries, through marking out one community or society’s 
difference from another (Zerubavel 1982; 1982b).
96
  
Calendrical ‘temporal reference frameworks’ must therefore be understood not only 
as socially and culturally specific, but further, as embroiled in power relations and dynamics, 
as they arise out of specific economic and sociopolitical processes. This is well illustrated by 
considering the rise of modern western temporal reference frameworks—including the 
Gregorian calendar, the Christian Era, and ‘International Standard Time’ (based on GMT)—
which have attained a nigh-on global hegemony in conjunction with changing economic and 
communicative practices, imperial expansion and domination, and the rise of global 
capitalism
97. Historical sketches of the ascendancy of modern ‘clock time’, for example, chart 
this ascendency in tandem with the rise of the factory and the advent of modern market 
relations and wage labour in sixteenth and seventh-century Europe, of railway transportation 
and shipping, and of telegraphic and telephonic communication (Giddens 1990; Kern 1983; 
Toulmin and Goodfield 1977). The expansion and institutionalisation of the Gregorian 
calendar and the seven-day week has been similarly embroiled within geopolitical processes 
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 Key examples of this phenomenon include the Gregorian reform of the Julian calendar in 1582, 
which exacerbated the split between Catholics and Protestants for more than a century, or the French 
Republican calendrical reform of 1793, which contributed to France’s isolation from the rest of the 
world. Another illustration is Stalin’s introduction of five and six day weeks between 1929 and 1940, 
as a means of disrupting church-attendance (Zerubavel 1982b).  
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 By 1855, 98% of all public clocks in Great Britain were set to GMT; in 1883, ‘standard railway 
time’ in the US, (based on GMT), was put into effect; and in 1884 the ‘International Meridian 
Conference’ was held, which inaugurated the international standardisation of ‘International Standard 
time’, based on GMT, though it is still not universally observed (Zerubavel 1982b).  
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of modernisation and globalisation
98
. Accordingly, as Andrew Hom argues, the increased 
levels of temporal coordination enabled by modern clock time and calendar time have been 
integral to securing the ‘edifice of political modernity’ (Hom 2010).  
It is often ‘forgotten’, however, that modern standardised frameworks of calendar 
time and clock time have been actively forged as a response to the desire and logistical need 
for temporal coordination within changing socioeconomic circumstances and shifting cultural 
dominions. Such ‘forgetting’ can be understood as a process of reification, whereby 
universalised modern calendar time and clock time has come to be taken for granted and 
presumed to be natural or simply ‘there’: a ‘given’ backdrop to changing political, economic 
and social conditions. This can be linked to the common presumption, as discussed in chapter 
3, that ‘real’ historical time is essentially calendrical or chronological, i.e. a ‘mere sequence’ 
or series of successive instants. The idea of a mundanely chronological or ‘chronotic’ time as 
a homogenous backdrop against which the diverse lives of individuals and societies play out 
and can be plotted is not, it must be stressed, a conception unique to western modernity 
(Hutchings 2008). Yet, within western modernity, the notion of ‘chronotic time’ has become 
deeply entrenched, not only through conceptions and theories such as Newton’s theory of 
‘absolute’ measurable time99, but further, as stated, through the thorough institutionalisation 
and standardisation of calendar and clock time, which have become integral to how modern 
social and economic relations are organised (Thompson 1974; Osborne 1995:35)
100
.  
The entrenchment of the modern notion of chronotic time, therefore, might best be 
grasped in terms of a two-way process, whereby the Newtonian scientific conception has 
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 For more detail on calendrical reforms and standardisation processes, see Blackburn and Holford-
Stevens (1999). 
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 Newton, like Aristotle, proposed an ‘absolute time’, which, as Stephen Hawking explains it, means 
that he believed in time’s absolute separation from space, and that ‘one could unambiguously measure 
the interval of time between two events, and that this time would be the same whoever measured it, 
provided they used a good clock’ (Hawking 1988:18).  
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 Standardised clock and calendar time is fundamental to modern capitalism as it enables the 
coordination of complex systems of production, distribution and exchange. E.P. Thompson’s essay on 
‘Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’ is the classic text on this (Thompson 1974).  
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provided the basic conceptual foundation for conceiving time as a homogenous medium that 
can be divided up and counted, and in turn, the thorough institutionalisation of this way of 
organising time—via standardised calendars and clocks—fully ingrains the idea that this is 
how time ‘really’ is.  On the one hand, the Newtonian conception of time ‘conditions the 
possibility of counting time by means of the technologies of calendars, clocks and 
timetables’, because it presumes time is something that is essentially measurable and 
countable (Hutchings 2008:4-5). Chronotic time is therefore ‘not reducible to the way it is 
accessed via calendars or clocks’ (ibid: 6, emphasis added). Yet on the other hand, the 
implementation of increasingly universalised and standardised systems of clock and calendar 
time has reinforced the chronotic understanding of time as quantitative and ‘calendrical’ to 
such an extent, that the presumption that this is how historical time ‘really is’ persists today, 
in a world in which Newtonian science has been largely abandoned. The grand-scale efforts 
that have gone into the institutionalisation of modern clock time and calendar time have been 
‘forgotten’ or ‘concealed’, such that this rationalised, even, homogenous time appears as 
natural, simply ‘there’, even without scientific theoretical support. 
This reified conception of calendar time is problematic, in the first instance, because 
it ‘covers over’ the constructed character of calendar time and its role as a socially devised 
coordinating system. Though hegemonic calendrical arrangements may have begun as a 
proposition among alternatives, once they become reified and taken for granted, it becomes 
difficult to challenge them and argue for a different kind of temporal coordination (Hom 
2010:1149). The reified conception of calendar time is also problematic in light of its intimate 
connection with progressive constructions of ‘world history’. At first glance, the progressive 
conception of history seems to be at odds with a quantitative, calendrical conception of 
historical time, given that any conception of ‘progress’ involves qualitative judgments, as 
history is divided ‘according to principles of comparative value, in which some times become 
seen as more significant, better or worse, than others’ (Hutchings 2008:7). In fact, however, 
several theorists have argued that progressive theories and narratives of history go ‘hand in 
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hand’ with the ‘dated grid of a homogenous empty time’ (Chandler 1999:131; Benjamin 
2007; Hutchings 2008; Chakrabarty 2000).  
This is firstly because the capacity to compare and rank different periods or ‘stages’ 
ultimately relies on the presumption of a ‘transparent’ or homogenous time ‘through which 
one can see the difference between stasis, progress and regress, and may identify the 
principles governing change’ (Hutchings 2008:7). Moreover, the idea of a total ‘world 
history’ relies upon the idea that diverse histories and temporalities can all be encompassed 
‘within’ the same homogenous historical time. As Dipesh Chakrabarty explains it, this time is 
homogenous because ‘it is not affected by any particular events; its existence is independent 
of such events and in a sense it exists prior to them. Events happen in time but time is not 
affected by them’ (Chakrabarty 2000:73). The reified calendrical chronology thereby 
functions as the medium in or through which different times and temporalities can be merged, 
in a ‘higher-order calculus that can calibrate uneven and diffuse temporalities’ (Chandler 
1999:132). In this sense, the idea of a single human history is entirely dependent upon a 
‘homogenous, secular, calendrical time’, with its implication that ‘irrespective of a society’s 
own understanding of temporality, a historian will always be able to produce a time line for 
the globe, in which for any span of time, the events in areas X, Y and Z can be named’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000:74, emphasis added)
101
. The reified notion of a homogenous, calendrical 
‘time-within-which’ can thus be considered as a basic framework for progressive, 
universalising constructions of ‘world history’, which have been inextricably bound up with 
overseas imperial expansion and the idea of ‘uneven development’ (Koselleck 2004:245-6; 
Chandler 1999:131). 
The imperative for the rest of the chapter, therefore, is to overturn the reified 
conception of calendar time, which has arguably been complicit in securing progressivist and 
universalising approaches to ‘world history’, and conceals the constructed character of 
calendar time as a devised system for coordinating social life and mapping out histories. To be 
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 I return to this argument in chapter 7, where I further consider the concept of ‘totality’.  
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clear: challenging reified, naturalised understandings of calendar time does not entail a claim 
that historical time can or does exist independently of physical or cosmological dynamics and 
patterns, or of scientific theories, which always condition historical knowledge and 
experience
102
. The point, rather, of distancing my discussion of calendar time from 
conceptions of ‘natural time’, and from scientific theories, is to foreground the social, 
political and cultural work that goes into constructing and using calendar time, and its role in 
configuring certain kinds of time-concepts and historical narratives. The rest of this chapter 
thus seeks to develop a qualitative approach to calendar time, which gives priority of focus to 
the complex temporal and sociopolitical dynamics which ‘underpin’ calendar time, thereby 
pushing us to probe further than the seemingly indifferent face of the calendrical grid. In 
effect, this will entail a reversal of the model whereby the quantitative underlies the 
qualitative, positing instead that the qualitative underpins and produces the quantitative. One 
way of developing such an approach is to draw a distinction between the quantitative process 
of ‘time-measuring’ and the qualitative process of ‘time-reckoning’.  
 
2 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ‘TIME-RECKONING’ AND ‘TIME-MEASURING’ 
 
The reified notion of calendar time works to ‘cover over’ the constructed and conventional 
character of calendar time, and further, can be conceptually linked to progressive and 
universalising constructions of history. A more complex, qualitative understanding of the 
temporal and sociopolitical dynamics which ‘underpin’ calendar time is therefore required, 
which will guard against its reification and the concomitant idea that humans exist in a single 
frame of homogenous calendrical time that can encompass all individual histories and 
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 Indeed, one way to refute the understanding of calendrical time as a homogenous all-encompassing 
‘backdrop’ to lived history would be to demonstrate how the ideal of homogenous or absolute time 
entertained by Newtonian science breaks down in light of Einsteinian theory (Chakrabarty 2000). My 
key point here, however, is not simply that the Newtonian understanding of time is wrong. It is rather, 
that calendar time needs to be understood as a socially specific creation or ‘version’ of cosmological 
time.  
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qualitatively different temporalities. To open up a qualitative approach to calendar time, this 
section draws upon Heidegger’s hermeneutical method of ‘tracing back’ to the interpretative, 
interactive processes of ‘time-reckoning’ which give rise to formally configured calendars. 
Focusing exclusively on the chapter on ‘Temporality and Everydayness’ in Division II of 
Being and Time, the key argument is that Heidegger’s distinction between ‘time-measuring’ 
and ‘time-reckoning’, and his concepts of ‘datability’, ‘spannedness’ and ‘significance’, offer 
a useful starting point for beginning to think through calendar time in qualitative terms. 
Towards the end of the section, however, I will argue that this analysis must be isolated from 
the wider project of Being and Time, due to its hierarchical designation of the different levels 
of temporality, and Heidegger’s ‘thin’ conception of public time. 
In Division I of Being and Time, Heidegger describes the basic structure of 
Dasein’s103 everyday ‘Being-in-the-world’ as ‘Care’ or ‘Concern’ (Sorge), which can be 
defined as a condition or state of social and material embeddedness, and practical engagement 
with the phenomena or entities around us. In Division II, in a chapter on ‘Temporality and 
Everydayness’, Heidegger claims that ‘time is first discovered’ in this structure of Care or 
Concern. Indeed, ‘reckoning with time is constitutive for Being-in-the-world’ (2009:382). 
Practical, materially-situated existence, or ‘Concernful Being’, he explains, is all about 
‘reckoning up, planning, preventing, or taking precautions’, all of which are grounded in 
temporality. Concern expresses itself through the ‘then’ as ‘awaiting’, through the ‘now’ as 
‘making present’, and through the ‘on that former occasion’ as ‘retaining’ (ibid: 459).  
These Concernful temporal orientations—awaiting, making-present, and retaining—
are not to be understood in isolation from one another, Heidegger argues, but rather as 
interconnected and mutually constitutive. This can be understood as a version of the basic 
phenomenological idea that within the ‘then’ lies the ‘now-not-yet’, and within the ‘on that 
former occasion’ lurks the ‘now no longer’ (ibid). Yet, Heidegger takes this 
phenomenological temporality in an interesting direction, when he characterises the 
                                                          
103
 ‘Dasein’ means literally ‘there-being’, or oriented being, and is Heidegger’s term for ‘the being of 
humans’, and also the ‘entity or person who has this being’ (Inwood 1999:42).  
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interrelated framework of the ‘now’, ‘then’ and ‘on that former occasion’ as a framework of 
‘datability’. Datability, he stresses, is not to be confused with the practice of assigning a 
formal numerical date using an actual or ‘factical’104calendar. ‘Even without ‘dates’ of this 
sort’, Heidegger stresses, ‘the ‘now’, the ‘then’ and the ‘on that former occasion’ have been 
dated more or less definitely’ (ibid: 459). In other words, an event is ‘datable’ by virtue of its 
relation to a lived ‘now’, a ‘then’ and an ‘on that former occasion’, prior to its being formally 
dated as a numerical instant. ‘Datability’, for Heidegger, thus takes ontological priority over 
the formal, numerical ‘date’, in the sense that the assignation of a date to an event depends 
upon an event’s initial grounding in the everyday temporality of Concern. Moreover, the 
temporal structure of datability is qualitatively different from the succession of isolated 
instants or ordinal now-points that constitute actual, numerical calendars, because it is a 
fundamentally relational temporality, where the ‘now’, the ‘then’ and the ‘on that former 
occasion’ are interconnected and mutually determining. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, these phenomenological modes of temporal orientation are not reducible to, or even 
mappable on to, a serial succession of instants in relation to a ‘before’ and ‘after’ (Husserl 
1964:48; Osborne 1995:49-50). 
A further reason that datability does not entail a sense of time as a succession of 
instants or moments, claims Heidegger, is that every ‘now’, ‘then’ and ‘on that former 
occasion’ has, along with its relational datability-structure, its own ‘spanned character’ 
(Heidegger 2009: 462). This ‘spannedness’ is understood as something which endures across 
any series of ‘points’, because everyday time is a time for something, in relation to a ‘for 
which’, or ‘for the sake of which’ (ibid: 467). Thus, Heidegger writes, ‘we say ‘now’—in the 
intermission, while one is eating, in the evening, in summer; ‘then’—at breakfast, when one is 
taking a climb, and so forth’ (ibid: 462). This immersion in the event means that ‘when 
Dasein is ‘living along’ in an everyday, Concernful manner, it just never understands itself as 
running along in a Continuously enduring sequence of pure ‘nows’’ (ibid: 462). Moreover, 
                                                          
104
 ‘Factical’ is a term Heidegger uses for ‘being-already-in-a-world’; ‘factical’ calendars by 
implication are those actually existing calendars which we use as ‘equipment’ on a day-to-day basis 
(Inwood 1999:58).  
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the ‘now’ is datable, claims Heidegger, because it has ‘the character of appropriateness or 
inappropriateness’: a ‘significance’ in terms of the relation it has to the ‘for which’ or ‘for the 
sake of which’. In the everyday mode of Concernful Being, then, Dasein’s way of ‘reckoning 
time’ is fundamentally relational in two senses: firstly, in the sense that a ‘now’ is only ‘now’ 
in relation to a ‘then’ and an ‘on that former occasion’; and secondly, in relation to 
encountered entities, situations, and tasks to be undertaken, which is what gives everyday 
time its ‘spanned’ character and its ‘significance’. Heidegger thus depicts time-reckoning as a 
complex temporal process that occurs within specific, materially-embedded situations. ‘What 
remains decisive’ Heidegger insists, is Dasein’s way of ‘reckoning with its time’: a way of 
reckoning which must be differentiated from the practice of quantitative time-measurement 
(ibid: 456).  
Having foregrounded the process of time-reckoning, however, Heidegger’s key 
argument is that this fundamental work of time-reckoning gets ‘forgotten’ or ‘covered over’ 
within the ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ mode of interpretation. In the ‘ordinary understanding of 
time’, he contends, the ‘nows’ are shorn of their relations and ‘leveled off’, such that time 
comes to be understood as something that is essentially countable: ‘time shows itself as a 
sequence of “nows” which are constantly ‘present-at-hand’, simultaneously passing away and 
coming along (ibid: 474). ‘In obtaining the measurement, we, as it were, forget what has been 
measured as such, so that nothing is to be found except a number and stretch’ (ibid: 471). 
When time is characterised as pure succession, ‘datability’, ‘spannedness’ and ‘significance’ 
are ‘missing’ or ‘covered over’. In other words, we become so engaged with the (quantitative) 
product that we overlook the (qualitative) process and what it means to measure time in a 
specific way. Or as Ricoeur explains it:  
 
‘When we speak of time as a system of dates… we quite simply forget the work of 
interpretation by which we moved from making-present, including all that it awaits 
and it retains, to the idea of an indifferent “now”’ (Ricoeur 1988:82).  
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Whilst his polemic against the ‘ordinary concept of time’ is not without flaws105, it is 
possible to read Heidegger’s critique of the ‘forgetting’ of the interpretative work of ‘time-
reckoning’ as a philosophical critique of the reification of calendar time and clock time. 
Moreover, I suggest, his concepts of ‘datability’, ‘spannedness’ and ‘significance’—as 
embedded in the process of ‘time-reckoning’—gesture towards an alternative, qualitative 
conception of calendar time. In the first instance, Heidegger’s account of datability illustrates 
that calendar time depends upon much more complex temporal dynamics than is commonly 
supposed, as the points on the calendrical time-grid are functional and meaningful only 
because of the work of ‘making-present’, ‘awaiting’ and ‘retaining’. Put simply: calendars are 
usable and readable because we look backwards and look ahead, to distinguish ‘today’, ‘this 
year’, ‘that decade’ or ‘this century’ (ibid: 107). Heidegger thereby recovers traces of the 
phenomenological and interpretative dynamics underpinning calendar time, which can often 
be obscured by the ‘linear’ configuration of its structure. In so doing, the Heideggerian 
account implicitly gestures towards a more complex understanding of the temporality of the 
date, which goes beyond the simple before-and-after ordinal relation. As I demonstrate in 
section 4, dates can have temporal resonances and logics that exceed, and can even contradict, 
their position on a chronological, calendrical timeline. This is possible because a date marks a 
historical event in two ways. Firstly, it orders historical time along chronological lines by 
assigning a singular moment to a specific event, positioning it within a before-and-after 
relation. But secondly, the calendar makes events ‘available all at once to memory and 
interpretation’ (Lampert 2006:71). This means that we can not only mark out and follow 
                                                          
105
 Heidegger’s polemic against the ‘ordinary’ conception of time is flawed in several respects, not 
least because it reductively equates scientific conceptions of time with the Aristotelian concept of time, 
i.e. as expressed in Book IV of Physics, where he defines time as the ‘number of change in respect of 
the before and after’ (Aristotle 1987:125). The reason for Heidegger’s dismissive treatment of science, 
Ricoeur explains, is that he ‘takes for granted that science has nothing original to say that has not been 
borrowed tacitly from metaphysics’, which in turn, is a highly reductive conception of western 
metaphysics as essentially Aristotelian (Ricoeur 1988b:88). This conflation is disingenuous, as not only 
is it a reductive treatment of western metaphysical accounts of time, but it is also a reductive treatment 
of the complex and diverse scientific theories of the multiple ‘times of nature’, including quantum 
time, thermodynamic time, the time of galactic transformations and the evolution of the species. It is 
important, therefore, to read the ‘ordinary conception of time’ as exactly that: a reified understanding 
of what time is ‘really’ or ‘objectively’ like, which may have affinities with certain scientific or 
metaphysical perspectives – such as Newtonian physics or Aristotelian metaphysics– but is not to be 
confused with ‘the scientific conception’ or the ‘metaphysical conception’ per se. 
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histories according to a chronological order, but importantly, that memory and interpretation 
will always operate on a different and more complex temporal level. Historical knowledge, 
understanding, and imagination do not extend over a continuous, chronological line of time, 
but rather, oscillate back and forth between past, present and future. Thus, whilst the 
quantitative calendrical time frame is ‘a datum against which temporality can be registered’, a 
calendar can only be read and used precisely because we do not think or experience historical 
existence in a straight chronological line (Tribe 2004: xi). What a date means or signifies will 
always exceed its ordinal position in a chronological sequence.   
As well as helping to recover the complex temporal and significatory dynamics 
‘underpinning’ calendar time, Heidegger’s concepts of ‘datability’, ‘spannedness’ and 
‘significance’ also help to articulate the date’s function as a kind of ‘material anchor’ which 
locates an event or text within the conditions of its occurrence. ‘Every ‘then’, Heidegger 
writes, ‘is a ‘then, when…’; every ‘on that former occasion’, is an ‘on that former occasion, 
when… ’; every ‘now’ is a ‘now that…’ (2009: 467, emphasis added). A numerical calendar 
date is premised on a ‘reckoning’, which is always already embedded in a socio-material 
context. In Heidegger’s account, dating frameworks arise because time is reckoned with 
collectively. Alongside ‘datability’, ‘significance’ and ‘spannedness’, Heidegger therefore 
cites ‘publicness’ as one of the key features of Dasein’s everyday ‘within-time-ness’. ‘In the 
‘most intimate Being-with-one-another of several people’, he writes, ‘they can say ‘now’ and 
say it ‘together’… The ‘now’ which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of 
Being-in-the-world with one another’ (ibid: 411). This is because ‘Mitsein’ or ‘Being-with-
others’, is a fundamental aspect of Dasein’s ‘Being-in-the-world’. The creation of a calendar 
or the assignation of a date marks the interpretative, creative, qualitative act of ‘reckoning 
time’, and also the fact that to be in time is to be with others.  
In some respects, then, there is a commonality between Heidegger’s philosophical 
method of ‘hermeneutical phenomenology’, which seeks to ‘reactivate the work of 
interpretation’, and sociological and anthropological theories of calendar time, which 
emphasise its social, material basis and the need for a qualitative approach. Clifford Geertz, 
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for example, claims that a social calendar ‘cuts time up into bounded units not in order to 
count and total them but to describe and characterize them, to formulate their differential 
social, intellectual and religious significance’ (Geertz 1966:45). Zerubavel makes a similar 
case: ‘The social equalization of mathematically unequal durations and the unequalization of 
equal ones’, he contends, ‘certainly presupposes the ability to view time from a perspective 
other than the traditional physicomathematical one. It involves conceiving of time as a 
qualitative, and not merely a quantitative, dimension’ (Zerubavel 1979:4-5). Yet, when it 
comes to considering the question of calendar time as a social, public time in more detail, the 
Heideggerian approach is ultimately insufficient, due to Heidegger’s ‘thin’ conception of 
public life and public time.  
As discussed, Heidegger claims that ‘time is first discovered’ in the mode of Care or 
Concern, i.e. within everyday embeddedness in the material and social world (Heidegger 
2009: 382). However, the overall aim in Division II of Being and Time is in fact to argue for 
the ontological primacy of the ‘ecstatic temporality’ of the individual Dasein as the ‘source’ 
of all other kinds of temporality, including the time that seems to belong to the ‘world’ or to 
the ‘public’. Whilst the social, practical temporality of everydayness does have an 
‘existential’ or ontological significance for Heidegger, the guiding idea of Being and Time is 
that the individual Dasein progressively clarifies its understanding of itself by working away 
from the ‘everyday’ world of Concern and Being-with-Others in search of a more ‘originary’ 
form and a more ‘authentic’ experience of time (2009: 277-8).106 A key aspect of Heidegger’s 
argument here is that public time is essentially ‘inauthentic’.  
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 Indeed, he reserves the term ‘temporality’ exclusively for ‘ecstatic’ temporality: the temporality 
which interprets itself’ (2009:460). It would be tangential to delve too deeply here into Heidegger’s 
intricate and flawed arguments regarding the ‘originary’ nature of ‘ecstatic temporality’, and the 
‘authentic’ mode of ‘Being-towards-death’, given that this chapter is about calendar time. Suffice to 
say that they are two basic problems: the first concerns the argument that all kinds of temporality are 
‘derived’ from ecstatic temporality, including the sense of an independent nature-time or ‘world-time’. 
On both an intuitive and a theoretical level, the argument that the notion of a natural or cosmological 
time is simply a ‘flattened out’ version of the ‘temporality which interprets itself’ is hardly a credible 
thesis. As noted in the previous chapter, the Husserlian attempt to entirely ‘bracket’ the naturalistic 
standpoint runs into similar difficulties. The second problem with Heidegger’s project lies with the 
distinction he draws between authenticity/inauthenticity, which in turn, rests upon the problematic 
existential/existentiell distinction. ‘Existentiell’, as Heidegger uses it, refers to the concrete choice of a 
way of being in the world, whilst ‘existential’ refers to any analysis that aims at explicating the 
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 The public time of everyday Concern is positioned at the bottom of Heidegger’s 
hierarchical organisation of temporal ‘levels’, because, according to Heidegger, it is the most 
likely to become ‘snared in the present’ and ‘leveled out’ in the ‘ordinary’ conception of time, 
due to its practical nature. The immersion of everyday temporality in the ‘ready-to-hand’, and 
the ‘present-to hand’107, Heidegger argues, means that the accent is often placed on the 
‘making-present’ at the expense of ‘awaiting’ and ‘retaining’, such that the ‘now’ gains a 
prominence and easily slides into a homogenous conception of time as a series of ‘now-
points’ (ibid: 278). This propensity of practical, everyday time to slide into the ordinary 
conception of time is exacerbated, in Heidegger’s account, by the fact that public life is itself 
a realm of inauthenticity, uniformity and homogeneity, where individuality, nuance and 
meaning become swallowed up by the dictatorship of the ‘they’ (Heidegger 2009:163-8): 
 
‘Publicly, time is something which everyone takes and can take… The only time one 
knows is the public time which has been leveled off and which belongs to everyone—
and that means, to nobody’ (ibid: 477).  
 
This notion of public time as a meaningless, homogenous, anonymous time, however, 
is highly reductive. It is true that public time always precedes and exceeds us: we are born 
into, and live according to, time structures that are not of our own making. ‘The world is 
always given to me from the first as an organised one’ (Schutz 1971:9). In this sense, 
measuring frameworks always preexist and shape how different groups and individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                      
structures that differentiate Dasein from all other beings.  Yet, as Tina Chanter argues, there is a series 
of normative presumptions and biases built into Heidegger’s ‘ontological’ method that cover over its 
own prejudices. From this critical perspective, we can legitimately ask ‘whether the entirely analysis of 
temporality is not tied to the personal conception Heidegger has of authenticity, on a level where it 
competes with other existentiell conceptions’ (Ricoeur 1988b:67).  
 
107
 The ‘ready-to-hand’, and the present-to-hand’ can be understood as two modes of being or types of 
entity. ‘Present-to-hand’ is the term Heidegger uses for neutral or natural entities, whilst ‘ready-to-
hand’ refers to artifacts or things that serve human purposes in some way. In fact, in Heidegger’s 
account, we are disposed to see things as ready-to-hand before we regard them as present-to-hand or 
neutral. Both modes of being, however, are to be distinguished from the mode of being of Dasein 
(Inwood 1999:128-9).  
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experience and think about time; they themselves are part of the temporal circumstances to be 
‘reckoned’ with. But this does not mean that all of the individuals or groups within the orbit 
of organised public time structures experience them in the same way, or that they have a 
uniform or universal meaning. Indeed, Heidegger’s own characterisation of the time of 
everyday Concern demonstrates that the intersubjective, qualitative process of ‘time-
reckoning’ is always rooted within the specificities of situation. Arguably, then, Heidegger 
does not make enough of his own distinction between time-reckoning and time-measuring in 
his account of public time. Whilst the practical, public temporality of everyday Concern may 
have a propensity to become ‘leveled out’ in the ordinary conception of time, Heidegger’s 
own method of ‘tracing back’ to the interpretative nature of time-reckoning shows that time-
reckoning is always ‘prior’ to the quantitative temporal reference frameworks that are used as 
public reckoning-instruments. ‘What remains decisive’, Heidegger has claimed, is ‘Dasein’s 
way of reckoning with its time’: a way of reckoning which, at the level of everyday Concern, 
draws its significance from our immersion in a particular event and context and depends upon 
a complex interconnection between past, present and future.  
Heidegger’s quickness to conflate public time with the ‘ordinary’ conception of time 
thus seems rather simplistic in light of his own careful analysis of reckoning and measuring 
and the difference between them. If we follow Heidegger’s own reasoning, public time cannot 
be reduced to the ordinary, quantitative conception of time, even though it may make use of 
quantitative time frames to structure and coordinate public life, and we may well ‘forget’ the 
interpretative work of time-reckoning that underpins and gives rise to these frameworks.  
Consequently, whilst Heidegger’s distinction between time-measuring and time-reckoning 
can serve as an initial basis for developing a qualitative approach to calendar time, this 
depends upon a selective appropriation which extracts the discussion of ‘time-measuring’, 
‘time-reckoning’, ‘datability’ ‘spannedness’ and ‘significance’ from the wider project of 
Being and Time. The illuminating aspects of Heidegger’s analysis include his articulation of 
calendar time as pragmatically engaged in a world of meaningful Concern, and his 
demonstration that time-reckoning is distinct from, and irreducible to, time-measuring. 
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However, to develop a ‘deeper’, more adequate account of calendar time as a public time, we 
need to reject the reductive sociological content of Heidegger’s own analysis of 
everydayness, his dubious quest for an ‘originary’ temporality, and his hierarchical 
designation of different modes of living as more or less ‘authentic’.  
 
3 
A DEEPENED ACCOUNT OF PUBLIC TIME: 
COORDINATION AND DIVERSITY 
 
Moving away from reified notions of calendar time necessitates a qualitative approach, which 
seeks a complex and nuanced understanding of how calendar time works to coordinate and 
configure historical time. Heidegger’s distinction between time-measuring and time-
reckoning, and his concepts of ‘datability’ ‘spannedness’, and ‘significance’, can provide the 
initial basis for such as qualitative conception. Firstly, he demonstrates that the temporality of 
calendar time is not reducible to the straightforward chronology of the timeline or calendrical 
grid, but rather, is rooted in the interconnectedness of ‘awaiting’, ‘making present’, 
‘retaining’. Secondly, he shows that that calendar time is materially embedded and related to 
things or phenomena we are ‘concerned’ with, and is therefore interested and ‘significant’. 
Thirdly, he shows that calendar time is a social, public time, grounded in a ‘being-with’. 
However, whilst he underscores the fundamentally social and public character of calendar 
time, Heidegger in fact falls back on a ‘thin’ and reductive conception of public time, which 
undoes his insightful analysis of ‘time-reckoning’. Accordingly, we need to formulate a 
‘deepened’ conception of public time, as a crucial aspect of our qualitative approach to 
calendar time (Leland 2001).  
Considering the ‘publicness’ of calendar time requires the balancing of two equally 
important points. The first of these is the importance of standardisation as a coordinating 
mechanism, given that standardising temporal reference is an integral component of social 
life. ‘Time could not be a major parameter of the social world if it could not be related to in a 
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standard way which is shared by a collectivity’ (Zerubavel 1982:85). History as a public 
discourse requires standardised time frames, in order for historical materials and narratives to 
be accessible and sharable. Dating frameworks enable us to follow and ‘map’ traces of the 
past, and to share and coordinate diverse narratives, by providing common temporal 
references. The problem, therefore, is not with standardness per se, because the creation of 
temporal reference points and frameworks is an important means of attaining temporal 
coordination. The problem, rather, emerges when common, standard temporal reference 
frameworks become reified, or are presumed to have the same meaning or value for every 
individual or group whose lives are affected by them. Whilst people share public or standard 
time measures as an integral component of social life, they often attribute completely 
different meanings to these measures, or indeed, discern a ‘lack of fit’ between their own 
experience of a particular time span and its public measure (Hutchings 2008:5; Weiss 
2011:171). The second key point, then, alongside the importance of coordination, is the 
inevitability of social diversity, which means that no two people ever experience or ‘live 
time’ in the same way, including public time (Weiss 2011:171-2). 
As we have seen, Heidegger’s ‘thin’ conception of public time takes for granted that 
public time-frames and measuring devices are encountered and lived in the same way by 
everyone. Indeed, this thin conception of public time is informed by Heidegger’s thin 
conception of the ‘public’ more generally as a ‘uniform mass’, which rules out any detailed 
consideration of significant differences between individuals within a public, and obscures the 
way in which groups can be differently situated within a given social and cultural realm 
(Leland 2001:112)
108. This ‘thin’ understanding of publicness therefore precludes any 
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 This interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein and publicness, it must be noted, is contested 
within Heidegger scholarship. Charles Guignon, for example, claims that the concepts of ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘inauthenticity’ refer to the ways in which one takes up one’s cultural heritage, and thus that 
‘authenticity’ is not an individualistic conception in Heidegger’s work. ‘Authentic Dasein’, he writes, 
‘remembers’ its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture and shared history (Guignon 1993). 
Yet, whilst there is some textual support for this reading, much of Heidegger’s own language and 
assertions in Being and Time contradicts the picture that Guignon paints. For example, he clearly states 
that ‘the Self of the everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self… 
As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the ‘they’, and must first find itself’ 
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consideration of how public time serves different interests, and how it impacts differently 
according to specific social positions and situations. What is required, then, is an alternative, 
‘deepened’ conception of the ‘public’ upon which to base a conception of ‘public time’: a 
conception which can register the importance of standardised public reference frameworks in 
terms of enabling shared communication, but which can also register that these frameworks 
do not have the same meaning or effects for everyone.  
To this end, I suggest, we can fruitfully draw upon Hannah Arendt’s pluralistic 
conception of the public, which manages to balance the importance of public institutions, 
frameworks and structures, with a recognition of the inevitable diversity amongst those who 
constitute a public. This is articulated, for example, in her account of the ‘public’ in The 
Human Condition (1998). On the one hand, Arendt’s account here affirms the profound 
importance of the public realm, which ‘gathers us together’ and relates us to one another. The 
term ‘public’, she explains, means that ‘everything that appears in public can be seen and 
heard by everybody’, and the presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear 
assures us of the reality of our world (Arendt 1998:50). As such, the public can be construed 
as ‘the common world’ itself, as constructed through human activity and conceptual 
frameworks, and is distinguished from ‘our privately owned place in it’ (ibid: 52). Yet, whilst 
affirming the value and necessity of the public, here and throughout her work Arendt 
expresses a keen awareness of the dangers inherent in conceiving of the common world as a 
‘mass society’ and presuming a ‘“common nature’ of all men who constitute it’ (ibid: 57). 
She therefore places a vehement emphasis on the fundamental plurality of the public realm, 
or common world: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Heidegger 2009:167). As a re-interpretation of the concept of Mitsein, Guignon’s account is more 
convincing.  
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‘The reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable 
aspects and perspectives in which the common world presents itself… For though the 
common world is the common meeting ground of all, those who are present have 
different locations in it, and the location of one can no more coincide with the 
location of another than the location of two objects. Being seen and being heard by 
others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a 
different position’ (ibid. 57).  
 
For Arendt, then, the common world is fundamentally dependent upon plurality, as 
without a plurality of perspectives, the diversity of this common world could never ‘appear’ 
and be shared. As such, the first key lesson to be learnt from Arendt is the need to affirm and 
protect the heterogeneity of communities and societies. Attempts to overcome that plurality 
and multiplicity, Arendt warns, must result in ‘the abolition of the public realm itself’ (Honig 
1998:114). The second key lesson is the importance of cultivating spontaneity, imagination, 
openness, and creativity within public political life (ibid: 103). This emerges from Arendt’s 
‘agonistic’ conception of politics, which again, depends upon a plurality of perspectives and 
voices within a common public context. The example of a truly ‘political’ public realm that 
Arendt repeatedly returns to throughout her work is that of the Ancient Greek polis. Arendt’s 
writings on the polis envisage public, political space not only as a competitive space in which 
‘moral and political greatness, heroism and preeminence are revealed, displayed and shared 
with others’, but more fundamentally, as a ‘space of exposure’, where different subjects offer 
themselves up to others, exposing their uniqueness yet also their dependence upon the others 
with whom they communicate (Benhabib 1998:69; Cavarero 1997). Though Arendt has been 
criticised for what has been interpreted as her nostalgic lionisation of Greek political culture 
(and moreover for her insistence on a public/private dualism
109
), many feminist theorists of 
                                                          
109
 In fact, however, Bonnie Honig argues that the Arendtian emphasis on resistability, openness, 
creativity and incompleteness—the ‘sine qua non of Arendt’s politics’—means reading Arendt against 
Arendt and resisting any a priori determination of a public/private distinction (Honig1998).  
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the public have used her pluralistic, ‘agonistic’ conception of public, political life as a way of 
contesting liberal or cosmopolitan ideals of universality and neutrality, and emphasising 
instead the uniqueness of different public subjects, and the open-ended, ‘contestatory and 
power-laden’ dimension of the public (Fraser 1990; Benhabib 1998).110 In this sense, Arendt 
enables publicness to ‘navigate through wider and wilder territory’ than usual within political 
theory (Ryan 1998:8).  
Arendt’s conception of public life thereby offers a way of registering the importance 
of the public or common world in ‘gathering us together’, whilst at the same time affirming 
the inevitability and value of plurality. Although Arendt is all too aware that public life can so 
easily collapse into a ‘dictatorship of the ‘they’’, her solution is not to follow Heidegger and 
seek a more ‘authentic’ way of life for the individual. Instead, she seeks to develop a more 
adequate conception of public life itself: a conception of publicness without concomitant 
presumptions about uniformity, universality or neutrality, which is rooted in the value and 
necessity of plural perspectives and positions. This is one reason her work has been of such 
inspiration to many feminist political theorists of the public. Whilst feminists have been 
sharply critical of models of the public sphere premised upon ideals of universality or 
neutrality, feminism nevertheless implicitly values publicness, in the sense that publicity 
enables critical communication, collective practices, the sharing of time, and the linking of 
ideas.
 
A crucial task for feminist political theory is therefore not to simply critique or abandon 
the ideal of publicness, but rather, to reconstruct a notion of the public which does not 
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 Seyla Benhabib, for example, argues that Arendt’s agonistic’ conception of the public offers an 
alternative to the liberal model of publicness, which is premised upon certain kinds of conversational 
constraints, with the fundamental constraint being neutrality (Benhabib 1998; see also Barber 
1988:151). She further contends that it offers an alternative to Habermas’ Kantian cosmopolitanism. 
Whilst Habermas moves away from the liberal criteria of neutrality towards the criteria represented by 
the idea of a ‘practical discourse’, feminist theorists have seriously challenged the presuppositions of 
Habermas’ abstract, universal, rationalistic model of the public sphere. Nancy Fraser, for example, 
challenges the occlusion of nonliberal, non-bourgeois and competing public spheres within Habermas’ 
historical sketch of the rise of the public sphere, (Habermas 1989), which means that he overlooks the 
ways in which counter-publics have always contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public 
sphere. Ultimately, then, he ends up idealising the Enlightenment ideal of a unified, single public 
sphere, at the expense of a ‘multiplicity of publics’ (Fraser 1990; see also Young 1987).  
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‘masquerade’ behind universality and neutrality, but rather can take differences and diversity 
into account (Landes 1998:143; Young 1987; Fraser 1990)
111
.  
Accordingly, I propose that Arendt’s pluralistic conception of the public can be 
redeployed as we seek to develop a ‘deepened’ account of public time: an account that is not 
premised upon assumptions about neutrality, universality and uniformity, but rather, upon the 
desire for temporal coordination and time-sharing within and across diversity. It must be 
acknowledged that Arendt’s theorisation of the public and the political categorically 
privileges the spatial over the temporal, as she posits the concept of public or ‘political space’ 
as a means of defending and protecting the distinctiveness and particularity of specific fields 
of political discourse and activity, against the generalised understanding of a universal, 
‘infinite’ historical time. Yet, in fact, we can find nascent ‘seeds’ for developing a deepened, 
qualitative account of calendar time in Arendt’s writings. In her essay on the ‘Concept of 
History’, for instance, Arendt is highly critical of the emphasis upon quantitative ‘time-
sequence’, and the ‘modern computation of historical dates’, which presents the adoption of a 
uniform dating system centered around the ‘CE’ marker as a ‘mere technical improvement’ to 
facilitate the ‘exact fixing of dates… without referring to a maze of different time-reckonings’ 
(Arendt 2006:65-7). She regards this adoption of a neutralised, uniform dating system as 
deeply complicit in the rise of a reified sense of a general historical time or ‘process’ in which 
the singularity of specific phenomena, and the uniqueness of different perspectives and 
experiences, are lost within universalising frameworks and grand historical narratives 
(ibid).
112
 What looks like a ‘Christianization of world history’, she argues, is in fact the 
establishment of a homogenising time-framework that eliminates or subsumes all religious 
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 For further feminist readings of Arendt, see Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt (ed. Honig 
1995). 
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 This forms part of her wider argument concerning the reifying imbrication of the ‘social’ and the 
‘natural’ within modern social and political science, such that social and historical sciences become 
conflated with the natural sciences which leads to totalising efforts to ‘manage’ human relations 
through ‘treating man as an entirely natural being whose life processes can be handled the same way as 
all other processes’ (2006: 59).  
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and qualitative time-concepts and temporalities within its all-encompassing reach, or ‘twofold 
extension toward infinity’ (ibid: 68; 81).  
Thus, whilst Arendt’s primary solution is to reclaim the spatial as a means of 
restoring the ‘political’, her strong critique of reified conceptions of calendrical, homogenous 
historical time does offer critical tools for developing a qualitative notion of calendar time 
that can register its constructed character. Moreover, Arendt’s pluralistic conception of the 
‘public’ can give rise to a different orientation towards, and deepened account of, public time. 
The pluralistic conception of publicness helps us to explain and affirm the significance and 
value of public dating frameworks in enabling the sharing, co-creation, and ‘exposure’ of 
historical experiences and narratives; yet it also requires an acute attentiveness to the variety 
of meanings and values that temporal reference frameworks can carry, and to the complex 
social and political dynamics that attend their operation.  
 
4 
STICKY SIGNS, HOT AND COLD CHRONOLOGIES, ANACHRONISMS, AND 
SPECIFICITY 
 
Calendar time plays an important historiographical role as a temporal coordinator and 
connector. Dating frameworks arise through the process of ‘reckoning’ time within shared 
situations, and make it possible for ‘mnemonic communities’ to correlate pasts, presents and 
futures (Zerubavel 1997:101). Yet, as ‘deepened’ accounts of publicness and public time 
indicate, reckoning time is not a smooth or even process, and public temporal reference 
frameworks do not have the same value or significance for all in their orbit. Feminist 
historiography therefore requires a qualitative approach and a critical reflexivity when it 
comes to the dating frameworks and timelines through which we organise and construct 
feminist histories. This final section will extrapolate from the theorisation of time-reckoning 
and public time above to consider how a qualitative approach might influence the way that 
feminist historians and theorists use dating frameworks and configure feminist timelines. 
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First of all, taking a qualitative approach means regarding the practice of dating and 
periodising as not simply a descriptive practice, but further, as an interpretative, normative 
practice. The choice of significant dates to serve as beginnings, turning points, or cut off 
points, is always selective and interested, motivated by a specific interpretation of the 
conditions and events being marked out. The dates and periodisations which we employ are 
not a neutral backdrop to our historical narratives, rather, they are deeply embroiled and 
complicit in securing them. We thus need to enquire into the normative status, and associative 
dimensions that specific dates and bounded ‘periods’ have, and ask ‘what could explain the 
choosing of a date or a date period’, as well as what it could explain (Chandler 1998: 32-3). 
To argue that demarcating periods and timelines is an interpretative, normative practice is not 
to diminish or dismiss the work that calendar time does in anchoring historical happenings 
and ideas within the contexts in which they occur, thereby aiding efforts to understand the 
specific socio-economic and cultural conditions of their emergence (Fraser 2008:106-8). 
However, the defence that calendrical periodisation marks out an ‘objective’ context or 
situation is extremely problematic if unaccompanied by a reflexivity around the temporal 
framing of the context or situation that demands to be reckoned with. Temporal framing is 
never a neutrally ‘descriptive’ act, because the way we frame an object makes us read the 
object differently (Chandler 1998:77). Moreover, a date itself can carry specific resonances 
and value-leaden associations.  
Building on Heidegger’s point about the ‘significance’ of dating, I therefore suggest 
that dates can be understood not only as ‘material anchors’, which locate an event or text 
within the conditions of its occurrence, but also, borrowing from Sara Ahmed, as ‘sticky 
signs’. Ahmed describes ‘sticky signs’ in terms of the resonances and affective value they 
accumulate through repeated associations (Ahmed 2004b:90-1). ‘The sign’, she explains, 
becomes a ‘sticky sign as an effect of a history of articulation, which allows the sign to 
accumulate value’ (ibid: 92). A paradigmatic example of a ‘sticky’ date, for example, would 
be ‘1968’, which carries a plethora of affects and associations, ‘standing for a moment of 
genuine revolution and inspiration as much as standing for a moment of ‘undercooked’ 
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idealism and failure’ (Berlant 1995:300-1). ‘1968’ therefore functions as both a material 
anchor and a sticky sign. A text dated ‘Paris 1968’ anchors it in its specific conditions of 
production, in a time and place. But the date-sign ‘1968’, in itself carries associations, 
resonances and affects. Thus, the date assigned to an event or a text does more than simply 
contextualise it, or ‘insert it within a state of affairs’ (Lampert 2006). The date-sign carries a 
value, which will guide and shape historical inquiry. ‘1968’, ‘the 1970s’, or ‘the twenty first 
century’ conjure different associations, according not only to geographical location, but 
further, to particular histories of articulation and repetition, and to one’s distinct social and 
cultural location. Indeed, certain signs become so sticky that it becomes difficult to determine 
what makes something sticky in the first place, because ‘stickiness involves such a chain of 
effects’ (Ahmed 2004b:91). 
Ahmed’s notion of ‘sticky signs’ thereby helps to demonstrate that the date is not an 
indifferent instant or a neutral sign. This is not to say, however, that date-signs are value-
laden or ‘sticky’ in the same way for all interpretative communities. ‘1968’ might have little 
significance in certain contexts and thus as a temporal reference point it is not always 
effective or particularly meaningful. Lévi-Strauss’ conception of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ 
chronologies offers a useful way of considering this: 
 
‘We use a large number of dates to code some periods of history; and fewer for 
others. This variable quantity of dates applied to periods of equal duration becomes a 
gauge of what might be called the pressure of history: there are ‘hot chronologies’ 
which are those of periods where in the eyes of the historian numerous events appear 
as differential elements; others, on the contrary, where for him (although not of 
course for the men who lived through them) very little or nothing took place’ (Lévi-
Strauss 1962: 259)
113
.  
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 To clarify, whilst this notion of ‘hot’ and ‘cold chronologies’ is helpful, I do not accede to Lévi-
Strauss’ structuralist approach to history and historical time more generally, for reasons outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  
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To illustrate, the usual ‘hot chronologies’ within hegemonic accounts of western 
feminism periodise the ‘boom times’ of the ‘second wave’ as occurring from the mid-1960s 
until the late 1970s, with the 1980s being treated as a period of decline and backlash (Faludi 
1992). Yet, Becky Thompson argues that retelling the story of ‘second wave’ US feminism 
from the vantage point of multiracial feminism compels us to rethink some of the usual 
periodisations of western feminism. ‘The 1982 defeat of the ERA’, she contends, ‘did not 
signal a period of abeyance for multiracial feminism. In fact it flourished during the 1980s, 
despite the country's turn to the right’ (Thompson 2010:48). From this perspective, the 1980s 
is not such a ‘cold chronology’ after all.  Marisela Chávez similarly throws the usual feminist 
timelines off-kilter, by retelling the story of US feminism in the twentieth-century from the 
Chicana perspective, citing the 1940s and 1950s, (usually regarded as fallow feminist 
periods), as particularly ‘hot chronologies’ for Chicana women’s activism (Chávez 2010:8). 
Unsettling feminism’s ‘great hegemonic model’ therefore requires us to reconsider what have 
been presumed to be the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ chronologies of feminism, and generate alternative 
and multiple timelines.  
In this respect, it is helpful to delve deeper into the complex temporality of the date, 
as a way of enabling not only a critical reflexivity around the normative practice of dating, 
but further, a more constructive and strategic use of dates and periodisations. The temporal 
logics of the dated timeline, I have argued, are more complex than simple chronology, as 
dates can have temporal resonances and logics that exceed, and can even contradict, their 
position on a chronological, calendrical timeline. Consider how, for instance, ‘1970s’ 
feminism is frequently coded within feminist discourse as ‘out-of-date’, with texts such as 
Kate Millet’s Sexual Politics or Shulamith Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex—both published in 
1970—being dismissed without necessarily being read. Yet, at the same time, a text whose 
publication date comes before these feminist texts, such as Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition—published in 1968—is so often coded as cutting-edge and ‘contemporary’. 
This example shows how anachronistic logic can work against feminism, when the 
temporality of feminism itself is value-coded as anachronistic, outdated and outmoded, 
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behind ‘the times’. Yet, the example also highlights the potential of the date to disrupt the 
dominant timelines and their coding, particularly when we consider the ‘shock value’ that can 
attend the citing of a date. In this example, the fact that ‘1970’ comes after ‘1968’ works to 
jolt and disturb the usual narratives about  ‘contemporary’ poststructuralist theory coming 
along after supposedly ‘outdated’ feminists like Millett or Firestone. As another example: 
“women’s suffrage rights were only granted in Switzerland in 1973” is frequently cited as a 
‘shock’ statement, because it disturbs the usual paradigm of ‘first the West, then the rest’. On 
one level, this is problematic because it is presumed that the response will be one of surprise 
(i.e. that we all do think that the West is ‘ahead’ of the rest, hence the ‘only’). But it does 
illustrate the potentially subversive purposes to which dating can be put, when dates are used 
to disorient, to engender surprise and initiate a thinking-again.  
Using dates to emphasise incongruities and contradictions can therefore help to 
disrupt dominant feminist periodisations and timelines, and can be used as a catalyst for 
replotting and reframing. Finally, in addition to the ‘shock’ factor, dating can also be used to 
challenge the reductionism that attends periodisation, by moving to smaller-scale, more 
specific markers such as the year, rather than larger-scale levels of the decade or the century. 
In the field of Literary Criticism, for example, the choice of a particular year to set the level 
of specificity is a fairly common tactic in response to the problems of generalisation and 
reductionism that attend the practice of grand-scale periodisation
114
. Following this 
annualising model, and choosing a particular year as a calendrical coordinator, I suggest, 
could help feminists achieve greater levels of specificity, and highlight the diversity of 
coexisting practices and events occurring within a very specific time frame.  
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 Some influential examples of the ‘annualised’ model of periodisation include essays which emerged 
from a series of conferences held at the University of Essex on the ‘Sociology of Literature’, each 
devoted to different dates (see Barker et al 1986).  
 162 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined a qualitative approach to calendar time, which does not take 
calendar time at face value as a neutral or straightforwardly chronological, ‘linear’ time. 
Drawing on sociological and anthropological studies, and also upon Heidegger’s distinction 
between ‘time-measuring’ and ‘time-reckoning’, I stressed that measuring frameworks 
emerge as an outcome of qualitative, materially-situated processes of collective time-
reckoning. Once we register that the quantitative, dated grid is the outcome of a more 
complex process of time-reckoning, we see that calendar time is in fact just as ‘significant’ 
and indeed, as temporally complex as other fields or aspects of historical time. The qualitative 
conception of calendar time opened up by Heidegger can also be enhanced by a ‘deepened’, 
pluralistic account of public time, which recognises its value in enabling temporal and 
historical coordination, whilst also recognising that dating frameworks and timelines are 
diverse in their meanings and effects. This implies that our use of dates and timelines requires 
as much reflexivity as does our use of language. Moreover, in uncovering the more complex 
temporal dynamics ‘underpinning’ calendar time, the qualitative approach opens up some 
potentially creative and constructive ways of using calendar time to coordinate and re-map 
feminist histories.  
Above all, however, foregrounding the process of ‘time-reckoning’ requires an 
acknowledgement that calendar time emerges as just one way of ‘reckoning’ and coordinating 
historical time. Many temporalities and time-measurement frameworks are simply not 
convertible into generalised calendar time units. Indeed, as Michelle Bastian argues, one of 
the most crucial tasks for theorists of time and temporality is to displace the idea that 
quantitative ‘linear time’ is the only means of attaining temporal coordination and belonging 
(Bastian 2011). To take a qualitative approach, then, is to recognise the multiplicity of 
temporal reference frameworks and temporal orders, which may overlap and entangle with 
dated grids and calendrical orders, but cannot be subsumed by them. One such temporal order 
is that of ‘generational time’, explored in the next chapter, where we will see that although 
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generational or genealogical temporalities can be mapped against a timeline, they are far more 
complex than the quantitative demarcation of ‘generations’ according to dated parameters.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Generational Time 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will explore ‘generational time’: the time that connects feminists of different 
eras and ages through generational and matrilineal temporal orders. The generational 
paradigm is frequently treated with suspicion within feminist theory. This is due to its 
association with unilinear and unidirectional notions of historical time, as the idea of a 
generational succession conjures images of feminism being ‘passed on’ or ‘handed down’ 
from one generation to the next. The generational paradigm is also criticised for its 
association with patriarchal, authoritarian models of tradition, structured around the tropes 
and logics of patrimonial endowment and debt, patrilineal succession, and Oedipal rivalry and 
rebellion. From this perspective, depicting feminist histories in terms of generational or 
matrilineal legacy and inheritance is just patriarchy with an ‘M’.  
Female-to-female inheritance, it is true, has always been problematic within 
patriarchal societies and cultures in which ‘the legacy passed from male to male is understood 
as natural and of central importance’ (Spencer 2004:10). Yet, whilst linear and patriarchal 
determinations of generational time may well be dominant, this does not mean that they are 
the only determinations that exist or are possible. Indeed, to dismiss generational paradigms 
as wholly ‘linear’ or ‘patriarchal’ is to miss the multiple meanings and temporalities that they 
can express and enact within feminist discourse and practice, thereby allowing patriarchal and 
linear frameworks and symbolics to overdetermine our analysis. The aim of this chapter, 
therefore, is to argue for a more nuanced approach to generational time, and to demonstrate 
that generational and matrilineal orders can be temporalised in various ways, according to 
specific contexts and historical trajectories.  
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Section 1 begins the chapter with a critical analysis of the dominant paradigms of 
generational time, focusing particularly on the arguments put forward by feminist theorist 
Judith Roof that the generational paradigm is irredeemably linear and patriarchal (1995; 
1997). Whilst Roof provokes a necessary scrutiny and de-naturalisation of the ‘generations’ 
concept, the claim that generational paradigms, in all their variation, are irredeemably or 
inevitably linear and patriarchal is an insupportable generalisation. Accordingly, I propose a 
broader approach, which focuses on the temporal ambiguities within the concept of 
‘generations’, and the variety of significations it can carry within different contexts. To 
consider how feminist generations and genealogies can be temporalised and practiced in 
nonlinear, non-authoritarian ways, section 2 turns to the work of Luce Irigaray on female 
genealogies (1993a; 1993b; 1993c; 1996). Irigaray’s intention is to rethink ‘woman-to-
woman sociality’ in ways which subvert the stronghold that patriarchal/Oedipal models have 
over intergenerational relationships, symbolism and imagery, and her psychoanalytic 
interventions and mythic re-imaginings offer a promising route out of linear generationalism. 
However, this promise is underdeveloped in her work, due to her uniform treatment of 
‘western history’, the ‘symbolic order’, and the ‘cultural imaginary’, which ultimately accords 
too much weight to mainstream models.  
In light of the shortcomings of the Irigarayan approach, section 3 takes inspiration 
from ‘postkinship studies’ in anthropology instead, and shifts towards thinking in terms of not 
one, but many ‘symbolic orders’ and ‘cultural imaginaries’, as a way of opening up a much 
more heterogeneous and nuanced approach to ‘generational time’ within feminist 
historiography. The section draws particularly on the work of Hortense Spillers (1987) and 
Madhu Dubey (1995) on matrilineal metaphors in the African American context, to consider 
how tracing different histories and symbolic orders opens up different generational 
imaginaries and relational practices. It concludes by suggesting that Dubey’s hermeneutic of 
‘repetition with variation’ offers a promising way of interpreting and engaging with 
generational time, as it can attend to the complex interplay between continuity and 
discontinuity within the process of history-making and tradition-building.  
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1 
GENERATIONAL ANXIETIES 
 
Generational paradigms have become increasingly prevalent within narratives of feminist 
history over the past forty years, as tracing feminist genealogies has itself become an orderly 
and continuous historical tradition (Scott 1996:1).
115
 Feminists have constructed generational 
histories and continuities not only to build intellectual and emotional connections between 
women of different ages and eras, but also to counter the persistent ‘erasure of women’s 
political and historical past, which makes each new generation of feminists appear as an 
abnormal excrescence on the face of time’ (Rich 1995:9-10). Yet, whilst the intention of such 
generational and matrilineal symbolism is to build constructive connections between 
feminists across time, feminists have become increasingly concerned that these paradigms are 
in fact having divisive effects. 
 Criticisms of the generational paradigm tend to focus upon the related tropes of anxiety 
and conflict. In the first instance, envisaging feminism as a singular journey, whereby each 
generation builds on the gains of the previous, can lead to anxieties over one’s own 
contribution and an unease about contingency. Judith Roof describes this as the ‘parent’s 
angst’, premised upon the ‘fear of a barren history’, i.e. a fear that the next ‘generation’ will 
refuse to follow in the footsteps of their foremothers and continue in the projected direction, 
or will ‘[reject] their mother’s model entirely and [commence] a new and different battle’ 
(Roof 1997:70). Such ‘parental’ anxiety is not unfounded, as the model of linear generational 
succession can indeed provoke a desire in younger feminists to break out of the chain, negate 
older feminisms, and begin anew, as they experience the burden of legacy in negative terms 
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 The idea of feminist generations became particularly entrenched through influential feminist texts in 
the 1970s such as Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex (1971) and Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics (1970), both of 
which begin by offering an account of feminist history reaching back at least one century. Roof also 
gives the example of Alice Rossi’s The Feminist Papers (1973) —‘fully devoted to the project of 
describing a feminist history’—and Jane Rule’s Lesbian Images (1975) - ‘primarily about foremothers’ 
(Roof 1999:70). 
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(Henry 2004; Looser 1999). The matrix of generational legacy and precedent can thus instill a 
sense of generational anxiety among both older and younger feminists, giving rise to a 
conception of feminist history as a struggle between competing generations (Roof 1997:69-
70; Howie 2010b:4). This is not to say that without generational paradigms, feminism would 
be an entirely harmonious field. The point, rather, is that symbolic familial or mother-
daughter tropes have exacerbated tensions, and can prevent feminists from exploring the 
complex intellectual reasons for conflicts within fields of feminist praxis and discourse, and 
from looking to larger institutional and cultural forces that ‘perpetuate sexism, foster rivalry 
and undervalue women's work’ (Roof 1997:85).  
The critical ‘generations’ debate within recent feminist theory has been crucial in 
highlighting the problematic effects that generational and matrilineal paradigms can have 
upon how feminist discourse is conducted and perceived. Moreover, the debate has provoked 
a penetrating theoretical investigation into the very concept of ‘generations’ itself. For some, 
such as Roof, the concept of historical generations is inextricably linked to patriarchal, 
traditionalist models of history and linear models of historical time, which means that 
feminists must abandon generational and matrilineal paradigms altogether. In an influential 
essay on ‘Generational Difficulties’ (1997), Roof argues that the concept of generations is 
intrinsically connected to familial structures and images, which tend towards ‘Oedipal’ modes 
of relating and communicating. Although the central theme of the Oedipal drama is the 
father-son relationship, in more general terms it depicts intergenerational relationships 
through the lens of rivalry, prohibition, frustration, repression, deferral, rebellion, and 
entitlement. Roof’s claim is that the familial paradigm of ‘feminist generations’ inevitably 
imports the ‘full force of Oedipal rivalry, recrimination, and debt’ into relations between 
feminists, which means that tensions and conflicts between feminists are over-interpreted in 
terms of unavoidable tension between ‘overbearing mothers’ or ‘undutiful daughters’ 
(1997:71). Even when the familial symbolism is not apparent, she contends, the concept of 
generations is implicitly dependent upon a biologistic ‘reproductive logic’ of historical 
change, which presumes that ‘the past produces the future as parents produce children’. This 
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reproductive logic is made most explicit in cases where the mother-daughter metaphor is in 
use, because it literally takes us to reproduction as the site of historical change (ibid).  
As well as being wedded to a reproductive logic and an Oedipal familial model, 
claims Roof, the concept of ‘generations’ instils an onerous concept of legacy, because it is 
bound up in ‘the metaphor of the patriarchal family in the throes of its illusory battle with 
mortality’ (ibid: 86). Propagating generational paradigms, she states, is a way of staking a 
claim in history, making one’s mark and ensuring one’s contribution is not forgotten, trying to 
direct the future to fulfill the goals and dreams of the past (ibid: 75). From this perspective, 
the generational trope functions as a totemic guarantee of historical continuity, representing a 
patrilineal figure of control ‘that prevents unruly 'Others' escaping the law of legacy and debt’ 
(ibid). As such, the establishment of a generational order ‘connotes a certain fear about a 
failure of cohesion, the dissolution of heritage, and the loss or defection of heirs that might 
dispel the myths of impossible continuity’ (ibid: 85). Generational logic, according to Roof, 
also imports patrimonial understandings of exchange, based upon ideologies of property and 
ownership, whereby ideas and practices are regarded as property that is not shared but 
‘handed down’ and endowed on the next generation (ibid:75) 
 Consequently, Roof argues, the concept of ‘generations’ both presumes and reinforces 
a unilinear, unidirectional understanding of historical time, which in turn fosters hierarchical, 
patriarchal models of communication and relationality. She concludes, therefore, that if we 
challenge ‘the very notions of time and history that ground these ideas, generation becomes 
an insignificant term in the creation, re-creation, sharing and proliferation of feminist 
knowledges' (ibid: 86). Her argument, however, warrants closer scrutiny. Is the concept of 
‘generations’ necessarily bound up in a reductive biologistic ‘reproductive’ understanding of 
historical change? Is familial symbolism necessarily ‘Oedipal’ or patriarchal? Is there only 
one generational temporality?  
 One of the most useful aspects of Roof’s critique is its provocation of a thorough de-
naturalisation of ‘generations’ as a historiographical concept. In some respects, ‘generations’ 
is of course bound up in ‘reproductive’ systems, given that the idea of generations refers, in 
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its most basic sense, to several ‘brute facts’ about human biology and the life of the species: 
birth, aging and death. There is reproduction: parents produce children, and those children 
produce children and so on. And this process is indeed unidirectional in the sense that my 
children cannot give birth to me. However, whilst it connects the idea of history to the ‘life of 
the species’, the concept of ‘generations’ does not belong to the biological as a given. It is a 
sociocultural formulation, or a ‘sociological projection’, of the biological process of 
reproduction (Ricoeur 1988:109). As such, Roof is right to contend that there is nothing 
inevitable about interpreting or organising historical change around the concept of 
‘generations’ or a generational succession, as there are various ways we could conceptualise 
the processes of birth, ageing and death at a cultural level. 
 Yet, whilst de-naturalisation underscores the contestability and contingency of 
‘generations’ as a cultural, discursive concept, Roof’s claim that it is inherently wedded to a 
patriarchal, linear model of historical time is more problematic. Indeed, a deeper analysis of 
‘generations’ at a cultural and conceptual level entreats us to explore its variety of 
significations and its ambiguities. On the one hand, it is certainly possible to argue that the 
concept of generations has propped up a traditionalist linear ideal of history. According to the 
traditionalist model, the ‘continuity’ of species reproduction is supposedly reflected within 
community and kinship structures, as ‘generations’ provide the conduit for transmission of 
the past and thus the straight line of history from past to present to future (Osborne 
1996:127). Yet, to focus solely on these aspects of linear continuity is to overlook the fact that 
the concept of ‘generations’ implicitly carries both continuity and discontinuity as core 
components of its meaning. Relations between overlapping ‘generations’ can be the medium 
of historical continuity, but also of rupture and discontinuity, due to the disruptive potential of 
demarcating a new ‘generation’ and the fact that ‘new generations’ do not always do what 
they are told or are expected to do, as Roof herself observes (ibid: 135). In this sense, I 
suggest there is a fundamental ambiguity at the core of generational time, as its 
temporalisation depends upon the dynamic interplay between continuity and discontinuity, as 
generational links and/or ruptures can be enacted and emphasised to varying extents, within 
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different situations. My initial proposal, therefore, is that taking a broader, more extensive 
perspective on the ‘generations’ concept will enable us to explore this temporal ambiguity in 
greater depth.  
 In its broadest sense, generational time can be conceived as a created time that 
mediates between the realms of people living before, during and beyond one’s own lifetime. 
In this sense, it makes possible the lived experience of receiving and forming historical 
memories and anticipating or imagining future historical time (Ricoeur 1988:112-4; Stiegler 
2010). For example, the idea of ‘predecessors’ instils a sense of connection to earlier lives 
and times and transmitted memories, whilst the idea of ‘successors’ stretches out futural 
horizons, denoting those likely to outlive us and the anonymous ‘future generation’ who have 
not yet been born (Ricoeur 1988:112-4). Once again, it is helpful to draw a distinction 
between a quantitative approach and a qualitative approach. The quantitative approach to 
‘generations’ charts cycles of birth, aging and death, calculating average intervals of 
procreation and life-spans to construct a generational model in purely quantitative terms. But 
to grasp the meaning of symbolic generational orders we must ask qualitative questions about 
the social dynamics of constituting a diverse group of people as a distinct ‘generation’, 
interconnecting ‘generations’ with one another, and endowing this process with cultural 
values and meaning (Mannheim 1952; Ricoeur 1988:110-111). This qualitative approach 
guards against the reductive presumption that all those who belong to a ‘generation’ of people 
born within the same dated parameters share a distinct, cohesive perspective or experience, or 
animate a ‘generational geist’ (Heller 1997:209). Moreover, it enables us to focus on the 
diachronic aspect of the ‘generations’ concept and the function of generational time as a 
relational time that enables connections between lives through or across time and a ‘large-
scale’ temporal imaginary. Indeed, the etymology of ‘diachrony’—meaning ‘through’ or 
‘between’ time—supports the idea that diachronic relations are not a one-way or mono-causal 
process, but rather, more of a two-way, dialogic process back and forth through time and 
between people.  
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 If generational time is understood in this broad sense as a fundamentally relational, 
connective time, it follows that its temporalisation depends upon certain ways of relating and 
making connections. In other words, the extent to which we emphasise or enact ‘generational’ 
continuities or discontinuities is dependent upon the way we relate and communicate with one 
another, which in turn, will depend upon specific contexts and historical trajectories. The 
same goes for matrilineal paradigms, which are invested with multiple meanings and 
connotations, have different modes of symbolic expression within different societies and 
communities, and can be played out and temporalised in various ways.
116
 Patriarchal and 
Oedipal models may well dominate cultural and social understandings of familial structure 
and relationships, yet it is too much of a generalisation to equate any kind of familial or 
matrilineal symbolism with patriarchal relational models and Oedipality.  
 Rather than abandoning all generational or matrilineal thinking at the outset, then, the 
rest of the chapter will seek to explore further the temporal ambiguity of generational time, 
and consider the variety of ways that generational or genealogical time can be configured and 
understood. It is necessary to be critically aware of the potentially problematic effects of 
generational rhetoric and symbolism, to interrogate our assumptions around, and reliance 
upon, generational paradigms and anxieties. Yet, if we take a broader and more nuanced 
perspective, we see that historical change need not be linked to ‘generations’ in its crudest 
quantitative sense, in terms of the division of history into thirty-year intervals (Mannheim 
1952), nor need generational time be understood in terms of an Oedipal familial paradigm, or 
a unilinear order of succession. The crucial question then becomes how to think ‘generational 
time’ outside the dominant paradigms, and to cultivate a more productive and contextually 
attentive approach.  
 
 
                                                          
116
 Indeed, generalising claims about ‘familial’ paradigms and their political value and meaning risk 
echoing the universalising claims made by some white American feminists such as Firestone and 
Millett, for example, that denounce ‘the family’ as the locus of women’s oppression, when the right to 
live together as a family comes with a very different history for African Americans than for white 
Americans (Carby 1999:51-2).  
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2 
OEDIPUS INTERRUPTED 
 
The recent debates around feminist ‘generations’ have drawn vital critical attention to the 
divisive, anxiety-inducing effects that generational and matrilineal symbolism can have 
within feminism, and moreover, compel a thoroughgoing critical analysis of ‘generations’ and 
‘generational time’ as cultural conceptions. A specific kind of generational paradigm is 
problematic, aligned to Oedipal models of relationality, and patriarchal, traditionalist, linear 
models of historical time. Yet, whilst the concept of generations can bolster patriarchal and 
linear models, it is not necessarily bound to them. As an initial means of reducing the 
influence of these dominant models, I have suggested that the notion of historical generations 
can be understood in its broadest sense as a conceptual or symbolic means of linking 
overlapping lives through time, which is open to various kinds of temporal configuration. 
Once we have opened out the field in this way, it becomes possible to consider a different 
kind of generational or genealogical order, outside of patriarchal, Oedipal and linear 
determinations.   
To explore the possibility of a different generational dynamic between feminists, and 
hence, a different generational temporality, this section turns to the work of Luce Irigaray on 
female genealogies.
117
 Irigaray, like Roof, is critical of the dissipation of debate among 
women into hierarchies of social power ‘tied to a prevalence of genealogical familial 
authority’ (Irigaray 1996:13-14).  Yet unlike Roof, Irigaray stresses that the problem is with 
patriarchal monopolisation and colonisation of the genealogical, rather than with the concept 
of ‘genealogy’ or ‘generations’ per se. Indeed, she insists that female genealogies and a sense 
of ‘verticality’, or connection through time, are crucial components in building strong female 
                                                          
117
 I want to acknowledge here the problem of conflating ‘female’ and ‘feminist’. Addressing the issue 
of ‘between-women sociality’ is a crucial dimension of the feminist project to rethink generational 
communication; yet, depicting the ‘receiver’ of feminist legacies as de facto female runs the risk of 
capitulating to the notion that feminism is a women-only affair that does not need to trouble or 
implicate men. As such, I move towards a broader approach to generational time towards the end of the 
chapter, advocating a hermeneutic of ‘repetition with variation’ which is non-gender specific.  
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identities and relations between women (Irigaray 1993a:94; see also Cornell 2002). As such, 
she seeks to subvert and challenge the dominance of patriarchal generational and genealogical 
models, through a series of psychoanalytic interventions, and performative engagements with 
mythic representations of female relations. This aspect of Irigaray’s work, I suggest, is useful 
to feminist historiography in its affirmation and demonstration that it is possible to think 
outside patriarchal and linear determinations of generational and genealogical symbolics and 
imaginaries. Yet, towards the end of the section, I argue that Irigaray does not fulfill her own 
promise, due to her monolithic treatment of the ‘western symbolic order’ and ‘cultural 
imaginary’.  
2.1 
Psychoanalytic Interventions 
 
In Sexes and Genealogies (1993b), Irigaray begins by painting a rather gloomy picture of 
female genealogies and ‘woman-to-woman sociality’. Relations between women are stifled, 
even impossible, within patriarchal culture and society, she claims, because its kinship 
structures separate women from one another and subordinate them to male authority. In a 
culture structured upon patriliny and patrimony, women’s own genealogy is severed and lost, 
as they are ‘abducted from their ancestors’, ‘torn away’ from their own mothers, and 
transplanted into the genealogy of male partners. ‘It must be made apparent’, she stresses, 
‘that we live in accordance with exclusively male genealogical systems… Patriarchal power 
is organised by submitting one genealogy to the other… Mother-daughter relations in 
patrilinear societies are subordinated to relations between men’ (Irigaray 1993b:16).  In je, tu, 
nous (1993c), Irigaray paints a similar picture, explaining that the Oedipal paradigm is the 
emblem and mechanism of this genealogical and reproductive order because of its division of 
genealogy into ‘one or two family triangles, all sired by the male’. As the patriarchal family 
serves the interest of male power and property, the female is reduced to the realm of raw 
‘nature’ and ‘uncultured’ reproduction (1993c:3). 
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For Irigaray, then, the ‘between-men culture’ of patriarchy can offer no suitable ways 
of symbolising and cultivating ‘between-women’ cultures, socialities and genealogies. From 
this perspective, the ‘political matricide’118 that pits younger feminists against older feminists 
arises because there is no adequate cultural alternative to the patriarchal, hierarchical rules 
and meanings governing genealogical and inter-generational relations. That is, to conduct 
themselves in social life, women are forced to mimic patriarchal kinship patterns and 
relationships modelled on genealogical descent, Oedipal rivalry and debt. Women ape these 
patterns and paradigms, Irigaray contends, because ‘we lack values of our own’ (1993c:4). 
Despite painting this seemingly bleak picture of genealogical relations between women under 
patriarchy, however, Irigaray goes on to make an enticing claim, which is that ‘the Oedipal 
paradigm only seems like the only order possible because it refuses to regard itself as myth’ 
(1993b:23). Granted, the Oedipal myth is not simply a fantasy, but rather, can be seen as a 
‘symptom’, in that it has a ‘symbolic logic that accounts for a real mode of functioning, a real 
structure of relations’ (Felman 1987:151). Nevertheless, Irigaray’s claim here dramatises the 
vital idea that whilst Oedipal modes may well have dominated familial and generational 
relationships under patriarchal conditions, their symbolic logic and mythic manifestations 
can, in principle, be interrupted and unsettled.  
 Irigaray’s work undertakes such interruptions in two key ways. The first is through a 
psychoanalytic intervention. One of her guiding ideas is that if social relations between 
women are to improve, we must look at psychic determinations of the social, rather than 
taking a purely socioeconomic perspective
119. In fact, for Irigaray, feminism has ‘failed’ 
precisely because it has failed to adequately investigate and unravel the symbolic structures, 
imaginary identifications and psychic attachments that underpin social organisation 
                                                          
118
 Madeline Detloff attributes the term ‘political matricide’ to Louise Bernikow (Detloff 1997).  
119
 Friedrich Engels, for example, argues that patriarchal kinship systems are determined solely by 
economic shifts and the introduction of private property, and therefore that patriarchal cultural norms 
and genealogical systems based on patrimony and patriliny are an effect of this economic organisation 
(Engels 2010).  
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(1993b:10-11). From Irigaray’s psychoanalytically-oriented perspective, then, if 
intergenerational relations between feminists are manifesting Oedipal tendencies, we can read 
this as symptomatic of a deeper problem of women’s relationship to ‘the symbolic’: i.e. the 
set of linguistic, sociocultural rules and norms that order, support and regulate our sense of 
reality and cultural intelligibility, including gendered relations and kinship structures. ‘How 
can we govern the world as women if we have not defined our identity, the rules governing 
our genealogical relations, our social, linguistic, cultural order’? (1993c:51). Women’s 
repositioning of themselves as socio-symbolic subjects, Irigaray argues, must first take place 
by questioning our symbolic and imaginary relation to the mother. This, above all, requires us 
to challenge the psychoanalytic idea, as entrenched by both Freud and Lacan, that entry into 
the ‘symbolic’ order of language and culture depends upon the paternal intervention and thus 
the exclusion and ‘forgetting’ of the maternal.  
 In Lacan’s account, the mother and child initially exist in a relation of fusion and 
undifferentiation, a state which needs to be broken up by the ‘Paternal Metaphor’ and the 
‘Law of the Father’ if the child is to enter into the cultural order, to represent and conduct 
themselves through language, and thus to become an individuated, encultured subject to 
themselves and others.
120
 Lacan, it must be registered, insists that it is the father’s name or 
‘paternal metaphor’ that is the fundamental ‘support of the symbolic system’, rather than the 
literal father. This marks a decisive shift away from the biologistic orientation of Freud’s 
account of Oedipalisation, where it is the literal father that prohibits the desire for the mother 
                                                          
120
 The child, Lacan claims, is born into the order of the Real, a realm of ‘pure plentitude’ and fullness, 
a continuum in which there are no boundaries and no lack. The child has no sense of its own corporeal 
boundaries, and no sense of inside and outside, subject and object, self and other. In this phase, the 
child exists in a syncretic unity, a joyous fusion, with the mother. This ‘hermetically sealed unit’ of 
fullness and completeness begins its dissolution with the onset of the ‘mirror stage’, in which the child 
begins to recognise lack or absence (of the mother or gratification of needs) and concurrently, to 
recognise its distinction from the mother and its environment. This is the realm of the Imaginary, in 
which the ego is primitively established through fantasised identification with others, particularly the 
mother. Lacan associates this dyadic, mutually defining, identificatory structure primarily with the 
mother–child relation in the mirror stage, which, if left to itself, ‘would entail a vicious cycle of 
imaginary projections, identifications, internalisations, fantasies and demands that leave no room for 
development or growth’ (Grosz 1990:50). Exchange is impossible because there is no third term, hence 
the equation of entry into the symbolic order of language and culture through the paternal.  
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and ensures entry into the cultural order of prohibitions and taboos
121
. However, feminist 
theorists have argued that the Lacanian account is equally problematic from a feminist 
perspective, because it still depends upon the idea that the mother-child relation has to be 
mediated via a third term if the child is to successfully enter cultural life. That is, although 
Lacan shifts the grounds of our understanding of patriarchal power relations and their social 
reproduction away from the biologistic orientation of Freud towards socio-linguistic 
processes, he nevertheless formulates this structure on the basis of a universal or ‘inevitable 
law’ that the maternal relation always has to be sacrificed and left behind. Thus, in Lacan’s 
work, as Elisabeth Grosz argues, ‘patriarchal dominance is not so much challenged as 
displaced, from biology to the equally unchangeable socio-linguistic law of the father’ (Grosz 
1990:15). Like Freud’s Oedipus complex, then, the Lacanian account of ‘Oedipalisation’ is 
premised upon the necessity of the ‘paternal’ or ‘third-term’ intervention into the mother-
child relation, as the condition for culture and communication. The idea that the Name and 
Law of the Father is a necessary regulator of desire and inter-subjective communication 
therefore makes patriarchal authority and patrilineal/patrimonial kinship structures seem 
inevitable. 
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 In Freud’s account, the Oedipal complex describes a transition in the (boy) child’s life whereby his 
primary attachment to, and desire for, the mother must be regulated and re-directed. It is the father that 
prohibits the boy’s (sexual) access to the mother, and thus the boy perceives the father as an unbeatable 
rival, and moreover, construes the father’s prohibitions as castration threats. In the (successful) 
resolution of this complex, the boy represses his primal desire for the mother, deferring or redirecting 
his desire towards the future when he will be rewarded, by having a woman of his own. In Totem and 
Taboo, Freud attempts to account for the origins of this ‘patriarchal pact’, through reference to the 
‘primal myth’ of parricide: the killing of the father figure by the fraternal horde (Freud 1950:141). This 
‘original sin’ founds an inexorable law of debt ‘through which the subject binds himself for life to the 
Law’, as founded on the Oedipal incest taboo and patriarchal kinship structures which regulate desire 
and familial relationships. As Lacan points out therefore, the power of the Oedipus complex in Freud’s 
system rests not so much upon the personage of the father figure, but rather on the authority of the dead 
or absent father (Grosz 1990:69). Indeed, Lacan stresses that paternal authority is always already 
symbolic, because paternity (at least traditionally) is uncertain and thus requires representation through 
the naming of the father. The ‘Law-of-the-Father’ refers to the kinship systems which forbid sexual 
access to those who have been named as family. It is the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ which thus becomes 
central to Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud’s psycho-biological Oedipus model in linguistic and socio-
cultural terms.  
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 For Irigaray, Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory is useful in that it helps to demonstrate 
the fundamentally patriarchal foundations of western culture. ‘What is now termed the 
Oedipal structure as access to the cultural order is already structured within a single, 
masculine line of filiation which doesn’t symbolize the woman’s relationship to her mother’ 
(Irigaray 1993b:16). Yet, although psychoanalytic theory has propped up the patriarchal 
symbolic order by making it seem inevitable, Irigaray argues, it in fact offers valuable tools 
for the task of rethinking female relationships and genealogies and challenging the ‘erasure of 
the maternal’. Thus, instead of simply accepting the story of originary mother-child fusion, 
and the need for separation from the mother,
122
 Irigaray uses psychoanalytic concepts and 
methods to try and find a place for maternal genealogy within the symbolic and assert that 
‘there is a genealogy of women’ (1993c:19). 
One example is Irigaray’s postulation of a ‘maternal order’ founded on a ‘placental 
economy’ (1993b). Whilst the patriarchal imagination has represented the relation between 
mother and child in utero as one of fusion that needs to be broken up and regulated by the 
paternal function, Irigaray suggests that by paying attention to the mediating role played by 
the placenta, we can formulate an alternative psychoanalytic account whereby the mother and 
child are already separate, though conjoined. Irigaray draws here on the work of biologist 
Helène Rouch, who likens pregnancy to a ‘natural transplant’ (1993b). The difference 
between pregnancy and an organ transplant, she explains, is that the placenta stops the 
defence mechanism against the (half-foreign) foetus. It thereby facilitates ‘regulating 
exchanges’ between mother and foetus, negotiating between the mother’s self and the ‘other 
within’. So whilst Lacan claims that genuine exchange depends upon the intervention of the 
paternal third term, the figure of the placenta implies that the ‘third term’ is already there.  
‘Culture’ is yet to give ‘interpretation to the model of tolerance of the other within 
and with a self that this relationship manifests’, Irigaray claims, and as such has failed to 
recognise or appreciate the ‘almost ethical character’ of the fetal relation and the placental 
economy (1993b). But it provides a promising ground for a ‘maternal order’ which does not 
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 As, for example, does Lacanian Ellie Ragland Sullivan (1987).  
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depend upon the intervention of ‘Paternal Law’ for the formation of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, and hence for the conditions of communication. The ‘placental economy’, 
Irigaray states, is an organised economy ‘which respects the one and the other’, and is far 
removed from the economy of patrimonial and patrilineal exchange. As such, the posited 
‘maternal order’ does not need to be transcended in order to make cultural relations possible, 
but rather, contains the seeds of communication and psychic relations already within: 
 
‘Were there a way for a child to symbolise its relations to the mother’s body, and 
were that relationship imagined as always already separate and at the same time life 
sustaining, the whole fantasy of fusion, triangulation, law, loss, and refusal of loss 
would be interrupted…’ (Weed 2010:27).  
 
The idea of a ‘maternal order’ and ‘placental economy’ is not developed in much 
detail in Irigaray’s work, but its value lies in gesturing towards an alternative psychoanalytic 
account which does not depend upon a transcendence of the maternal. Through 
psychoanalytic interventions such as this, which open up alternative models of relationality, 
individuation and enculturation, Irigaray thus begins to interrupt and unsettle the Oedipal 
dynamic, showing that it is one possible account among many. Moreover, as Howie posits, 
her postulation of a ‘maternal order’ can help reorient and introduce a different ethical 
sensibility into intergenerational relations between feminists (Howie 2010b). If Oedipal 
psychoanalytic theory seals and shores up patriarchal genealogical orders, then the maternal 
order offers a way of re-imagining the maternal relation, where the maternal does not need to 
be sacrified or negated, but rather, plays a vital role within psychic development and cultural 
life. By removing the necessity for daughters to turn away from their mothers, the notion of a 
maternal order invites a non-conflictual understanding of the mother-daughter relation and 
relations between women more generally, thereby initiating new ‘pathways through 
feminisms and between feminists’ (ibid: 10). As Howie argues, this can inaugurate a 
relational and communicational model that has a different logic and temporality: an 
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antecedence of an ethical relationship, or a ‘new covenant’ for a woman-to-woman sociality 
that ‘offers a way to hear the past in light of the new without anxious displacement’ (ibid: 8).  
This is not to say that we must ‘embrace the truth of the placenta’ as an emblem for 
woman-to-woman sociality, or that all forms of relations between women should be reduced 
or assimilated to an idealised version of the maternal relation (Weed 2010:27). The point, 
rather, is that the theory of ‘Oedipalisation’ is not incontrovertible, that it is possible to think 
beyond patriarchal paradigms and imagine genealogical relations and temporalities in a way 
much more conducive to forging productive feminist relationships.  
 
2.2 
Mythic Reimaginings 
 
Irigaray’s psychoanalytic interventions interrupt and unsettle Oedipal and patriarchal 
paradigms, by opening up alternative accounts of individuation and enculturation which do 
not depend upon a suppression of the maternal, and as such, do not equate culture with 
patriarchy, or genealogy with patriliny and patrimony. In this regard, her work demonstrates 
that taking a pragmatic approach to psychoanalytic theory can be beneficial to feminist theory 
and historiography, as we seek to develop more constructive and adequate models of 
genealogy and intergenerational communication
123. Alongside Irigaray’s psychoanalytical 
interventions, there is a second dimension to Irigaray’s work on female genealogies which 
operates on the level of the ‘cultural imaginary’, as she explores different ways of culturally 
representing female genealogies through myth.  
The ‘Imaginary’ is a term used by Lacan to describe the realm of identification and 
imagistic representation of relations, in which the ego is primitively established through 
                                                          
123
 As stated in the introduction, the pragmatic approach to truth is based upon the question of what 
practical difference it would make to think in a particular way. Taking a pragmatic approach to 
psychoanalytic theory, then, is to regard different theories and methods as ‘toolkits’, rather than as 
fixed theories which have a universal applicability.  
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fantasised identification with others
124. The ‘cultural imaginary’ within psychoanalytically-
inflected cultural theory is an extension of this term to designate the cultural realm of 
identification and representation through social and cultural systems of image, narrative and 
fantasy (Roof 1996:10). The relationship between the symbolic order and the cultural 
imaginary is complex, given their deep intertwinement, but the cultural imaginary can be 
essentially understood as a ‘symptom’ or expression of the symbolic order, which in turn, 
gives structure to the imaginary and makes it intelligible (ibid; see also Ragland Sullivan 
1987:156). A key component of the cultural imaginary is myth, which Irigaray describes as a 
‘historical expression’ of the symbolic, sociocultural rules and psychic structures which 
permeate the dominant socio-symbolic system at a given time.  
As Irigaray understands myths to be expressions of symbolic rules and psychic 
structures, much of her work on myth takes place in a diagnostic vein, as she reads certain 
myths as symptomatic of a patriarchal symbolic, using them to demonstrate that ‘western 
culture and civilisation’ is fundamentally built upon an ‘originary’ matricide125. Irigaray 
focuses primarily on myths of Ancient Greece, as she claims that ‘our imaginary still works 
according to the schema set in place by Greek mythology and tragedy’ (1993c:12).126 For 
example, in Irigaray’s reading of Aeschylus’s Oresteia, the murder of Clytemnestra by 
Orestes is a mythic expression of the symbolic rule that matricide is the ‘originary’ of 
patriarchy: the sacrifice of the mother and the ‘severing of the genealogical link between 
women’ (Schwab 2010:80; Irigaray 1993a:78). Irigaray’s readings of Greek myths, however, 
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 Particularly the mother (hence the need for the ‘paternal intervention’). 
 
125
‘Originary’ is a Heideggerian concept which Joanna Hodge deploys to clarify the status of 
‘matricide’ in Irigaray’s thought. For Heidegger, Hodge explains, an originary event does not take 
place at the beginning of a sequence of events, from which the sequence then proceeds. Rather, ‘the 
originary from which a particular discursive formation emerges has to be repeatedly enacted and 
reinscribed if the formation is to stay in place… (it) articulates itself as an omnipresent and recurrently 
affirmed set of parameters that open up certain lines of possibility while closing off others’ (Hodge 
1994:192).  
126
 This treatment of myth as a kind of ‘collective unconscious’ is reminiscent of Jung’s notion of 
‘archetypes’ and the ‘collective unconscious’ (1981).  
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are not exclusively aimed at revealing the ‘originary matricide’ upon which patriarchy rests. 
Some of her readings are recuperative, as she ‘returns’ to prominent myths that represent and 
give cultural expression to the mother-daughter relation, a relation, which she claims is 
ordinarily the ‘least cultured space of our societies’ (1993b:47). Although patriarchal 
traditions have ‘wiped out’ traces of mother-daughter genealogies, Irigaray insists, repressed 
‘gynocratic’ orders nevertheless resurface in myth. For example, Irigaray reads the Demeter-
Persephone myth not only as a story of destruction and loss, but also in affirmative terms, as 
it demonstrates a powerful vibrant bond between mother and daughter which the myth shows 
to be ‘indispensible to the survival of the earth, the human race and the gods…When the link 
between mother and daughter—the intergenerational link between women—is lost, life does 
not flourish’ (Schwab 2010:85).  
Irigaray’s reconstructive and affirmative mythologising also takes place through her 
evocations of a gynocratic ‘prehistory’127. The myth of matriarchal or ‘gynocratic’ prehistory, 
it must be stressed, is not widely regarded as a credible historical thesis (Eller 2000).
128
 
Nevertheless, Irigarayan scholars argue that Irigaray embraces the myth as myth, using it to 
emphasise that patriarchy need not be regarded as universal or inevitable, and to imagine how 
western cultures might have developed differently. Indeed, Irigaray claims that skeptical 
attitudes and disregard for ‘prehistory’ proliferate precisely because ‘patriarchy is mistaken 
for the only history possible’ (Irigaray 1993b:24). The intended effect of such claims is to de-
naturalise and unsettle the stronghold of the patriarchal symbolic, to insist that ‘the coming of 
patriarchal law is not that “always already” taken step from nature into culture’ (Schwab 
2010:90).  
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 She refers particularly to the work of nineteenth-century mythologist Johann Bachofen, which 
draws on classical Greek sources to postulate an era of matriarchy ending in classical times with the 
rise of male rule and the ‘male principle’. Though Irigaray uses the term ‘gynocracy’ rather than 
‘matriarchy’, to stress that a ‘gynocentric’ socio-symbolic structure would be completely different and 
not simply an inversion of patriarchy, she accedes to Bachofen’s method of reading prehistory in myth.  
 
128
 The end of the nineteenth century saw a brief flourishing of the myth of matriarchal prehistory, with 
anthropologist Herbert Spencer among its more famous proponents, and it is taken up by Engels in The 
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (2010). Most anthropologists dropped the idea at 
the turn of the century due to sketchy evidence, though Soviet anthropologists stuck close to the myth 
until at least the 1950s (Eller 2000).  
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It can of course be objected that recuperative ‘origin stories’ project idealised images 
of the female and the feminine, or depict myths as repositories for timeless truths or a 
‘beautiful past.’ Yet, Irigaray’s defenders argue that her positing of ‘mythic origins’ is 
intended as a provocation to think through unrealised conditions of possibility, rather than a 
claim to a lost ‘truth’. Moreover, through emphasising the psychoanalytic underpinnings of 
her work, we can draw a parallel between Irigaray’s ‘performative engagement’ with myth 
and the psychoanalytic scene of transference, where the point is ‘less to construct the precise 
details of the story than to establish another possibility for communication’ (Butler 2005:57). 
Psychoanalysis, therefore, is not about recovering the ‘origin’ of neurosis, or simply 
reproducing the past, but rather, is about reworking past and present in a relationship with 
another. Irigaray’s ‘return’ to mythology, argues Samantha Haigh, can be interpreted in 
precisely these terms, not as a bid to ‘recover a lost, authentic, feminocentric ‘origin’’… but 
in order to reread, to (re)invent and reappropriate:  
 
‘This move… parallels exactly the psychoanalytic move of return and reworking, the 
way in which, during the transference relation, it is not the ‘narrative’s forgotten 
origin’ which is primary but the ‘active process of constructing a text’’ (Haigh 
1994:63).   
 
In the sense that Irigaray’s ‘return’ to Greek myths can be interpreted as a process of 
reworking and reinvention, it functions as a performative demonstration of interruption, of 
trying to think outside the dominant Oedipal and patriarchal paradigms, by uncovering 
alternative representations of mother-daughter relations within the cultural imaginary.  From a 
purely psychoanalytic perspective, it must be stressed, Irigaray’s engagements with myth and 
the cultural imaginary alone are unsatisfactory, as they do little to intervene into 
psychoanalytic theory, or the theory of the symbolic order of which the cultural imaginary is 
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supposedly a ‘symptom’ (Weed 2010).129 As Laura Green writes, ‘we need to be clear about 
the maternal contribution to subjectivity first if we are to repair what Irigaray calls the female 
genre’ (Green 2012:6). We also need to question Irigaray’s seeming ‘confidence in the 
capacity of new myths and images to be socially transformative’ (Deutscher 2002:58). Yet, 
from a historiographical perspective, Irigaray’s mythic re-imaginings can serve as a valuable 
starting point, in their affirmation that a different model of ‘woman-to-woman sociality’ and 
intergenerational communication is possible: a model that is not ‘enslaved to the past’ and 
premised upon a hierarchical order of transmission, but rather, ‘offers itself as an opening to a 
field of communication, as a world of the creation and exchange of thought and culture…’ 
(Irigaray 1996:46). 
Having said this, however, the project of uncovering and building alternative 
genealogical and generational temporalities remains underdeveloped in Irigaray’s own work 
— more of a promise or a ‘glimmer’. This is due to her totalising treatment of ‘western’ 
culture and mythology, as she elevates Greek myths and Oedipal paradigms as the governing 
myths of ‘western’ culture and history. ‘With a few additions and subtractions’, Irigaray 
writes, ‘our imaginary still works according to the schema set in place by Greek mythology 
and tragedy… The mythology that underlies patriarchy has not changed’ (1993c:12). 
Irigaray’s style of making generalising claims about ‘western culture’ and thought in this 
manner results in a restriction of her own radical project, as it forces her to push the 
transformative potential of female creativity and expressivity towards a future ‘still to come 
(or to come again?)’ via a repressed gynocratic prehistory (Battersby 1998:101)130. By 
essentially equating the western cultural imaginary with the world of Greek myth, Irigaray 
                                                          
129
 Laura Green also argues that Irigaray’s call to use symbolic archetypes as ‘identificatory supports’ 
is actually a kind of projection theory, in which women are expected to consciously project ideals of 
femininity onto ‘ego ideals’. This is problematic because projection is primarily a defence mechanism. 
‘What Irigaray identifies as a problem relating to the infant’s failure to introject the maternal other – 
rather than incorporating her as a Symbolic figure… – cannot be solved by means of ‘projection’ 
(Green 2012:6).  
 
130
 And, I would add, lead her to exoticise nonwestern forms of communication and conceptualisation, 
particularly in her later work such as Between East and West (2002).  
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leaves herself little to work with; indeed, given that the mythic feminine characters Irigaray 
‘returns to’, such as Demeter and Persephone, are supposed to be projections of the 
patriarchal imaginary, it is difficult to see her mythic ‘reclamations’ as an especially radical 
move (Green 2012:6). Moreover, her generalising, universalising purview blocks out the 
transformative potential of alternative myths, narratives and cultural representations, which 
already exist within the shadows or crevasses of the dominant culture, but are consistently 
overlooked and ‘forgotten’ (Battersby 1998:101-2; 2007:157-159). 
Irigaray’s evocation of ‘history’ is just as homogenising and universalising as her 
evocation of western mythology and culture. Her writings abound with sweeping references 
to grand historical ‘stages’, ‘eras’ and ‘periods’. Such historical depictions are, indeed, often 
reminiscent of Hegel’s division of history into epochs and eras that can be summed up by a 
theme or single idea, and at times her words seem to echo the Hegelian move of positing a 
retrospective telos as a way of ‘making sense’ of history. ‘Perhaps we needed to go this far’, 
Irigaray writes, ‘in order to understand that we must go back to the origins of the decline of 
our culture’ (Irigaray 1993c:122). 131 It is possible to read Irigaray’s authoritarian style and 
her big-sweep treatment of history as deliberately ‘mimetic’, or as a rhetorical strategy 
deployed to enforce her key point that sexual difference is yet to be really thought (Irigaray 
1993a:5). Similarly, we can interpret Irigaray’s claim that ‘our imaginary still works 
according to the schema set in place by Greek mythology and tragedy’ as a ‘mimetic’ strategy 
which ‘lets the myth recount its own interruptions’ (Athanasiou and Tzelepis 2010:5). 
However, universalising allusions to western history or western culture in the singular, even if 
they are deliberately ‘mimetic’, mean that within Irigaray’s work, particular histories, and 
particular myths, which may well subvert the dominant paradigms, go unnoticed: 
 
                                                          
131
 Indeed, we might attribute Irigaray’s big-sweep approach to history to an excess of mythic thinking, 
such that she renders history itself in mythic or epic dramatic terms, as an eternal struggle between 
maternal and paternal, feminine and masculine, female and male. 
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‘There is no place … for the particular histories of others to emerge… no place for 
the plurality of representations of difference: for the foreign, the ecstatis, the 
enslaved, and the colonised which are always there, haunting the imaginary of the 
tragics and our own’ (Varikas 2010:243).  
 
Consequently, whilst Irigaray’s work opens up and affirms the possibility of re-
imagining and reconstituting genealogical orders and temporalities, her style of making 
generalising claims about western culture and history ultimately grants too much to the 
dominant patriarchal paradigms. Her insightful critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
essentially that it remains complicit in maintaining the patriarchal symbolic order by not 
examining its own historical determinants (Weed 2010:18)
132
. This line of critique points to 
the radical possibilities opened up by taking a historiographical perspective. Yet, arguably, 
Irigaray does not take this line of critique far enough, as her own historical proclamations are 
so generalising that she effectively equates ‘western history’ with the history of certain kind 
of patriarchy, and ‘western culture’ with a monolithic set of myths.  Even if we interpret 
Irigaray’s grand historicising and mythologising as a kind of ‘mimesis’, the effect is the same: 
myths and histories which do not fit into the master narrative are once again overlooked. As I 
have argued previously: it is not enough to interrupt and trouble already-dominant narratives 
and myths. We need to find and tell different ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
132
 In fact, Lacan himself does intimate that he does not intend his psychoanalytic model as a timeless 
theory, affirming that when something new comes to light that forces a complete rethink, ‘another 
structural order emerges’… (quoted in Weed 2010:18). Nevertheless, the presentation of his theory of 
Oedipalisation as the condition for entry into order of language, society and culture is difficult to 
reconcile with this apparent affirmation of historical determinants.  
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3 
MANY GENERATIONAL SYMBOLIC ORDERS AND IMAGINARIES 
 
Irigaray’s insight that ‘the Oedipal paradigm only seems like the only order possible because 
it refuses to regard itself as myth’ offers an opening into rethinking generational and familial 
symbolism within historiography (1993b: 23). The Oedipal drama has been foundational to 
the conception of social relations and cultural transmission within western cultural theory, 
primarily due to the influence of Freud and Lacan, and also structuralist anthropologists such 
as Claude Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss 1969)
.
. These theories and rubrics offer useful insights 
into how patriarchal cultural logics and structures maintain and reproduce themselves. Yet, by 
granting them too much explanatory and imaginary power, we allow them to overdetermine 
our analyses. As we have seen, in Lacanian theory, ‘Oedipalisation’ is cast as the inaugural 
structure of language and subjectivity, whereby the Law and the Name of the Father 
intervenes in the mother-child ‘fusion’ to mark the child’s entry into the realm of the 
Symbolic. If we accept this theory, then Oedipus becomes the very mark and normative 
condition of culture itself (Butler 2002:34). This implies that the wide social variability of 
kinship and genealogical patterns has little or no efficacy in rewriting the symbolic order – an 
order that is regarded as not only pervasive but as inevitable (ibid). Irigaray’s psychoanalytic 
interventions and mythic reimaginings go some way to interrupting this seeming inevitability 
of ‘Oedipal’ relations; yet her big-sweep, monolithic treatment of ‘the western symbolic’, 
‘western culture’ and ‘western history’ rather dims the transformative and subversive power 
of her thought.  
Accordingly, this section takes its cue from the more radical approach towards 
generational and genealogical symbolics and imaginaries that can be found within an 
emerging anthropological field which Judith Butler describes as ‘post-kinship studies’ (Butler 
2002; Franklin and MacKinnon 2001; Schneider 1984). This body of work theorises kinship 
as ‘a kind of doing’, which does not reflect a prior or reified structure but which can only be 
understood as a practice that enacts a specific assemblage of significations as it takes place 
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(Butler 2002:34-6)
133. In this sense, ‘kinship’ is a mobile classificatory technology, which is 
generative of, and responsive to, ‘the kinds of material, relational, and cultural worlds that are 
possible or livable, and for whom’ (Franklin and MacKinnon 2000:278). This mobile, 
performative conception of kinship, argues Butler, takes us away from an understanding of 
the symbolic order of genealogical kinship patterns as a hypostatised, reified structure of 
relations that underwrites and ‘lurks behind any actual social arrangement’. It permits us 
instead to ‘consider how modes of patterned and performative doing bring kinship categories 
into operation and become the means by which they undergo transformation and 
displacement’ (Butler 2002:34). Ultimately, then, ‘post-kinship’ theorists relax the distinction 
between the symbolic and the social, because the presumption that social relations and 
practices have the power to undermine and transform the symbolic order of ‘rules’ governing 
those social relations implies, finally, that ‘the symbolic does not precede the social and… has 
no independence from it’ (ibid: 38)134. This means that hegemony is ‘eminently challengeable 
at the level of social, political and historical practice’ (ibid: 35).  
The ‘post-kinship’ approach thus gives the concept of a ‘symbolic order’ much more 
substance and historical determination than it often receives within Lacanian or Irigarayan-
inspired feminist theory. The ‘post-kinship’ paradigm also shows that symbolic orders can be 
understood as shifting structures, which fluctuate and mutate due to changing historical 
determinations. This implies that instead of there being one monolithic symbolic order, or 
indeed one cultural imaginary, there will be as many symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries 
as there are forms of social practice and relations. This final section, therefore, will 
demonstrate how the thought of ‘many’ symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries, rather than 
‘one’, can enable feminists to think through the significations of generational and matrilineal 
paradigms in a much more nuanced and heterogeneous manner, considering the variety of 
                                                          
133
 This argument is put forward by anthropologist David Schneider in A Critique of the Study of 
Kinship (1984). See also Franklin and MacKinnon (2000 and 2001).  
 
134
 For more on Butler’s critique of the ‘quasi-timeless character’ of the Lacanian notion of the 
symbolic order, see Antigone’s Claim (2000:20-21).  
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different narratives and imagery at our disposal, and the different ways that generational 
logics and temporalities are configured and enacted according to specific contexts and 
historical trajectories and resonances.  
 
3.1  
Shifting Symbolics and Historical Resonances 
 
The importance of tracing out different symbolic orders through different historical 
trajectories and geographical contexts is made apparent in Hortense Spillers’ illuminating 
work on genealogical symbolics within the African American context. In her seminal essay 
‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’ (1987), Spillers traces a very different history of ‘the 
symbolic order’ to that traced by Irigaray in her more Hegelian moments, as she discusses the 
impact of the Atlantic slave trade upon the kinship patterns and gendered subject-positions 
which structure African American life in the United States. ‘The symbolic order that I wish to 
trace’, she writes, ‘begins at the “beginning”, which is really a rupture and a radically 
different kind of cultural continuation…. We write and think, then, about an outcome of 
African American life in the United States under the pressure of those events’ (Spillers 
1987:68).  
Spillers’ core argument is that the intertwinement of kinship relations and property 
relations under slavery shows that gendered subject-positions and structures of kinship 
‘adhere to no symbolic integrity’ (ibid: 66). Indeed, she writes, if ‘kinship’ were possible 
among captive persons, the property relations and rules of slavery would be undermined, 
because the children of enslaved persons would then ‘belong’ to a mother and father (ibid: 
74). This is of course not to say that African peoples in the New World did not maintain 
emotional connections and imagined continuities, which are what make blood-relations 
meaningful in the first place (ibid). Her point, rather, is that histories of slavery demonstrate 
that the meanings of ‘family’, ‘genealogy’ and ‘kinship’ are shifting and contingent, at the 
mercy of property relations determined by racialised symbolic structures:  
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‘“Family” as we understand it “in the West”—the vertical transfer of a bloodline, or a 
patronymic, of titles and entitlements, of real estate… from fathers to sons in the 
supposedly free exchange of affectional ties between a male and a female of his 
choice—becomes the mythically revered privilege of a free and freed community… 
The point remains that captive persons were forced into patterns of dispersal, 
beginning with the Trade itself, into the horizontal relatedness of language groups, 
discourse formations, bloodlines, names, and properties by the legal arrangements of 
enslavement… We might choose to call this connectedness “family” or “support 
structure”, but that is a rather different case from the moves of a dominant symbolic 
order, pledged to maintain the supremacy of race. It is that order that forces “family” 
to modify itself when it does not mean family of the “master”, or dominant enclave’ 
(ibid: 74-5).  
 
This differential symbolic history, Spillers contends, has resulted in a unique position 
for the African American woman, which ‘places her out of the traditional symbolics of the 
female gender’. Legal enslavement removed the African American male from the prevailing 
social function of the Name and Law of the Father, therefore setting a ‘dual fatherhood’ in 
motion, comprised of ‘the African father’s banished name and body and the captor father’s 
mocking presence’. Under such conditions, Spillers contends, a ‘dual motherhood’ is also 
established, whereby ‘motherhood as female bloodrite is outraged, is denied, at the very same 
time that it becomes the founding term of a human and social enactment’ (ibid). On the one 
hand, then, the perceived absence of the Father’s symbolic mark upon the African American 
family has resulted in persistent pathologisation of the African American family and its 
supposedly ‘matriarchal’ structure.135 Yet on the other hand, the unsettling of the Law and the 
                                                          
135
 As Spillers shows in her analysis of Moynihan’s 1965 ‘Report on the “Negro family’. In fact, claims 
Spillers, when the power of the African American female is described as ‘matriarchal’, it is misnamed, 
because historically, a captive mother had no right to claim her child, and further, motherhood is a 
subjugated form of cultural inheritance.  
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Name of the Father within the context of enslavement gives way to a potentially ‘monstrous’ 
symbolic position: ‘a female with the potential to “name”’. As Spillers explains:  
 
‘The African American woman, the mother, the daughter, becomes historically the 
powerful and shadowy evocation of a cultural synthesis long evaporated—the law of 
the Mother—only and precisely because legal enslavement removed the African-
American male not so much from sight as from the mimetic view as a partner in the 
prevailing social function of the Father's name, the Father's law’ (ibid: 80). 
 
By tracing a different symbolic history, Spillers’ essay thereby reveals Irigaray’s 
monolithic representation of maternal genealogies and ‘woman-to-woman’ sociality to be 
biased towards a certain kind of cultural system and experience, bringing to light the 
obfuscation of race and slavery in Irigaray’s analysis of patrilineal genealogies and 
patrimonial exchange relations. For instance, Irigaray claims that under western patriarchy, 
women’s genealogical links are severed because of patrimonial and patrilineal kinship 
structures under which women are ‘abducted from their ancestors’, exchanged between 
patriarchal family units, and reduced to the ‘natural’ function of reproduction. Yet Spillers’ 
historically sensitive analysis shows how genealogical relations can be severed and shaped in 
different ways, as slavery forced the separation of children from both their mother and father, 
instigating a ‘traumatic symbolic destruction of the social significations of kinship, gender, 
and name’. This legacy, as Ewa Ziarek points out, still threatens to ‘disarticulate the very 
conception of gender and kinship’ that Irigaray depicts as uniform in its effects upon 
women’s identity and genealogical relations (Ziarek 2010:210).  
Spillers’ essay also makes apparent that Irigaray’ strategy for transforming women’s 
relation to the symbolic is rather narrow. Irigaray, as discussed, engages with psychoanalytic 
theory and myth—primarily ‘the Greeks’—as a means of unsettling patriarchal symbolic 
structures and opening up a place for the maternal. But by tracing a different symbolic 
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history, Spillers shows that different histories and legacies can yield representational 
potentialities and ‘texts for empowerment’ that Irigaray is unable to consider because of her 
blanket approach to history, symbolic structures, and mythic reimaginings in ‘the West’. 
Spillers argues that in the absence of the symbolic patriarchal figure, the ‘monstrosity’ of a 
strong maternal figure offers a potentially radical social and identity position for African 
American women:  
 
‘This different cultural text actually reconfigures, in historically ordained discourse, 
certain representational potentialities for African Americans… and it is our task to 
make a place for this different social subject…Actually claiming the monstrosity (of a 
female with the potential to “name”) which her culture imposes in blindness, 
“Sapphire” might rewrite after all a radically different text for female empowerment’ 
(Spillers 1987:80).   
 
The subtleties and complexities of Spillers’ essay thereby require that feminist 
theorists think twice before making grand claims about the cultural meaning and symbolic 
logics of generational and familial paradigms. Instead, we need to consider how different 
histories yield different representational and relational potentialities for different groups and 
individuals. As Madhu Dubey argues, the history of black motherhood gives the matrilineal 
paradigm its ‘special resonance’ within contemporary black feminist criticism, where ‘chosen 
kinship’ can be interpreted as a strategy for overcoming a specific and brutal history of 
dislocation and disinheritance by means of fictional familial and cultural connection (Dubey 
1995: 245). In contrast to white women, she argues, ‘neither a cultural nor a familial lineage 
was available as a seemingly natural given’ for black women in the US. Dubey’s analysis thus 
rather complicates Roof’s dismissal of the naturalised ‘reproductive logic’ of generational 
paradigms, as Dubey argues that it is ‘precisely this lack of a naturalised tradition that 
motivates the impulse to naturalise tradition and that paradoxically exposes the constructed 
status of the natural in black feminist discourse’ (ibid, emphasis added).  
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Being sensitive to ‘special’ historical resonances does not require suspension of a 
critical perspective. Dubey herself is keenly aware of the hazards of using generational and 
matrilineal metaphors within feminist literary criticism, discussing the dangers of 
consolidating and idealising a fragmented past, of positing the maternal figure as a guarantor 
of temporal continuity and an ‘authentic black feminine identity’, and of conflating the wide 
range of female relationships into the mother-daughter matrix. However, whilst recognising 
the potential pitfalls of matrilineal configurations, Dubey, like Spillers, pays careful attention 
to the ways in which histories of slavery have shaped experiences of black motherhood and 
familial relations in America and thereby conditioned the project of black cultural 
reconstruction (ibid: 246). This is made possible through a theoretical perspective that is 
attuned to the specific historical resonances and meanings that generational and matrilineal 
paradigms can carry within different feminist contexts.  
 
3.2 
Repetition with Variation 
 
Working on the presumption that there are ‘many’ shifting symbolic genealogical orders and 
cultural imaginaries, rather than just ‘one’, complicates any attempt to formulate a singular 
perspective on feminist genealogies and generational relations. Different symbolics and 
different imaginaries offer different cultural ‘texts for empowerment’ and representation, and 
different ways of interpreting and constructing generational and matrilineal orders. Thinking 
in terms of many symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries, rather than one, also requires that 
we take a much more nuanced approach to generational time.   
As stated in section 1, we can regard generational time in a broad sense as a relational 
time that connects us with those living before, during and beyond one’s own time. If we 
understand generational time in this way, it follows that the extent to which we emphasise or 
enact generational continuities or discontinuities is dependent upon the way we relate and 
communicate with one another, and the way we negotiate questions of authority, innovation 
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and control. Tradition-building and history-making is inevitably a ‘scene of struggle between 
competing and often incommensurable desires’ (Dubey 1995:247).. For example, desire for 
posterity and control over the future can coexist with a desire to relinquish control and enable 
others to take over. Desire to begin again can coexist with a desire or yearning for a 
connection with the past. The particular mix of desires, and the way that they are relationally 
played out, will result in different and specific temporalisations of generational time, with 
varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity, connections and ruptures. Accordingly, we 
need a generational hermeneutic that can attend to these complex mixes of desires, and the 
temporal interplay between continuity and discontinuity which ensues
136
. My concluding 
proposal here is that a hermeneutic of ‘repetition with variation’ can be usefully deployed as a 
means of thinking through the temporal ambiguities and nuances of generational time.  
This hermeneutic is aptly put into practice by Dubey, in her reading of Gayl Jones’ 
blues novel Corregidora (Jones 1988). Whilst this is a fictional, rather than a historical text, it 
offers illuminating insights for feminist historiography, as fictional narratives can express 
insights and inscribe a range of mother-daughter tropes and intergenerational 
intersubjectivities which stimulate new ways of thinking (Rye 2006).  Corregidora recounts 
the experiences of blues singer Ursa Corregidora and the relationships of three generations of 
her maternal ancestors with their Portugese slave owner, Corregidora. Structurally, the novel 
oscillates between the narrator Ursa’s reflections on her present situation, and passages which 
express the flood of memories of stories told to her by her mother, grandmother and great-
grandmother about their pasts: a flood which shapes and constantly interrupts Ursa’s present 
and her orientations towards the future. As Dubey describes it, ‘the novel’s structure so 
thoroughly fuses Ursa’s story with the history of her foremothers that any distinction between 
                                                          
136
 Indeed, an important criticism of Irigaray’s work is that whilst she opens out the possibility of a 
different kind of generational or genealogical temporality, she arguably simply displaces the issue of 
conflict between women on to patriarchy and offers an overly harmonious imagery (Deutscher 
2010:257; Stone 2010:171-172)
. ‘The placental emblem’, writes Deutscher, does not allow for a 
‘negotiation of aggressive affect, encroachment, or violent intent in the mother-fetal relationship, nor in 
relations between mothers and children, and women and others more generally’ (Deutscher 2010:253).  
 
 194 
past and present becomes inoperative’ (Dubey 1995:252). In this regard, the novel effectively 
demonstrates the imbrication of past, future and present, overturning any conception of a 
neatly bounded generational perspective, or a step-by-step generational succession. By means 
of the novel’s nonlinear structuration and the complexity of its characters’ relations, Jones 
‘interrogates the means by which a matrilineal or any other tradition achieves its cohesion and 
authority… refusing the ‘synthesizing, totalizing impulse of matrilineal tradition building’ 
and the hierarchical arrangement of a linear succession of influence and ‘handing down’ 
(ibid: 263-4). 
Alongside this temporal ambiguity, the novel also gives a strong sense of the 
emotional and relational ambiguity that underpins the process of tradition-building and 
cultural inheritance (ibid: 250). In many respects, Jones depicts the matrilineal legacy as a 
debilitating burden, as ‘Ursa’s fragmented memories of the stories told to her by her maternal 
ancestors repeatedly erupt into her narrative, stalling her attempt to transcend history and to 
create a new story for herself’ (ibid: 252). As such, Dubey argues, Jones challenges the 
assumption that ‘the mother’s past should provide the ground for the daughter’s utterance’ 
(ibid: 253). Nevertheless, even as she dwells upon the onerous and potential hazardous 
aspects of generational legacy, Jones does not fall into the ‘trap of privileging sheer 
contradiction’ and discontinuity. Rather, her novel manages to admirably negotiate the 
interplay between continuity and discontinuity within the genealogical relationship, through 
its structural reliance on the ‘blues method’ of ‘repetition with variation’, or ‘repetition with 
difference’ (ibid: 264):  
 
‘Always articulating contradiction within a structure of relation, this method engages 
the past in a manner different from both an Oedipal model of tradition based on 
generational rivalry and the matrilineal model with its affirmation of generational 
unity… The novel’s structure of repetition with difference denies an exclusive 
privileging of either generational conflict or continuity and offers instead a model of 
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tradition that holds the past and the present in a state of creative disequilibrium’ (ibid:  
264). 
 
The model of ‘repetition of variation’ thus does not accede to the linear order of 
succession, but equally, does not set up a dualistic juxtaposition between ‘continuity’ on the 
one hand, and ‘discontinuity’ on the other. Accordingly, ‘repetition with variation’, or 
‘repetition with difference’, moves us beyond the idea that all instantiations of continuity are 
always and inherently patrilineal and pernicious, and also beyond overly naïve or 
romanticised notions of feminist continuity across time. In relation to the variable workings of 
repetitive temporality, as Dominick La Capra argues, ‘notions of simple continuity and 
discontinuity are deceptive, for “continuity” involves not pure identity over time but some 
mode of repetition’. The idea of repetitive temporality ‘directs inquiry toward the specific and 
variable articulations of repetition and change or “continuity and discontinuity” over time’ 
(La Capra 1994:174). As such, ‘repetition with variation’ can facilitate a nuanced, sensitive 
approach to generational time within feminist historiography, as a hermeneutic that can grasp 
the discontinuities and differences that are as necessary to the development of a living 
tradition as are continuities and historical resonances.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has argued for a nuanced, contextualist approach to generational time, which 
appreciates the various ways that generational time can be temporalised through cultural 
symbolism and imagery, and different relational practices. This means rejecting arguments 
that generational and genealogical paradigms are inherently unilinear and unidirectional, or 
inherently authoritarian, traditionalist and patriarchal. It requires us to consider instead the 
interplay between continuity and discontinuity within the temporalisation of generational 
time, and to recognise that there is no singular symbolic determination (‘patriarchal’) or 
temporal order (‘linear’) governing the use of generational or matrilineal paradigms. On the 
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contrary, generationalism and matrilinearity have complex, specific meanings and 
temporalities within different fields and traditions of feminism, operating within the orbit of 
multiple symbolic logics and historical resonances. To orient us towards this nuanced and 
contextualist understanding, I have argued for a paradigm of ‘many’ symbolic orders and 
cultural imaginaries rather than just ‘one’, and for a hermeneutic of ‘repetition with 
variation’, which enables us to think through the multiple significations and ambiguities of 
generational time. The following chapter will elaborate on the concept of ‘repetition’ in more 
detail, as I begin to draw together some of the themes and ideas that have themselves recurred 
through the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Repetition  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I evoked Madhu Dubey’s notion of ‘repetition with variation’, as a 
way of thinking about generational relations and tradition-building which does not accede to 
the linear order of succession, but equally, does not set up a dualistic juxtaposition between 
‘continuity’ on the one hand, and ‘discontinuity’ on the other. The idea of ‘repetition with 
variation’, I proposed, captures the delicate and precarious interplay between continuity and 
discontinuity within the temporal dynamics of generational time and the process of tradition-
building, and can accommodate and articulate contradictions, fragmentations, and 
ambiguities, as well as resonances and links between feminisms of the past and feminisms of 
the present.  This chapter will further elaborate upon ‘repetition’ as a historiographical 
concept, drawing together various ideas and themes that have been discussed in previous 
chapters. The aim is to show how ‘repetition’ enhances the multidirectional, multilinear 
model of historical time I have been developing through the thesis, at both a conceptual and a 
practical level.  
When we think of historical progress in terms of a unilinear, continuous progression, 
‘history repeating itself’ can only be thought in negative terms, as a sign that transformative 
efforts have failed and progress has stalled. This negative concept of repetition—as a step 
backwards or a waste of time—has a demoralising impact within feminism, leading to a sense 
of frustration or defeat (Browne 2012). The intention here, however, is to demonstrate how 
this negative concept can be overturned when we think in terms of ‘repetition with variation’ 
or ‘repetition with difference’, which recasts repetition in history as a potentially creative and 
productive phenomenon. Indeed, this alternative understanding of repetition overturns the 
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unilinear, progressivist models of historical time and change that classify repetition as a 
negative phenomenon in the first place.
137
 To demonstrate this alternative conception, section 
1 draws on the work of feminist philosopher Christine Battersby, who establishes a unique 
model of historical time that operates through repetition and ‘echo’ (1989; 1998; 2007). I 
focus particularly on Battersby’s appropriation of the Kierkegaardian concept of ‘recollecting 
forwards’ and the Nietzschean concept of ‘untimeliness’, which she uses to depict repetitive 
temporality in terms of a relational dynamism between past, present and future. This gives 
rise to an insightful account of ‘vertical’ or diachronic relations, and to a process-oriented 
conception of historical truth and reality, which can build on my own discussions of indirect 
realism, narrativity, and generational time in earlier chapters.  
Section 2 then considers how this alternative conception of repetition can translate 
into historiographical practice. The first half of the section extends the discussion of 
Battersby’s work, as I show how the thought of repetition can translate into a transformative 
historiographical practice, which works through ‘repeating’ or re-activating forgotten ideas 
and methods that can unblock feminist thought in the present, and bring positive change. The 
second half of the section takes a more critical perspective, as whilst it is important to rethink 
the temporality of the historiographical process and the productive aspects of ‘repetition’, it is 
equally important to acknowledge that repetition is not always a positive phenomenon. There 
are ideas and presumptions that we would rather weren’t repeated, but which nevertheless 
persist and resurface within feminist discourse in the present, often unconsciously. My 
proposal here is that the concept of repetition can inspire a reflexive and critical mode of 
historiographical practice, alongside the more affirmative mode, precisely because it makes 
us realise that the ‘bad bits’ of past feminisms cannot be simply left behind, but rather, often 
                                                          
137
 The idea of ‘repetition with variation’ or ‘repetition with difference’ has become a reasonably 
common theme within feminist theory and can be drawn from various sources: for example, from 
Derrida’s notion of différance (see e.g. Schor, Weed and Rooney (2003)), or from Deleuze’s work on 
virtual self-differentiating temporality (see e.g. Colebrook and Buchanan (2000)). This chapter, 
however, in keeping with the theoretical framework of the rest of the thesis, develops a conception of 
repetition grounded in the interpretative, experiential, and relational depths of historical time as a lived 
time, and the politics and patterns of social remembering. As such, it draws on theorists whose work is 
also grounded in these thematics.   
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repeat themselves in our own presumptions and discourses. To elaborate, I turn to Dominick 
La Capra’s psychoanalytically-inspired concept of ‘historiographical transference’ (1984; 
1854; 1994; 2004), as a way of understanding the process of repetition and displacement that 
occurs as a structural determinant of historical practice. I conclude by advocating the notion 
of a ‘dialogue’ between past and present, as a way of positively and responsibly engaging 
with repetitions of the past in the present, of both the desirable and the undesirable kind.    
 
1 
RECOLLECTING FORWARDS AND THE UNTIMELY EVENT 
 
In his essay on ‘Repetition’, Kierkegaard writes that ‘genuine repetition’ does not signify a 
simple remembrance of a past event, or a recurrence of the same. It refers, rather, to the 
process whereby the possibilities generated by the past are taken up and actualised in the 
present, which Kierkegaard describes as a process of ‘recollecting forwards’:  
 
‘Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions, for 
what is recollected is repeated backwards, whereas genuine repetition is recollected 
forward’ (Kierkegaard 2001c:115-116). 
 
In The Phenomenal Woman (1998), Battersby uses this idea of repetition as ‘recollecting 
forwards’ to provoke a complete reconceptualisation of the relation between past, present and 
future. The account she gives of lived time as a repetitive temporality helps to elaborate the 
multidirectional, multilinear, internally complex conception of historical time that this thesis 
is seeking to develop. In the first instance, the idea of ‘recollecting forwards’ requires us to 
move away from a conception of the past as a fixed, determinate foundation—which exists as 
‘objectively true’—towards a more fluid and fragmentary model in which the past is 
ambiguous and indeterminate, and can be ‘repeated’ in the present in various ways. As I 
argued in chapter 2, there is no direct access to a past that is ‘given’ as ‘true’ to all parties, 
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and as such, there can be no simple ‘re-take’ of the past (Battersby 1998:209). To illustrate 
this point, Battersby turns to Kierkegaard’s rendering of the story of Antigone in Either/Or 
(Kierkegaard 2001a). Here, Kierkegaard presents an Antigone racked with uncertainty about 
the extent to which her father Oedipus knew about his guilt and his fate, particularly 
following his death, as she loses all opportunity to ask him. Her uncertainty and anxiety 
regarding her family’s past are thus taken up into her life as a ‘secret’: an ambiguous relation 
to a past that she cannot change, but which necessarily escapes her. Indeed, Battersby writes, 
‘it is ‘anxiety’—a temporal relationship that binds future to present and that endlessly 
reworks the past—that becomes the mark of Antigone’s own singularity’ (ibid: 154). In one 
way, Antigone’s ‘sad fate is like the echo of her father’s’; however, in Kierkegaard’s hands, 
that echo is ‘a form of repetition that transforms the present; it does not simply repeat a past 
or a destiny that is fixed (fated) in the manner of the Greek tragedies’ (ibid: 169).  
This conception of the past as an enigmatic or ‘elusive precursor’—which repeats and 
echoes in the present yet cannot be definitely grasped and known—has significant 
implications for how the present itself is conceptualised (ibid: 182). On this model, the 
present is not an omniscient moment of complete insight; but nor is it simply a passive 
conduit or link in the chain from past to future. Instead, Battersby describes the present as a 
‘generative caesura’, a ‘nook’ where the many different paths from the ambiguous past 
intersect in a ‘deepened present’, to produce multiple interpretations and possibilities that 
stretch into the future. This image makes it impossible to think of the ‘moment’ in terms of a 
‘single, linear series of ‘nows’ that are linked together through one uniting history’. On the 
contrary: 
 
‘The present is birthed within a multiple play of possibilities. The ‘now’ emerges in 
a ‘nook’ of intersecting paths, all of which contribute to the present and to the 
individualised egos and objects that emerge in this meeting’ (ibid: 150-1).  
 
 201 
Such reconceptualisations of past and present, in turn, have a significant impact on 
the way we think about the future and the process of historical change. Within this 
framework, it is repetitions, echoes and ‘feedback loops’ that create the change, a process that 
continually defies the expectations of the present and past. Recollection ‘loops round on itself 
in ways that allow new patternings and novelty to emerge from thematic resonances’ (ibid: 
175). Battersby’s interpretation of repetition as ‘recollecting forwards’ thus offers an 
alternative to thinking about repetition as something antithetical to change and ‘progress’, 
when imagined as a straight line towards a predetermined goal. Rather, according to this 
model of lived temporality and transformation, we ‘recollect forwards’ towards a future that 
is continually being re-opened and called into question, as novelty emerges through the 
productive use of resonance and echo (ibid: 210). ‘Recollecting forwards’, as Rachel Jones 
explains, can be understood as ‘a kind of echoing which does not passively repeat but actively 
transforms past and present simultaneously’ (Jones 2009).  
There are many themes and ideas within Battersby’s reworked account of repetition 
and the past-present-future relation that resonate with my own discussions in previous 
chapters. One aspect of particular interest to my project is Battersby’s stress upon the 
‘vertical’ relationships that develop diachronically through time via echo and repetition, 
creating temporal layering and depth. To illustrate the vertical or diachronic relation, 
Battersby draws on Kierkegaard’s rendering of Antigone, as we have seen, and also on his 
version of the Abraham/Isaac story in Fear and Trembling (Kierkegaard 2001c), focusing on 
the way he uses repetition in this text as a narrative technique to create a complex temporal 
framing of the events and characters.
138
 He ‘tells and retells the story’, she explains, ‘but 
alters details so that throughout, the reader (and narrator) is left with an ambiguous past… we 
are presented with alternative Abrahams; alternative ‘facts’; alternative realities; alternative 
narratives in which we could fit this singular event’ (Battersby 1998:169). The identities of 
                                                          
138
 It must be emphasised that Battersby’s reading of Kierkegaard is selective. For example, she is 
explicit that her use of Kierkegaard focuses on the philosophy of repetition and temporality which 
emerges from this text, and is not endorsing Kierkegaard’s intention that Abraham be judged in 
‘religious’ terms, in which it is necessary to forgive one’s father/god, even if he is a rapist or a 
murderer (Battersby 1998:171). 
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Abraham and Isaac, Battersby claims, are thus ‘given resonance and temporal depth in much 
the same way that Kierkegaard’s (modernised) Antigone works and reworks her relationship 
with the past’. From this perspective, individual selves and identities are shaped by the past, 
but not in a deterministic sense. We are not simply products of our past or our environment; 
but, on the other hand, we cannot escape them to be entirely self-determining. Instead, selves 
are shaped in ‘temporal loops, harmonies and scores’, as echoes and feedback-loops link an 
(uncertain) past to an (undetermined) future (ibid: 175). In this sense, repetition operates as a 
kind of ‘double consciousness’, as ‘the past is reworked by the individual’s consciousness, 
but this consciousness is itself dependent on an otherness that preceded it’ (ibid: 173).  
Through emphasising the temporal layering, looping, and depth that comprises the 
diachronic relation, this approach invites us to explore the internal complexity of historical 
time, as it emerges through diachronic relations between historical subjects. Moreover, by 
foregrounding the vertical relation, Battersby’s Kierkegaardian model of intersubjective 
relations is fully able to grasp the power dynamics and struggles with hierarchies that 
inevitably attend and govern the processes of inheritance and identity-formation. According 
to Battersby’s account of the ‘patternings’ of identity, intersubjectivity and ‘otherness’ are 
always constitutively primary: a theoretical ‘absolute’ that is common within feminist 
phenomenology, hermeneutics and political theory alike. Yet the strength of Battersby’s 
‘vertical’ analysis is that she resists the temptation to theorise this intersubjectivity in an 
overly harmonious or ‘horizontal’ manner. Rather, the multiplicitous temporal order that she 
extracts from Kierkegaard emerges not only through temporal loops and flashbacks, but also 
through competing ‘takes’ on past, present and future (ibid: 183).  
This conception of power-laden ‘vertical’ relationships and competing narratives 
links with my own previous discussions about narrativity and generationality, where I have 
argued that there can be no simple ‘passing on’ of feminist legacies, as we negotiate relations 
of authority and dependence, and competing interpretations, experiences and narratives, to 
chart different courses through our feminist pasts and presents. Unlike Irigaray’s rather 
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utopian re-imaginings of female genealogies
139, Battersby’s vertical relational model depicts 
female genealogies and historical legacies in terms of complex contestations, and negotiations 
of continuity and discontinuity. This helps us to conceptualise the process of configuring 
historical time though narrativity, dating frameworks and generational symbolics as a process 
that is fraught with tensions and points of rupture and disconnection, as well as being made 
possible through the resonances and connections between different narratives, timelines, 
ethical imperatives, and political visions. As Dubey’s analysis also shows, the idea of 
‘repetition with variation’ or repetitive temporality can aptly grasp the coexistence of 
discontinuities and differences alongside continuities and resonances, within the process of 
history-making and tradition-building.  
Alongside this important focus on temporal depth, relationality and power dynamics, 
another aspect of Battersby’s interpretation of ‘recollecting forwards’ that can enhance my 
own model of historical time is the process-oriented conception of historical truth and reality 
that it offers. In chapter 2, I developed a model of indirect historical realism, proposing the 
notion of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ as a way to understand the relationship of 
interpretation to happening. On the one hand, I argued, the way in which a happening or event 
is understood and interpreted is itself part of the event – constituting part of the event’s truth 
and meaning. But on the other hand, the event will always exceed any specific interpretation 
or conceptualisation. What it means, what it meant—and therefore what it ‘was’ or ‘is’—is 
always ambiguous, contingent, and contestable. Whilst the historical meaning or ‘truth’ of the 
past event is determined to an extent by interpretative frameworks and problematics in the 
present, the past can never be fixed through the historical accounts we construct and narrate.   
Similarly, in Battersby’s account of repetitive temporality, there is no fixed historical 
truth, only a ‘temporally enfolded complex of symbols, traces, feelings, moods that invite us 
to confront the ‘givens’ that are made mysterious via encodement with the multiplicity of 
paths that might have led from the past’ (ibid: 171). This means that actuality and reality 
cannot be established through an appeal to a transparent experience or memory, nor an appeal 
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 For critiques, see Deutscher (2010) or Stone (2011).  
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to consensus or coherence. For example, Antigone’s fate is not an ‘absolute truth’ to be 
discovered, ‘a true self… to be revealed and corroborated by others’ (ibid: 169). Likewise, the 
‘repetitions’ of Abraham and Isaac’s story mean that we are never left with a final, ‘true’ 
underlying meaning of the story (ibid: 169). As with Kierkegaard’s Antigone, the past is 
taken up into the present to give a temporal depth, but there is ‘no privileged access to that 
depth’ via the mechanisms of memory or a transparent and fully thematisable experience: 
‘There are no ‘ultimates’ or absolutes’—experience itself is suspect—but there is nevertheless 
a (fluid, shifting, dynamic) ‘real’ that is composed by the way the self is positioned in the 
complex dynamics of multiple self-other relationships’ and the ‘secrets’ of the past (ibid: 168-
170).  
Battersby further develops this processual conception of historical reality and truth in 
The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference (2007), where she draws upon the Nietzschean 
conception of the ‘untimely’ event.140 Her exposition focuses on a key passage from Beyond 
Good and Evil (Nietzsche 2006a), where Nietzsche claims that the most transformative events 
cannot be grasped at the time of their occurrence:  
 
‘The greatest events and thoughts are understood last. The sexes, generations or 
races
141
 that are simultaneous with them do not live through such events – they live 
right past them’ (quoted in Battersby 2007: 185; see also Nietzsche 2006: 358).  
 
Such events pass us by because they defy our existing frameworks of understanding. But they 
are not simply negated or relegated to a fixed and frozen past: over and done with but never 
understood or realised. Rather, as Battersby explains it, ‘there is an ‘event’ (Ereignis) and a 
                                                          
140
 Once again, it must be stressed that Battersby’s reading of Nietzsche is selective. She registers the 
dangers of adopting a Nietzschean approach, for example, positing that his underlying model of life 
and ‘health’ prevents him from theorising a less antagonistic self-other relation (Battersby 2007:186-7). 
 
141
 Battersby points out that Nietzsche uses the term ‘Geshlechter’, which can mean ‘generations’, 
‘sexes’ and ‘races’. She uses the 1966 Walter Kaufman translation, but for a slightly different 
translation of this passage, see the more recent Nietzsche Reader, edited by Ansell Pearson and Large 
(2006). 
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‘something’ (Etwas) awaiting the encounter… an indefinite something already there – waiting 
to be registered’ (Battersby 2007:186). The idea of ‘untimeliness’ thus carries a logic of 
‘delay’, but this is not a delay in the sense that the untimely event contains an absolute or 
fixed truth that ‘fits better’ with the present or future, rather than its ‘own time’. Instead, 
untimely events defy all accepted, expected, or pre-determined patterns of history, lurking in 
the fringes of cultural memory, and re-emerging and ‘repeating’ at unforeseen moments, to 
break apart and disrupt the sedimented time frames and syntheses that cannot entirely 
suppress or contain them. In this regard, Battersby argues, Nietzsche affirms the capacity of 
forgotten and untimely events and ideas to ‘re-emerge as the self looks back at the past from 
the perspective of the future and a differently oriented ‘now’’ (ibid: 185). 
This conception of the ‘untimely event’ offers another way of elaborating the 
process-oriented approach to historical reality and truth, which complements and enhances 
my dynamic model of historical happening and reflexive, indirect realism. To ‘reconfigure 
truth as an event’ is to adopt a process-oriented conception of historical truth, whereby the 
truth of the past is not determined through agreeing and settling on the truth of a course of 
events once and for all, thereby fixing them in time. Instead, truth is always being reworked, 
as the echoes and repetitions of past ideas and events re-emerge from within the folds and 
layers of history, and transform our conceptual frameworks and sense of the true, the real, and 
the possible. This is not to be taken as an agnostic or relativistic position on historical truth. 
According to the indirect realist position I have proposed earlier, we are not free to invent any 
historical truth or narrative we wish, due to the constraint of the archive and the historical 
imperative of truth-telling guided by the ontological presupposition of the trace (Ricoeur 
1988:184). The turn to the ‘untimely’, rather, enables us to cultivate an extended meaning of 
the ‘event’ and further make sense of a dynamic account of historical reality and truth, 
premised upon the opacity and ‘unfinishedness’ of the past. Within the framework of 
‘recollecting forwards’ and ‘untimely’ resurfacings, the present and future are shaped by the 
past, but not in a deterministic manner, as the past is repeated in the present and future in 
unpredictable and unexpected ways.  
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2 
REPETITION IN PRACTICE  
 
The previous section has outlined an alternative conceptualisation of historical repetition, 
recasting repetition in terms of ‘recollecting forwards’ and ‘untimely’ resurfacings that 
provoke fresh understandings of past, present and future. On this model, repetition is not a 
simple retake of the past, nor a step backwards or waste of time when measured against a 
linear, teleological ideal of progress. Instead, repetitions, resurfacings and ‘feedback loops’ 
are the very mechanism of change and transformation. This account of repetition adds further 
insights and images to my multilinear, multidirectional and internally complex model of 
historical time, enabling a dynamic account of the past-present-future relation, a processual 
model of historical truth and reality, and a temporally rich account of diachronic relations and 
ambiguous, contested inheritance. In this section, I propose that this reworked concept of 
repetition opens up not only an alternative philosophy of historical time; it also opens up a 
form of historiographical practice, which is both transformative and critical. The first half of 
the section draws further on Battersby’s work, which demonstrates the transformative aspect 
of ‘repetition in practice’ through ‘remembering’ difference and ‘others within’, as a means of 
overturning hegemonic paradigms, and offering new pathways through the present via the 
past. The critical aspect will be outlined in the second half of the section, which makes 
reference to La Capra’s model of historiographical ‘transference’.  
 
2.1 
Historical Blind Spots and Remembering Others Within 
 
Throughout her work, Battersby shows how the uncovering of forgotten or neglected texts 
and artworks can trigger the re-emergence of ignored or forgotten ways of thinking and 
living, which can open up possibilities in the present, and unsettle reified ‘truths’ that have 
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come to appear as fixed or natural, but are in fact contingent.
142
 Crucial to this project is the 
notion of historical ‘blind spots’, which result from the sedimentation of received ideas and 
conventional modes of judging and perceiving, and render us incapable of registering 
elements which controvert these sedimented cognitive and interpretative frameworks. ‘We are 
positioned in history and located in overlapping power structures and spaces’, Battersby 
explains, ‘in such a way that certain things become so self-evident that they produce blind 
spots in our vision and effectively screen out that which, at present, cannot be noticed’ 
(2011:126).  
This notion of historical blind-spots is chiefly inspired by Nietzsche’s account of 
concept-formation in his essay ‘On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense’:  
 
Every concept arises through the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that 
one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept ‘leaf’ is 
formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the 
distinguishing aspects… We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking 
what is individual and actual (Nietzsche 2006c:117).  
 
                                                          
142
 In this sense, Battersby’s methodology has affinities with Foucault’s historical-critical method of 
‘genealogy’ (Battersby 2011:126). However, whilst Battersby’s approach is in many respects 
congruent with Foucault’s, there is an important difference, which I argue makes Battersby’s work a 
more fruitful resource for feminist historiography than Foucault’s. This difference lies in Battersby’s 
recognition of the importance of not only recognising and seizing on discontinuities and 
fragmentariness, but also, the importance of building continuities as a relational practice and a strategy 
of resistance (Battersby 1989:231). Foucault’s stress on discontinuity stems from his distrust of 
totalising visions of continuity and sequentially coherent change in culture (Foucault 1984:88). This is 
a distrust that I share; indeed, my entire thesis is intended to overturn this totalising and teleological 
model of historical time, which has had such a detrimental effect within feminist theory. Yet, whilst it 
is necessary to disrupt this model, forging historical continuities remains an important strategic aspect 
of feminism, helping to provide inspiration and to foster solidarity. Further, I do not necessarily equate 
continuity with teleology or totality, because, as demonstrated in chapter 5, this chapter, and the 
following, different kinds of continuities can coexist with discontinuities, within frameworks of 
repetition and ‘polytemporality’, rather than teleological or totalising models of historical time.  
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For Battersby, this passage perfectly illustrates the subversive power of Nietzsche’s thinking, 
which lies in his idea of ‘forgetting’. This is because ‘forgetting’ implicitly holds the 
possibility of remembering what has been discarded or forgotten during the formation of 
truths and hegemonic interpretative frameworks. The mind ‘forgets’ material differences and 
singularities as it forms general concepts, Nietzsche claims; yet, according to the ‘untimely’ 
model, forgotten differences and singularities are not simply negated. Rather, they remain on 
the ‘fringes of consciousness’, and as such, there is always the possibility of a new encounter 
with such forgotten differences, which then transforms our conceptual understanding of 
‘reality’ (Battersby 2007:188), or as Nietzsche puts it, ‘smashes it to pieces’ (Nietzsche 
2006:117).  
The key to Battersby’s use of this passage of Nietzsche’s lies in her extension of his 
account of ‘forgetting’ and ‘remembering’ in the formation of concepts, to draw an analogy 
with the historical process. To conceptualise and thematise history, she argues, we ‘forget’ all 
the differences and singularities which do not fit within our overarching schemas and 
narratives. Consequently, our framework of assumptions about our past and present ‘stops us 
from seeing’ or registering things which do not conform to our expectations and dominant 
ways of living (Battersby 2007:189). Nevertheless, what is excluded or forgotten remains on 
the fringes and in the folds of cultural memory, re-emerging at a later moment to disturb 
historical ‘truths’ and established perspectives on the past. This ‘shattering’ of conceptual 
understanding through the remembering of forgotten differences can help us think more 
productively about ‘others within’, those who are not outside the dominant symbolic order but 
nevertheless ‘vanish within its folds’ (1998:188): 
 
‘Knowledge systems can be transformed by an encounter with an ‘other’ that is not 
forever unknowable and unrepresentable - even if that ‘other’ has eluded 
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consciousness so completely as to fade into invisibility and inaudibility at some 
localised conjunctures of historical time’ (2011:138).143  
 
These two notions of historical ‘blind-spots’ and of ‘others within’, I contend, are of 
methodological value to feminist historiography, firstly, because they demand a critical 
interrogation of the hegemonic narratives and interpretative and cognitive frameworks that 
govern one’s theoretical practice, forcing us to consider the ‘blind spots’ they induce, i.e. 
what might be blocked out, silenced or distorted. Moreover, they encourage us to seek out 
alternatives, and to adopt an open attitude towards the past, suspending judgment and 
allowing for the possibility that we might be surprised and reoriented by what resurfaces.  In 
this sense, the thought of ‘repetition’ can inform a historical practice which encompasses the 
three modes of ‘restless revisionism’ that I proposed in chapter 2: a form of practice which is 
‘reflexive’ in its interrogation of blind spots, blockages and silences, ‘active’ in its quest for 
alternative and ‘forgotten’ traces and fragments, and ‘receptive’, in its cultivation of a more 
open attitude to history and a willingness to being transformed by the encounter with the past.  
This kind of practice is well exemplified in an essay on representational strategies 
and ‘cultures of birth’, in which Battersby considers how birth-giving and artistic creativity 
can be reconsidered through seeking out subversive female voices within ‘minor’ arts or 
‘minor’ literatures (2006).144 ‘If only we know how to look’, she writes, ‘we can already find 
women artists representing maternity, birth, creativity and procreativity in ways that disrupt 
                                                          
143
 There are also affinities with Adorno’s method of ‘non-identity thinking’, which affirms that 
forgotten singularities are capable of emerging from unstable groupings, or ‘constellations’ of 
schematised particulars. Like with her reading of Nietzsche, Battersby draws a parallel between 
Adorno’s account of sensory experience and concept-formation, and the process of historical 
remembering and forgetting within the formation of social identities and norms. Even though 
‘constellations’ might constitute a temporary conceptual or historical ‘blind-spot’ that prevents us from 
seeing or registering differences, Battersby claims, ‘patternings of individual differences in the 
‘constellation’ are not lost, but remain in ways that allow them to impinge on consciousness in 
flashes… in which what re-emerges is those differences that reason ‘forgot’ (Battersby 1998:139). 
 
144
 The term ‘minor’ is taken from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, where 
they explain that the difference between minority and majority is not simply quantitative. Rather 
‘minor’ indicates a subversive language or literature that ‘send[s] the major language racing’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987:116).  
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the dominant traditions of western modernity’ (2006:294). With reference to three women 
artists whose oeuvres span almost the entire twentieth century—Paula Modersohn-Becker 
(1876-1907), Frida Kahlo (1907-1954), and Helen Chadwick (1953-1996)—Battersby shows 
how female artists have consistently confounded hegemonic depictions of motherhood and 
notions of artistic creativity within the ‘canonical’ western tradition, thereby pointing to 
‘blind spots’ within the hegemonic discourses which have ‘set mothering outside culture’ and 
reserved artistic production for males. Moreover, she argues that through these ‘minor’ 
works, we can find alternative artistic strategies for representing ‘the problem of the subject 
who births’ (2006:307).145 Her earlier work Gender and Genius  (1989) similarly explores 
how neglected artworks by women offer tools for reimagining and rethinking the female, 
overturning those very frameworks that would seek to relegate their work to the margins, and 
moving ‘forward via the female past’ (1989:222).146  
My suggestion here is that as well as helping to overturning wider andocentric 
models and discourses, the notion of ‘blind spots’ and ‘untimely repetitions’ could make 
feminists more receptive to the transformative possibilities opened up by feminism’s own 
forgotten or ‘hidden’ histories: histories that we have ‘lived past’ because they have defied 
the norms of hegemonic feminisms, but are beginning to re-emerge and make us think again 
about what feminism is, has been, and what it can do. This kind of approach to feminist 
history can be found in the interdisciplinary anthology Black Women’s Intellectual 
                                                          
145
 Battersby uses a similar technique in The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference, where she turns 
to German poet Karoline von Günderode (1780-1816) in order to formulate a new way of thinking the 
sublime that does not conform to the ‘egotistical’ conception of the sublime as a transcendence of 
materiality (2007:119-127). She also turns to various female artists including Evelyn Williams 
Dorothea Tanning, Kay Sage, Mona Hatoum and Anne Katrine Dolven (ibid: 137-156).  
 
146
 Battersby’s key argument here is that in light of the discontinuities and fragmentations imposed 
upon and between women’s creativity under patriarchy, there is a strong case for a feminist project of 
tradition-building that forges continuities between disparate female works and artists – offering ‘tricks 
in perspective’ and tracing ‘new patterns of inheritance’ as a strategic practice that prompts a rethink of 
aesthetic values and female creativity (1989:221-31). Battersby’s appeal to tradition-building has 
attracted criticism (see for example Felski, 1995), and there is certainly a danger in overplaying the 
beneficial aspects of building continuity and coherence in the face of fragmentation. However, I submit 
that whilst Battersby’s project in Gender and Genius is certainly risky, the risk is mitigated by the 
stress she places in her later works upon the inevitability of cracks and discontinuities, and indeed, the 
necessity of being alert to ‘others within’ and affirming the transformative power of ‘remembering’ 
forgotten or suppressed differences and discontinuities. 
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Traditions: Speaking Their Minds (2007), which revisits the lives and works of nineteenth-
century African American women writers and activists including Maria Stewart, Sojourner 
Truth, Francis E.W. Harper, Pauline Hopkins, Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells, and Mary 
Ann Shadd Cary
147
. The editors Kristin Waters and Carol B. Conaway begin by stating, in 
language reminiscent of Nietzschean untimeliness, that ‘this anthology is a step toward 
reclaiming the legacies of Harper and other nineteenth-century black women whose lives we 
otherwise might have “walked past” without knowing and appreciating their remarkable 
contributions to the traditions of black thought’ (Waters and Conaway 2007:1–2). The 
language of untimeliness here casts the anthology’s objective as much more than a 
retrospective recognition or a straightforward correction of a previously inaccurate history. 
Bolder than the desire for recognition, or for accuracy, their ‘untimely’ approach is fuelled by 
a desire to allow these forgotten theoretical contributions to act on the present and future. 
This is achieved by the anthology in two key ways. Its first important intervention, as 
outlined by Regis Mann, lies in drawing attention to sites of loss, to the blind spots of western 
feminist theory and all that has been ‘forgotten’ (Mann 2011). Mann is referring here to the 
specificities and complexities of black women’s theoretical contributions to western 
feminism, which have been overlooked and ‘lost’ (Mann 2011:582-3). The figures of black 
women, she claims, have functioned overwhelmingly as ‘apparatuses through which to clarify 
and make “viable” theoretical concepts legible, rather than as sites of knowledge production’ 
(ibid: 577-578). As an example, Mann refers to the way in which Sojourner Truth has been 
co-opted, appropriated and ‘fetishised’ as a symbolic figure, with her actual words and their 
epistemological import rarely acknowledged (ibid: 579). Or when her ideas and words have 
been heeded, they have frequently been  ‘translated’ into the theoretical language and 
terminology of the day, for example, when Denise Riley ‘translates’ Truth’s words from 
‘Ain’t I a Woman?’ into ‘Ain’t I a Fluctuating Identity?’ (Riley 1987; see also McDowell 
2007). The particularities of Truth’s contributions have thus been covered over by a 
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sedimented interpretative framework and theoretical language which blocks out what she 
actually said or might have meant.  
 To ‘go back’ and uncover such lost words draws attention to these blind spots and 
sites of loss, thereby highlighting and disrupting western feminist theory’s ‘continual elision 
of the historical specificity of black women’s lives and epistemologies’ (Mann 2011:582). 
But more than this, an ‘untimely’ revisionist practice creates new opportunities for dialogue 
within the field, through recovering and reactivating forgotten histories and ‘lost 
epistemologies’ that provoke fresh approaches to the predicaments of the present. This, Mann 
explains, means allowing the past and present to ‘inhabit the same space as a framework for 
imagining and creating feminist futures’ (ibid:  584). For example, R. Dianne Bartlow’s 
contribution to the collection of essays makes links between Maria Stewart’s writings and 
acts in the nineteenth-century, and contemporary feminist work by theorists and activists 
including Patricia Hill Collins. She identifies areas of shared concern, such as educational 
disenfranchisement and institutional racism, and also similarities in approach, for example, 
between Stewart’s and Collins’ similar conceptions of critical social theory and knowledge 
production ‘as a way to survive’ (Bartlow 2007:74; see Collins 1998). As the editors of the 
collection describe it, Bartlow ‘weave[s] the past into the present by following the threads 
developed by Stewart into contemporary discourse’ (Waters and Conaway 2007:5). The essay 
thus does not simply pay tribute to Stewart, nor does it stop short at a critique of hegemonic 
feminist theory’s blind spots and elisions in ‘forgetting’ her. Its intention, rather, is to 
reactivate the past within the present, through putting the ‘intellectual episteme’ of this 
nineteenth-century writer and activist into conversation with contemporary feminisms, as a 
means of refreshing and strengthening feminist theory (Mann 2011:587).  
For another illuminating example of how feminist histories can be ‘recollected 
forward’ to transformative effect, we can turn to Kathi Weeks’ re-visitation of the ‘Wages for 
Housework’ movement in her recent monograph The Problem with Work (2011). ‘Wages for 
Housework’—a theoretical framework and political programme articulated in a number of 
texts in Italy, the UK and the US between 1972 and 1976—has rarely been taken seriously as 
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a feminist movement, and is typically portrayed in histories of feminism as ‘a rather odd curio 
from the archive of second-wave feminist theory’ (ibid: 114). Weeks’ return to these texts is 
not a straightforward rehabilitation or rescue mission, as she acknowledges that the Wages for 
Housework literature tends towards universalising analyses and an essentialising identity 
politics (in which women are addressed as ‘housewives’), and appears to propagate a dualistic 
model of productive versus reproductive labour (ibid: 126-7). Her aim, rather, is to recover 
some of the ‘lost dimensions of the project’ that can speak to the conditions of the present and 
inspire contemporary and future feminist movements. In this sense, Weeks conceives of 
Wages for Housework as a ‘living legacy rather than as a dead relic’, and her interest is in 
‘remaking’ it, rather than ‘preserving its memory’ (ibid: 116). For example, focusing 
particularly on texts by Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (1973) and Nicole Cox and 
Silvia Federici (1976), Weeks extracts an important critique of the capitalist work ethic. This 
strain of ‘antiwork’ politics has frequently been glossed over or missed in the Wages for 
Housework literature, but Weeks argues that it has a lot to offer to feminist theory in the 
contemporary context of the post-Fordist ‘work society’ with its unremitting glorification of 
hard work and cooptation of nonwork time
148
.  
Weeks also unearths an insightful analysis of the ‘utopian demand’ within these texts, 
which she presents as a refreshing antidote to the anti-utopian strains that have come to 
predominate in feminist politics as a result of cultural and political backlashes and economic 
crises.   In response to backlash politics, Weeks observes, it is common for feminists to scale 
back the scope of their political demands, ‘their commitment to revolutionary change giving 
way to an absorption in struggles to hold the ground already won’ (ibid: 183)149. Yet, we can 
learn something about expanding our horizons and making ‘utopian demands’ from the 
Wages for Housework texts, Weeks contends, which serve as an example of ‘utopianism 
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 For more on this, see Wendy Brown’s essay on ‘Resisting Left Melancholy’ (Brown 1999).  
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without apology’, and as a provocation to imagine, postulate, and instigate postcapitalist, 
postpatriarchal futures (ibid: 174). Whilst backlash logics and rhetorics tell us feminism has 
gone too far and demanded too much, the Wages for Housework texts suggest, on the 
contrary, that ‘the danger is not that we might want too much, but that we do not want 
enough’ (ibid: 225). Thus, Weeks shows that through turning to the past to inspire a more 
radical political imagination in the present, we can turn to the future with renewed hope, 
energy and imagination, reactivating the insights and spirit of a ‘half-remembered hope and 
failed dream’ and bringing the past to bear on feminism’s present and its possible futures 
(ibid: 114-7). ‘The point’, she writes, is to become more open to ‘the lost possibilities from 
which we might learn’, to ‘go back in order to bring some of the insights from the 1970s 
forward’ (ibid: 118). 
The examples referred to here show how repetition and ‘recollecting forwards’ can be 
understood not only in conceptual terms, but also in practical terms as a feminist strategy: a 
productive use of echo and repetition which can bring change within the discursive and 
political landscapes of the present. This can work both with regard to overturning wider 
androcentric discourses, but also with regard to overturning hegemonic histories of feminism 
itself. Having emphasised the positive, transformative potential of ‘repetition in practice’, 
however, the reflexive, critical aspect must now be examined in more detail. Otherwise, we 
risk fostering a naïve affirmativism which singles out the ‘good bits’ of forgotten feminist 
histories and risks glossing over the more problematic aspects of those texts or events we 
wish to ‘repeat’. Further, an overly affirmative approach risks overlooking repetitions of the 
less desirable kind, for example, of racist, colonialist, ethnocentric, or heterosexist sentiments 
and practices that we may have presumed to belong to feminisms of the past, but which 
persist and re-emerge within present presumptions and discourses.
150
 The discussion below 
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will therefore focus more closely on these problems, and finally, will show how the idea of 
repetition can lead us towards a ‘dialogic’ relation to the past.  
 
2.2 
Historiographical Transference and Dialogue 
 
The major obstacle to realising the potential pertinence of past feminist ideas and approaches 
to present conditions, as discussed in chapter 1, is a sequentialist, progressive notion of 
history, which constructs clear breaks between one historical phase and another, as each 
overtakes and leaves the other behind. Embedded in this understanding of the historical 
process is an overly secure epistemological confidence that one’s present is separate from, or 
has transcended, the problems of the past. This results in a presumption that past perspectives 
and approaches are deficient and of no relevance to the present, and as such, it blocks out the 
potentially positive and transformative kind of ‘repetitions’ discussed above. Moreover, the 
confidence that the present has transcended the past, and is necessarily an improvement upon 
the past, blocks out an awareness of the more problematic ways in which the past continues to 
repeat itself in the present.  
This kind of treatment of the present can be identified, for example, in the two main 
approaches that have predominated within feminist literary criticism. To illustrate, literary 
theorist Jennifer Fleissner gives a survey of the critical treatment of white American female 
writers of the 1880s such as Sarah Orne Jewett, Edith Wharton, Charlotte Perkins Gilman and 
Kate Chopin, over the past forty years of feminist criticism (Fleissner 2002). The first 
approach Fleissner identifies can be described as ‘affirmative’, as it aims to build affinitive 
bridges between the past and present, and concentrates wholly on appropriating the ‘good 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the folding of the past into the future, beyond the control or limit of the present’ (2000:1016). As a 
methodological imperative, this is arguably rather flimsy when it comes to the question of how one 
might actually approach and interpret feminist acts, ideas and texts of the past, which may express 
(explicitly or implicitly) racist, colonialist, ethnocentric or heterosexist sentiments.  
 216 
bits’ of these texts in line with feminist thought in the present151. The second can be described 
as a ‘historicist’ approach, which aims at a ‘critical distance’, ‘locating’ the texts within their 
particular historical moment or context, and interpreting them according to the norms and 
practices of their day
152
. Clearly, these two different approaches postulate a different kind of 
relation between past and present. The affirmative approach constructs a continuity between 
(certain aspects of) these women’s writings of the past and the feminist present, whilst the 
historicist approach set up a break, as the writings are fixed or located in their historical 
‘moment’. Nevertheless, each approach can be shown to depend upon the presumption that 
the present has ‘transcended’ the past. Whilst the affirmative approach posits an affinity 
between past and present, Fleissner argues, the underlying presumption, nevertheless, is that 
the present has essentially overcome the problems of the past. The implicit idea behind these 
readings of Jewett or Gilman, she contends, is that ‘looking back, we are able to construct a 
better perspective that keeps the good while rejecting the bad’ (Fleissner 2002:49). The 
historicist approach may appear to be preferable to the affirmative approach, as it seems to 
disentangle itself from the politics of historical interpretation and selectivity in the present by 
‘stepping back’ to make judgments according to the texts’ own historical contexts. Yet in fact, 
historicist criticism often rests upon equally problematic epistemological presumptions, in 
that the past is treated as a finished stage of history, which the present has overcome and 
moved beyond. For example, in the historicist readings that Fleissner examines, ‘the authors 
are made to represent their era’s worst excesses of class snobbery, racism, cultural 
imperialism – all the things that the scholars who uncovered them would wish only to leave 
behind’ (ibid: 46-6). She proposes, therefore, that ‘the historicist insistence on rendering 
writers more dead than alive may be a screen, a way of covering over the ways in which they 
do still live, the ways in which critic and author are not as distant from one another as it might 
appear’ (ibid: 52). Indeed, this can be regarded as a form of ‘temporal othering’ or ‘temporal 
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distancing’, as discussed in chapter 1, whereby negative aspects are projected back in time in 
order to carve out a distinct and superior position for an author in the present.  
In each case, then, there is a presumption that the ‘bad bits’ of the feminist past can be, or 
have been, left behind, as we position ourselves as ‘having moved temporally “beyond” them 
to a place of greater sophistication and understanding’ from which to judge (ibid). The 
question of critical judgment, however, does not need to be polarised between ‘a sympathetic 
rendering of the past and a critical distance from it’, both of which depend upon an overly 
secure, hierarchical division between past and present (La Capra 1985:41). This kind of 
presumption can be avoided, I propose, through taking the pathway opened up by the 
temporality of ‘repetition’. As discussed above, the idea of ‘repetition’ disturbs the 
epistemological security of the present through making us attentive to ‘others within’ and 
open to ‘repetitions’ that ‘trouble the folds of our feminist projects’ (Jones 2009). Moreover, 
the idea of ‘repetition’ can also make us recognise the ways in which less desirable elements 
are already repeating themselves in the present, without us being aware.  
An instructive way to consider this kind of unconscious repetition is through the 
framework of ‘historiographical transference’, proposed by Dominick La Capra. Within 
psychoanalytic theory, ‘transference’ refers to a ‘repetition-displacement of the past into the 
present’, an unconscious redirection of desires or feelings towards a new ‘object’ or ‘other’ 
(La Capra 2004:72). ‘Transference’ is therefore bound up with a notion of time not as simple 
continuity or discontinuity, but as ‘repetition with variation or change’ (ibid)153. In the clinical 
context, the aim is for the analyst and the analysand to work through such transferential 
displacement in a manner that does not ‘blindly replicate debilitating aspects of the past’. This 
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 Freud called this temporality ‘Nachträglichkeit’, which translates as ‘afterwardsness’, or 
‘deferredness’, referring to the way in which a repressed memory only becomes a trauma after the 
event, through forms of repetition and restaging. These repetitions indicate the trauma's disturbing 
sway over the present, thereby problematising the idea of a clean break from the past, and showing that 
the past is always ‘unfinished’ (La Capra 1994).  
 
 218 
means facing up to fears of possession by the past and loss of control of it, but also resisting 
the narcissistic temptation to assert full control over the ‘object’ (ibid.). 
The idea of ‘transference’, La Capra suggests, has purchase beyond the psychoanalytic 
field and clinical context, and is highly pertinent to the historiographical question of how to 
conduct an ‘exchange’ with the past as an ‘other’ (ibid: 75). In the previous chapter, we saw 
how the psychoanalytic idea of ‘working through’ or ‘reworking’ the past-present relation is 
taken up in Irigaray’s work on female genealogies and mythic imaginaries. In La Capra’s 
work, it is the historiographical context which becomes the site in which fears, desires and 
investments are ‘worked through’.154 There is always, he contends, a ‘transferential’ relation 
between practices in the past and historical accounts of them, as the problems at issue in the 
‘object’ of study reappear or are ‘repeated with variations’ in the work of the historian or 
historiographer (La Capra 1985:72-3). Indeed, we are often attracted to certain aspects or 
events of the past precisely because they trouble us or disturb through an eerie sense of 
familiarity. Accordingly, if repetition and displacement of this kind is simply a structural 
determinant of historical work, then it is crucial that historians and historiographers are able 
to critically negotiate this ‘transferential’ relation to the past.  
The problem of historiographical ‘transference’—or repetition-displacement of the past 
into the present—is circumvented or simply repressed in the idea of an affirmative 
communion with the past, and also in the historicist idea that the text can be fixed in its 
‘moment’ and understood at a distance. These seeming alternatives, La Capra argues, are not 
really alternatives, in that they both ‘share a disavowal of the process of displacement as a 
complex interaction of repetition with change; they also disavow the complex nature of one’s 
implication in and tendency to repeat aspects of the processes one studies’ (La Capra 
1994:177-8). That is, in each case, it is denied that the repetition of the issues in the ‘object’ 
of study are in fact being repeated and worked through in the historian’s or historiographer’s 
present, as they try to assert full control over the ‘object’ through assigning a predetermined 
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categorisation, a definitive interpretation, or a fixed temporal framework which distinctly 
distinguishes the present from the past.  
 As a genuine alternative, La Capra’s suggestion is that the unsettled ‘transferential’ 
relation to the past can be best handled through envisaging historical practice as a ‘dialogical 
exchange’. The dialogic approach, as La Capra describes it, is sensitive to transferential 
displacement, recognising transferential tendencies as a means of resisting an uncritical 
identification with the ‘other’, and also of resisting the temptation to claim a total distance 
and separation. In this regard, it aids the ‘reflexive’ mode of historical practice I have outlined 
previously, and also the idea of ‘working through’ and ‘reworking’ the past through the 
present and the present through the past. Moreover, the ‘dialogic’ relation between past and 
present can also be understood as a provocative interaction, whereby the ‘voices’ of the past 
are allowed to ‘speak back’ to the present (La Capra 2004:79). As such, the idea of a 
‘dialogue’ between past and present also links back to the ‘receptive’ mode of historical 
practice discussed earlier, which attempts to suspend or scale back the judgmental and 
interpretative frameworks of the present, in order that we might open ourselves up to the 
challenges of the other’s ‘voice’ and subsequently be transformed by encounter with past. A 
‘dialogic’ approach, therefore, not only enables new pathways from the past to emerge in the 
present, but also allows us to test current views by ‘listening attentively to possibly 
disconcerting ‘voices’ from the past’ (ibid: 37).  
In the interest of a transformative, and also a critical historiography, then, it is a 
‘useful critical fiction to believe that the texts or phenomena to be interpreted may answer one 
back and even be convincing enough to lead one to change one’s mind’ (La Capra 1985:72-
3). It must be acknowledged that the past cannot always ‘speak back’ in the way that the 
dialogic model suggests. Any kind of ‘dialogue’ with the past within historiographical studies 
takes place within a larger social, political, economic, and cultural context that places 
conditions and restrictions upon it (La Capra 1984:42). La Capra’s own key concern here is 
the barriers between elite and popular cultures, and the difficulties that ensue in enabling 
critical ‘dialogues’ between a popular text and a scholarly reading of that text (La Capra 
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1994). Other issues that arise include the absence of recorded ‘voices’ of the past to dialogue 
with; indeed, this is one of the central problematics of both feminist and subaltern 
historiography (Spivak 1999:206-7)
155. Despite these caveats however, I support La Capra’s 
proposal that ‘transference’ and ‘dialogue’ are useful historiographical concepts, which 
ensure that the past remains open and unsettled, that we resist the urge to deflect or categorise 
away those aspects of our feminist pasts and presents that we would rather forget about, at the 
same time as engaging with those aspects that inspire us and demand to be rethought and 
reconsidered in light of changing circumstances and perspectives. Within the framework of 
transferential repetition and dialogical relations, there is no secure present that is free from 
what Elizabeth Freeman has described as ‘temporal drag’ – the ‘pull of the past upon the 
present’ (Freeman 2011:256). Rather, the dialogic approach acknowledges that the parts of 
certain feminist texts or practices that we find compelling cannot be ‘wholly severed from 
those we find disturbing, as they constitute those very issues that ‘remain ‘alive’ because 
unsettled, not fully categorised away, today’ (Fleissner 2010:54). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined how ‘repetition’ can be understood as a philosophical concept 
which supports a multilinear, multidirectional model of historical time, and also as a practical 
paradigm which supports both transformative and critical forms of historical practice. The 
conceptual framework of ‘repetition with variation’, ‘recollecting forwards’, and 
‘untimeliness’, I have argued, enhances the indirect realist approach developed earlier in the 
thesis, which posits a dynamic interrelation between past and present, whereby the past is not 
fixed or finished, but rather, continues to echo and repeat in the present, as it is taken up in 
various, and contested ways. As such, the framework of repetitive temporality not only 
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facilitates a dynamic understanding of the past-present-future relation and their mutual 
imbrication, but further, a process-oriented model of historical reality and truth-making, and 
an insightful account of diachronic relations and ambiguous, contested inheritance. The 
historiographical turn to repetition also has a practical applicability, as stated. In the first 
instance, ‘repetition’ can be undertaken as a strategic, transformative historical practice, 
which works by retrieving and reactivating forgotten fragments and bodies of work as a 
means of breaking through the blind spots and blockages of the present. Moreover, the idea of 
repetition can inform a critical, reflexive historical practice, through making us reflexively 
aware of how ‘bad bits’, as well as ‘good bits’ of past feminisms, resurface and repeat in the 
present and remain unsettled and provocative. This means rejecting presumptions that the 
present is separate from, and has transcended the problems of the past, or that we can ‘move 
on’ from the past in a simple linear fashion. Instead, the framework of repetitive temporality, 
and the paradigm of a ‘dialogic’ relation between past and present, require both an openness 
to the transformative potentials of the past, and a commitment to reassessing one’s own 
presumptions and interpretative criteria in the present. The question of how we can relate 
more productively and sensitively to our shared feminist pasts, presents and futures will be 
considered further in the final chapter, where I consider the question of bringing diverse 
histories together and sharing historical time within the framework of ‘polytemporality’.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Polytemporality  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapters have each explored different fields and dynamics of historical time. 
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that historical time is ‘polytemporal’ or 
‘composite’: comprised of many ‘times’ and temporalities, which are interrelated but not 
reducible to one another. Moreover, I have argued that different feminist histories are 
configured and reconfigured according to different ‘mixes’ of time and temporalisations. This 
gives rise to a vital question that until now has been suspended: has historical time been 
unraveled to such an extent that all talk of temporal togetherness and coordination has 
become meaningless or impossible? On what grounds can we speak meaningfully about 
‘feminist history’ and ‘feminist historiography’ as a field of collective practice and temporal 
belonging, if feminist historical time is so diverse, if there is no ‘one historical time’ of 
feminism? In light of such questions, the aim of this final chapter is to consider how we can 
conceive of shared time and shared histories according to the paradigm of ‘polytemporality’.  
The first part of the chapter is devoted to challenging the concept of ‘totality’, which 
is often summoned as a means of imagining and forging historical and temporal togetherness. 
A distinction must be drawn between speculative ‘totalisation’ and the regulative sense of 
‘totality’ as a heuristic or guiding idea. The speculative sense of ‘totalisation’ refers to the 
quest to devise a total theory or ‘grand narrative’ that can account for the movement, 
mechanism and meaning of history ‘as a whole’. In contrast, in its regulative or heuristic 
sense, the concept of ‘totality’ is understood as a guiding idea or a figurative device that 
orients the historical imagination and historical enquiry. As stated in the Introduction of the 
thesis, it is rare to find a speculative theory of ‘history as a whole’ within contemporary 
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historiography and historical studies. Yet, this does not mean the idea of totality has been 
abandoned. Indeed, various philosophers and historiographers, including Paul Ricoeur (1988) 
and Fredric Jameson (1988), argue that the idea of historical or temporal totality is what 
compels us to connect diverse and fragmentary histories and temporalities together, and to 
invest collective historical practice with liberatory hope and aspiration. 
The first key aim of section 1 is to contest the argument put forward by Ricoeur that 
the idea of ‘one’ history, and ‘one’ historical time, must be postulated as a historiographical 
correlate to Kant’s transcendental axiom that ‘time’ is ‘one’ (Ricoeur 1988). I emphasise that 
the idea of ‘one’ total historical time is itself a socioculturally and historically determined 
idea, rather than a transcendentally necessary one. As such, I claim, theories of historical time 
are not required to follow or ‘respond’ to Kant’s transcendental idealism. This means that the 
idea of historicotemporal ‘totality’ must be assessed on entirely pragmatic grounds, i.e. in 
terms of its value and effectiveness in forging a productive sense of temporal togetherness 
and historical collectivity. My pragmatic argument here, contra Ricoeur and Jameson, is that 
the idea of historicotemporal ‘totality’ is not only unnecessary; it is also detrimental to the 
project of generating a historiographical practice that is sensitive to polytemporal 
determinations of historical time. This is because the thought of ‘totality’, even in a ‘deflated’ 
sense as regulative or figurative  idea, invites a notion of historical time as a ‘container’: a 
single time that we are all ‘in’ by default, whether we know it or like it or not, which effaces 
all the different ways of configuring and conceiving of historical time. Against the higher 
ideal of ‘totality’, such plural determinations are regarded as lesser approximations, rather 
than as constitutive of historical time.  I suggest, therefore, that it may be more productive to 
try and think through the question of historical collectivity and relatedness without the idea or 
specter of totality.  
To this end, section 2 proposes two alternative ways of conceiving and approaching 
historical collectivity and shared historical time, under the pluralistic rubric of 
‘polytemporality’ rather than a regulative or figurative idea of ‘totality’. The first half of the 
section develops a notion of ‘complex coevalness’ as a created mode of shared time. Turning 
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to the work of Johann Fabian (1983), Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) and Dipesh Chakrabarty 
(2000), I demonstrate that it is possible to conceive of and create a shared historical ‘moment’ 
or present without integrating or flattening qualitatively different temporal frameworks, 
experiences, and perceptions into one. The second half of section 2 then addresses in more 
detail how ‘complex coevalness’ can be practiced, i.e. how different temporalities can be 
‘translated’ and related to one another without a regulative ideal of totality. To consider this 
question, I contrast the ‘higher ideal’ of translation (which attends the idea of totality), with 
the alternative ‘barter-like’ model of translation proposed by Chakrabarty. This model puts 
forward a way of relating different historical temporalities which does not entail assimilation 
or absorption, but equally, does not simply declare relativity or incommensurability. The 
chapter concludes by drawing a parallel between the polytemporal approach to history and the 
coalitional approach to politics, which theorises political relations and practices in terms of 
complex ‘bottom-up’ and intersectional processes provoked through shared problems, rather 
than appealing to universal ideals or horizons of totality.  
 
1 
AGAINST ‘TOTALITY’  
 
To challenge ‘totality’ as a regulative historiographical concept, this section will refer 
primarily to the defence of ‘totality’ put forward by Paul Ricoeur (1988). In developing my 
internally complex, polytemporal model of historical time, I have frequently drawn on 
Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative volumes (1984; 1985; 1988), which offer many illuminating 
insights into the different times and temporalities that I have been discussing, i.e. the time of 
the trace, calendar time, narrative time, and generational time. Yet, whilst Ricoeur’s 
discussions in these volumes offer many fruitful resources for opening out a pluralistic, 
polytemporal model of historical time, he himself is reluctant to pursue such a path. His final 
gesture towards the end of his long study is to reign in this temporal plurality, as he ultimately 
returns to an idea of historicotemporal totality, of historical time as ‘one’.  
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Towards the end of Volume 3 of Time and Narrative (1988), Ricoeur considers the 
question of historical totality in a chapter entitled ‘Should We Renounce Hegel?’ (1988:193-
206). It is impossible, Ricoeur acknowledges, to speak of a speculative ‘total mediation’ of 
history within a post-Hegelian philosophical context. As discussed, Hegel’s teleological 
account of an underlying rationality underpinning ‘world history’ is easily discredited on 
ethical grounds when faced with the actualities of historical happenings and consequences. 
‘Before so many victims and so much suffering as we have seen’, Ricoeur writes, ‘the 
dissociation Hegel introduces between consolation and reconciliation has become intolerable’ 
(ibid: 205). Moreover, the speculative attempt to decipher the ‘supreme plot’ of ‘History’ and 
determine ‘the basis upon which the history of the world may be thought as a completed 
whole’, has also been abandoned, as we admit the ‘finitude of interpretation’ (ibid: 206). We 
must therefore, he claims, renounce the possibility of a ‘total mediation’, and accept that the 
temporal mediations performed by the historical consciousness are open and imperfect (ibid: 
261).  
However, it is with a heavy heart that Ricoeur ‘renounces’ Hegel. ‘For what readers 
of Hegel’, he asks, ‘once they have been seduced by the power of Hegel’s thought as I have, 
do not feel the abandoning of this philosophy as a wound?’ (ibid: 206). Moreover, whilst he 
accepts that the speculative totalisation of historical time at the level of ‘world history’ is no 
longer a viable option, Ricoeur nevertheless insists that the idea of a total historical time must 
not die with Hegel’s philosophy of history. This idea cannot be abandoned, he argues, 
because historical thinking must face up to the ‘unavoidable’ notion of time conceived as a 
totality, as a collective singular. After all, he says, ‘we always speak of “time”’(ibid: 250). 
Ricoeur’s influence here is Kant, for whom the oneness of time is an a priori ‘intuition’ that 
cannot be threatened by the plurality of determinations of time, (linked to the plurality of 
schemata), at the level of experience (Kant 2007:185-6, A145/B184). As Kant writes in his 
‘Transcendental Aesthetic’: ‘Different times are but parts of one and the same time’ (ibid: 75, 
A31/B47). And again: ‘the infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every 
determinate magnitude of time is possible only through the limitations of one single time that 
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underlies it’ (ibid, A32/B48).  It is thus ‘as a priori that the intuition of time is posited as the 
intuition of one unique time’ (Ricoeur 1988b:251).  
Ricoeur’s final question then, at the very end of Time and Narrative, is to ask how 
historiography ‘responds’ to this transcendental ‘axiom’ of Kant’s, once it has been accepted 
that Hegel’s speculative ‘total mediation’ of history is a distant dream. What corresponds on 
the side of historical consciousness to the Kantian axiom that ‘different times are just parts of 
the same time’? (Ricoeur 1988:257). Can historical thinking provide a response to this 
‘unavoidable intuition’ of the totality of time, even whilst we recognise the many different 
ways of configuring and conceiving historical time?  It is here that Ricoeur recognises the 
limitations of the central thesis of Time and Narrative, which is that the ‘poetics of narrative’ 
provide a response to the philosophical ‘aporias’ of time. He concedes that narrative cannot 
constitute an adequate ‘reply’ to this particular aporia—the totality of time—because ‘the 
notion of plot gives preference to the plural at the expense of the collective singular in the 
refiguration of time’ (ibid: 256). As argued in chapter 4, there are always multiple plots for 
the same course of events, and these diverse narratives are always articulated in terms of 
different and fragmentary temporalities. Ricoeur, however, is dissatisfied with the implication 
that his articulation of historical time is ‘a mere multiplication of mediations between time 
and narrative’, and thus persists in his quest to find the historiographical ‘version’ of Kant’s 
axiom of the ‘oneness’ of time (ibid: 241).  
He initially considers the Heideggerian solution to the problem of temporal totality, 
which is to subsume the multiple levels of temporal experience within the radically privatised 
temporal totality of Being-towards-death (Heidegger 2009:279-311)
156
. Yet, Ricoeur 
concedes that Heidegger’s analysis of Being-a whole as Being-towards-death is a highly 
inadequate basis from which to derive the collective time-concepts and temporal frameworks 
required by history (Ricoeur 1984; 1988). Ricoeur’s aim, therefore, is to move beyond both 
the Hegelian solution (which posits a speculative totalisation of historical time at the level of 
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 As Heidegger describes it, death is Dasein’s ‘ownmost’ possibility. My death is ‘mine’, in that no 
one can die my death for me (2009:307).   
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‘world history’), and the Heideggerian solution (which posits a temporal totalisation at the 
level of individual ‘primordial’ temporality). To do so, he turns, finally, back to Kant himself, 
arguing that Kant’s conception of the ‘regulative idea’ holds the key to formulating a 
historiographical ‘reply’ to the transcendental axiom of the totality or ‘oneness’ of time.  
The ‘solution’ to the ‘aporia of totality’, Ricoeur claims, can be found in the Kantian 
notion of the regulative idea, because it enables us to rethink the idea of ‘history’ itself—in 
the collective singular—as a ‘regulative idea’ that ‘stands over and against’ the axiom of the 
oneness of time. ‘To think of history as one is to posit the equivalence between three ideas: 
one time, one humanity, and one history’ (1988:258). Ricoeur’s inspiration here is not the 
Kant of the first Critique but rather, the Critique of Practical Reason, because, he argues, 
historical thinking requires a horizon of historical totality as a guiding idea of historical 
practice, rather than speculation. It is on the plane of collective practice that the ‘imperfect 
mediations’ between expectation (future), traditionality (past), and initiative (present), require 
the horizon of a single history, which in turn, ‘corresponds to the axiom of a single time’ 
(ibid: 259). The idea of one history and one historical time is therefore not ‘an empty and 
lifeless transcendental’, Ricoeur argues, because it intends the ‘principle of hope’ that 
underpins the fundamentally practical historical interest in collective memory, anticipation 
and communication. This argument echoes Kant’s own suggestion in the ninth thesis of his 
‘Idea for a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan’, which is that even if the idea of a 
universal, purposeful history may well be impossible to verify, philosophy must nevertheless 
interpret history as if this were the case (Kant 1991:52).  Indeed, Ricoeur contends that the 
equivalence between the ideas of ‘one time’, ‘one history’, and ‘one humanity’, is in fact the 
implicit ‘presupposition’ behind Kant’s cosmopolitan philosophy of history (Ricoeur 
1988:258).  
According to Ricoeur’s final conclusion, then, historical thinking takes us ‘beyond 
the limits’ of narrative: from plural and ‘imperfect mediations’, to the regulative idea of a 
historicotemporal totality (ibid: 259-60). My own argument, however, is that it is not only 
unnecessary, but also undesirable, for historical thinking to try and move beyond plural 
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configurations of historical time towards the thought of a ‘higher’ historical or temporal 
totality. My first point of contention lies with Ricoeur’s insistence that historiography must 
‘respond’ to Kant’s transcendental axiom of the ‘oneness’ of time and find an equivalent or 
corresponding idea of its own. The central claim in this thesis has been that historical time is a 
sociocultural, created time, constituted through reckoning with archival fragments and traces 
of the past, constructing narratives, making calendrical coordinations, and creating relational 
genealogies. If historical time is a socioculturally constituted kind of time, then it follows that 
the idea of ‘one’ historical time, and indeed, ‘history’ in the collective singular, is itself a 
sociocultural, historically contingent idea, not an ‘intuitively’ or ‘transcendentally 
unavoidable’ one (Reé 1991:976). As Koselleck contends in his historical study of historical 
time:  
 
‘Only from around 1780 can one talk of “history in general”, “history in and for 
itself”, and “history pure and simple”, and as all elaborations on this theme indicate, 
there was an emphasis on the departure of this new, self-referring concept from the 
traditional histories in the plural. If anyone had said before 1780 that he studied 
history, he would have at once been asked by his interlocutor: Which history? History 
of what?’ (Koselleck 2004:194). 
 
If we accept that the ideas of ‘one’ history in the collective singular, and ‘one’ 
historical time, are  historically and socioculturally, rather than transcendentally, determined,   
there is no reason to accept Ricoeur’s argument that it is necessary for a theory of historical 
time to ‘respond’ to the axioms and aporias generated by Kant’s transcendental idealism.  The 
question then becomes a pragmatic one. Even if it is not transcendentally unavoidable, is the 
idea of historicotemporal totality nevertheless practically or methodologically indispensible, 
as Ricoeur claims? The implication of Ricoeur’s argument is that without the regulative idea 
of totality—‘one history, one time, one humanity’—it would be impossible to create and 
conceive of collective, effective, shared histories at all; rather, there would simply be a ‘mere 
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multiplication’ of historical temporalisations and individual histories, an inoperative temporal 
pluralism (Ricoeur 1988:258). Fredric Jameson also defends the idea or figure of totality as a 
‘methodological imperative’ guiding historical and textual interpretation, though from a 
Marxian rather than a Kantian perspective
157
. Jameson is clear, like Ricoeur, that whilst we 
may strive or aspire towards totality, it cannot be attained in a theoretical or speculative sense. 
‘Totality is not available for representation, any more than it is accessible in the form of some 
ultimate truth’ (Jameson 1988:55). Instead, for Jameson, ‘totality’ is a figurative means of 
imaginative and cognitive ‘mapping’, where to ‘totalise’ is to ‘to project a totality greater than 
the surface appearance of things’. It is necessary to ‘project a totality’ and push ‘the horizon 
of our vision outward to include ultimately the totality of human experience’, he argues, 
because relationality is ‘only explained at the highest level, from the perspective of the 
whole’. The appeal to some ‘ultimate underlying unity of the various “levels” supplies the 
rationale and philosophical justification for that more concrete and local practice of 
mediation’ (ibid: 40).  
For Jameson, then, the idea of totality guarantees or underwrites the project to relate, 
connect, and translate or ‘transcode’ distinct texts and phenomena within fields of collective 
thought and practice. It is impossible, he claims, to invent ‘local codes’ for interpretation 
‘except against the background of some more general identity’ (ibid: 41-2). In this regard, 
totality functions within Jameson’s work as an epistemological and aesthetic prescription to 
‘strive constantly to relate and connect, to situate and interpret each object or phenomenon in 
the context of those social and historical forces that shape and enable it, and ultimately with 
respect to the entire set of its conditions of possibilities’ (Hardt and Weeks 2000:22). 
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 Jameson’s defence of the concept of totality, as advanced in The Political Unconscious (1981), is in 
fact three-pronged. The first reason that the concept of totality is necessary, he claims, is because of the 
expansive nature of capital and the tendency of the capitalist mode of production to ‘make of the world 
a totality’. An analysis of capital, therefore, must strive towards totality. His second reason is that it is 
necessary to enable relationality and ‘transcoding’: the forging of connections and relations between 
disparate but interrelated ideas, texts and phenomena, through the processes of communication and 
translation. His third reason is that the political impetus to grasp the vital claims made upon the present 
by the past can only be provided by the thought of a single, unified history. It is the second and third 
arguments that will receive attention here, as my research question concerns the possibility of 
collective history and temporal belonging, rather than the challenge of tackling capitalism.  
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Moreover, he insists that it provides the political and ethical impetus for generating critical 
and transformative histories. According to this line of argument, only the thought of totality 
carries the requisite power to inspire us to join collective forces and disparate narratives, to 
trace patterns and face up to the ‘big’ issues that drive political and ethical thought and 
practice. ‘These matters can recover their urgency’, Jameson writes, ‘only if they are retold 
within the unit of a single great collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic 
form, they are seen as sharing a single fundamental theme… only if they are grasped as vital 
episodes in a single vast unfinished plot’ (Jameson 1988:19-20).  
As stated, if ‘projecting a totality’ is recast as a methodological imperative, then the 
pragmatic question is whether it is a useful one, which requires an interrogation of its results. 
My claim here is that the idea of totality is not of utility to feminist historiography, as it 
imports certain assumptions about historical time which underwrite totalising narratives and 
approaches to history, even when a totalising theory or narrative is not being attempted. That 
is, the thought of an ultimate or higher ‘totality’ is complicit in sustaining the idea that 
historical time is a homogenous ‘time-within-which’ plural histories and temporalities are 
played out. As we have seen in chapter 4, the implicit and presumptuous idea behind this 
‘time-within-which’ is that, whatever the particulars, and independent of culture or 
consciousness, people automatically exist in the same one historical time (Chakrabarty 
2000:74). Within such a framework, it is difficult to value and consider the plural 
determinations of historical time, because ‘totality’ encourages us to think that these plural 
temporal determinations are only approximations of a greater totality, which might not be 
available to representation, but nevertheless exists as an ‘absent cause’ or at a ‘higher level’ 
of completeness. Thus, from the perspective of totality, temporal plurality can only be 
regarded as ‘incomplete’ or ‘lacking’, rather than constitutive of historical time (ibid).  
In making this argument, it is important to reiterate that the heuristic idea of a single, 
total ‘history’ must be distinguished from totalising, speculative theories and narratives of 
history, and moreover, from the political practice of totalitarianism – a conflation that 
Jameson has described as ‘baleful’ (Jameson 2000:284). Another important distinction to 
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register is the difference between a ‘closed totality’, where everything is subsumed under the 
order of a single, central controlling force or idea, and an ‘open totality’, in contrast, which 
has no fixed or pregiven end, but rather is always ‘moving and growing’, staying ‘open’ 
because of the ‘unpredictable efficacy of the new’ (Hardt and Weeks 2000:22). Nevertheless, 
even if the historical totality ‘projected’ by Jameson is open and ‘always moving and 
growing’, and even if it is a ‘figurative device’ and not a speculative theory, it still invites the 
thought that historical time is a homogenous ‘container’ for diverse histories and 
temporalities, albeit an open and expanding one. The problem with Jameson’s rallying call for 
us to ‘always historicize!’, then, as Chakrabarty argues, lies with the term “always”, because 
it fuels the presumption of a ‘continuous, homogenous, infinitely stretched out time that 
makes possible the imagination of an “always”’, a presumption that everything is 
‘historicisable’ according to the terms of modern historicism (ibid: 111).  
I suggest, therefore, that a ‘polytemporal’ model of historical time ought to resist the 
temptation to subscribe to a regulative idea or methodological imperative of ‘projecting a 
totality’ as a means of bringing diverse historical temporalities together and conceiving of 
shared historical time. Indeed, thinking in terms of ‘totality’ is arguably antithetical to 
thinking in terms of polytemporality, because it effaces the constitutive plural determinations 
of historical time. The task, then, is to find an alternative theoretical framework, which 
challenges the claim that ‘relationality is only explained at the highest level, from the 
perspective of the whole’, and that only the thought of totality fuels the project to create 
transformative collective histories. In light of the previous chapter’s argument concerning the 
persistence of the past in the present, I should stress here that I am not trying to claim that we 
can wholly ‘cut off’ or surpass the idea of a ‘total’ historical time. Engaging a ‘dialogical’ 
model with the past—as I advocated in chapter 6—makes it impossible to simply declare a 
break from this kind of thinking and claim that feminist historiography can straightforwardly 
move ‘beyond’ it. We thus need to realise our entanglement in the analytics and imaginaries 
of ‘totality’ and the extent to which we are conditioned by it as continues to influence 
historical thinking. Nevertheless, whilst recognising its persistence, my point is that there is 
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no need to be ‘mournful’ regarding the demise of the Hegelian project to speculatively 
determine a total history, and further, that there is no need to insist on the idea of ‘totality’ as 
a regulative idea or methodological imperative guiding historical and historiographical 
practice. On the contrary, the waning of the influence of Hegelian and Kantian philosophies 
of history over historiographical thinking presents an opportunity for generating alternative 
models and methods, that can be put into ‘dialogue’ with Hegelian and Kantian models and 
methods, and might well prove to be more politically effective and inter-relationally 
productive for feminist theory and practice.  
 
2  
POLYTEMPORALITY 
 
The previous section rejected arguments that the idea of ‘totality’ is a necessary regulator or 
guarantor of historical thought and practice. I emphasised, firstly, that the idea of ‘one’ total 
historical time is socioculturally and historically contingent and as such, that there is nothing 
‘necessary’ about it. Secondly, I argued that the idea of historiotemporal ‘totality’ is 
incompatible with the polytemporal model of historical time that I am proposing, as it helps to 
maintain the reified notion of historical time as a universal, homogenous ‘time-within-which’, 
which effaces and undervalues the diverse determinations of historical time. Accordingly, this 
section will examine ways of conceiving of shared time and collective histories under the 
pluralistic rubric of ‘polytemporality’, rather than against an idea or projected horizon of 
‘totality’. The first half of the section expounds a conception of ‘complex coevalness’: a 
mode of shared historical time which does not absorb qualitative temporal difference into 
temporal oneness. The second section then develops a model of ‘temporal translation’ that 
can support complex coevalness on a more practical level, contrasting the ‘analytic’ model of 
translation with a ‘barter-model’ of translation, which dwells in heterogeneity, rather than 
trying to overcome it through a universal, neutral ‘third term’.  
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2.1  
Complex Coevalness 
 
Once we have claimed that there are multiple pasts, presents and futures, which are lived and 
conceived according to different temporal schemas and concepts, we need to develop a 
framework or language of ‘sharing time’, which can register and work with this temporal 
plurality. How can we speak of shared historical ‘moments’, or indeed of a ‘present’, in which 
we share stories of our pasts and presents, and our visions and hopes for the future?  
It is important, first of all, to distinguish between what scientists might mean when 
they speak of sharing a ‘moment’ of time, and what it might mean in an existential or 
sociological sense. To this end, Johann Fabian draws a helpful distinction between three 
terms: ‘synchronous’, ‘contemporary’ and ‘coeval’. In Fabian’s usage, ‘synchronicity’ refers 
to events occurring at the same physical time, whilst ‘contemporaneity’ refers to co-
occurrence in ‘typological’ time (i.e. ‘periodised’ time)158, and ‘coevalness’ refers to the 
active ‘occupation’ or sharing of time (Fabian 1983:31). It is this last term ‘coevalness’, I 
propose, that holds the key to conceiving of a shared ‘moment’ of historical time from a 
polytemporal perspective. ‘Coevalness’, Fabian explains, ‘is a mode of temporal relations. It 
cannot be defined as a thing or state with certain properties. It is not “there” and cannot be put 
there; it must be created or at least approached’ (ibid: 34). The reason that coevalness must be 
created, Fabian argues, is that coevalness is the condition for communication. ‘The term 
coevalness’, he writes, ‘marks a central assumption, namely that all temporal relations… are 
embedded in culturally organised praxis’. If social interaction presupposes intersubjectivity, 
then intersubjectivity, in turn, is inconceivable without assuming that the participants are 
                                                          
158
 In a quantitative sense, the word ‘contemporary’ refers to all that belongs to a society or culture at a 
particular point on a shared calendar; however, in a qualitative sense, it is a term used to engender a 
specific kind of temporal relation, because to designate something as ‘contemporary’ is often a way of 
saying that it is novel or ‘cutting edge’.  
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coeval, i.e. that they share time. ‘Communication’, then, is ‘ultimately, about creating shared 
Time’ (ibid: 34).  
This basic definition of ‘coevalness’ as a condition for communication can be taken 
as a pragmatic presupposition, which, within the historiographical context, means that if 
coevalness is a necessary condition for communication, then it is a necessary condition for 
historical and historiographical discourse. If we accept my argument that historical time is 
generated through intersubjective ‘temporalisations’ of history, then it follows that 
coevalness, as a ‘mode of temporal relations’, is a necessary condition for historical time 
itself. In other words, there would be no ‘historical time’ without temporal relations, without 
the practice of sharing time, even indirectly or diachronically ‘through’ or ‘across’ time. This 
is essentially a reversal of the idea that being ‘in’ a homogenous historical time is what makes 
the sharing of time possible, as I am claiming, instead, that sharing time, or forging temporal 
connections, is what makes the idea of ‘historical time’ itself possible. 
Having emphasised the necessity of creating coevalness, however, Fabian’s second 
key argument is that whilst in theory, coevalness is a necessary condition of communication, 
in practice, coevalness is often ‘denied’. Fabian describes the ‘denial’ or ‘refusal’ of 
coevalness as a technique of ‘temporal distancing’, which appears in his own field of 
anthropology as the ‘persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of 
anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse’ 
(ibid: 31). Whilst on the one hand, he argues, anthropologists recognise in a theoretical sense 
that productive empirical research is only possible when the researcher and the researched 
share time through communicative praxis, on the other hand, this coevalness is denied in 
practice, as ‘the discourse that pretends to interpret, analyze, and communicate ethnographic 
knowledge to the researcher’s society is pronounced from a “distance”, that is, from a 
position which denies coevalness to the object of enquiry’ (ibid: 73). Fabian is referring to the 
discipline of anthropology, yet his reflections apply equally well to the field of feminist 
history and historiography. As we have seen, narratives of feminist history frequently employ 
techniques of ‘temporal othering’ or ‘temporal distancing’. Feminists of different ages, 
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theoretical schools or ‘generations’, who have collectively produced histories of feminism, 
and who share the same discursive, relational spaces, nevertheless distance themselves from 
one another through setting up temporal barriers and boundaries.  
Yet, whilst Fabian’s argument regarding ‘temporal distancing’ is congruent with my 
own argument concerning the ‘temporal othering’ that occurs within feminist discourse, his 
argument regarding the ‘denial’ of coevalness does in fact pose a significant challenge to my 
own polytemporal model of historical time, which is this: how can we postulate multiple or 
plural historical temporalities, and multiple pasts, presents and futures, without ‘denying 
coevalness’? On the one hand, I am claiming that coevalness is a necessary condition for the 
intersubjective construction of ‘historical time’; yet on the other hand, I am claiming that 
there are multiple historical times, a claim which, taken on its own, simply evades the 
problem of coevalness.  That is, simply declaring that there are ‘multiple times’ circumvents 
the question of how different times and temporalities coexist within communicative, 
discursive fields that depend upon temporal relations and shared time. Indeed, as Fabian 
contends, the idea of ‘multiple times’ can lead to a debilitating cultural relativism – ‘walling-
in the Time of others so that it cannot spill into ours’ (ibid: 52). The challenge, then, is to find 
a way of conceiving, creating and practicing coevalness, whilst appreciating temporal and 
historical plurality and difference.
159
 ‘Somehow’, as Fabian insists, ‘we must be able to share 
each other’s past in order to be knowingly in each other’s present’ (ibid: 91) 160. But we need 
an account of how people can share pasts and be together in the present, where ‘coevalness’ is 
not a strategy for assimilation but rather, enables temporal differences to exist whilst time is 
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 It is difficult to generate a ‘theory’ of coevalness, because, as Fabian puts it, ‘the problem is not just 
“there”; it is continuously generated at the intersection of contradictions in anthropological praxis’ 
(1983:37). As a communicative and epistemological condition, he insists, coevalness can only be 
‘inferred from results’, i.e., from the different ways in which recognition or denial of coevalness inform 
theory and writing’ (ibid: 34).  
 
160
 At the very end of Time and the Other, Fabian in fact tentatively postulates that the concept of 
‘totality’ might be the solution to the problem of denying ‘coevalness’ (1983). Yet, for reasons 
explained above, this is not my own approach; thus I find Fabian’s use of ‘coevalness’ helpful, but seek 
to move on from him at this juncture.  
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shared. To develop such an account, I suggest, we require a conception of the ‘moment’ itself 
as plural and ‘not-one’, as a key element of thinking in terms of ‘complex coevalness’.  
A conception of the ‘moment’ as plural and ‘not-one’, as discussed in chapter 6, can 
be found in the work of Christine Battersby, who argues that the ‘now’ emerges in a ‘nook’ of 
intersecting paths which may have led from the past into the present and open up an uncertain 
future. Taking inspiration from Kierkegaard, Battersby’s model of lived time makes it 
‘impossible to think of the ‘moment’ in terms of a single, linear series of ‘nows’ that are 
linked together through one uniting history’ (Battersby 1998:150-1). A similarly fragmentary 
and pluralistic conception of the ‘moment’ can be found in the work of Gloria Anzaldúa. This 
conception is taken up and elaborated by Michelle Bastian, who argues that Anzaldúa’s work 
offers a nuanced understanding of temporal belonging and coevalness that resists the ‘lure of 
unity’ or ‘mathematical ideas of equivalence’ (Bastian 2010:153). Ordinarily, Bastian argues, 
‘shared time’ is thought in terms of a ‘homogeneous present or presence. That is, the time that 
we share is thought to be a ‘now’ that brings differing experiences, histories and anticipations 
into a certain alignment by virtue of a shared moment in the present’ (ibid). In contrast, she 
contends, Anzaldúa’s work can be viewed as an effort to ‘think difference within the 
supposedly singular moment of time, which enables multiple histories, loyalties and modes of 
acting to exist simultaneously’ (ibid: 164).  
Anzaldúa considers the problematic of the differential moment primarily through a 
philosophy of the self, as she considers how it is possible to give a philosophical account of 
her sense of herself as ‘whole’, when in any one ‘moment’ she is ‘always already divided by 
contradictions and called to respond to multiplying demands’ (ibid: 156). Anzaldúa’s solution 
is not to suggest a ‘generalised dispersal’ in contrast to the ‘moment’; instead, she seeks a 
way of being that can respond to heterogeneous demands at the same time. This is not, 
Bastian stresses, the ‘at the same time’ that pertains to clock time, whereby ‘the qualitative 
differences of each person’s moment are erased by the assumption of an underlying 
commensurability and uniformity’. Rather, she argues, ‘Anzaldúa’s refusal to split her 
contradictory heritages, and the political demands each makes upon her, suggests an 
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understanding of simultaneity, where to be ‘at the same time’ is to resist the desire to purge 
difference (and social contest) from the present’ (ibid). In this sense, not only does 
Anzaldúa’s work offer a way of thinking about one’s ‘own’ time and sense of self as 
‘divided’ or ‘contradictory’; it also offers a way of thinking about sharing time with others, 
without recourse to a homogenous timeframe or a projected totality.  
One passage Bastian cites to help give a sense of what ‘coevalness’ or being together 
‘at the same time’ means in Anzaldúa’s work appears twice in the first section of 
Borderlands/La Frontera (1999): once at the beginning as part of a larger poem, and again at 
the end, as the final words: 
 
‘This land was Mexican once 
was Indian always 
and is. 
And will be again’ (Anzaldúa 1999:113).  
 
The ‘land’ Anzaldúa is referring to here is Aztlán - the mythical homeland of the Aztec 
people which has played a key role in the Chicano Movement’s attempt to claim national 
rights to the South-West United States. Yet, Anzaldúa’s evocation of Aztlán performs a 
radical subversion of the traditional ‘origin myth’ prototype that links a unified people to a 
‘rightful home’. Instead of constructing a ‘loss’ narrative staked on an ‘interrupted trajectory’, 
or offering a linear, sequentialist  history of the South-West United States, (as that which was 
successively Native American, then Mexican, then part of the US), Anzaldúa highlights 
instead the shifting allegiances and competing claims that have resulted from invasions and 
re-invasions, as the land has variously been ‘home’ to Native Mexican and American 
civilisations, to Spanish conquistadors and Anglo-Americans. Bastian’s interest in the passage 
focuses on Anzaldúa’s use of a ‘confusing amalgam of incongruent presents, pasts and 
futures’, as she traces the multiple lines of this turbulent and violent history and considers the 
differing, and yet simultaneous political demands which emerge from it in the present. Her 
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claim ‘was Indian always’, for example, suggests that ‘the history upon which indigenous 
claims are based abides within the present as a past that can never be cancelled out’ (Bastian 
2011:158). 
The unconventionality of Anzaldúa’s temporalisations thus enables her to write ‘a 
history of the borderlands that affirms and recognises its contradictory historical trajectories 
simultaneously’ (ibid: 158-9). The crucial point for Bastian is that Anzaldúa is not 
‘attempting to manage these diverse histories by rendering them commensurable (in reference 
to an all-encompassing spatial or temporal background)’, or by ordering them hierarchically 
within a linear history that splits and divides differences by ‘isolating them within different 
stages or moments, thus obscuring both the diversity of the present and the continuing claims 
of the past’ (ibid: 159). As such, Anzaldúa’s complex evocations and negotiations of her 
heritage implicitly offer an account of time that ‘enables contradictory histories and 
contradictory ways of acting to share the same time, to be coeval with each other’ (ibid: 162; 
see also Fernandes 2010)
161. Indeed, from this perspective, ‘to be coeval (i.e. to live in the 
same time with another)’, is precisely about recognising ‘the multiple lines of time and of 
history that operate within the present’ (ibid: 157-8). 
Another theorist who offers a promising way of articulating ‘complex coevalness’ is 
Chakrabarty, who advocates a subaltern historiography that thinks in ‘time-knots’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000). Thinking in terms of ‘time-knots’ means, firstly, placing a strain on the 
categories of past, present and future and recognising their interdependence and mutual 
imbrication: a theme that has been prominent throughout this thesis, and is undertaken so 
effectively by Anzaldúa in the passage quoted above. To live time is to live in ‘time-knots’, 
which are comprised of the traces and fragments of the multiple pasts that we inhabit, and 
also ‘the futurity that laces every moment of human existence’ (Chakrabarty 2000:250). Past 
worlds are never completely lost or finished; indeed, the reason that we have ‘points of entry’ 
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 Leela Fernandes makes a similar argument, contending that the 'new Mestiza consciousness' which 
Anzaldúa constructs in Borderlands radically transforms how we think about historical periodisations 
and temporality (Fernandes 2011).  
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into the past times that we study as ‘history’ is the fact that ‘they are never completely alien; 
we inhabit them to begin with’ (ibid: 113). Pasts ‘are’ there, in taste, in cultural training, in 
practices of embodiment, just as futures already ‘are’ there, in the sense that we cannot help 
but be oriented towards the future. This is not the conscious thought of ‘a future’, 
Chakrabarty explains, not the future that ‘will be’; but rather, the futurity we cannot avoid 
being aligned with (ibid: 251). In this sense, within lived time, there is no neat division 
between past, present and future, and no rudimentary sequential temporality. Rather, ‘it is 
because we live in time-knots that we can undertake the exercise of straightening out, as it 
were, some part of the knot (which is how might think of chronology)’ (ibid: 112). 
The second key to thinking in ‘time-knots’ is to recognise the multiple lines of history 
and the ‘mutual contamination of ‘nows’ that participate in a variety of temporal trajectories’ 
(Hutchings 2008:166-7). The writing of history, Chakrabarty argues, must ‘implicitly assume 
a plurality of times existing together, a disjuncture of the present with itself’, just as Anzaldúa 
and Battersby envisage multiple lines of history coexisting in a complex and differential 
‘present’ (Chakrabarty 2000:109). From this perspective, the thought of ‘totality’ is a 
hindrance to thinking the present or the moment as plural and ‘not one’. This is because, as 
explained above, ‘totality’ makes us regard plurality as ‘incomplete’ or ‘lacking’, when in 
fact, ‘not-being-a-totality’ is a constitutional characteristic of the “now” (ibid:250, emphasis 
added). The ‘now’ is always fragmentary and ‘not-one’, but crucially, these trajectories and 
fragments of pasts, presents and futures should not be understood as parts of a greater totality 
or whole, as ‘additive’. Rather than imagining or projecting a totality, then, the task is thus to 
create a ‘bottom-up’ or ‘criss-cross’ movement: generating ‘conjoined and disjunctive’ 
genealogies, as we ‘contemplate the necessarily fragmentary histories of human belonging 
that never constitute a one or a whole’ (Chakrabarty ibid: 125).  
The work of Anzaldúa and Chakrabarty helpfully demonstrates that becoming 
‘coeval’ need not entail a reduction in temporal complexity. Through engaging with a variety 
of histories and temporalities, we reach an understanding of the historical ‘moment’ as plural 
and ‘not-one’, and the ‘present’ as ‘noncontemporaneous with itself’. As such, we can think 
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togetherness within and across diversity, precisely through theorising historical moments 
themselves as heterogeneous, porous and fluid. This controverts the usual understanding of a 
shared ‘moment’ of time as an automatic ‘leveller’, as something we are simply ‘in’. Rather, 
according to the paradigm of ‘complex coevalness’ that I am proposing, shared moments and 
shared time must be created, through the cross-fertilisation of different temporalities and 
historical trajectories. This means that any historical present or ‘now’ is a conjunction of 
times, saturated with plural pasts, presents and futures, and forged through multiple, 
entangled lines of history. 
 
2.2 
Translating Temporalities  
 
The section above has outlined ‘complex coevalness’ as a mode of shared, created time which 
does not depend upon a projected totality nor does it presume ‘one’ historical time that we are 
all automatically ‘in’, either on the level of ‘history as a whole’ or on the level of the singular 
historical ‘moment’. This final discussion will consider more closely how we can put 
‘complex coevalness’ into practice, using the problematics and practices of linguistic 
translation as an analogy for sharing histories through different temporalities and time frames.  
Chakrabarty outlines two relevant models of translation (2000:83). The first can be 
understood as the ‘scientific’ or ‘analytic’ model, which relies upon a ‘higher ideal of 
translatability’, and is central to the practices of modern historicism. On this model, a 
translation is enabled by the generality or universality of a third term of exchange, which 
functions as a ‘supervening, general construction mediating between all particulars on the 
ground’ (ibid: 76). As such, the particulars in question can in principle be rendered 
commensurate and mutually intelligible, thanks to the universal, mediating language or 
category. This higher ideal of translatability, Chakrabarty argues, depends ultimately upon a 
Newtonian ideal of objectivity, in which ‘translation between different languages is mediated 
by the language of science itself’. For example, ‘pani’ in Hindi and ‘water’ in English can 
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both be mediated by the universal third term ‘H20’ (ibid: 75). This ‘third term’ of translation 
is not a category that belongs only to the natural sciences, however, as the scientific model of 
translation has predominated in the modern social and historical sciences as well.
162
 Indeed, 
Chakrabarty’s key argument here is that the homogenous ‘time of historicism’ fulfills a ‘third 
term’ function within modern historiography and social science that is analogous to that of 
‘H20’ in the natural sciences: 
 
‘The idea of a godless, continuous, empty, and homogenous time, which history 
shares with the other social sciences and modern political philosophy as a basic 
building block, belongs to this model of a higher overarching language. It represents 
a structure of generality, an aspiration towards the scientific, that is built into 
conversations that take the modern historical consciousness for granted’ (ibid: 75-6).  
 
The ‘higher ideal of translatability’ in this case rests upon the assumption that diverse 
historical temporalities are always translatable through the medium of a neutral historical 
time, which they are all ‘in’. As stated, the implication is that however different individuals, 
groups or societies may temporalise and conceive of their historicity, however they might 
organise their memories and share time, ‘the historian has the capacity to put them into a time 
that we are all supposed to have shared, consciously or not’ (ibid: 74). This understanding of 
historical time, as I argued in the previous section, is given sustenance by the methodological 
imperative to project a ‘totality’ as a regulative idea or horizon, because it encourages us to 
think that whatever our particular situation and interpretation, we are all ‘in’ one historical 
time. When Jameson calls for us to ‘always historicize’, he is therefore taking for granted the 
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 Chakrabarty’s main example here is Marxist histories, where categories such as ‘abstract labour’, 
‘labour power’, or ‘productive labour’ function as mediating ‘third terms’ that have the same status as 
‘H20’. The third term—e.g. ‘abstract labour’—expresses the ‘measure of equivalence’, such that events 
and places become ‘exchangeable with one another’ and general histories of ‘capital’ or ‘work’ can be 
written. In other words, it is taken for granted that a category such as ‘labour’ has universal 
applicability, and therefore that through it, different ‘life-worlds’ can be translated. Whilst recognising 
that there will be differences, what is presumed is that ‘work’ means essentially the same thing in all 
these different contexts (Chakrabarty 2000:76). 
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‘common language’ of a historical time that makes plural and diverse histories translatable or 
‘transcodable’ (ibid: 111). The effect of such overarching categories and ideas, Chakrabarty 
contends, is that those temporalities which do not fit easily with the ‘universal’ homogenous 
concept of historical time are either overlooked, or made to fit in. This means not only that 
historical differences are neutralised and relegated to the margins, but further, that the 
challenges such differences pose to those hegemonic categories being used to make sense of 
them are ignored. Relying upon the ‘homogenous’ concept of historical time as a ‘third term’ 
can thus make us constitutionally unprepared for the possibility that there are unforeseen 
ways of thinking and imagining historicity and historical time.
163
  
As an alternative to the ‘analytic’ model based upon a generalised exchange through 
a third or middle term, Chakrabarty proposes a ‘barter-like model’ of translation or 
exchange.
164
 This is not an act of translation modeled on the procedures or objectivist 
imaginary of Newtonian science, nor does it appeal to any of the implicit universals that 
inhere in the sociological and historical imagination (ibid: 85). There is no presupposed, 
overarching category that is supposed to remain ‘unaffected by differences between the 
entities it seeks to name and thereby contain’ (ibid: 86). On this model, codes are switched 
without going through a universal logic or set of rules, but instead, through a set of ‘barter-
like’, term-for-term exchanges, attentive to specific ‘poetic requirements’ of rhetoric and 
rhythm. For example, according to this model of translation, it is perfectly possible to 
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 Chakrabarty focuses particularly upon the problem that ‘enchanted’ temporalities pose to the empty, 
secular time of historicism. As an example, he discusses Ranajit Guha’s essay ‘The Prose of Counter-
Insurgency’ on the 1855 Santal rebellion (Guha 1988), which has to deal with the Santal leaders’ 
account of the rebellion in supernatural terms, ‘as an act carried out at the behest of the Santal God 
Thakur’. The historian, Chakrabarty claims, can speak of ‘religious consciousness’, but ‘cannot offer 
Thakur the same place of agency in the story of the rebellion that the Sandals’ statements had given 
him’ (2000:104). He refers here to Rudolf Bultmann’s argument that the presupposition of the 
‘historical process’ as a ‘whole’ means that ‘the continuum of historical happenings cannot be rent by 
the interference of supernatural, transcendent powers and therefore that there is no “miracle” in this 
sense of the word’ (Bultmann quoted in Chakrabarty 2000:105). The supernatural temporality of divine 
intervention is therefore neutralised and suppressed, as the Santal rebellion is assimilated and 
‘translated’ into the language and time of modern historicism. I discuss the question of enchanted 
temporalities and sacred time further in the thesis’ Conclusion.  
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 Among his inspirations, Chakrabarty cites Gayatri Spivak’s writing on the politics of translation, 
and her question of how the translator can ‘attend to the specificity of the language she translates’ 
(Spivak 2009:201).  
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translate the Hindi ‘pani’ into the English ‘water’ without having to go through ‘the superior 
positivity of H20’ (ibid: 83). This occurs through engaging in dialogue, conjuring images and 
describing sensations, rendering each person’s idea and experience comparable and 
intelligible without being assimilated through a general term. 
Practicising exchange and translation according to this model, above all, means 
staying with heterogeneities, ‘without seeking to reduce them to any overarching principle 
that speaks for an already given whole’ (ibid: 107). The barter model is therefore not only 
sensitive to specificity; it is also rooted in an awareness of the limitations of translation. 
Instead of try to hide falterings and stutterings, translations are conducted so as to make 
visible the problems of translation, marking them with an ambiguity and ‘uncanniness’ (ibid: 
88). This awareness of limitations, fragmentations and imperfections, it must be emphasised, 
is not a claim that different histories and temporalities are ‘incommensurable’ or 
unintelligible to one another. ‘To allow for plurality’, Chakrabarty writes, ‘is to think in terms 
of singularities. To think in terms of singularities however… is not to make a claim against 
the demonstrable and documentable permeability of cultures and languages’, thereby 
implying a cultural relativism (ibid: 83). Rather than searching for a mediating third term, or 
on the other hand, simply declaring relativity or incommensurability, the barter model of 
temporal translation searches for porousness, ‘beckon[ing] us towards more affective 
narratives of human belonging where life forms, although porous to one another, do not seem 
exchangeable through a third term of equivalence’ (ibid: 71).  
The barter model of translation therefore constitutes a productive framework for 
historiographical understanding and practice which is grounded in a recognition of the 
‘contingent and ongoing cross-contamination of different temporal orderings’ (Hutchings 
2008:152-3). The methodological imperative here is to develop a capacity to explore both the 
possibilities and the limitations of one’s own temporal horizons and logics, to register ‘blind 
spots’, as well as searching for ‘porousness’ and creating connections. Accordingly, I suggest, 
the barter model of translation can inform a feminist historiography that is sensitive to 
polytemporal determinations of feminist history, by opening up a way of understanding how 
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historical temporalities can be related, translated and shared, without falling back on an 
overarching feminist framework, such as ‘waves’ or ‘phases’, that assimilates all. Indeed, as 
Shih contends, the presumption that universalising concepts and categories are necessary 
‘mediators’ is one of the key factors propping up the philosophical and cultural hegemony of 
western feminism and its strategies of incorporation and containment (Shih 2002:114).
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 As 
the mainstream’s ‘need to translate’ is so often based on a desire to reduce and simplify 
unfamiliar ideas and arguments and histories into shorthands and summaries, she argues, the 
result is often (quoting Spivak) ‘uncaring translations that transcode in the interest of 
dominant feminist knowledge’ (Spivak 2009:96). Or conversely, given that a ‘caring’ and 
sensitive translation takes time and effort, an unfamiliar idea, practice or history can simply 
be deemed ‘untranslatable’ or ‘incommensurable’: the consequence ‘not of difference made 
essential or absolute, but of ignorance’ (Shih 2002:97). The challenge before us, Shih claims, 
is therefore to imagine and practice an ‘ethics of encounter’ that is neither simply 
assimilationist nor conflictual (ibid: 92).  
Such an ethics of encounter, I propose, can be cultivated through adopting the 
conceptual model of ‘complex coevalness’ and the ‘barter’ model of temporal translation, 
which requires us to search and probe for ‘porousness’ without the guide of a higher unity or 
‘totality’ as a regulative ideal. There may be ‘violent jolts’ the imagination ‘has to suffer from 
the experience of traveling across temporalities’, as the different ways of thinking and living 
time bump up against each other (Chakrabarty 2000:94). Yet, if feminist history and 
historiography is to become a ‘site where pluralities will contend’, it has to be taken to its 
limits, ‘to make its workings visible’ (ibid: 96). Multiple, disparate feminist time frames and 
temporalities do intersect and weave together, yet they need not be translated into ‘one’ 
historical time of feminism in order for us to conceive and construct collective histories. 
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 This ‘asymmetrical ignorance’ results in highly reductive and arbitrary assignations of ‘difference’ 
and ‘similarity’ which means that, as Chinese scholar Li Xiaojiang contends, Chinese women have 
increasingly become ‘untranslatable’ to the West because of the West’s ‘willful mistranslation of them’ 
and their reaction against such mistranslations. Indeed, Li has criticised not only ‘western feminists’ 
but also diasporic and postcolonial intellectuals, who ‘transform the dyadic interaction into a tripartite 
construct – mediating between the Western audience and the nonwestern ‘Other’’ (Shih 2002: 102).  
 245 
Rather than relying upon allegedly ‘universal’ homogenising temporal templates and 
frameworks, we need to create shared histories which affirm the diverse ways of 
experiencing, imagining, measuring, configuring and reckoning historical time. This is an 
ongoing, intersubjective project that both ‘unfolds within and also makes possible a shared 
experience of time’ (Weiss 2011:184).  
 
CONCLUSION:  
POLYTEMPORAL HISTORIOGRAPHY AND COALITIONAL POLITICS 
 
This chapter has considered the vital question of how diverse historical temporalities can 
relate to one another, and become part of a shared historical field.  I have argued against 
‘totality’ as a rationale or a regulative, methodological device for linking and relating multiple 
histories, because the idea of historical totality, even as a ‘regulative idea’ or a 
‘methodological imperative’ (rather than a speculative theory), goes hand in hand with the 
idea of historical time as a homogenous time in which we are all automatically ‘in’. This 
gives rise to presumptions of a ‘higher’ unity and cancels out the polytemporal configurations 
of historical time. I have argued instead for a polytemporal paradigm, and for an 
understanding of ‘complex coevalness’ as a relational mode which is produced through 
thinking in ‘time knots’ and conducting ‘barter-like’ temporal translations. The practical 
implications of the polytemporal model of historical time for feminist historiography will be 
drawn out in more detail in the thesis’ Conclusion, but I want to conclude this chapter now by 
briefly drawing a parallel between a ‘polytemporal’ approach to historiography and the 
‘coalitional’ approach to feminist politics.  
As stated in the thesis’ Introduction, if there is something called ‘feminism’, it is 
difficult to think of it as a ‘paradigm’ or ‘framework’ as such. Indeed, ‘feminism’ itself is a 
contested term, as is the category ‘women’. They are terms which call for ‘barter-like’ 
translations, rather than presumptions that ‘feminism’ and ‘women’ are universal ‘third terms’ 
that can be taken for granted. When we say ‘we’, it is not a case of naming of an underlying 
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shared identity. It is an act of forging a shared response and responsiveness, of naming a 
shared, active desire to challenge the subordination and oppression of women within male-
dominated societies and communities, and the marginalisation of women’s knowledges, 
experiences and creations within androcentric discourses. This kind of understanding informs 
a coalitional approach to feminist politics, where ‘feminism’ is distinguishable by the kinds of 
questions, problems and challenges it poses and faces, which constitute common sites for 
debate and challenge and creativity. From a coalitional, pragmatic perspective, feminist 
thought and practice needs to be mobile in response to shifting conditions, and moreover, able 
to engage with the variety of perspectives which collide and join forces within specific sites 
for action and debate. Instead of a phasic model, teleological ideals, and the ‘non-repeatable 
moment’, the coalitional approach requires a flexible temporal framework that can bring 
together different modes of acting rather than dividing them across time, affirming them as 
‘relevant and appropriate choices in the present’ (Bastian 2011:162). Similarly, from a 
polytemporal perspective, feminist historiography needs to be mobile, and to engage with a 
variety of temporal frameworks, and with temporalities more complex than the linear account 
of historical progress that has dominated feminist theory and politics.  
Coalitional and polytemporal approaches, it must be stressed, are not limited to 
making only local claims (Flax 1987), or incapable of tackling totalising processes or 
identifying predominant patterns. The point, rather, is that effective feminist political and 
historical engagement does not depend upon projecting a totality as an ‘absent cause’ or 
‘higher ideal’, or a grand redemptive vision of feminism. Coalitional theories, instead, 
envisage the process of tracing patterns and relating disparate practices and phenomena as a 
‘bottom-up’, shifting and incomplete activity. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, for example, speaks 
of a ‘temporality of struggle’ as ‘an insistent, simultaneous, non-synchronous process 
characterised by multiple locations, rather than a search for origins and endings’ (1995: 81). 
This is reminiscent of Chakrabarty’s description of thinking in ‘time-knots’, conducting 
temporal translations, and generating ‘conjoined and disjunctive’ genealogies, as we 
‘contemplate the necessarily fragmentary histories of human belonging that never constitute a 
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one or a whole’ (Chakrabarty 2000:125). It is not a case of simply ignoring or evading 
totalising processes or grand historical narratives. The idea, rather, is that instead of tackling 
them through an equally grand counter-narrative or totalising theoretical framework, we 
‘release into the space’ occupied by particular European histories and hegemonic political 
paradigms ‘normative and theoretical thought enshrined in other existing life practices and 
their archives. For it is only in this way that we can create plural normative horizons specific 
to our existence and relevant to the examination of our lives and their possibilities’ (ibid: 20). 
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
Towards a Polytemporal Historiography  
 
In the Introduction to this thesis, I set out the core question driving a pragmatic approach: 
what difference would this particular idea or way of thinking make? (James 2000:26-7). This 
is the question which orients my concluding remarks here, as I draw together the 
polytemporal model of historical time that I have built up over the past few chapters, and 
consider what difference it could make to feminist theory and historiography if we conceive 
of historical time in this way. How would a feminist historiography guided by the logics of 
polytemporality and repetition be different from a historiography guided by the logics of 
totality and teleology? How might it alter the ways we construct and approach histories of 
feminist theory and practice? What kinds of future possibilities are opened up by a 
polytemporal approach?  
 The driving ambition of the thesis has been to challenge the dominant model of 
historical time within contemporary historiography, which remains bound to notions of linear 
succession, teleological progress, and totality. This model of historical time informs and 
supports the hegemonic model of feminist history, presented as a progressive series of 
‘waves’ or ‘phases’, which culminate in an author’s position in the present, from where she 
has a purview of ‘feminist history’ as a whole. As demonstrated in chapter 1, the hegemonic 
model’s reliance upon the temporal logics of ‘teleological totalisation’ and ‘sequential 
negation’ has detrimental effects upon how feminists in the present conceive and relate to 
feminist pasts. The organisation of different feminist approaches into sequential historical 
stages precludes a productive exploration of the interconnections between coexisting strands 
of feminism, and of the potential relevance that older forms of feminism might have within 
present contexts. Moreover, the totalising and teleological gesture of discerning an overall 
‘direction’ to feminist theory not only results in a closed-minded attitude towards the past and 
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future, but can also bolster universalising assumptions whereby we presume that feminisms 
everywhere are working out the same trajectory, at different ‘stages’ of development.  
 My response to this problem has been to conduct a detailed ‘root and branch’ 
investigation into the concept of historical time, to ensure conceptual clarity as we seek to 
further interrogate this dominant model of historical time, and most importantly, to develop 
alternatives. In the course of this investigation, I have formulated a ‘polytemporal’ model of 
historical time, premised upon the core idea that historical time is constructed through various 
temporalities and fields of time, which intersect and interweave to produce shifting, internally 
complex configurations of historical time. The thesis has focused on four ‘times’ that 
consistently enter into constructions of historical time: the ‘time of the trace’, ‘narrative time’, 
‘calendar time’, and ‘generational time’. Taking each ‘time’ in turn, I have demonstrated that 
each temporal field is itself internally complex, and can be ‘temporalised’ in various ways.  
The main priority in the thesis has been to develop alternative models and methods, 
rather than to refine my critique of the hegemonic model of feminist history, and the 
dominant model of historical time which underpins it. Nevertheless, the polytemporal model I 
have outlined has much to offer critical historiographical approaches. In the first instance, the 
polytemporal model opens up a way of critically unpacking concepts of historical time, 
through identifying the different temporal combinations which give rise to particular concepts 
of historical time. By adopting a polytemporal approach, feminist historiographers can thus 
gain deeper and more detailed critical insight into the hegemonic model of feminist history, 
through examining the different temporal layers and combinations that construct and sustain 
it. The polytemporal approach enables us to investigate, for example, how the model of 
overlapping, progressive series of ‘waves’ or ‘phases’ is supported by simplistic conceptions 
of historical chronology, as well as by traditional linear modes of narrative configuration with 
a clear direction, beginning, middle, end. We can also examine the extent to which the 
‘waves’ trope maps on to a unilinear idea of a generational succession, or the extent to which 
it is bolstered by an aggregative model of knowledge-building and revisionism, which in turn, 
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rests upon an understanding of the historical past itself as a completed and aggregate set of 
events.  
As demonstrated throughout the thesis, analyses of these different times and 
temporalities requires a thorough critical scrutiny of not only our epistemological 
frameworks, but also our ontological presumptions about historical reality and time, which 
underlie our understanding of what it is to write history, to trace the past, to construct a 
chronology or create an order of inheritance. The polytemporal approach thereby facilitates a 
broader and more penetrating critical response to the problem of historical time than the 
structuralist approach, which is restricted to a textual analysis of tropes and techniques. A 
textual analysis of how the hegemonic narratives of feminism are secured is certainly 
important; but if we continue to believe that historical time is ‘really’ chronological and 
unidirectional, or that the past is ‘really’ a total and complete sum of raw facts, then the 
thoroughgoing reconceptualisation of historical time that feminist historiography requires 
cannot be achieved.  
The main contribution of the thesis, as stated, has been to demonstrate that the 
polytemporal model opens up alternative possibilities for reconceptualising and reworking 
historical time, in ways which could make a significant difference within feminist theory and 
historiography. As set out in the beginning of the thesis, an alternative model of historical 
time needs to be able to account for the coexistence of ‘multilinear’, parallel trajectories 
which nevertheless inform and intersect with one another. It should also be ‘multidirectional’, 
in the sense of allowing for two-way determinations between past and present, as the past 
affects and shapes the present, and in turn, present perspectives affect and shape our relation 
to the past. This kind of model, I postulated, would facilitate more fruitful interactions and 
conversations between feminisms of the past and the present, rather than fixing certain types 
of feminist theory to certain times, and presuming that the past has nothing to say to the 
present. Finally, an alternative model of historical time should be able to account for multiple 
determinations of the ‘time of feminism’ itself, to generate a more a more sensitive and 
 251 
receptive approach to the various ways in which feminists make feminist history and conceive 
of historical time.  
Whilst various feminists have recognised the need for this kind of model of historical 
time, there has been little elaboration as to what exactly it might look like or how it might 
work. To remedy this, Chapters 2-5 of the thesis have each offered a thorough conceptual 
elaboration of the range of temporal possibilities within their designated ‘field’ of time, 
demonstrating various ways of reconceptualising historical time as multilinear and 
multidirectional. Taken together, these chapters present a robust exposition of a polytemporal 
model, giving content to the idea of a multidirectional, multilinear historical time, which so 
often remains under-developed and under-explored. Two significant forms of transformation 
in particular have emerged across all of the different chapters. The first is the importance of 
grasping the fluid relation between past, present and future, as a means of remaining open to 
the possibility of the past interrupting the present, and impacting on the future in unforeseen 
ways. I have theorized this temporal fluidity through various frameworks and concepts, for 
example, through the two-way temporality of the ‘trace’, the palimpsestic temporality of 
‘narrativity’, the bidirectionality and anachronisms of ‘calendar time’, and the dynamic 
interplay between continuity and discontinuity within ‘generational time’. The second key 
form of transformation is the importance of registering and working with plural 
determinations of historical time, which has also been theorised in various ways, for example, 
through ‘pluritopic hermeneutics’, the pluralistic conception of ‘publicness’, or through the 
paradigm of ‘many’ symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries rather than just ‘one’. To try 
and consolidate the polytemporal model, and offer a more integrated conclusion, I will return 
here to the two concepts that I explored in the final two chapters of the thesis, concepts which 
aptly capture and express these two themes of temporality fluidity and temporality plurality: 
‘repetition’ and ‘polytemporality’ itself. In this sense, they can be considered as the 
conceptual ‘emblems’ of a multidirectional, multilinear historical time, and a polytemporal 
historiography.  
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Repetition and Polytemporality 
 
‘Repetition’, or ‘repetition with variation’, generates a conceptual account of historical 
change and process that operates according to echoes and feedback loops, and a relational 
dynamism between past, present and future. The idea that the past can be repeated in the 
present requires a decisive shift away from a conception of the past as fixed and finished, 
towards a more fluid and fragmentary model in which the past is ambiguous and 
indeterminate, and exists in a complex relation with the present in which it ‘repeats’. 
Moreover, on this model, the present is not a clearly bounded, all-knowing, or all-powerful 
moment of complete insight, but nor is it simply a passive conduit or link in the chain from 
past to future. Rather, it can be viewed as a kind of temporal matrix or ‘hub’, as different 
traces and trajectories spill over from the past, and can be taken up and ‘repeated’ in various 
ways, producing multiple theoretical and strategic possibilities. In this regard, the model of 
‘repetition with variation’ subverts ‘presentist’ approaches that would seal the present off 
from its unsettled relation to the past, and also reductive approaches that treat the present in 
terms of a point-like moment in a chronological series. It also offers an alternative to the 
teleological ideal of emancipation as a step-by-step process of ‘graduated’ progression, 
whereby different stages lead up to the present and (anticipated) future in one all-
encompassing movement forwards. Within the framework of repetitions, feedback loops, 
echoes, and untimely resurfacings, the present and future are shaped by the past, but not in a 
deterministic manner, as the past repeats itself in the present and future in unpredictable and 
unexpected ways. This makes it impossible to conceive of feminist history as a series of 
completed phases or stages that come one after the other, and proceed teleologically from past 
to present to future. Instead, it conjures impressions of feminist history as a shifting 
entanglement of indeterminate pasts, uncertain presents and undecided futures, which coexist 
in complex and dynamic interrelation, and are continually being reopened and called into 
question. 
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‘Polytemporality’ is a concept that enables us to develop a new language of ‘sharing 
time’, which can register and work with this plurality of entangled times and temporalities. 
Taking a polytemporal approach means thinking in terms of ‘complex coevalness’ and ‘time-
knots’, rather than in terms of a higher totality, homogenous moments, or unified stages and 
eras of time. It means conducting ‘barter-like’ temporal translations and creating ‘conjoined 
genealogies’, which can never add up to a completed whole or be subsumed within an all-
encompassing temporal framework or master narrative.  Translating temporalities and sharing 
histories from a polytemporal perspective is about searching for ‘porousness’ whilst being 
aware of the limitations of our own temporal perspectives, concepts and logics. A 
polytemporal approach, therefore, can shape a feminist historiography that is sensitive to 
various determinations of feminist history and configurations of feminist time, and does not 
fall back on hegemonic frameworks such as ‘waves’ or ‘phases’ of feminist history in the 
collective singular. It guards against presumptions that a particular timeline or date is 
necessarily significant for all, that a certain kind of narrative structure is mutually intelligible 
or universally appropriate, that all generational orders have the same temporal logics or 
patterns, or that we are all oriented and affected by the traces of feminists pasts in the same 
way. Instead, to think in terms of ‘polytemporality’ is to seek out ways of sharing time and 
constructing histories which do not reduce, but rather affirm, the pluralistic complexity of 
historical time.  
 
Practical Implications 
 
Given that this has been a theoretical historiographical study, as opposed to a substantive 
historical intervention, the focus has been on giving a conceptual account of the polytemporal 
model, rather than actual case studies. However, inspired by pragmatic philosophy, the 
different chapters have each considered the implications for the feminist historian and 
theorist, indicating how these alternative conceptions might translate into historical practice, 
and alter how we construct and approach histories of feminism. Rather than simply offering a 
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purely abstract philosophical speculation on the nature of historical time, then, the 
polytemporal model I have developed can be considered as a practical as well as a conceptual 
model.  
For instance, I have argued that the concept of repetition can open up a 
transformative, strategic historical practice, premised upon the ‘recollecting forwards’ or the 
proactive ‘repetition’ of forgotten or discarded ideas and methods, which can be used to 
unlock present feminisms, and be brought to bear on feminism’s possible futures. The 
concept of repetition can also inspire a reflexive and critical form of historiographical 
practice, because it makes us aware of less desirable elements that continue to repeat 
themselves in our own presumptions and discourses, even as we may think we have moved 
on. ‘Repetition in practice’ thus affirms the transformative and subversive power of the 
historical past, yet also requires a critical reflexivity around more problematic repetitions of 
the past in the present. This links to the idea of ‘restless revisionism’ I proposed in chapter 2: 
a form of historical practice which fosters a provocative relation between the ‘active’ and the 
‘reflexive’ modes of historical practice, and moreover, cultivates a ‘receptive’ attitude, 
through which we remain open to the surprises and reorientations that history can bring.  
The chapters on ‘repetition’ and the ‘time of the trace’, further, have both offered 
concrete examples to illustrate how ‘restless revisionism’ and ‘recollecting forwards’ can 
work, such as Deborah Withers’ ‘Sistershow’ project, Waters’ and Conaway’s ‘untimely’ 
anthology of nineteenth century feminism, or Kathi Weeks’ redeployment of ‘Wages for 
Housework’. The chapters on ‘narrative time’, ‘calendar time’ and ‘generational time’ have 
also considered the practical implications for the feminist historian and theorist. Chapter 3, 
for instance, demonstrated how the theoretical paradigm of ‘narrativity’ can inform a mode of 
‘contrapuntal reading’, which seeks to read beyond or in-between the authorial voice and the 
defined contours of a single narrative, teasing out the relational, political and temporal 
dynamics that underpin any singular narrative account. Additionally, it showed how 
‘narrativity’ can inspire alternative ways of writing and constructing feminist histories, using 
‘fractured forms’ to construct decentered or ‘interactional’ narratives—such as Diane Elam 
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and Robyn Wiegman’s ‘side-by-side’ narrative technique—as a way of expressing 
interpretative ambiguities and multiple perspectives, and avoiding a sense of temporal 
‘closure’.  
The discussion of ‘calendar time’ in chapter 4 offered practical suggestions as well, 
as I illustrated how a ‘qualitative’ approach to calendar time can facilitate a critical form of 
historical practice, which is reflexively attuned to the ways in which dates and periodisations 
operate as ‘sticky signs’ such as ‘1970s feminism’, and as ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ chronologies 
within feminist histories. Moreover, I suggested that the qualitative approach can lead to more 
creative and subversive calendrical practices, for example, using dates to ‘shock’ and disturb 
hegemonic timelines and presumptions, or using the specificity of dates to guard against 
reductive generalisations, and to point to the coexistence of different kinds of feminism 
within the same date. Chapter 5 advocated a similarly nuanced approach to generational time, 
proposing that the thought of ‘many’ symbolic orders and cultural imaginaries, rather than 
‘one’, can direct us to search for alternative paradigms and techniques that subvert the usual 
hegemonic orders of unilinear succession, as found for example in Gayl Jones’ ‘blues novel’.  
These practical suggestions and concrete examples begin to demonstrate what 
difference it could make to feminist theory and historiography if we conceive of historical 
time as internally complex, multilinear and multidirectional. Through such suggestions, I 
hope to have shown that a multilinear and multidirectional historical time can be achieved not 
only through theoretical elaboration, but moreover, through being put into practice, as we 
open up multiple channels and tracks between feminist presents, pasts and futures.  
 
Future Possibilities 
 
I want to conclude the thesis now by considering how the polytemporal model of historical 
time I have proposed here might be tested and pushed further. In the first instance, whilst the 
thesis has tried to draw out the practical implications of the ‘polytemporal’ model of historical 
time for feminist theory and historiography, the primary contribution of the thesis has indeed 
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been theoretical. As such, it will be illuminating and important to work more closely with 
substantive historical and archival feminist projects in the future, to consider further how the 
polytemporal model of historical time might be put into practice, and demonstrate what 
polytemporal feminist histories might look like, and how they might work. Moreover, whilst 
my study here has been situated and oriented by the specific problematics and paradigms of 
feminist historiography, the polytemporal approach to historical time could have a broader 
application and inform other historiographical fields, including the histories of other political 
movements, branches of cultural or art history, or archive studies. Finally, whilst I have 
identified four key ‘fields’ of time that consistently enter into constructions of historical time, 
I have stressed that they are not exhaustive of historical time, and that the model I have 
developed here is not fixed or all-encompassing. There are various temporal fields and 
temporalities that can play an important role in shaping concepts of historical time, which I 
have not considered here, and which warrant further exploration.  
One important field of time that has an interesting relationship with historical time is 
religious, spiritual or ‘enchanted’ time. Indeed, the question of this relationship is one of the 
key concerns guiding Chakrabarty’s study of postcolonial thought and historical difference, as 
he argues that modern conceptions of historical time are inherently secular and thus 
categorically incapable of accommodating spiritual or ‘enchanted’ temporalities (Chakrabarty 
2000:72-7). This argument gives rise to some vital questions for feminist historiography to 
address, especially in light of recent debates within feminist theory concerning the emergence 
of the ‘post-secular’ and its challenge to secularist feminist hegemonies (Reilly 2011; Ahmed 
2002; Mani 2009). To what extent can we discern an implicit secularist bias within feminist 
historiography and feminist conceptions of historical time? For example, to what extent does 
the polytemporal model I have proposed in this thesis depend upon a secularist framework? 
Can it accommodate religious and spiritual temporalities, which may well include teleological 
determinations, or eschatological meta-narratives that imbue history with an overall meaning 
and purpose? Moreover, what kinds of insights and temporal models do religious and spiritual 
feminisms bring to the project of rethinking historical time? How might feminist studies on 
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religious rituals contribute to philosophical understandings of historical repetition? How 
could feminist hermeneutical writings on religious texts and issues of interpretation and 
translation inform historiographical approaches to historical texts? (Gross 2010; Jones 2009).  
Another important temporal field to be considered is that of new technologies, which 
significantly affect the ways in which historical narratives and trajectories are composed, 
configured and encountered. The impact of new technologies, particularly the participatory 
formats of digital media, upon feminist activism and modes of organising is being thoroughly 
explored (Everett 2004; Garrison 2010). Yet, from a historiographical perspective, it is also 
crucial to explore how changing technologies are influencing how feminist histories are being 
constructed and temporally configured. On the one hand, contemporary digital culture is, in 
fact, often associated with the waning of ‘historical consciousness’. Andreas Huyssen, for 
example, has powerfully articulated concerns that the ‘outsourcing’ of memory—as 
everything is automatically ‘remembered’ for us—can (perhaps paradoxically) lead to a kind 
of ‘mass amnesia’, just as the obsession with documenting and recording can lead us to live 
the present at a remove (Huyssen 1995). On the other hand, however, new technologies are 
having a profound impact upon the ways in which historical information is disseminated and 
organised, including, for example, mechanisms facilitating cross-referencing such as hyper-
text, or the capacity of a database to assemble and produce fragments and narratives based on 
different search criteria. Indeed, whilst transforming narrative structures, technological 
changes may also be unsettling narrative’s privileged position with regards to history, as new 
visual media challenge the dominance of older linguistic media (Bolter and Grusin 1999:57). 
Such technologies and media profoundly affect the ways in which the traces of 
history are pursued, how time lines are generated and dates are coordinated, how different 
generations are able (or unable) to communicate with one another, and how genealogical 
relations are traced and given symbolic expression. These technologies transform the ways in 
which events are not only understood and organised retrospectively, but further, the ways in 
which events unfold and are understood at the time of their occurrence and the moment of 
recording. As Derrida has insightfully argued: ‘The technical structure of the archiving 
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archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into 
existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as records 
the event’ (Derrida 1996: 16-17). This adds another dimension to my ‘indirect realist’ account 
of the ‘mediated’ nature of historical reality and the interrelation between interpretation and 
happening. 
Interesting historiographical possibilities can thereby emerge through engagement 
with the multiple modalities of digital culture, which is not simply about the technology itself, 
but rather, about the cultural and relational practices which attend it, and how people use 
media texts and technologies to record and remember. Vicki Callahan describes this kind of 
approach as ‘media archaeology’: a 'deep time methodology' which engages with a nonlinear, 
multidirectional flow of information, rather than a single evolutionary stream of data, through 
which the work of history becomes ‘a discovery process with open-ended results and multiple 
points of entry' (Callahan 2010:4). Online archives, interactive media, and ‘improvisatory live 
remixes of found footage’, she claims, offer myriad opportunities to displace homogenous, 
linear histories (ibid: 5). ‘The archive becomes in this context not the last edifice standing in a 
received history, but a dynamic agent of change and a space of becoming’ (ibid: 6, see also 
Harris 2007). In this regard, the field of digital and media studies itself is generating temporal 
and historical approaches and paradigms which can shape how we understand and configure 
historical time. Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin, for example, propose the paradigm 
‘remediation’, as a means of grasping the relationship between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of 
cultural mediation (1999). Instead of a historical progression whereby newer media simply 
subsume and replace their predecessors, these media theorists contend that ‘ours is a 
genealogy of affiliations, not a linear history, and in this genealogy, older media can also 
remediate newer ones’ (ibid: 55; see also Murray 1998). Through engaging with temporal 
technologies and paradigms such as these, a polytemporal historiography could further extend 
its relevance and levels of complexity, weaving in even more temporal layers, dynamics and 
rhythms.  
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